

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Series 2, Volume 78

July 20, September 30, 1962

(i) Bhutan

107. To P.K. Deo: Relations with Bhutan¹

August 21, 1962

Dear Shri Deo,

Your letter of the 20th August.²

Bhutan is an independent country in treaty relations with India. According to our Treaty, we do not interfere at all in its internal affairs, but in regard to the external affairs we are to guide its policy. We have, in fact, been encouraging Bhutan to play some part in international contacts. Thus we have recommended that it should become a member of the Colombo Plan. Our relationship is a sound one and we have had no trouble but undoubtedly it is a little delicate. We do not wish to say anything which would lead Bhutan to think that it is not independent. At the same time, we do not also wish to say anything which would lessen the relationships according to the terms of the Treaty.

I do not think that the news item in the *Indian Express*, to which you refer, can be correct.³ Shri Dorji, the Prime Minister of Bhutan, was interested in

¹ Letter to Swatantra Party, Lok Sabha MP; address: 29 Feroz Shah Road, New Delhi.

² P.K. Deo's letter has not been traced.

³ According to a report in the *Indian Express* of 16 August 1962, Jigme Dorji, the Bhutanese Prime Minister, had been in London for the past two months "to get his country accepted as a separate state in the international field." He also reportedly demanded that Bhutan be made a member of the Colombo Plan with the idea of getting "aid for Bhutan directly from the Colombo Plan countries and not through India." The report said "it is presumed that his demand has been accepted."

enquiring about certain matters which might be helpful to Bhutan. We have not got the details of this. When he comes back to India he will no doubt keep us informed.

I would add that our relations with the Bhutan Government and the people are the happiest. I hope you will share this letter with the co-signatories of your letter.⁴

Yours sincerely,

[Jawaharlal Nehru]

China

399. To UP Congress Members: Conflict with China Looming⁵

Nehru: India must be ready for any emergency

Worsening of Border Situation. Relationship with China in Dangerous Phase
Lucknow, Saturday, 28 July - Prime Minister Nehru said here today that though India did not want a war with China, the situation on the northern border had worsened of late, and he, therefore, would not entirely rule out the possibility of "suddenly, by some chance", an armed conflict breaking out between the two countries.

The Prime Minister, who was addressing a joint meeting of the members of the UP Congress Committee and of the Congress Legislature Party at Moti Mahal, said that he did not mean to imply by this that "there is bound to be a conflict between India and China: but if it comes, we should be ready to face it."

The Prime Minister, in his ninety-minute speech, dealt exhaustively with the relations of India with China and Pakistan, and the internal problems facing the country.

⁴ See also item 413.

⁵ Report of speech, reproduced from the *National Herald*, 29 July 1962.

Referring to Pakistan, the Prime Minister said that it was a pity that relations between India and Pakistan were somewhat strained. "We wish that our relations should be friendly, and we should forge ahead in cooperation with each other", he remarked.

Referring to the situation on the northern border, the Prime Minister said that a threat from any country would be a matter of concern to India, and, more so, when such a threat came from a big country like China. The relationship between India and China had now entered a dangerous stage, he said.

Proceeding, the Prime Minister said that a war between two big countries like India and China would bring no benefit to any of the two nations. It would only bring death and devastation.

He added: "We have said it repeatedly that we do not want a war with China. China has also said the same thing repeatedly. A war between our two countries can only cause devastation. No one nation can conquer the other.

Difficult Terrain

"However, finding that we were weak in Ladakh, China occupied a portion of our land there. Actually, we were not weak. It was the terrain of that area which had created difficulties for us, and had placed us in a weaker position. It is an uninhabited, desolate area of cliffs, boulders and snow at great height, where it is difficult for an ordinary man even to breathe. They had the advantage of starting from a high plateau. It was easier for them to construct roads leading to Ladakh. For us it was an uphill task. There was no road in that area. We could not rush our forces there. The question of supplies was also difficult. We decided to construct roads, and during the last two years the work of road-building was done by the army, because it was much swifter in its work than the "go-slow" public works departments. The work of road-building in that area would be completed within one or one and a half years. With the construction of roads, the situation improved for us. It became easier for us to send supplies. We have also arranged for big transport planes. We have now become stronger in that area.

"During the last one year, the Chinese have not advanced in that area, except, may be, for some very minor advance. We have made good arrangements in that area to check the intruders. This, it seems, has not been liked by China, which has now alleged that we have intruded on their land. The recent correspondence was a reflection of it. The situation there is important. It, however, does not mean that there will be a war. But if it comes, we should be ready to face it. If anybody attacks us, we would fight back.

Need for Unity

"An essential prerequisite for meeting such a situation is complete national unity. We should, therefore, wipe out all traces of communalism from amongst us. A modern war is mainly a war of resources, and, therefore, it is necessary for us to develop our resources at a fast pace by implementing the Third Five Year Plan."

Turning to relations between India and Pakistan, the Prime Minister said that it was regrettable that the relations between the two countries were not good. He added: "We do not want to harm them. After all, the people of Pakistan are our brothers, who have taken a wrong path. When India was divided, we thought that even though we were separating, we would work together. But then there came the large-scale riots and murders. Then there came the question of Kashmir.

"Pakistan, however, looked the other way. Its formation itself was based on the ideology of the Muslim League. It was an ideology of dislike of India and the Hindus. This ideology was to some extent the outcome of the narrow-mindedness among a section of the Hindus themselves.

"The leaders of Pakistan had no idea what they wanted to do with the country that they had carved out. They had no constructive programme except to foster enmity with India. Apart from this, they became jealous of India when they saw her advancing at a fast speed. They themselves were incapable of doing anything to improve the condition of their country, dominated as they were by feudal elements and big bureaucracy.

Therefore, in order to divert the attention of the masses of Pakistan from

the internal, economic and social problems, they started raising the Kashmir issue in and out of season.

"Kashmir is a vital issue for us. It is the issue of secularism for India. It is a matter of honour for India that a Muslim majority state should be a part of her. Pakistan claims Kashmir because it is a Muslim majority state. We cannot accept this principle. If we accept this principle, then a number of problems would be created. We do not accept the principle of forming countries on the basis of religion. If this principle is accepted, then what would happen to the five crores of Muslims in India and about one crore of Hindus in East Pakistan.

"It was sad that the relations between India and Pakistan should be strained. We want the friendliest relations with Pakistan. So far as the people of Pakistan are concerned, they have no ill-will for the people of India, as the people of India have no ill-will for the people of Pakistan. It is the top leadership of Pakistan that is responsible for creating tensions. The Pakistan leaders raise the bogey of India to divert the attention of their own people from their own problems. But they cannot go on doing this for ever. The people of Pakistan are now themselves raising socialist and economic questions. Once these questions come to the forefront in Pakistan, this anti-Indian tirade of the Pakistani leaders would end by itself.

"We wish to have friendly relations with Pakistan, and we want that India and Pakistan should progress in cooperation with each other."

400. For the Embassy of China⁶

⁶ Note, 5 August 1962, handed over to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, New Delhi. GOI, MEA, Historical Division, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, Volume VI, Part III, (Chinese Incursions into Indian Territory), April 1962 - October 1962, p.4. This note is also available in *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, July-October 1962. White Paper No. VII* (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs), p. 19.

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to two notes presented by the Chinese Government to Indian Charge d' Affaires at Peking⁷ on August 1, 1962.⁸

The Government of India in their note of 28th July⁹ lodged a protest that a Chinese patrol had opened fire at 10.00 hours on 27th July, against an Indian patrol in the Chip Chap Valley area approximately in the region referred to in the Chinese note. The Chinese note presumably refers to the same incident. The allegation by Chinese authorities that an Indian patrol resorted to firing at a Chinese post is not only baseless, but appears to be an attempt to confuse issues and escape responsibility for the aggressive activity of the Chinese local forces against which a protest had been lodged in the Indian note of the 28th July.

The Government of India have satisfied themselves that no Indian military post has been established in any part of Chinese territory. It is the Chinese local forces, who have established Chinese military posts in Indian territory and caused serious tension by their continuing aggressive activities in the Ladakh region of India. The Government of India emphatically reject the Chinese allegation that Indian posts have been set up in areas that are nineteen and twenty kilometres respectively inside Chinese territory.

The Chinese allegation that on 27th July, a detachment of Indian troops fired at a Chinese post in Nyagzu north of Pangong Lake, is absolutely without any foundation. No Indian party was in that area on that date.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, the assurances of its highest consideration.

⁷ P.K. Banerjee.

⁸ *White Paper No. VII*, pp. 10-11.

⁹ *White Paper No. VII*, p. 7.

401. In the Lok Sabha: Ladakh Situation¹⁰

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Speaker,¹¹ Sir, on the 28th November, 1961, I placed *White Paper No. 5*¹² on the Table of the House.¹³ This contained the further notes, memoranda and China. I am now placing on the Table of the House another *White Paper No. 6*,¹⁴ which contains some ninety notes sent by us to China and some seventy-five notes sent letters exchanged between the Government of India and the Government of by China to us, since the 10th November, 1961. Many of these have already been published in the press. The Chinese Government sometimes publish their letters and notes to us even before they reach us. This led us to publish our replies to them earlier than was customary. Normally, according to diplomatic practice, publication takes place some time after receipt of the communication. We have drawn the Chinese Government's notice to this diplomatic practice and we hope, in future, this will be adhered to. Because of this we have not till now given publicity to our last note to the Government of China dated 26th July, 1962.¹⁵ I am now, however, placing this note on the Table of the House. This is not included in the *White Paper No. 6*.

During the last session of Parliament, I referred to the measures taken by Government to stop further Chinese advances into Indian territory. These

¹⁰ Statement, 6 August 1962. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Third Series, Vol. 6, 6 to 18 August 1962, cols 120-124.

¹¹ Hukam Singh.

¹² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, November 1960-November 1961. White Paper No. V* (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs).

¹³ For Nehru's statement while placing *White Paper No. V* on the Table of the House, see SWJN/SS/72/item 275.

¹⁴ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, November 1961-July 1962. White Paper No. VI* (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs).

¹⁵ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, July-October 1962. White Paper No. VII* (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs), pp. 3-4.

steps continue to be taken by our Government and a number of military posts have been established. It may be said that it is very difficult for Chinese forces to advance now because of the establishment of Indian posts at various points without an actual conflict between the two. It is in this context that the strong and almost abusive Chinese notes must be interpreted. We have in all our notes repeatedly pointed out to the Chinese authorities the dangers inherent in Chinese aggressive activities and our determination to defend our borders even though we will avoid doing anything to precipitate a clash.

In recent weeks Chinese troops in superior strength have sometimes come up close to our posts with a view to harassing and intimidating them. This has happened in the Galwan Valley. Our men exercised the utmost self-restraint and exhibited exemplary courage and patience in the face of grave provocations from the Chinese forces. The Chinese forces thereupon retired to some extent, but Indian and Chinese forces in this area continue to be in close proximity, though no untoward incident has occurred so far in this area.

In the lower reaches of the Chip Chap Valley, an Indian patrol, while performing routine duties, was ambushed by Chinese forces and attacked by rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. Our men had to return fire in self-defence. Two members of the Indian patrol were wounded, one slightly, in this incident. Another incident occurred in the Pangong area. Despite the provocation, our forces did not return the Chinese fire there.

A feature of Chinese propaganda in these incidents has been to allege that Indian troops have encircled Chinese forces and fired at them, while the Chinese are reported to have waved and shouted to our troops not to attack. We have found that these allegations are baseless and are merely attempts to cover up Chinese aggressive activity against our posts or patrols. As the House will notice from the correspondence contained in the *White Paper*, the Chinese notes display a characteristic ambivalence. The first part of the note generally contains baseless allegations, often in exaggerated and even abusive language, while the latter part refers to the

Chinese desire to settle our border differences by peaceful negotiations. The recent increase of tension in the Ladakh region has been the direct result of intensified Chinese military activity which is inconsistent with the Chinese professions of their desire to settle this question by peaceful negotiations. We in India are by our background and temperament peaceful by nature. We earnestly believe in settlement of differences by peaceful discussions and negotiations. The unwarranted Chinese aggression on our territory came, therefore, as a shock and surprise to us. Despite the Chinese aggressive behaviour and the inconsistency between their professions and practice, we still desire to settle our differences with China by peaceful discussions and negotiations. At the same time, we will not hesitate to meet any threat to our territorial integrity with firmness and, where necessary, by force.

