



aforementioned excerpt from my conversation with Eisenhower.  
The Chinese paid greatest attention to the issue of detention of 5 Americans in China, as well as the remark by Eisenhower about the reason for which the USSR did not take the same position on the Taiwan question as on the German question.

N.S. Khrushchev (after the translation ended): It is clear why Eisenhower was in a hurry to send his message to China.



powers. Germany was divided into two



acted differently. The Americans who  
if you do not take the course on co  
traded for counterparts. Lenin did it

be kept in detention. At some poin

ed. In a word, in our opinion, the  
Americans that you hold in pris

the Americans who are imprisoned in the PRC. I only promised Eisenhower to raise this question in the form of a friendly advice during my stay in the PRC. And the Americans raised this question only indirectly.





will not go to war because of the off-shore islands and Taiwan.

N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, Americans will not go to war because of Taiwan and the off-shore islands. We are familiar with the content of the instructions thnt were given to [Jo

with the Americans are two different things. With the United States we will seek to resolve issues by peaceful means. If the United States does not leave Taiwan, then we will negotiate with them until they go from there. The relationship with Jiang Jies

what the Americans demand, i.e. to provide a guarantee on the non-use of force regarding Taiwan. The Americans long ago posed the question and told us about it via Eden as early as March 1955. The second way is to draw a clear line between our relations with the United States and the relations with the Jiang-Jieshi-ists. As to the relations with Jiang Jieshi, here any means should be used, since the relations with Jiang Jieshi are our internag.08oter.

After a one-hour break the exchange of opinions resumed.

Mao Zedong: What should we do?

Zhou Enlai: We should continue.

Mao Zedong: To do what the Americans propose is not too good for us.

And the Americans do not want to reciprocate, to do what we want.

N.S. Khrushchev: You are leaving us in an awkward position. You frame the question as if we support the position of Americans, while we stand on our Soviet communist position.

Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should postpone this question indefinitely.

Everyone sees that we are not close to the United States and that the United States, not us, send[s] its fleet to our coast.

N.S. Khrushchev: One should keep in mind that we also are not without sin. It was we who drew the Americans to South Korea. We should undertake such steps that would allow the Americans to respond with their steps in the direction of a relaxation of the situation. We should seek ways of relaxaing of the situation, to seek ways to ameliorate the situation. You know

you should have no doubts about it. We would think that one should work out a whole system, a staircase of measures, and in such a way that people would understand us. After Stalin's death we achieved a lot.

I could tell about a number of points on which I disagreed [wuw(rau)6(lin]. )]TJ0 -1.82

not prevent us from preserving good relations with him. If you let me, I



Mao Zedong: They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for 12 hours.

Zhou Enlai: What data do you trust more, Indian or ours?

N.S. Khrushchev: Although the Hindus attacked first, nobody was killed among the Chinese, and only among the Hindus.

Zhou Enlai: But what we are supposed to do if they attack us first. We cannot fire in the air. The Hindus even crossed the McMahon line. Besides, in the nearest future [Indian] Vice President [Savrepalli] Radhakrishnan comes to China. This is to say thnnot fire undertaking measures to resolve the issue peacefully, by negotiations. In my letter of 9 September to Nehruot provided detailed explanations of all thnno had occurred between India and us.

N.S. Khrushchev: Comrade Zhou Enlai5 You have been Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC for many one can resolve disputed issues wic-ut [spilling] blood. In this particular case I do not touch at all the issue of the border, for if the Chinese and the Hindus do not know where the borderline goes between t [spilling]5 0 Tén 2 hours.

N.S. Khrushchev: That the center knew nothing about the incident is news to me. I would tell you, what I was against. On 22 June 1941 Germans began their assault against the Soviet Union. Stalin forbade opening fire in response, and the instruction to open fire was sent only after some time. As Stalin explained, it might have been a provocation. Of course, it was Stalin's mistake. He simply got cold feet [on strusil]. But this case is absolutely different.

Zhu De: Hindus crossed the McMahon line that tears away 90 thousand square kilometers from China.

Chen Yi: After the revolt in Tibet there were several anti-Chinese, anti-communist campaigns in India. There were demonstrations against our Embassy in Dehli and the consulate in Calcutta; their participants reviled the leaders of the PRC and shouted anti-Chinese slogans. We did nothing like that, and the Indian Ambassador. As1om Chi34.5(hadw noAs1om )]TJ-68.





you have done before that we disagree with.

Zhou Enlai: The Hindus conducted large-scale anti-Chinese propaganda for 40 years until this provocation. They were the first to cross the border; they were the first to open fire. Could one still consider under these circumstances that we actually unleashed this incident?

N.S. Khrushchev: We are communists, and they are like Noah's Ark. You, comrade Zhou Enlai, understand it as well as I do.

M.A. Suslov: Noah's Ark in a sense that they have a pair of every creature.

Peng Zhen (in hasty agitation): Nasser has been abusing without reason the Soviet Union that deliver

patrols had crossed the MacMahon line, he issued the instruction for



organs.

Lin Biao: There was no command from the top.

Mao Zedong: We could not keep the Dalai Lama, for the border with India is very extended and he could cross it at any point.

M.A. Suslov: You should have known in advance about his intentions and plots.

Mao Zedong:

We wanted to

delay the

transformatio

n of Tibet by

four years.

N.S. Khrushchev: And that was your mistake.

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N.S. Khrushchev: We took and do take this view.

Mao Zedong: I would like to introduce a clarification - I never attended the session at the 8 th Congress when comrade Mikoyan spoke. I would

like to speak to Mikoyan personally.

N.S. Khrushchev: You skipped that session precisely because Mikoyan spoke there. Zhou Enlai once delivered to us a fair lecture. He is a good lecturer, but I disagree with the content of his lecture.

Liu Shaoqi: We never told anybody about our disagreements, not





border with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will certainly  
undertake provocations aLilfth the Rb

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