

## Foreign Relations of the United States

"Mr. Dulles followed these remarks by citing statistics on Chinese Communist military strength in Tibet together with statistics of the population of Tibet



for support of the anti-Communist resistance in his country, but his appeal was

contributions are: 1) international voluntary relief agencies; 2) Indian-owned PL 480 agricultural commodities diverted through the Indian Government or voluntary agencies; 3) International Red Cross channels; or 4) direct cash contributions to the Indian Government.

Source: *Me, have, and the British Empire*, Vol. 1, Innean Go  
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In discussing situation with GRC officials you should seek as feasible to convey





Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy

it is virtually impossible to amend the Constitution under present conditions. A Constitutional amendment requires approval by at least two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Yuan or by three quarters of the members of the National Assembly. The number of members of these two bodies presently living in Taiwan barely exceeds the required figures, so that in effect unanimous votes would be needed. The Ambassador's opinion was that neither body would be willing to assume the responsibility of giving up Chinese territory. He said that the GRC has already made a forthright declaration on the subject in the form of President Chiang's statement of March 26<sup>7</sup> promising the Tibetans that when the GRC recovers the mainland it will assist the Tibetans to realize their aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Mr. Robertson observed that President Chiang's statement was

and undesirable one from the GRC's point of view. Our own view, of course, is that the GRC represents the whole of China and therefore can take and announce a position regarding a part of mainland China at any time without having to await recovery of the mainland.

Mr. Robertson concluded by stating that we recognize the type of action suggested by him presents real problems for the GRC, but it would make things much more difficult for Peiping and he hoped the GRC would give our views careful consideration. Ambassador Yeh said he would report our views to Taipei.

- b. Tibet, on the other hand, has sought complete independence, although in 1951 the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama under duress signed an agreement recognizing Chinese Communist suzerainty over Tibet.
- c. The British and the United States have long recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understandin

Tibet-the last message was received today, April 25-reports that the Tibetan



said that he didn't know but that it might be that the United States would want to recognize a declaration of independen







With reference to the Dalai Lama's request for supplies, a separate memorandum will be furnished.<sup>12</sup>

As the Dalai Lama has not publicly asked for international recognition of the Free Tibetan Government, his request for United States recognition is probably intended to feel out the United States attitude as a guide to his future moves. Recognition is a political act and we could grant recognition when publicly



discreetly to sound out our close friends, beginning with the United Kingdom

Washington, May 5, 1959

SUBJECT

United States Position on Recognition of an Independent Tibetan Government

1) Recognition

We should at once discreet

Tibetan problem and on the best procedure if it appears desirable to seek such consideration.

If the Tibetans publicly appeal to the United Nations,

a) We should extend our consultations





forces. Every effort is being made to identify and establish communications with such forces; [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Allen W. Dulles

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**379. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of**

mentioned that the Treaty had been reaffirmed with the Chinese Communists<sup>21</sup> and that it was clear in its provisions allowing regional autonomy but providing for Chinese suzerainty.

Several members of the Joint Chiefs expressed their hope that the V.S. would be able to take affirmative and positive action in support of the Tibetan people. There followed a discussion of the attitudes of India and the rest of the Asian world. Mr. Murphy described the difficulties which might result if the V.S. established itself as the protector of the Dali Lama and the Tibetan people. He thought it was extremely important that Nehru not be able to place the Tibetan problem in the context of the cold war and thereby to find it possible to wash his hands of the matter. General Lemnitzer hoped we were documenting the Tibetan fighting so we could prepare the necessary "White Paper" to influence world opinion at the proper time.

There then followed a general discussion



by the Asians as an indication of weakness, indifference, and a lack of dynamic



visit Southeast Asian countries to solicit international support for the Tibetan cause.