In a note we sent to the Government of China on the 14th May, 1962,¹⁶ we made concrete suggestions regarding mutual withdrawal to the boundaries claimed by the two sides in the Ladakh region with a view to creating the necessary atmosphere for settlement of the dispute by peaceful discussions and negotiations. The Chinese did not agree to it. Instead, the incidents during the last few months have created further tension. We have, in our recent note dated 26th July, 1962, again pointed out to the Chinese Government the necessity of avoiding incidents and reducing tension and of making an adequate response to the constructive suggestions made by us to create the necessary favourable climate for further talks and discussions of the boundary question. I quote the following paragraph from our note of July 26.

"Paragraph 8. The Government of India are prepared, as soon as the current tensions have eased and the appropriate climate is created, to enter into further discussions on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials as contemplated during the meeting of Prime Minister Chou En-lai with the Prime Minister of India in 1960. The

¹⁶ See *White Paper No. VI*, pp. 41-43.

Government of India hope that the Government of China will give a positive response on the concrete suggestions made by the Government of India for relaxation of the current tensions and for creation of the right climate for negotiations."

To this note of ours we received a reply in the late afternoon yesterdays¹⁷ This reply is rather disappointing as the Chinese Government continue to repeat the charges made by them and to maintain their position as stated previously. They go on to say in their final paragraph as follows:

"The Chinese Government approve of the suggestions put forth by the Indian Government in its note for further discussions on the Sino-Indian boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two countries. There need not and should not be any preconditions for such discussions. As a matter of fact, if only the Indian side stop advancing into Chinese territory a relaxation of the border situation will be effected at once. Since neither the Chinese nor the Indian Government want war and since both Governments wish to settle the boundary question peacefully through negotiations further discussions on the Sino-Indian boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two countries should not be put off any longer. The Chinese Government proposes that such discussions be held as soon as possible and that the level, date, place and other procedural matters for these discussions be immediately decided upon by consultation through diplomatic channels. The Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will give positive consideration to this proposal and kindly reply at an early date."

We are examining this note of the Chinese Government and we hope to send a reply to it at an early date. We shall keep the Parliament informed of developments.

¹⁷ The note is dated 4 August 1962, see *White Paper No. VII*, pp. 17-18.

402. T.T. Krishnamachari: Meeting on Border Problem¹⁸

August 8, 1962

My dear T.T.,

This is to remind you to come to my house at 6 pm on the 11th August. We shall consider the frontier situation.

Yours affectionately,

Jawaharlal Nehru

403. Sikkim Maharajkumar's China Visits¹⁹

Please convey to the Lok Sabha Secretariat that to our knowledge the Maharajkumar of Sikkim²⁰ has not visited China even once during this year or previously so far as I know. He has, however, visited Hong Kong which is a British colony and is not under the control of the Chinese communist regime. I do not think there have been any contacts between him and the Chinese communist regime. Beyond this I can make no statement. We shall, however, get in touch with the Maharajkumar on his return to India and ask him what the facts are.

404. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Border - 1²¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Speaker,²² Sir, I beg to move:

¹⁸ Letter to Minister without Portfolio. NMML, T. T. Krishnamachari Papers, File 1962, Auto.

¹⁹ Note, 10 August 1962, in response to the Calling Attention notice by U.M. Trivedi and Brij Raj Singh, both Jan Sangh, Lok Sabha MPs, regarding the reported visits of Sikkim Prince to China.

²⁰ Palden Thondup Namgyal.

²¹ Motion, 13 August 1962. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Third Series, Vol. 6, 6 to 18 August 1962, cols 1477-1481.

²² Hukam Singh.

"That the situation along the India China border, particularly in the Ladakh region, be taken into consideration."

A week ago, on the 6th of August, I placed a new *White Paper*, No. VI, on the Table of the House.²³ This contained the notes and correspondence between the Government of India and the Government of China since the previous *White Paper* was published. Similarly, I placed a letter which the Government of India had sent to the Government of China dated 26th July.²⁴ We received a telegram giving the purport of the reply from the Chinese Government, on the morning of the 6th August. In the statement I made then, I quoted some portions of the reply of the Chinese Government. Since then, we have placed the full text of the Chinese note in the library of Parliament and have also placed copies in the Parliament Office for the convenience of Members.

Since then, no major incident has happened on the frontier. According to our information, there were three instances of firing by Chinese troops from a distance. These occurred, on the 27th July in the Pangong lake area when two shots were apparently fired towards our forces; on the 29th July also in the Pangong lake area, three shots were fired; on the 4th August, north east of Daulat Beg Oldi, one shot was fired.

All these were from big distances and no damage was done. We have protested to the Chinese Government about the first two incidents.

The Chinese have protested to us as, according to them, the Indian troops fired in their direction on four occasions: on 27th July in Chip Chap river area, two shots were said to have been fired; on the 27 July also in the Nyagzu area, sixteen shots are reported to have been fired by our troops; on 31st July in the Galwan Valley area, one shot is said to have been fired; on 1st August, also in the Galwan Valley area, seven shots are alleged to have been fired by our troops.

According to our information, these allegations of firing by our patrols are

²³ Item 401.

²⁴ *White Paper No. VII*, pp. 3-4.

not correct. For the rest, according to our information, some Chinese patrols have been moving about in the vicinity of the Galwan Valley area and have occasionally been observed digging in.

Otherwise, the situation remains the same. Our aircraft have been visiting our posts and giving them supplies. The Chinese have protested against our aircraft flying over what they call Chinese territory. They have given a long list of such flights. We have replied that it is absurd to allege that they were flying over their territory as they have all along been over Indian territory. The situation, therefore, on the frontier remains serious as it has been in the past and is likely to continue in the future.

Since I made the statement in the Lok Sabha a week ago, there has apparently been some misunderstanding and misinterpretation of what I said. Some people, who ought to have known better, have had the temerity to suggest that we are going to take some action which would bring dishonour to India. I can only imagine that those who have said this are not very well acquainted with the training and background we have had in the past. That past training as well as our present mood lead us to seek peaceful settlements of disputes with foreign countries and we shall try to do so to the utmost of our ability. It also confirms us in our decision to protect the honour of India and the defence of India to the utmost of our capacity. But there has been apparently some misunderstanding about the two lines which the Chinese have claimed on different occasions as their alleged frontier in Ladakh: one is that which Premier Chou En-lai indicated while confirming the boundary line given in the Chinese map of 1956, and the other is the line which was indicated in the Chinese map which was given to our officials. These lines differ and the latter line is much more to the west than the former. We have pointed out to the Chinese Government that some of their posts have even gone beyond the Chou En-lai line. This was obviously a further aggression on India and something which could be easily verified by a reference to the maps. To this the Chinese replied that the two maps are more or less the same. This is very extraordinary. These facts are capable of easy verification. We drew the Chinese Government's attention

to this matter. This has led some people to say that we accept Chou En-lai's line. This is utterly wrong. As we have repeatedly stated, we do not accept any of their lines. We stand by the international frontier which is shown in our maps and about which so much evidence was produced by our officials. The other question that is raised is about our proposal to have further discussions on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials, as contemplated during the meeting with Premier Chou En-lai in 1960.²⁵ It was at that time understood that there would be such a consideration after the officials had done their work.

We have not been able to do so owing to tensions and further aggression by the Chinese. We made it clear that such further discussions could only take place after the current tensions had eased and appropriate climate was created. We had previously said that in order to ease tensions there should be withdrawals of both our forces to beyond the line claimed by the other. It seemed to us essential, and we laid stress on this, that any further discussions on the boundary question would be fruitless unless there was relaxation of tensions and the right climate for negotiation was created. On the 6th of August, when I referred to the Chinese reply, I stated that it was a disappointing one. The Chinese Foreign Minister, in a broadcast in Europe made on the 3rd August, had stated that "to wish that Chinese troops should be withdrawn from their own territory is impossible. That would be against the will of the 650 million Chinese. No force in the world could oblige us to do something of this kind."

I realise that in public statements, Ministers often emphasise their claims in strong language, but, even allowing for that, what the Chinese Foreign Minister²⁶ has said, means laying down preconditions which make it impossible for us to carry on discussions and negotiations. We had not suggested force being used to make the Chinese troops withdraw, but a proposal to create a climate for peaceful discussion which was honourable to

²⁵ For discussions, see SWJN/SS/60; for the Report, see SWJN/SS/66/Supplement.

²⁶ Chen Yi.

both India and China.

It is clear to us that any discussion on the basis of the report of the officials cannot start unless present tensions are removed and the status quo of the boundary which existed before and which has since been altered by force is restored. The Government of India is prepared to discuss what measures should be taken to remove the tensions that exist in this region and to create the appropriate climate for further discussions. This would be preliminary to any further discussions on the basis of the report of the officials with a view to resolving the differences between the two Governments on the boundary question.

We have not yet sent a reply to the Chinese Government to their note of the 4th August. We hope to send it within two or three days. It will be on the lines I have indicated.

At this stage, I do not want to say more; I should like to hear what the hon. Members have to say in regard to this situation and then make such statement as I can.²⁷

405. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Border - 2²⁸

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Speaker,²⁹ Sir, I followed yesterday with considerable interest and care the speeches delivered by various Members of this House on this motion.³⁰ I, particularly, was interested in the oratorical efforts and the wide range of subjects covered by the speeches, most of which had little to do with the subject in dispute. Shri Anthony³¹ in his vivid imagination

²⁷ For Nehru's reply to debate on the motion, see item 405.

²⁸ Reply to debate on motion on the India-China border situation, 14 August 1962. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Third Series, Vol. 6, 6 to 18 August 1962, cols 1750-1777.

²⁹ Hukam Singh.

³⁰ For Nehru's statement on 13 August 1962 introducing the motion, see item 404.

³¹ Frank Anthony, Nominated.

saw heads rolling here including Professor Mukerjee's³² head. That itself shows that his imagination runs riot and leaves reality far behind. The Maharaja of Kalahandi³³ delivered a speech which I found a little difficult to understand. It was not very coherent in various places.

He wound up by asking us to take certain remedial measures. His remedial measures are: to convene a conference of South-East Asian countries, to ask military aid from some countries to meet this menace on the frontier, and various other like proposals. I wondered whether he or the group he represents really understands the position, has given any thought to it or merely thinks in terms of a cold war and wants India to jump in head foremost into it.

What a conference of South-East Asian countries will do is beyond me. And, who are these South-East Asian countries? Which of them does he want to be called? I should like him to make a list of them and show it to us. Which of them is going to help us or can help us? It is best if they carry on themselves. We have recently had a case of a South-East Asian country which had given a great deal of trouble-Laos. Unfortunately, it has been decided by agreement of all the countries concerned including some great powers. What is the basis of that decision? What was the basis of the decision that Geneva Agreement, six years ago that these countries must not enter into any military alliance with any party, that they must remain un-aligned, uncommitted? That is the only safety for them. This has been accepted and admitted by the great leaders of the power blocs themselves. So, the hon. Member, the leader of the Swatantra Party, is so ignorant of what is happening in the world, what is happening in India, what is happening on the frontier. I do not know what his party represents in this country except ignorance, ignorance on the social sphere, ignorance in the political sphere, ignorance in the economic sphere.

He told us that India is no longer a zamindari. Evidently, his mind still turns

³² H.N. Mukerjee, CPI.

³³ P.K. Deo, Swatantra Party.

round to the question of zamindari. It is long past. India is certainly not a zamindari, and there are no other zamindaris also in India.

We have discussed the question on the frontier many times in the past, and yet, whenever it is discussed, we go back not to the present situation and what we are to do, but, as Shri Anthony and the Maharaja also said, to what we should have done eight years ago or six years ago, that we should not have put forward China to become a member of the United Nations, we should not have said that China has sovereignty over Tibet, and so on-facts which are long past. I have dealt with them in the past. I could deal with them again, but I do not wish to take the time of the House.

The point is, how we are to face a serious situation now. I do submit that this situation can be considered politically and militarily. It is no good talking about the Mahabharata as if it exists at the present moment. Although the *Mahabharata* is a magnificent book from which we can learn a great deal, but I do not think it will help us in resolving the frontier crisis.³⁴

Hem Barua:³⁵ Lesson for Raghunath.³⁶

Jawaharlal Nehru: Nor is it any good to talk about our 45 crores of Indians standing as one. It almost reminds me of Marshal Chen Yi³⁷ talking about his 65 crores of Chinese wanting this and that. It is, if I may say so, with all respect both to hon. Members opposite and to Marshal Chen Yi, rather

³⁴ Raghunath Singh, Congress, speaking in Hindi, had stated that though, according to the Sabha Parva of *Mahabharata*, China had acknowledged the sovereignty of India 5,000 years ago, it would not be proper to say on this basis that China had been a part of India then. He spoke after U.M. Trivedi, Jan Sangh, who had posited: "Can we not point out to the Mount Kailas and say that the name Kailas itself indicates that it must be an Indian name. The name Mansarovar could be given by no other nation except the Indian nation. We have been going there for thousands and thousands of years." *Lok Sabha Debates*, ibid, cols 1529, 1547-1548.

³⁵ PSP.

³⁶ Refers to Raghunath Singh, see fn 302 in this section.

³⁷ The Foreign Minister of China.

childish to talk in this fashion. The 65 crores of Chinese are a great number and have great power behind them, but in a context of this kind one does not talk, no responsible person talks in that way, neither he nor hon.

Members here.

We have to deal with a difficult situation, a serious situation as I have often said and a situation that has been with us for many long years. We cannot solve it suddenly because of obvious difficulties in our way or in anybody's way who tries to solve it. We can increase our capacity to solve it militarily or otherwise. I do think and I am quite right in saying that our capacity to deal with this situation politically and militarily has grown in the last two years or so. It has definitely grown. I do not wish to exaggerate that; but it is much better. Shri Anthony asked me whether our position was better now than a year or two ago. I say it is definitely better both militarily and politically. But, nevertheless, I cannot guarantee.

I think the Maharaja of Bikaner³⁸ talked about giving a date when they will vacate. How can I give a date when we shall get the Chinese to vacate? We shall do our utmost to do that. We shall continue to do that and we shall not submit. But about one thing I can give an assurance-it is not necessary for me to give it-and I should think that that assurance would be welcomed by every hon. Member of this House and that is that nothing should be done in this matter, or in any matter, which will bring any kind of dishonour on India and that we would prefer to be reduced to dust and ashes before we are guilty of any such thing. That is the broad approach. But when you come to political and difficult problems, you do not talk in the air as, I regret to say, some of our hon. Members did. They made brave declarations and said, "We shall do this; we shall not do this." Responsible politicians or statesmen do not talk tall. They try to act as stoutly as they can.

In this world today, apart from the general question of war, etc., in this changing world all kinds of things are happening. All kinds of new weapons are being forged. I have a feeling that many of the hon. Members on the

³⁸ Karni Singh, Independent.

other side who spoke have no realisation of the modern world. They live in some kind of a world of their own creation. Some people talked bravely of the 45 crores of Indians; others, like the Maharaja, asked us immediately to go under the wing or shelter of some other power and take its aid to defend US.³⁹ That is not an honourable thing, I think. Personally I do not think that we shall maintain our independence for long if we go about seeking military aid from others to defend ourselves. That is apart from its being fundamentally opposed to the policy we have pursued all this time of being unaligned—a policy which is not only being recognised everywhere as the right policy but which is spreading all over the world. Even those stout and big countries that are aligned have come to respect it.

Apart from any policy question, so far as India is concerned, situated where it is, that is the only possible policy that any intelligent man knowing the world today can possibly accept. Yet, vaguely and loosely, the Swatantra Party leader talks about our asking the aid of South-East Asian countries—what aid they can give us is beyond my imagination—or of great powers having a concert for the defence of all this area. All this has nothing to do with reality. Any responsible person in authority, whether in the

³⁹ P.K. Deo, the Maharaja of Kalahandi, had presented a substitute motion for the one moved by Nehru:

"That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely: -

'This House, having considered the situation along the India China border, particularly in the Ladakh region, is of the opinion that the Government of India has completely failed in their foreign policy so far as it relates to India-China relationship and urges upon the Government to take the following steps: -

- (a) Immediate breaking of diplomatic relationship with China;
- (b) Calling of a Conference of free countries of S.E. Asia to discuss common security measures;
- (c) To arrange for military aids from other countries to gear up our defence;
- (d) To improve our relations with Nepal;
- (e) That the Prime Minister should himself take over the defence portfolio;
- (f) That the Prime Minister should come out with a categorical statement that there will be no negotiation with China unless and until they withdraw from Indian territory'."

Government or in the Opposition must deal with reality. Certainly whatever be the difficulties, we have to face them. Whatever happens and however grave the crisis we must never lose our nerve. It seems to me that some hon. Members of the Opposition never seem to be able to control their nerves. They are always losing it. They talk about heads rolling and all that. That shows that their nerves have gone out of order whatever else might have happened.

We are in a serious position on the frontiers. It is quite absurd to talk about China invading India and all that. China has committed aggression. That is bad enough. We should face it and try to get it vacated. But, imagining that she is swooping down the whole of India and swallowing it has, I submit, nothing to do with reality or possibility, even remote possibility of any situation. India is not so weak as all that. India is growing in strength, whether militarily or otherwise. Military strength does not today or at any time consist of large hordes of people. If anybody knows at all the history of India, we have never been lacking in courage. But, we have been lacking in wisdom, we have been lacking in modernity. Whenever India has been conquered or defeated, it was not because of any wonderful deeds of the conqueror, but because of our own feebleness, our lack of unity, our backwardness, economic, industrial backwardness, better weapons on the other side. That is more important. Forty-five crores do no good at all unless there is unity and they are trained up and they have a modern mind. I regret to say that the opposition does not even have an idea of what a modern mind is, much less possess it.

Every time we come up here, the arguments are, why did we recognise China ten years ago, why did this happen twelve years ago. Why can't they come to the year 1962 and see what is happening in the world instead of repeating all this? I think of every step that we have taken in the past; I mean the recognition of China ten years ago. Our non-attendance at the San Francisco Peace Conference—I think perhaps Shri Frank Anthony said it—

Frank Anthony (Nominated - Anglo-Indian): No, no.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am sorry then; somebody else said it. Perhaps the gallant Maharaja said it:⁴⁰ I do not know—our non-attendance at this Conference had nothing to do with China, absolutely nothing. It had a great deal to do with Japan and it pleased Japan.⁴¹ We have been friendly with Japan. Many other things because of that; because we did not participate in a cold war exercise against Japan and we made our separate treaty with Japan. All these things are of the past. The present has certainly grown out of the past. Our troubles in the frontiers have grown out of the past. We have to face the present situation.

I am not going into the past which I have dealt with so many times during debates in this House. But in the last two years, as we have stated, we have concentrated on increasing our strength, military strength, strength in communications, roads, etc.

May I draw the attention of this House, talking about Ladakh, to the whole of Jammu & Kashmir State of which Ladakh is a part? Rightly or wrongly, the Kashmir Government took Ladakh and the frontiers for granted. It had no posts there or measures for defence of them. Nor was there any fear in those days. They sent perhaps every two years a small deputation or some people, some officers and others to some places to collect some little money, very little money which was more a gesture. Anyhow, they had nothing. Then came Independence to be followed immediately afterwards by aggression by Pakistanis on Kashmir which we resisted. Pakistani aggression went right up to Ladakh. In fact the route to Ladakh, the Zoji La

⁴⁰ Contending that India had been complacent, at the cost her own interests, in advancing China's interests, in bilateral relations as well as internationally, P.K. Deo said that "India had declined to attend the peace treaty with Japan which was signed in San Francisco, because China was not a party to it." *Lok Sabha Debates*, Third Series, Vol. 6, 6 to 18 August 1962, col. 1498.

⁴¹ P.K. Deo tabled notice of a question of privilege on an error in this statement by Nehru. For Nehru's response to the notice, see items 408-409.

pass, was captured by the Pakistanis, and that prevented us from getting to Ladakh; there was no way to get to Ladakh except a risky one by air. We then tried to go by another route to Leh from Manali, a very difficult route. However, our Army did get there. But, something else happened.

Meanwhile, our Army did something which deserves to be recorded in the annals of warfare, that is, it went up to the Zoji La pass with tanks, it had widened the roads and went up to the Zoji La pass with tanks and drove out the Pakistanis from that position, and thereby opened out the route to Leh, which is the heart of Ladakh. I am merely mentioning that this happened right at the end of 1948, and the Pakistanis were driven out of a large part of Ladakh which they had controlled. But, ever since then, the House knows that we confront the Pakistanis who are in control of one-third of Jammu and Kashmir State, and we are constantly threatened by all kinds of fierce deeds which the Pakistanis will commit upon us.

This was the position in the early fifties of this country. It was about that time that China took possession of Tibet, and nothing that we could have done could have stopped it; people seem to think that if we had said "No, you must not do it", they would have stopped it, or if we had said that we would not recognise them, they would have stopped it. That is rather a fanciful notion. Rightly or wrongly, they took possession of Tibet, and soon after, as their possession grew, their hold grew, it was difficult for them from the logistic point of view to feed them, to send supplies etc. right across the Gobi desert, which is a tremendous desert. They have gradually made roads etc., and in the course of that road-making in the middle of the fifties, they improved the whole caravan route which passed through the northern area of Aksai Chin into Tibet from Sinkiang. It is a caravan route being used from time to time. They used it because it was easier for them to go from Sinkiang to Tibet that way instead of crossing the Gobi desert. And later, a year or two later, they improved that route and made some kind of a road. Roads in Tibet, as the House will know, are not cemented roads. They are just levelled places, because owing to the extreme cold, the ground is so hard that it is as good as cement or anything of that sort. So,

they used that. There was some difficulty about using that Aksai Chin road because of lack of bridges. I do not know; probably, they have built the bridges later. That was the first aggression of China on our territory, right about 1957; I do not know when the road was actually made, but we heard of it at the end of 1957 or 1958, I forget exactly when.

The Minister of State in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Ram Subhag Singh): 1957.

Jawaharlal Nehru: In 1959, while we were protesting against this to the Chinese Government, and their answer had not come, and we were waiting for it; and it came in early 1958, I think ...

Ram Subhag Singh: In 1958.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Just then, the incipient rebellion in Tibet grew in size, and as a result of it, the Chinese sent much larger forces to Tibet, which immediately fanned out to its frontiers, partly, may be, because they thought that help was coming to the Tibetan rebels from the frontier, from India and elsewhere; they came to the Indian frontier partly because people were escaping; the Dalai Lama had escaped. In the same way, they spread out to the Western side.

We, who were fairly wide awake on this side, and right from the beginning, when the Chinese took possession of Tibet, had not expected it, but, anyhow, we were alert about our frontier on this side, the Sikkim and NEFA frontier, and we had even then put up a number of check-posts there. We added more to them.

On the Western side, on the Ladakh side also, we thought it was necessary. It was the second priority; NEFA was the first priority. It was a much more difficult undertaking. The distances were big and the terrain was difficult. So slowly, we were proceeding on the Ladakh side with our military posts. But we realised that the only way to do it was to build roads. Otherwise, the

distance was too great and it took too long. Even by air, we could not go there. We established an air field there in—I forget the year—1954 or 1955. All this was with a view to protect this against any possible incursion. The Chinese had not come into Ladakh yet. But at the back of our mind was also the risk of it.

I remember going to Chusul air field in—I forget the year—1954 or 1955. But there were no Chinese round about anywhere. I went there because our air people were very proud of having made the air field. They called it the highest in the world. I do not know if it is—it is about 14,000 ft. high. I went there for a few hours and then came back.

I have been talking about my personal experiences. I know something about Ladakh—not very much—something by trekking over the Zoji La in 1916—it is a long time ago. In 1916, I went there, covering the distance partly on pony and partly on foot. So I knew something of that place. I did not go far, but I had some fair idea crossing the Zoji La.