The Dalai Lama has already made it clear that he is no longer interested in autonomy for Tibet under the Chinese Communists (having twice tried this course with disastrous results) but is determined to work for Tibet's independence. This puts him in fundamental conflict with Nehru's policy on Tibet. If we do not now respond positively to the Dalai Lama's appeal for support, Nehru's policy may well prevail,



\* \* \*



International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to Secretary of State  
Herter

concern, and has also asked whether the United States Government would be willing to propose to some other government, preferably in Asia, that it extend recognition to his government-in-exile. We are informing the Dalai Lama that once he issues his appeal for United Nations action it would then be appropriate for him to have direct contact with American officials, and that if he should invite the American Ambassador or the Charge d'Affaires to visit him they would be pleased to do so. With regard to the second point, the Dalai Lama has been informed that in our view consideration of obtaining recognition 01 TrC43vT Thibetcan government-inc

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## 6. International Commission of Jurists' Report

On July 25 the International Commission of Jurists released a preliminary report<sup>29</sup> concluding that the Chinese Commu



made on August 31 was receiving sympathetic consideration by USG and that he appreciated that.

I replied that I would communicate message to my Government at once and

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rather hopeless and said, "the time is rather short". Further questions elicited information that (1) Dalai intends make another public statement before returning to Mussoorie, in which he will set forth fully reasons why he appealing to UN and would stress sufferings of his people. He thought case would be convincing. (2) Dalai planning to open office in New Delhi. His representative would be Tsepon Shakapa and procedure was satisfactory to GOI. Dalai then said that there was very important point that he wished me stress with my government: Matter of independence of Tibet would have to be settled before Communist China was



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**385. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State**

Above points follow closely what we understand Nehru told Dalai and Dutt told Japanese Ambassador several days ago. Regarding (3), Dutt left impression on my mind without being explicit that he would regard as regrettable anything which forced USSR openly side with CPR.

He mentioned that Soviet representatives "in various capitals" have been quietly indicating they deplored some things ChiComs had been doing. It is not clear in this case whether Dutt would regret closing of some possible breach between USSR and CPR or was only fearful USSR might be led or forced into anti-Indian statements. In talks with Japanese Ambassador Dutt expressed fear that forcing of USSR take position might create difficulties between it and US and impair chances of detente possible through Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks.

I reminded Dutt I had told Prime Minister, under instructions, that we hoped we could avoid working at cross purposes with Indian delegation in any debate on Tibet. USG realized India's spio 2e.even primary interest in question. I expressed hope to Dutt that even if GOI unable sponsor case in UNGA, at least it would not oppose its being considered and would be able support a propos2e. for constructive action. Dutt said much would depend how case presented and what action proposed. In dian GA delegation would not indulge in strong words. but "you never know what Krishna Menon will do". Menon would be "under very strict instructions in this case". Tibetan item "very delicate situation" because there were also "strong feelings" in India that case should be heard

**386. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>35</sup>**

Washington, September 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

Appeal of the Dalai Lama to the United Nations

Washi

PARTICIPANTS

appreciated, he san.1our tactful handling

4. USG continues strongly believe that ~~wide~~ ~~the~~ ~~support~~ ~~base~~ ~~in~~ ~~China~~ ~~UNGA~~ ~~repression~~ ~~human~~

Lama, were ignored. Even Peiping regime

the dispute settled. Bhutan, Sikkhim and Nepal are disturbed over possible Chinese Communist incursions.

Tibetan and Indian border situations." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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**389. Telegram From the Delegation to the V.N. General Assembly to the Department of State<sup>42</sup>**

New York, September 18, 1959, 9 p.m.

Delga 21. Reference: Tibet. Secretary met with Lloyd and Couve on Tibet this morning. Secretary said he would like very much to see Tibet item inscribed



bringing the matter to UN would divide Commonwealth. Lloyd felt Indians probably would have to vo

Both Couve and Lloyd placed great stress on strong statements by various speakers in the general debate and during plenary discussion of Chinese representation issue, but without inscription of a separate Tibetan item, Secretary countered that Hungarian and Tibetan matters essentially same sort



Delga 82. Re: Tibet. Dixon (UK) told us Kuznetsov (USSR) had spoken to him "very seriously" about Irish initiative on Tibet which latter assumed US and UK were actively encouraging. Kuznetsov argued discussion would range beyond Tibet; would spoil present international atmosphere and relaxation of tensions; and would increase difficulties between India and Communist China. He added

**392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India**

"President Eisenhower has asked me to extend to you and the people of Tibet the respect and sympathy of the people and the Government of the United States in your courageous struggle against ruthless oppression. Respectfully yours."

Herter

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### **393. Telegram From the Delegation to the V.N. General Assembly to the Department of State<sup>51</sup>**

New York, October 8, 1959, 9 p.m.