So from that time onwards, we were trying to protect this and made this an air base—the Chusul one. We tried to build roads. The first road that had to be built was to Leh itself which was the base. Unless we could reach Leh quickly, it was no good making roads elsewhere. This was a difficult piece of engineering, especially as the road itself was crossing certain bridges. That was made.

So initially the problem before us was the building of roads. We could not do anything without roads, and, where we could, some air fields. We built them. There was also the problem of getting aircraft which could be used for this purpose. We applied our minds to this. We had a special Border Roads Development Committee formed, which has done very well and built—I do not know exactly—thousands of miles of roads in very difficult terrain and rather fast. It has still not completed its work. Of course there is no completion of it, because more and more roads come into our plan as we make them. But it has eased our situation considerably, both because of the Leh road and some roads which are going to Chusul and other places.

On the NEFA side too we built roads. In UP we built roads on the border.

In the Punjab we have built roads.

But however rapidly we built roads, we could not reach our posts. Some we could, but most of them we could not. We tried to feed them from air and give them supplies. That meant aircraft. We got special aircraft for this purpose. Now apart from the supplies, the mere stationing of our troops anywhere in Ladakh, whether it was in Leh or whether it was in the interior, meant supplying them with everything conceivable that they wanted, because they could get nothing there, nothing to eat and so on. That required air supplies. We built up our air supply position by getting aircraft-big aircraft-from various countries. We have got some helicopters etc. But in the main it consisted of big transport aircraft. There were some from the United States and some from the Soviet Union. Those from the Soviet Union were the bigger ones, which were very helpful. Then having got them, we had the difficulty that those heavy aircraft landing on our temporary air fields there dug them up. So, we had to make the air field stronger. All this, one problem after another. However, we proceeded and we improved our military position, our supply position, and we have got troops in various areas there with forward posts.

Somebody said that we have allowed nine new Chinese posts. That is true, and yet it gives a completely wrong idea of what the position is. If they have got nine posts, we have got 22 or 23 or 24, I do not know how many, three times the number. These posts of theirs are projections, patrol projections of their own posts. They have not gone very far. In fact, it may be said that ever since we got there with our posts, it has been exceedingly difficult for them to advance further. They may advance a mile outside their own posts, a mile or two, that is a different matter, just as we can advance and we do advance, but broadly speaking, we have held them in check there, and there can be no further advance by them without a major conflict.

That is not enough, of course, obviously not, but that was the first step that had to be taken, to strengthen ourselves and prevent any kind of further advance taking place. So, that has been more or less satisfactorily done. That does not mean that we are satisfied with the frontier position. Apart

from the fact that we have to get them to vacate it, even otherwise it is not satisfactory, but I would not go into the military aspects. But it is certainly a satisfactory first step in which we have succeeded.

Therefore, I said that from a military point of view we are better off, better circumstanced, than we were a year or two ago, but if I am asked when I will get them to vacate it, that involves far greater preparation, far greater not only preparation—certainly preparation in the military sense, in the air sense, and certain political factors also. On the political field I think I am right in saying the position is more satisfactory than it was. It is difficult to measure this. A military situation might be measured, a political situation cannot easily be measured, but I think it is better, but ultimately and inevitably the position depends upon our own strength, military strength, and the strength of the people and their general response to face any crisis. Now it is very satisfactory to learn, to hear many of the brave statements made by hon. Members on both sides of the House of how we shall face any crisis, of how we shall meet any danger. That is all right, and that feeling in the country is essential as a background. Nevertheless, we know from the history of India that all the courage of the Indian people did not protect them because they were lacking in military weapons and the military art, whatever it is. One of the simple things our ancestors were lacking in was possessing even a physical map of India. Even till fairly recent times before the British came, they had no proper maps of India. They had vague drawings, while the British when they came, everybody knows, did not win by any major feat of arms although they had better arms and that helped them, better trained soldiers—and small numbers of Indian soldiers might have been utilised—and in the end, maps and they had spies everywhere. Every Indian Court had a British spy, often a Minister in the Court. That is how they won. By their information services, by their maps, they knew exactly where they were, where the other party was, while those who opposed them gallantly, full of courage, Rajputs, Marathas and others, had no map—simple thing. Gallantry is a fine thing, but something more is necessary in warfare than gallantry. Nowadays with modern weapons and

other things, all this has become even more complicated.

It rather pleases us to compare India with China and say one Indian is equal to ten Chinese. I do not know. I think an Indian soldier is equal or more than any soldier in the wide world. That is true. I am convinced of that. They are very fine men, and I should like to pay my tribute not only to the soldiers but to our Army Headquarters, to the Defence Ministry and our Air Headquarters, for the fine work they have done in these two or three years especially in the frontiers.

But the point is, how are we to meet modern weapons, modern techniques, with the resources at our disposal? Of course, to the best of our ability, we try to develop the modern techniques themselves here. That is why, our whole objective has been in recent years not so much to buy from abroad, but to build up, to manufacture machines here, aeroplanes, helicopters and other things, and that takes a little time. Yet, we have done well, and we hope that in another year or two our strength will grow to manufacture these. That is how we are facing it, and meanwhile we are taking such measures as we can.

Shri Anthony on a previous occasion—I think I was not here then—objected to our military people keeping secrets; I do not know what particular secret, I think it was about helicopters, the question arose about it. In a matter of this kind we are governed almost entirely by what our military staff say. If they advise us this must not be disclosed. We abide by their advice. It is not I or the Defence Minister that lays it down. It is the General Staff which says this must not be disclosed. And the difficulty is that when we buy things from abroad or we are manufacturing we come to special terms with a foreign country. The foreign country tells us that we must not disclose these. We do not care, but we have given our word to them not to disclose it because they insisted; either they have given us on terms which they do not wish to be disclosed—they are good terms for us, but they want to get better terms from somebody else—whatever the reasons may be. So these are the reasons why one cannot easily disclose these terms of our contracts with others or what we are building.

Anyhow, my point was we have concentrated on building, on manufacture. We have manufactured a very fine supersonic plane at Bangalore,⁴² but having manufactured the plane, it does well, in order to manufacture more, we have to get engines. We cannot get the old engines from the British sources, but we are getting other engines, and that will be manufactured. We are manufacturing helicopters. They are so important in those hilly areas. We hope to manufacture other fighter planes.

I must confess that it hurts me for us to spend so much money on weapons of warfare, but circumstances being what they are, I think we would be failing in our duty not to possess them. It is not so much that one fights with these weapons, one may, but the fact of not having them itself is an encouragement to others. I feel that in the last few years, occasions arose when if we had not been adequately prepared and we had not got adequate weapons and aircraft, we might have had to face a war. It did not come because we were prepared and they knew we were prepared. So, much as I dislike this, we have to get it. It is exceedingly important not to allow the enemy to have control of the air. It is an obvious thing. Everybody will realise that it is better to have self-control. If you have not got it, at least the enemy should not. And, if they had speedier and powerful aircraft the idea spreads that you have not got control of the air.

I do not know if hon. Members, how many of them, have any experience of bombing. I have not much experience. But I have a little experience, seeing bombs falling all around you. Nothing is a more frustrating experience, how aircraft comes quietly and puts bombs where it chooses with nothing to face it, no rival aircraft to face it. Because the mere fact that you have rival aircraft partly drives it out and partly sends it up high in the heavens from where it is more difficult to bomb. Other things happen.

Of course, all this is a rather old story, this bombing and aircraft. The next stage is rockets. But it is difficult for us to forget the intervening stages and jump over. And, even from the point of view of our technical skill

⁴² See SWJN/SS/69/item 360.

developing, it is desirable that we should manufacture these things, these supersonic aircraft, in this country. So, we took all those steps and, in the military sense, roads were built etc. We built a kind of rampart on this part of Ladakh and put up numerous military posts, small ones and big ones. It is true that these posts are in constant danger of attack with larger numbers. Well, it does not matter. We have taken the risk and we have moved forward, and we have stopped effectively their further march.

If anybody takes the trouble to read the numerous letters of protest that we have received from the Chinese authorities, he will see how angry they have been at our establishing these posts, how they have said, "You are trying to cut us off; you are trying to encircle us." The same thing that was said on our side about them are repeated by them about us. Some things have happened and much has happened on the part of our military there. If you see one of their telegrams, they say—I forget the period—they have mentioned the figure, over 300 air sorties by us. They say, "You come into our territory." It may be six months. During the last six months, they say over 300 air sorties have come into their territory. And the obvious answer was, "It is not your territory, it is our territory and we go as we like." All this is happening.

People should realise what is being done. It is a fine job that is being done by our military and Air Force. It is not right to put it at a lower level.

Nevertheless, we cannot suddenly press a button and declare that the place is vacated, the aggression is ended. That will go by our strength. We are gradually building up our strength—and by political means.

Shri Karni Singhji asked me something about the atom bomb and that China has an atom bomb. I do not know when China may have an atom bomb.

Broadly speaking, although we are not thinking of an atom bomb, I think we are more highly developed in atomic energy than China is. That does not mean that China cannot produce an atom bomb before us because we are not trying to. But, I shall not be worried in the least if they do. People seem to think that if a country has got an atom bomb, it is bound to win in war. That is not so. If they have an atom bomb do you mean to say that after all

effort they produce an atom bomb only to let loose on India? They will keep it for other purposes. If they let it loose on India it is worse for them.⁴³

An Hon. Member: Wishful thinking.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not understand our getting cold hands and cold feet because they may have an atom bomb or because they have a larger number of soldiers in Tibet who may shoot us down from the top. They can shoot down; they can create difficulties for us. They may. It is a possibility. If they want to they can overwhelm some of our military posts. That does not mean that we are defeated. We shall face them with much greater problems and face them much more stoutly. So, all these military factors and political factors have to be kept in view.

It is no good my talking tall or anybody else talking tall—"We will do this or that." We should not do anything which, as I said, brings dishonour to our country because that is not an arguable matter. None of us should do it; and, certainly, no Government can be responsible for it.

Having said that, we should try every means to solve the problem, anyhow, if you like by military means or by peaceful means. The military means have to be conditioned by military factors, not by speeches here. And, therefore, that conditioning has to be there. In any event, I do believe that war is a bad thing. War between India and China will be a bad thing, bad for us, bad for China and bad for the world because it may become a world war. And, in the context of the world today, when so much is said and so many efforts are made for disarmament, for peace etc. it will be a particularly bad thing for

⁴³ Karni Singh, Independent, wanted "to know what the situation would be if, God forbid, the Chinese take it into their heads one day to make a nuclear test in that part of Ladakh which may be Indian territory, but which may be in their hands at present. What would the Indian soldier feel if one day he finds himself confronted with an atomic burst when our country may not necessarily be prepared in that line because we do not believe in the atomic way of wars?" He suggested that India should carry out nuclear research "to an extent that, in an emergency, we can carry this research to its logical conclusion."

us who stood for disarmament and peace to talk in warlike terms.

It may be, some people imagine, that this shows cowardice, kayartha, that we do not talk in warlike terms. I would again remind them that some of the bravest of the brave in India who talked in the most warlike terms, ultimately, were defeated because of the better strategy, and better thinking and better weapons of the other party. It is better economy of the other party. Therefore, we have to think in modern terms and with modern minds.

Thinking in modern terms, the first thing is that everything should be done to avoid war because the consequences of that war will be very terrible for the world and for us especially. We do not want to enter any war if there is a war in the world unless circumstances force us, unless there is an attack on us. So, let us not talk vaguely and rather lightly about war. But, at the same time, conditions being what they are, we have to prepare for that.

I have told the House just now that I hate spending our hard-earned money, money which is required for development, for war planes and others. Each war plane may represent, I do not know, how many factories, how many plants, how many hospitals, how many things. Yet, we do it because the circumstances are such. But we do it without an excessive desire to spend that way. So, I do not myself see what other policy we can pursue except to hold fast to what we stand for and prepare our strength.

A great deal has been said: we must not talk to the Chinese unless they vacate. I refuse to accept that statement. I am quite clear about it. I am not such a child as to be made to say something which I think is fundamentally a wrong thing.

Hem Barua:⁴⁴ May I submit that you ...

Jawaharlal Nehru: Please let me go on. Please let me go on. (Interruption). It is a childish and infantile position to take up. First of all, there is a

⁴⁴ PSP.

difference between negotiation and talks. There is a world of difference. One should always talk, whatever happens, whatever the position and wherever the chances. If I have the chance to talk, I will talk to them. It is quite absurd not to talk. I sent for the Chinese Ambassador here.⁴⁵ He was going away. I gave him a farewell lunch. He came to my house. And it was said, "Oh, see how his relationship with the Chinese is; he has given lunch." That is an advice which I am never going to follow so long as I am in authority. About that I am quite clear.

Hem Barua: You yourself said like that on a previous occasion.

Jawaharlal Nehru: No, no, Nothing doing. I have never said that.

[Translation: Mani Ram Bagri:⁴⁶ Did he also sometime ... (Interruption).]

Jawaharlal Nehru: I make it perfectly clear. It is my practice to invite every retiring Ambassador to a meal. This Ambassador was the doyen of the corps⁴⁷ for sometime and I invited him and his wife to a meal. During the meal and afterwards I talked to him about the frontier situation. I did. Why should I be afraid of it? I told him that it was drifting badly and the least he could do was to avoid incidents. He could not settle it with me. I told him that otherwise it would be drifting to war. What effect it had, whether it had any effect on him is a different matter. He has no doubt reported to his Government. That is a thing which is always done. The Defence Minister⁴⁸ went to Geneva where there was also the Chinese Foreign Minister.⁴⁹ It was his absolute duty, I told him so, to meet him and talk to him. He could not negotiate. There is no question of any negotiation. At that time some little

⁴⁵ Pan Zili.

⁴⁶ See fn 314 in this section.

⁴⁷ The Diplomatic Corps in New Delhi.

⁴⁸ V.K. Krishna Menon

⁴⁹ Chen Yi. See SWJN/SS/77/item 403.

firing had taken place in the Galwan Valley. I told him that he must tell them that this thing was drifting and if they were not careful there would be war. He did so, quite rightly; he told them this when they met; there is very little time; the only time they meet in these places is at lunch or dinner. In Geneva he met the Chinese Foreign Minister once at breakfast and once at dinner. The others were present in these meetings. I am sorry to say that hon. Members who make much of it know nothing about the normal practice in the modern world, especially in Western countries and more especially in the diplomatic world. They seem to think that we must bring about untouchability in our relations and unapproachability everywhere. That is not the way diplomacy is carried on. The main point is that we must not take a wrong step by committing ourselves to anything wrong. If our case is strong, as I believe it is, we should shout it out at every opportunity and I should shout it out to the opponent also and make him see our views. I do not understand this approach; it is a dangerous approach because it makes people feel that by our standing in a corner we shall solve the world's problems and our own problems. It is quite absurd; I do not understand how this kind of idea enters people's heads. We have to live in the world as it is. It is difficult enough to follow the basic policies for which any individual stands. We have sometimes to compromise those basic policies but we cannot follow our policies or do anything if we take up the stand and say: we will not talk.

Now, there is a good deal of difference between negotiation and talking. Talking must always be encouraged wherever possible. Negotiation is a very formal thing; it requires a very suitable background; it should not be taken up unless a suitable background comes. That is what we have said. Talking is an entirely different thing. Talking may not yield any result, may be; at any rate it helps in understanding, in probing the other's mind. May be, the other probes your mind too. It helps in understanding. It may not yield any results. It is essential and preliminary for diplomats to deal with each other, even in wartime. I wonder how many of you realise that the ambassadors of the two countries like the United States of America and China which do not

recognise each other or, at any rate, the United States does not recognise China and is not at all favourably inclined to do it, have been meeting regularly for the last seven years in Warsaw and considering their problems. They have no ambassadors; there is no Chinese ambassador in Washington; nor an American ambassador in China. They chose Warsaw as the place where both the ambassadors talked and talked. Observe how they persisted in their talks for seven years. They have not become untouchables. I do not know and I cannot say but the latest I heard was that they were gradually approaching some kind of an understanding after six or seven years of talk—of course not a daily talk, but once a month or even at longer intervals. This thing is normally done by countries which are even inimical to each other because the only other way is to brace the sword at every provocation, jump into the arena, sword in hand; that is considered rather childish behaviour nowadays.

I have in the statement that I made in the beginning of this debate yesterday, made it perfectly clear as to what broadly our policy is and we propose to adhere to it and I should like the support of the House in carrying it out, as the House has been pleased to give it to me on previous occasions. But I want to say that this matter is obviously not a party matter, not a Congress matter. It is a national matter. Everybody agrees to that. Yet, I regret to say that it is sometimes treated as a party matter, in a party way. Sometimes the mere fact that Government is responsible for it makes them run down the Government and that, I consider, is not justified. We may be wrong: anybody may be wrong. I welcome the Members of the Opposition or Members of this side of the House to point that out privately and publicly as they like. But it is the mentality that I object to, the mentality of running down the Government in a matter of national importance, which leads, not to unity which everyone wants, but to disunity; it leads to things like the cessation of production, etc. All these things are wrong. When we talk about the frontier we talk bravely about all of us being together, and all the 45 crores standing as one man and facing it. When it comes to our normal activities, we are, 45 crores, constantly broken up into 45 crore parts; if not

so many, at least, to many parts. Unity or an attempt at unity does not mean not criticising at all; but still a different approach is essential. Every country does that. It is not a question of a socialist country or a capitalist country. I do feel that many of these criticisms that come from some of the opposite side, some Members on the opposite side, are based on a very radical difference in viewpoint. I cannot help it; they are welcome to have a different viewpoint. But when once I said that Shri Frank Anthony advocated our giving up the policy of non-alignment which I gathered from his speech, he said later that he did not mean that and that he was not for our giving it up. But whatever he has said even in his speech yesterday—it is a very forceful speech—was for giving up that policy; it can have no other meaning; it means that. And as for Maharaja of Kalahandi, he did talk about it. He did not use the word "non-alignment". But to get military aid is to become somebody else's dependant in that way. There was all the tall talk of courage of our 45 crore men when talking of getting military aid to defend our frontiers. If our country cannot defend itself and die if necessary in the attempt, then we are not either maintaining our honour or dignity or strength or capacity. We must be clear of the broad lines of the policy we pursue. It is clear that we must fight every aggression, whatever it is; it is clear to my mind.

What are the reasons for the Chinese Government doing like this? The reasons are still rather difficult to find. Everybody who sees me and meets me, American or English or any Press man here or a foreign Pressman, asks me: why do you think China has taken this step against India, losing the friendship of India which is a valuable thing at the most in the hope of getting some rare mountains? I have no answer to give them. I cannot. I can guess about various things, what is happening in Tibet, this and that; their old policy of spreading themselves out and their imagining, according to their own maps, that this is ours; let us know we are strong to pull others into submission, whatever it may be; because it is extraordinary to me. The more I think: of it, I realise how and why the Chinese have acted in this way. It is not a small matter that they should lose the goodwill of India. It is not

a small matter even for the 650 million of China. It is a big thing, and they have lost it. For what? They will continue in having it and as a consequence they are losing the goodwill of many other countries in Asia. They have lost a great deal.

A little territory by itself is neither here nor there except when that territory becomes a matter of honour. That is a different matter. What will they gain if they think that they can gain a little mountain territory from us? They will gain perpetual conflict; it is no small matter; perpetual ill will, and it may spread out to other countries. I think—and I thought so—perhaps they themselves will realise this: that they have gambled rather badly. Whatever their views may be, I am not able to find that out. But we in answer to that should refrain from gambling ourselves badly. We must act wisely; determinedly but wisely.

Hem Barua: Should we gamble at all?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, all life is a gamble and everything that one does is a gamble. They are gambles which are not wisely thought out. Everything is a gamble; our Five Year Plan is a gamble. Our future is a gamble. That is a different matter. But have a well-thought-out thing and be prepared to take the consequences. We have to proceed in that way. On no account must we do anything which will bring dishonour to India or weakness to India. I do not believe in surrendering anything that one has, whatever the consequences. That is true. But let us not call every bit of thing—if I talk to somebody—a surrender. It is childish nonsense, in may say so, and it is absurd for the Government if it is to be carried on in this way: do not talk; do not have tea with him; do not have lunch with him! Is this the way to carry on this great debate, this great argument, in this great conflict with another country? Are we to carry on by not having tea with somebody and not having meals with somebody else? The whole thing is fantastic. What does it mean?

But I can understand this; the hon. Members feel strongly about this issue,

as all of us should. If they think it is necessary to remind me that I should not weaken, I have no objection. I want to be strengthened by our goodwill and your strength. But what I fear is, as I said, there is the basic difference of opinion between the policy we have been pursuing, not today but all these years, and the policy of some hon. Members, and this basic difference of opinion comes out in their speeches and in their amendments which they have moved and it is this. Basically whatever they may say, they do not like our policy of non-alignment. They want the cold war to come in here and the cold war is bound to come in if we join up with somebody. The cold war will come in here not only with its other evils, weakening us in our defence and in our military position but with everything. That is the choice which this House should make. Therefore, we should choose carefully. We all agree that we must stand up to the aggression and we must do our utmost to get it vacated. Therein we agree. But what follows is either said explicitly or implicitly implied—we must join some military bloc to save us from this. That, I am not prepared to do. Even if disaster comes to us on the frontier, I am not prepared to do that, because I am not going to let India rely on a foreign army to save *its* territory. That, I am not prepared, whatever happens. I do not think that that contingency will arise. I think we are strong enough to resist and to prevent anybody coming, and I do not think that it can arise because of the world situation apart from our strength and many other reasons.

In the mountains, in Ladakh, the situation has arisen and we face it and we will continue to face it and continue to get over it and to push them out. That is a different matter. It may last years. I am not thinking of this crisis being resolved suddenly. It may last years unless some other developments take place and these internal or external developments, the world developments, take place. We must be prepared to face it for years. But that does not mean that we should leave our basic policies which I think are good and which have done us good and which are recognised to be good. May I say quite clearly that there is, and there has been, no question at all of our accepting the 1960 Chinese line or any other line. It is quite absurd.

But some hon. Members talked about our deep *interest* in spiritual, religious and other matters—Kailas and Mansarovar—and therefore, we should take our boundary up to Kailas and Mansarovar, up to Brahmaputra! That kind of thing has no meaning to an intelligent man. Only the unintelligent can say so. I regret to use that word. It has no meaning. We respect, we honour Kailas and Mansarovar. It has been my desire—I wrote in my book 30 years ago—one great desire to visit Mansarovar. But there it is. But I do not make Mansarovar or Kailas a zamindari of India *in* order to visit it. This idea is essentially a zamindari idea—by possessing something as a zamindari and bossing over it.

The world is moving out. I think even countries' boundaries do not count for much, not to speak of astronauts and cosmonauts who are going round and round. We live in a changing world. It is a little difficult for us to keep our minds up-to-date. It is difficult to understand what these cosmonauts mean. Two of them are going round and round, conversing with each other, conversing with the world.⁵⁰ What do they mean to this changing world? They do mean something: a mighty force has come into being, a mighty thing, both peaceful purposes and warlike purposes. We do not keep up-to-date. We still talk in terms of medieval ages. Most of us live too in terms of medieval ages. That is unfortunate and we have to come out: whether it is for five years plans, whether it is for our defence or whether it is for our progress, we have to think on modern terms.

I regret I am unable to accept those amendments which have been moved. There are some things in those amendments to which I have no exception, but I am unable to accept the whole background of those amendments. I believe we have been given an amendment approving of this Government's policy. If you permit that being taken up, I should like to support it.

P.K. Deo (Kalahandi): Most respectfully, I would request the Prime

⁵⁰ Referring to the two Soviet cosmonauts orbiting around the earth in separate spaceships, see item 8, fn 57.

Minister to make a statement to clear the misunderstanding that is prevalent in the country: that there would be no negotiation so long as the Chinese do not vacate the occupied places in India.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Yesterday morning I made a statement. I shall make no more categorical statement. I want freedom of action. I want to say it quite plainly. I say, first of all, that nothing can happen without this House being informed.

Secondly, we should agree that nothing should be done which, in the slightest degree, sullies the honour of India. For the rest, I want a free hand.