Delga 137. Re: Tibet.

1. Thondup<sup>52</sup> and two other Tibetans accompanied by Gross<sup>53</sup> called on Lodge at Waldorf. Thondup made effective plea for Tibetan cause, emphasizing particularly independence theme. Although aware of practical problems involved in any UN consideration of Tibet involving independence, he questioned US repeatedly as to whether action on human rights basis would in some way affect adversely cause of Tibetan independence. He clearly continued hope GA might address itself to question of Tibetan independence.

2. Lodge told him any move in GA on this basis would not be prudent in view of preoccupations and attitudes of majority in GA. We also reassured him that consideration of violations of human rights in Tibet would in no way adversely

<sup>51</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10--859. Secret.

<sup>52</sup>

affect broader Tibetan aspirations. Lodge also noted difficulties for other delts if precedent set re Tibet which might later be cited in other cases adversely.

3. Thondup stressed his great confidence in American people and government and expressed hope that whatever happened in UN would be of character to encourage and not discourage Tibetan people. He urged us to speak, support, and use our good offices in behalf of Tibetan cause.

4. Lodge promised complete support and cooperation but noted obvious reasons why it was tactically wise for U.S. remain in background where it would work hard to achieve support for resolution.

5. Gross explained Thondup had arrived wi

7. Thondup returned to point that concentration upon human rights might in some way prejudice cause of Tibetan independence which seemed worry him considerably. Lodge pointed out that effort to obtain UN action on independence would fail and would then be exploited by ChiComs, whereas res expressing sympathy with Tibetan people on human rights grounds, no matter how moderately it might be worded, could be used by Tibetans as evidence of UN interest and support for people of Tibet.



<sup>56</sup> that the Dalai Lama has  
basis which would fail to receive necessary support and which could then be  
requested United States support for hearing the Tibetan case in the United  
exploited by ChiComs and others against Tibetans.  
Nations on the basis of aggression and that the Tibetans are pressing for  
recognition of the independent sovereign status of Tibet. I consider it Lodge  
important that we come to an early decision on the question of the status of  
Tibet, both to enable us to reply to the Dalai Lama's request and to prepare for  
conversations with Gyalo Thondup, brot

**394. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far  
Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter<sup>55</sup>**

SUBJECT

United States Position on the Status of T

Our Embassy in New Delhi has reported

call on you. I recommend that you re

determination. Also, unless the Tibetans are given some definite indication of

Tibetans might realize self-determination should a change in the situation make this practicable. You could also inform him that at an appropriate time after the General Assembly had completed its consideration of the Tibetan item we would be prepared to issue a public statement supporting the right of Tibetans to self-determination.

The Tibetans will probably be unhappy at our failure to go all the way toward recognition of Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, I think Thondup could be made to see that recognition under present conditions would not serve the best interests of the Tibetan people and that in offering to state publicly at an appropriate time in the future our support of the right of the Tibetans to self-determination we are moving in the direction that he desires us to take.

However, so long as the Chinese Communists occupy Tibet self-determination is not practicable and the struggle of the Tibetan people for control of their own political destiny is likely to be a long one. If Thondup should appear persuaded of the merit of our position, you could tell him that we plan to

- 1) That you receive Gyalo Thondup when he comes to Washington for the purpose of explaining to him our attitude toward the status of Tibet.<sup>59</sup>
- 2) That you<sup>60</sup> inform him that, while the United States cannot accord recognition to the Dalai Lama's government under present circumstances, it
  - a) fully supports the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny,
  - b) would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to this end should a change in the situation make this practicable, and
  - c) would be prepared to make a public statement, after completion of General Assembly consideration of the Tibetan item, affirming our support of Tibetan self-determination.
- 3) That, if Thondup's response is encouraging, you authorize our Ambassador in New Delhi to inform the Dalai Lama formally of the above position.
- 4) That you authorize the notification of the Governments of the Republic of China, India, and Great Britain of our decision prior to sending formal notification to the Dalai Lama.<sup>61</sup>

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### **395. Telegram From the Delegation to the V.N. General Assembly to the Department of State<sup>62</sup>**

New York, October 23, 1959, 8 p.m.

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<sup>59</sup> A memorandum of October 15 from Murphy to Herter recommended that Thondup be

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Delga 251. For Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re: Tibet.