Hem Barua: The Prime Minister has made a reference to what he said yesterday. I have certain doubts about what he said yesterday. He said in one place about preliminary negotiations towards the relaxation of tension. May I know whether he proposes to have this on the basis of status quo? In another place, he said about negotiations on the basis of officials' reports. May I know on what basis—on the basis of the garbled and truncated version of the Chinese or on our report?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I cannot precisely say. I think the present situation in the frontier is such that we cannot have any serious talks with the Chinese. Therefore, I said, I am prepared to ask, whenever I have the chance to meet an important person, "If you are anxious, as we are, to have serious talks, a climate must be created for it." What is necessary for that climate, we may discuss.

Hem Barua: I just wanted to know for the enlightenment of the House and of the whole country, on the basis of which report negotiations would be held—on the basis of the garbled and truncated Chinese version or on the basis of our report?

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is a subsequent step. When we talk about it on the basis of the reports—plural—obviously we do not discuss it on the basis of one report, but on the basis of both reports. Obviously we stand by our report and of course, no doubt the other party will stand by its report. We will discuss both the reports. But that question does not arise; that climate has not arisen. It is in order to facilitate that climate to arise that we may—I do not say that we will—have some talks.⁵¹

406. In the Rajya Sabha: Chinese Occupation of Territory⁵²

Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:⁵³

- (a) the total area of the Indian territory under the unauthorised occupation of China;
- (b) the area of the Indian territory which was recovered from China during the last three years; and
- (c) the area of Indian territory which China has usurped during the last three years?

Jawaharlal Nehru:

(a) The nature of the terrain and other factors in that part of Ladakh which is at present under the unlawful occupation of China, make it difficult to give a precise estimate of the area seized by the Chinese. However, this area is about 10,000 to 12,000 square miles.

⁵¹ With regard to the amendment to the motion moved by P.K. Deo (see fn 307 in this section), the Speaker ruled that it had been disposed of, and added:

"Now, I think, because the hon. Members on the Opposition have also now expressed that the speech of the hon. Prime Minister was unexceptionable and was acceptable to every section of the House, there is no need for our passing any motion with regard to that. Everybody is agreed and supports everything that has been said by the Prime Minister. Therefore, there is no need for putting that motion to the House."

⁵² Written answers, 16 August 1962. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. 40, Nos. 1-8,6 to 16 August 1962, cols 1812-1814.

⁵³ Question by V.M. Chordia, Jan Sangh.

(b) Measures have been taken to stop further Chinese encroachments on Indian territory but Chinese forces have not withdrawn from positions already occupied by them.

(c) During the last three years the Chinese have established further military posts in an area of about 800-1,000 square miles but we also have our posts in this area so that there is no actual physical occupation of any large area except to the extent that each military post commands certain limited area in its vicinity.

407. In the Lok Sabha: Officials' Report of Border Dispute⁵⁴

Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:⁵⁵

(a) whether the Chinese version of the text of the report of the officials of India and China on the Sino-Indian border question has now been studied;⁵⁶

(b) If so, the reactions of Government; and

(c) what are the important points on which the report is at variance with our stand?

The Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs (Dinesh Singh): (a) Yes, Sir,

(b) The Report as published by the Chinese Government appears to be a faithful translation of the original text of our Report in English.

(c) No significant points of variance have been noticed between the Chinese version of the Report and the original Chinese and English texts.

⁵⁴ Written answers, 18 August 1962. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Third Series, Vol. 6, 6 to 18 August 1962, col. 2479.

⁵⁵ Question by Shree Narayan Das, Congress.

⁵⁶ For the Officials' Report, see SWJN/SS/66 Supplement.

408. China and San Francisco Conference - I⁵⁷

Please send me the paper relating to this matter which I received from the Lok Sabha Secretariat. I shall then send an answer to that.

2. Perhaps you could draft a brief statement on my behalf. This will be on the following lines.

I regret that there was a discrepancy in what I said in the course of my speech in the Lok Sabha on the 14th August.⁵⁸ In the small pamphlet on *Leading Events in India-China Relations*,⁵⁹ page 2, it is stated that "A Peace Treaty with Japan was signed at San Francisco by 49 nations (on the 8th September, 1951). India declined to attend the Conference because, among other reasons, China was not a party to it". In my reply to the debate in Parliament, I stated that non-attendance of India at the San Francisco Conference in regard to the Japanese Treaty had absolutely nothing to do with China. There is thus this discrepancy.

I have now referred to the old papers in connection with this Treaty. I find that among the reasons considered by us for not going to San Francisco was that there could not be peace in the Far East without China and the USSR being also parties to it.

When I made the speech, I had no recollection of this, and hence I committed an error which I greatly regret.

3. I find now that on the basis of what I said, a notice of a question of privilege has been tabled by Shri P.K. Deo.⁶⁰ If this comes up tomorrow, I shall make some such statement.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Note, 20 August 1962, for M.J. Desai, the Foreign Secretary.

⁵⁸ Item 405.

⁵⁹ *Leading Events in India-China Relations, 1947-1962* (New Delhi: GOI, MEA, 1962).

⁶⁰ Swatantra Party.

⁶¹ See also item 409.

409. China and San Francisco Conference - II⁶²

Notice of a question of privilege tabled by Shri P.K. Deo, MP.

Shri P.K. Deo's previous notice was received by me two or three days ago. As there was an obvious discrepancy in what I said in the Lok Sabha and in what was given in the pamphlet issued by External Affairs, as stated by Shri P.K. Deo, I have had reference made to this-matter from our old papers. From these I find that there were a number of reasons which led us to not to associate ourselves with the San Francisco Treaty. Among these reasons was also our feeling that peace in the Far East required the association of China and the USSR.

2. Thus, what I stated in my reply in the Lok Sabha was not quite correct, and the statement in the pamphlet was correct. I greatly regret that, owing to a lapse of memory, I made this mistake.

3. I am prepared to make a statement on the above lines in the Lok Sabha.⁶³

410. No Fraternising with Chinese Troops on Border⁶⁴

[Note, 21 August 1962, from M.J. Desai, the Foreign Secretary, begins]

Please see the further sitrep received today placed below.

2. I told General Thapar⁶⁵ and, later Defence Minister⁶⁶ that this meeting should not have been held, that this fraternising prejudiced our position and that there can be no question of our accepting the Chinese posts in these areas and co-existing with them. Nor should we do anything which gives them a position of dictating to us what facilities they will permit to our posts.

⁶² Note, 20 August 1962, for the Lok Sabha Secretariat.

⁶³ See also item 408.

⁶⁴ Noting, 21 August 1962. MEA, Historical Division, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute* Volume VI, Part III, (Chinese Incursions into Indian Territory), (April 1962-October 1962), Notes, p.31.

⁶⁵ P.N. Thapar, Chief of the Army Staff.

⁶⁶ V.K. Krishna Menon.

3. No further meetings of this kind will be held. Defence Minister did not, however, feel that, there had been anything seriously wrong in this meeting.⁶⁷

M.J. Desai

21-8-1962

[Prime Minister]

[Note, 21 August 1962, from M.J. Desai, the Foreign Secretary, ends]

[Note, 21 August 1962, by Nehru, begins]

I agree that we should not encourage fraternising.

J. Nehru

21-8-1962

[Note, 21 August 1962, by Nehru, ends]

411. In the Rajya Sabha: Border Situation⁶⁸

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Chairman,⁶⁹ Sir, I beg to move:

"That the situation along the India-China Border, particularly in the Ladakh region, be taken into consideration."

Before dealing with this subject, perhaps you will permit me, Sir, to refer to one or two developments of international significance, which have no relation to this subject, but I feel the House will perhaps appreciate my references. One is the recent agreement arrived at between the Indonesian Government and the Government of the Netherlands in regard to West Irian. I should like to congratulate both those Governments on the peaceful settlement of a very difficult and delicate problem and—I should like to add—more especially congratulate the Secretary—General of the United Nations, U Thant, who took the initiative in this matter, and also, if I may,

⁶⁷ See appendix 42.

⁶⁸ Motion, 22 August 1962. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. 40, Nos. 9-16, 17 to 29 August 1962, cols 2876-2882, 2981-3002.

⁶⁹ Zakir Husain.

Mr Bunker, who played an important role in these negotiations.⁷⁰ This removes one source of conflict in South-East Asia. A little while ago there was the Laos settlement, which also has removed another source of conflict in South-East Asia. There are still other conflicts going on in South-East Asia, but the settlement of these two is a matter of good augury for the peace of South-East Asia, and we are particularly happy not only because of our intimate contacts with the countries concerned but also because, in a sense, we are part of South-East Asia, and we earnestly hope that there will be peace there.

Another matter I should like to refer to is the recent de jure transfer of Pondicherry to India. This matter has been pending for a large number of years, and most of us and many Members of this House must have felt rather frustrated at the great delay in this transfer. But ultimately it has taken place. We realised then and we realise now that France was going through a difficult period, and there have been big constitutional changes in France and therefore, although we pressed for it, reminded them of it, we did not wish to say or do anything which might injure our relations with France. I am glad that the policy of patience pursued by us has led to a successful result. Now, Pondicherry and the other old French Settlements are part of India, and presently the matter will come up before this House in another form.⁷¹ But the main thing is, we have done this, in accordance with our habit and practice, peacefully and without injuring in any way our relations with France, and I should like to express my appreciation of the French Government and specially of its eminent President, President de Gaulle.

Sir, coming to the subject of my motion, there is little that is new that I can place before the House. On the first day of this session of Parliament I made

⁷⁰ Ellsworth Bunker, US diplomat and a former Ambassador to India, negotiated an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia leading to the transfer of control of West Irian to the UN on 15 August 1962, as a preliminary step before it was turned over to Indonesia.

a brief statement in this House as well as in the other and placed the latest *White Paper*⁷² on this question. That brought matters up to date so far as the giving of information is concerned. Subsequently, in the last few days there has been a debate in the other House also. Now, nothing in the shape of incidents has happened since then. The position remains much the same. There have been certain charges and counter-charges of firing taking place. But apparently if this took place, it took place at some long distance and it hurt nobody. At the present moment, therefore, the situation remains much as it was and I cannot say if it has definitely improved; it has certainly not grown any worse.

There are some indications—I do not know how far they are likely to be correct—that our post at Galwan may be reached by a column that we had sent by road. Meanwhile they have been sent supplies by air regularly and there is no lack of supplies to any of our military posts. In spite of the fact that the situation has not grown worse, essentially the situation is a bad one, is a serious one by the mere fact that, according to us, a large part of our territory is under Chinese occupation and so long as that continues the situation is bound to be exceedingly serious.

We have followed in the last few months and years, in fact, the policy of trying to strengthen ourselves to meet this menace, strengthen ourselves in various ways more especially on the borders themselves, by building road communications and the rest and by putting up posts, and at the same time not giving up our hope that it may be settled by peaceful means. We follow this dual policy because we feel, apart from our general feeling, that war, as is usually undesirable, is peculiarly so in the present age with the development of weapons, and because of the fact that India and China are so situated, any war between them would be disastrous for both and would

⁷² On 4 September 1962, Nehru introduced the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha regarding incorporation of Pondicherry into the Indian Union, see item 159. The Bill as passed by that House was moved by Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Home Minister, in the Rajya Sabha on 7 September 1962 for its consideration.

be a very prolonged war. We do not want a war as I have said often enough, nor do we want any occupation of our territory by a foreign power. We have, therefore, to proceed on these dual lines. It may be a little difficult to achieve our objective in the near future and we must, therefore, be prepared for some time to elapse before we achieve it.

I just mentioned two cases, one was of West Irian which for ten years has been a matter of conflict. It has at last been settled. And even on the Pondicherry issue, many of our friends sometimes asked us to deliver ultimatums to the French Government. But we thought we would settle it peacefully and we have succeeded.

Now, the present position is that in the military sense we are much stronger than we were a year or two ago. We have put up a certain barrier to further encroachment or aggression and we, I think, in regard to these communications and other factors, will increase our strength in the future but we do not intend to bring about a major conflict on our part. Of course, if the other party takes some steps to that end, we shall face it naturally. I still think that our case is so good that under a proper consideration I do not see any adequate reply to it.

The Chinese make charges that we have occupied their territory, that we committed air violations because of our planes flying over their territory. They say that they have always had that territory. I do not understand on what basis they say that, because it is quite clear that ten or twelve years ago, anyhow, they were not there, not even in Tibet. It was after they went into Tibet and took possession of it that they reached these frontiers.

Now, the old Tibetan Government did not lay any claim to these wide territories in Ladakh. There were one or two points on our frontier about which there was some argument with the old Tibetan Government, long-standing arguments. They were small points here and there. They never laid claim to it. Now, the Chinese apparently are there, and the Chinese Government is a successor to the old Tibetan Government and they claim this as a part of China which means part of China through its being part of Tibet. Obviously, they were not there; they were not in Tibet at all.

They came to Tibet about ten or eleven years ago and after that. But for some years there was no particular move on their part in this direction. Round about 1957 they are said to have made that road in the north-east corner of Aksai Chin, that is, made road over a caravan track. And it was really in 1957 that they marched into eastern Ladakh in a big way. There can be no doubt that they were not there before. So, I do not understand the argument of the Chinese that they have been in possession of these areas in the past and continuously, as they say. May be, it is some metaphysical conception of the Chinese Empire which existed in the past ages. Even that does not hold water as the report of our officials clearly demonstrated and the abundance of arguments and evidence that they have placed, which they have probably seen.

I need not before this House justify our claim because I take it everybody realises, apart from the sentiment of it and the proof that has been produced in regard to it, the validity and strength of our position in regard to these areas. The question arises, therefore, what we should do about it. As I have ventured to state, our approach is a dual one, one is to go on strengthening ourselves and holding, as far as possible, the Chinese and at the same time to explore such avenues as we can find to achieve a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. It is not an easy matter. I realise that. It may take time, but it is better for it to take some time than for us to plunge into war. The main thing is we cannot acknowledge, or in any sense bow to their aggression, surrender to it or acknowledge it and we must strengthen ourselves to meet them in any way that it becomes necessary.

I had once said and asked them, in order to prepare for fruitful talks and negotiations, to withdraw. That is, I had suggested that both sides should withdraw to the line of the other side, to the map line of the other side. That would have left a large area unoccupied by the military forces and there would be no question of any conflict and we could then consider the matter, consider the evidence and other factors concerning this place. The Chinese Government at the time did not agree with that proposal because obviously it involved their withdrawing over a large area and our withdrawing over a

very small area. I hope they will consider that because that, I think, is the fairest and the most reasonable request and it does not, in any sense, bring or lead to any, if I may use a popular phrase, loss of face of any party because it is obvious that while this major aggression exists, it is not possible to have any fruitful negotiations. We cannot negotiate when there is active tension, etc. Therefore, we have suggested or we are going to suggest to them that in order to prepare the ground for fruitful talks on the main subject, the first thing to consider is how to create a situation which will be free from tension and which will involve withdrawal and for that we are prepared to talk on this limited issue. If it leads to anything further, then further talks may be indulged in. That is our present position. I may say that the last Chinese letter came dated the 4th August. I have said the last but it is not the last because since then several have come—complaints—subsequent letters are complaints of our air violation on their space and one or two charges of our people in Ladakh firing at them and so on but they are charges. The main letter came on the 4th August. To that no reply has yet been sent by us. Probably, we shall send it on the lines I have indicated fairly soon. That is the position. I do not wish to take up the time of the House now in repeating what I have previously said many times because it will be better for hon. Members to have more time for their comments and criticisms so that I can deal with them and reply to them at the end of the debate. I beg to move, Sir.

The question was proposed.

[Omitted: Speeches by various MPs]

Deputy Chairman:⁷³ Hon. Prime Minister.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Madam Deputy Chairman, first of all may I endeavour to clear up some misunderstandings that may have arisen? Prof.

⁷³ Violet Alva.

Ruthnaswamy⁷⁴ advised me not to indulge in vituperation. As an example of vituperation he said I had called possibly...

M. Ruthnaswamy: I took care to say that the vituperative vocabulary of the Prime Minister is rather limited.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That may be so. But he gave examples of it, because I had called some statement of a colleague of his in the other House nonsense. I do not quite know if he expects me to applaud statements made by his colleague, which I consider nonsensical. I do not think "nonsensical" to be exactly vituperation. It is often a statement of fact so far as his Party is concerned.

Then, another thing which he took exception to was my referring to the leader of his Party in the other House as the gallant Maharaja.⁷⁵ I thought that was hundred per cent parliamentary. I really do not know whether he objects to his being gallant or being a Maharaja. I for my part would welcome the day when Maharajas cease altogether in this country. That is a different matter. But so long as they are there, I am entitled to call them Maharajas.

Then, another gentleman, Shri Khobaragade,⁷⁶ objected to my calling some argument infantile.⁷⁷ Well, I confess that the word I used seemed to me to fit the argument raised. The argument was, I said, infantile. I did not call anybody infantile. I said it about this argument of not having tea with somebody, of my not inviting the Chinese Ambassador, or the Defence Minister not speaking to somebody. Quite apart from the fact that it is not good manners, it is not modern diplomacy. It is a perfectly infantile way of

⁷⁴ M. Ruthnaswamy, Swatantra Party.

⁷⁵ Nehru had used the expressions, taken exception to by M. Ruthnaswamy, in his speech in the Lok Sabha on 14 August while rebutting the arguments of P.K. Deo, the Maharaja of Kalahandi, see item 405.

⁷⁶ Bhaurao Dewaji Khobaragade, Republican Party of India.

⁷⁷ See item 405.

dealing with a serious problem and I repeat that—this kind of approach. And I gave as an example two countries which are entirely opposed to each other, more opposed than any two other countries probably are, that is, the United States of America and China. For many years their Ambassadors have been talking at Warsaw. They do not recognise each other, mind you. They have no official dealings with each other, no representatives. Yet because they had no representatives they tried to meet in Warsaw. Their Ambassadors for years now have been meeting every month, sometimes every week, and trying to discuss problems. That is the normal way. This kind of thing is a relic of our ideas of untouchability, something which has been put an end to in our Constitution, to say that you must not talk to somebody, you must not have tea with somebody. I confess I have never heard of this before in my life in any circle in any country. I confess it must be due to some relic of the caste system here and untouchability. Whether you are friendly with a person or you are hostile or inimical, you have to deal with him. You may have to deal with him in battle, but otherwise you have to deal with him in the council chamber and other places, discuss with him. In what form you deal with him depends on circumstances and it is nothing short of absurdity to say; "Oh, you must not do this till he conforms to all your wishes." That is not the way any country, even the mightiest in the world, deals with any other country.

Then, may I say that I welcome very much what the hon. Member, Shri Jairamadas,⁷⁸ said about the approach to this question? He was good enough to say a good deal about me. I am not referring to that part of his speech. But rather when we are dealing with any serious problem—even when we are dealing as between individuals but more so when we are dealing with national problems, great nations opposed to each other—it is never right, if I may say so—we may fight, if necessity arises one fights, or wish to run down the other party—to curse it and to use strong language. Of course, one may do so in our own circle and it sounds all right. We may do

⁷⁸ Jairamadas Daulatram, Nominated.

so at a meeting in the Ramlila grounds here, it sounds all right, and we enthuse people by it. One always enthuses people by cursing somebody else or some other country. But when that voice of ours and that language of ours reaches that particular country as well as other countries, then it does not produce the right result. It is obvious that by our strong language we do not frighten the other country or defeat it. If we have to gain what we seek to gain, apart from the field of battle, we have to do it by talking to it—there is no other way—by political pressures, military pressures or other pressures. There is no other way. And if we merely shut the door to any such approach and also when we create a position by our language or other acts—the other party or ourselves, it applies to the other party too using that language—when it becomes a tremendous question of honour and prestige—that is how language makes it a question of honour and prestige when the other party does not give in at all, when it might otherwise—that is entirely opposed to all the training I had in the past. Shri Jairamdas Daulatram referred to the Gandhian period of our struggle for independence. Gandhiji was not a weakling, nobody called him a weakling, but he was always soft in his language and tried to win over the other party. Take even our reactions to China. Why are our reactions so strong and angry? Certainly it would be because they have occupied our territory. But I venture to submit that the real reason for our anger is not even that. It is the way they have done it and the way they have behaved and the way they have treated us, our country. It is conceivable that they could have claimed a frontier revision or something and asked us for talks without occupying it. But after all that we had done for them it would seem a peculiarly ungracious thing for them to behave in this way. That has hurt us apart from the major hurt of their occupying the territory. They knew very well, I am not going into the rights and wrongs of this question, I am convinced that we are right, but apart from that they knew absolutely what our frontier was according to us, according to our maps. Our maps have not varied like theirs every few months or few years. Our maps have been there clearly defined, good maps which have been handed to them. Their attention has been

drawn to them and for years past they never really challenged them. They did not accept them, I will admit that, and they said their own maps should be considered afresh, their old maps and all that. But they knew very well what our maps were, where our boundaries were. I do submit, quite apart from the merits of the question, that it was utterly and absolutely wrong for them then to cross those boundaries without reference to us or without telling us that this is so and afterwards, when we raised this question, to produce maps which go on changing from year to year.

So, my point is that we must be as strong as we like in our expressions but not use language which needlessly hurts national prestige, because that makes it frightfully difficult for any kind of talks or any kind of possible, if it is possible, settlement to be arrived at. This applies to every country. In other words, we must not indulge in what is commonly known as the language of the cold war. The cold war does not help. You may disagree with a person, you may even fight him, but the language of the cold war is the language, if I may say so with all respect, of lack of civilisation. We should behave in a civilised manner. Civilised manner does not mean behaving weakly, but it ultimately helps, and it is becoming for civilised countries to behave in a civilised manner.

Then there are one or two other matters. Mr Mani⁷⁹ asked us about our publicity about this matter. I am sorry that our publicity has not reached him, but we have issued a number of pamphlets and books on this subject which have been widely circulated and often translated in French, Spanish, Arabic, Sinhalese, Burmese, Nepalese and Japanese among other languages. As for the All India Radio, the Radio broadcasts daily in Mandarin and separately in Cantonese, two broadcasts directed to China, one in Mandarin for 45 minutes, one in Cantonese for 45 minutes; one in Tibetan for 45 minutes; one in English but directed to China, Korea and Japan for an hour, daily. In South East Asia the daily broadcasts are: Indonesian or Bahasa as it is called for one and a quarter hours daily; Burmese for 1 hour

⁷⁹ A.D. Mani, Independent.

35 minutes daily; English for South East Asia for one and a half hours and French news for Indo China etc. for 15 minutes daily.

A.D. Mani: May I draw the attention of the Prime Minister to a statement made by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting⁸⁰ in the Lok Sabha on June 11th? I am reading from a newspaper report. "All India Radio does not intend to launch any special broadcast to counter the Chinese broadcasts beamed to India and other Asiatic countries."

This was stated by Dr Gopala Reddi in answer to a question from Mr D.N. Tiwari⁸¹ in Lok Sabha. This is the basis on which I made the statement that the AIR was not putting out broadcasts.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That I do not know. Presumably it means a special broadcast about the frontier question. These broadcasts, as I said, are broadcasts generally putting the Indian viewpoint, Indian news, Indian everything, to China and South East Asia in the course of which the frontier question also comes up. The hon. Member will appreciate that this kind of direct broadcasts for a particular matter have less effect, have less publicity value than in a general broadcast of news etc., something being said relating to the frontier.

Then reference was made to our letter of the 26th July.⁸² I really do not understand it. I have no doubt that some Members could have perhaps worded it better, but I really do not understand why so much stress has been laid on the fact that it has said something else than what it was meant to do. Possibly this is due to the fact that some newspapers went on

⁸⁰ B. Gopala Reddy.

⁸¹ Congress.

⁸² A.B. Vajpayee, Jan Sangh, had questioned the wisdom of asking the Chinese, in the GOI note of 26 July 1962, to return to the Chou En-lai claim-line of 1956, since India's stand all along had been that Chinese forces should go back to the international frontier. For the GOI note of 26 July 1962, see *White Paper No. VII*, pp. 3-4.

repeating without rhyme or reason that it did so. As an hon. Member quoted it, apart from that, the very next paragraph made that further clear. It is obvious that the whole point of reference to the Chou En-lai map claim-line was to show that they have been misbehaving still further. It has nothing to do with our accepting that line. That is absurd, to say that it conflicts with all that we have said or that we are likely to say. But it was to lay stress that they are, even according to their own Prime Minister's statement, committing aggression. That surely does not mean that we admit the previous aggression.