I believe we obtained maximum results in UN on Tibetan item.<sup>63</sup> This confirms wisdom of strategy we adopted of permitting Irish and Malaysians to take lead. In this way we also were able deny USSR handle it was always seeking in order to tag US with responsibility of reviving cold war and to convince others US not truly interested in peace.

I believe it would be desirable and worthwhile for Secretary to send personal letters of appreciation to Irish and Malayan Foreign Ministers commending them for their joint initiative in behalf of Tibet and for effective way in which

power, which is always an attractive way to appear in the GA and which we all too often are unable to do.

sympathy and help which the American



to hear of the message which Mr. Thondup had brought from his brother, the Dalai Lama.

Mr. Murphy indicated that great importance is attached to keeping the Tibetan situation before world public opinion. He suggested that the Dalai Lama might pitals of other countries, especially

es. This would be a good means of educating people

Mr. Murphy told Mr. Thondup that the U.S. had traditionally stood for self-determination of peoples. We believed this principle should apply also to the Tibetans. Mr. Thondup expressed appreciation for this stand.



certain other governments, such as th

go somewhat beyond its previous  
et, namely,  
decision the United States had been





it not only supported the aspirations of the Tibetan people for self-determination but in effect was a promise of future political independence. In this connection Ambassador Yeh advised Thondup to tell his brother Norbu





matter would be injected into President's good will visit which is being so warmly welcomed as such as the government's and people of India. It would cast cloud on whole visit. It would heighten suspicions of ChiComs and add fuel to their charge (which Dutt characterized as "insulting") that GOI was

I am aware force of arguments contained reftel and Merchant's eyes only message to me<sup>74</sup> but in my judgment proposed meeting would be highly undesirable. I believe it could only be frustrating to both principals. Moreover

1947. Department's 1652, repeated London 3695, repeated information Taipei 301.<sup>77</sup> You should take earliest suitable occasion deliver letter given below to

was subsequently set forth in a letter dated November 4, 1959, from Mr. Murphy to your brother<sup>79</sup> as follows:

'While it has been the historical position of the United States to consider Tibet as an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China, the American people have also traditionally stood for the principle of self-determination. It is the belief of the United States Government that this principle should apply to the people of Tibet and that they should have the determining voice in their own political destiny. The United States Government is prepared, when a suitable opportunity presents itself, to maP-0.opporilthe 3(arat.94 0 2.750.0001 Tc-0.0017 Tw[(at



Mr. Dulles General Cabell

Mr. FitzGerald

Mr. Dulles briefed the group on CIA operations in support of the Tibetan

the Representatives; and that in the event anything arises indicating the desirability of a change in plans, the Representatives will be consulted. A0.0xresident gave his approval for the continuation of the program as outlined.

Gordon Gray

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#### **401. Editorial Note**

A letter from Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama, February 20, 1960, reads as follows:

"Thank you for your letter to me dated January 5, 1960.



was transmitted in telegram 2800 from New Delhi, February 23, 1960.

(Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/12-1059 and 793B.00/2-2360,

In your letter of September 13 you requested United States' assistance for the Tibetan people in their struggle against Communist oppression and support for renewed United Nations consideration of Tibet. I assure you that the United States, by every appropriate means, will continue its endeavors to bring the

elements which you mentioned included in a resolution, I am certain that the

Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Mr. Gyalo Thondup, brother of the Dalai Lama, accompanied by Mr. Rinchen Sadutshang, called on the Secretary this morning. Mr. Thondup opened the conversation by saying he had been instructed by His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, to call on the Secretary to expre

travel, but mentioned that working

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**404. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>89</sup>**

New Delhi, November 26, 1960, 8 p.m.

4099. Foreign Secretary Dutt called my attention to GOI white paper covering Indo-Chinese Communist relations from period March-October 1960<sup>90</sup> in which India had protested repeated violations from Indian airspace by Chinese Communist planes. Chinese Communist reply asserted twice no Chinese planes over Indian territory but these American planes based Formosa which had been dropping arms, agents and equipment to Tibetans. Dutt added by way of

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US, pull rug from under severe criticisms of Chinese Communists in press and parliament, and turn public opinion against US, which GOI most anxious avoid.

Bunker