The hon. Member, Mr Vajpayee, quoted a Burmese daily about Chip Chap Valley or River.⁸³ The Burmese daily—that is what he quoted from—it was a quotation in the Burmese daily of a Chinese newspaper. Subsequently, that same Burmese daily gave, when its attention was drawn to it, a full statement about the Indian position in regard to the Chip Chap Valley. Shri Vajpayee referred to my reference to South East Asian countries. I should like to say that if any impression has been created in his mind or in any mind of any discourteous reference of mine to South East Asia countries, I am sorry, because I did not certainly mean it. I could not have meant it because we have very friendly and cordial relations with all these countries. I did not mean it. Some of these countries and the SEATO are tied up with military alliances. And as the House will know, the SEATO has not done any wonders in South East Asia. In fact, according to us, the coming of SEATO has made the position worse in South East Asia. It has not helped at all. However that may be, I was referring to this position that some are in the SEATO and others are non-aligned more or less. Others may, without belonging to any military alliance, incline one way or the other. We may agree with them here and there, and in some matters we may not. But Mr Vajpayee is quite right in saying that anything that might be construed as any discourtesy, any reference, is quite wrong, and I

⁸³ Vajpayee said that Burma was experiencing China's influence in the region, which is why a newspaper published by the Information Department of the Burmese Government had written that Chip Chap Valley belonged to China.

certainly did not mean it. Of course, we have very good relations with them. Then, an hon. Member—I forget who it was—asked me: When I ask for a free hand, what kind of freedom do I want?⁸⁴ My reference to a free hand was in relation to an amendment that had been moved which wanted to tie me up to that amendment. I said that I was not going to accept that amendment, that I wanted a free hand subject, of course, to the basic things that we stood for.⁸⁵ But it is absurd to ask a person to deal with a matter and tie him up hand and foot. He cannot deal with the matter. He must have some freedom to manoeuvre.

Now, most of the speeches in this House, apart from stressing this aspect or that aspect, have not been radically different, and I think I may well say that broadly, the policy pursued by us has been approved, although Mr Vajpayee's amendment is [a] thorough disapproval of almost everything that has been done or may be done.⁸⁶ That is my difficulty because hon.

⁸⁴ This was asked by A.B. Vajpayee.

⁸⁵ Nehru had used this expression in his speech in the Lok Sabha on 14 August 1962, see item 405.

⁸⁶ A.B. Vajpayee's amendment read: "That at the end of the Motion the following be added, namely:-

'and having considered the same, this House is of the opinion-

(i) that Government's China policy has been a dismal failure inasmuch as full eight years after China committed its first act of blatant aggression on Indian soil by constructing the Aksai Chin highway across our territory, Government has not merely failed to redeem Chinese-occupied territory but has been unable to check-mate China's continuing forays and encroachments and, more deplorably still, continues to betray an utter confusion of mind and suicidal illusions in respect of Chinese objectives and intentions, with the result that our attitudes very often seem humiliatingly incongruous with the situation, provide positive encouragement to the aggressor in its misdoings and undermine our prestige and credit in the eyes of world opinion and particularly of our neighbouring countries in Asia;

(ii) that the policy enunciated by the Prime Minister recently in respect of unconditional talks acting as a prelude to further negotiations constitutes a major and retrograde departure from the hitherto avowed Government

Members talk in contradictory languages sometimes. They approve of it and yet they put something in writing or in words which is not only disapproval but condemnation. I have tried to understand their mentality and all this leaves me to think that there is a fundamental difference in our approach which comes out. Even though it may overlap sometimes, it comes out. There is a fundamental difference in our approach. In spite of what the hon. Members of the Communist Party have said, there is a fundamental difference—not in this particular matter—in our approach to some of these problems. It comes out occasionally. Take the *Swadhinata* cartoon to which reference has been made.⁸⁷ It may or may not refer to this matter but it is

policy about negotiations;

(iii) that the Note of July 26, 1962, sent to China seriously compromised India's position because the Note, as drafted, impliedly committed India to acceptance of China's claim-line of 1956 and was, therefore, tantamount to a virtual offer to cede a major part of the occupied area; but welcomes the Prime Minister's subsequent affirmation that India would not accept anything other than the traditional international boundary as the basis of any talks;

(iv) that the continuing acts of aggression by China and the content and tone of its communications to India make it amply clear that China has not the slightest intention of relenting its hold on the Indian territory it has surreptitiously or forcibly seized;

(v) that in the face of the Chinese attitude, Government's present probings for opening of talks, whether in the form of the Defence Minister's parleys with the Chinese Foreign Minister, or as indicated by the Prime Minister's recent pronouncements, reflect adversely on India's self-respect, smack of a policy of abject appeasement and serve only to whet the aggressor's appetite; and this House, therefore, calls for an abandonment of this policy and a categorical declaration by Government that vacation of aggression by China is an absolute pre-requisite for negotiations'."

⁸⁷ On 22 August 1962, B.K.P. Sinha and Akbar Ali Khan, both Congress, alleged that a cartoon in the Independence Day number of the CPI journal *Swadhinata* (Calcutta) depicted "the famished or starving Indians" being fed by armed Chinese soldiers at the border. Calling the CPI "Trojan horses," Sinha said "this is how the organs of that party are trying to break the will of the Indian people to resist aggression on the country's borders."

a highly objectionable thing, and he may not agree with it.

Bhupesh Gupta: I would ask the Prime Minister not to give an opinion. I shall find out and send him this thing. And if it is wrong, we shall admit the mistake.⁸⁸

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am merely saying that the ideas of the members of the Communist Party perhaps on non-alignment may somewhat differ from mine, although they may ... (Interruption).

Bhupesh Gupta: We support everything that you say in that respect.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I said, they may differ. So also, when Mr Vajpayee expresses agreement on non-alignment, I have some doubts in my mind about his idea of non-alignment.

A.B. Vajpayee: May I know what the doubts are?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I would submit that your amendment itself indicates the doubts.

A.B. Vajpayee: No, my amendment has nothing to do with the foreign policy or non-alignment. It is confined to the Government's China

Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 40, Nos. 9-16, August 17-29, 1962, cols 2913- 2915 and 2954-2956.

⁸⁸ Bhupesh Gupta, CPI, said in the Rajya Sabha on 24 August 1962 that what the Congress MPs had referred to in the House on 22 August was "not a cartoon, but a pictorial representation of a very important concept of our political theory, namely the alliance of the workers and peasants for the progress of the people." He pointed out that the cartoon showed workers on the one side and peasants on the other, and not the Chinese soldiers. He added that *Swadhinata* had carried the same sketch even in one of its issues in 1954, before the border problem with China began. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. 40, Nos. 9-16, August 17-29, 1962, cols 3123-3128.

policy only.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is true but it is all part of the whole.

Some hon. Member—Mr Khobaragade, I think suddenly in the middle of other things just put in one sentence: "Why don't you take military help from other countries?", which, of course, is basically and fundamentally opposed to a non-alignment policy. Taking military help means practically becoming aligned to that country. So, at the back of their minds there is that thing lurking which leads, them, I think, to utterly wrong conclusions.

B.D. Khobaragade: No, Madam, I would just like to know from the hon. Prime Minister what steps they are going to take to train people and strengthen our military defences, because in spite of these protests and our desire to settle those problems by peaceful negotiations, the incursions are going on. Even the hon. Prime Minister had said two months back that he had some sort of a hunch that China desired some sort of peaceful settlement. But even then, there have been fresh incursions. Suppose tomorrow also fresh incursions take place, what steps are you going to take to strengthen our defences and our military position? Or should we allow China to make fresh incursions again into our country?

Deputy Chairman: Your statement is being interpreted.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am sorry that I have not quite understood what the hon. Member has said. It is my fault. But I should like to assure, first of all, that this question of our trouble with China on our border is a military question and a political question; there are many other aspects of it as well. Limiting it to the military aspect, I should like the hon. Member, if he has ever considered military matters, to consider as to what country, and how, can give us military aid in this particular matter. In one way, of course, they can give it, by having a world war and diverting attention. But that is a

different matter. About the defence of our frontier, how can any other country help us? They can help us in one way, if we are prepared to take it. That is they can give us free the things we want whatever they may be, aircraft or other things. But otherwise, how do you expect any big country or small country to send their armies to our North East frontiers to protect them? Obviously not. (Interruption). That is what I have said. They may send us some equipment, may be some aircraft, if we are prepared to accept it. And the cost we pay for it, not in money but in other ways, will be far greater than its possible value. I am looking at it purely from the practical point of view, and the cost of it will be far greater, and it will weaken us ultimately, weaken us actually in fighting on the frontier, apart from other ways. It surprises me that these patent facts are not obvious to everybody. Of course, the sympathy of the countries is always welcome, and it helps us. I think we have the sympathetic understanding on this issue of many countries.

Some hon. Members have referred here and elsewhere to the countries of South East Asia and to Nepal and said that we ought to be able to convince them to act differently than they have done in some matters. Well, I do not wish to go into each individual country's policy. That is for them to determine but it is not an easy matter. We either bring pressure on them which has the wrong results or we seek to make them understand our policy and, I believe, normally we succeed. But they have to deal with all kinds of pressures on themselves, sometimes the pressures may lead them in other directions. Broadly speaking, most countries, whether in Asia or Europe, understand our position in this and sympathise with us. But there are very few of them which can really help us except that it may be in regard to military equipment. We take military equipment from countries, we buy it. But the few crores that we may save if we got those military equipment as a gift would be far outbalanced by the tremendous loss in prestige, in position and even in sympathy that we may have from the rest of the world. It is obvious. Therefore, it is essential, so far as I see, for us to maintain our non-alignment policy and retain the friendship of all nations on that basis.

Now it is agreed—and there is nothing much that I can say—about the broad features of this policy as applied to the frontier, that is, to strengthen our defences, and at the same time be always ready for any opportunity that might lead to fruitful results in the way of a settlement. I must say, looking at it at the present moment, that the prospects are not good. But that should not lead me to jump into a wrong direction. May be later, because of various things happening including our own position, as it improves, it may lead us to better results. We may have to wait for it.

Again to say that we must not negotiate and not have talks seems to me very unrealistic. You may say that negotiation should come at the right moment—what the right moment is, you cannot exactly define; broadly you may indicate it; that is all right—because negotiations at the wrong moment may injure us. That I accept. But you cannot rule out negotiations, much less can you rule out talks. It is an attitude; it is a brave attitude but not a wise one. Hon. Members should remember that in our history there has been no lack of courage, tremendous courage, superhuman courage, but tremendous lack of wisdom, which has made that courage to lose in the conflict. That is our history. Whether it is the Rajputs or others, there was no lack of courage, but the Rajputs did not win in the end because they did not understand things. They lived in a world of their own; they did not know that the world was progressing, and as I said in the other House, they did not have, and even the Marhattas, gallant as they were, did not have a decent map of India, while a handful of Europeans, Frenchmen and others, in this country, had much better maps, had much better informers. In every Court in India they had their spies informing them, paid spies, and sometimes the Ministers of the Court were their spies, of the English people and the French, specially the English, apart from the fact that they had better weapons, modern weapons, and the other people simply talked about hordes. And the result was natural; with all the courage in the world they could not face the superior weapons and superior organisation and knowledge. It is extraordinary, if you read history, how you find it, how these people fought great battles—and were fine persons—without a map even, without

knowing where they have to go to and knowing little beyond their borders. So, we have to look at the position today realistically. Certainly the personal element is of the greatest importance—determination, courage, unity, etc. But in war we have to deal with modern weapons, not only modern weapons but other modern equipment, and in effect, today a war is something very different from a few armies fighting it. It is a war of peoples. Not that I want it—I am merely saying that; it becomes a nation in arms. It means the development of industry, the economy and all that, and therefore, preparation for adding to your strength means developing your economy and industry essentially. It is not that we get a few guns or a few aircraft from another country and we defend our country. What happens if those aircraft are destroyed, or do not fly? Then we are helpless. We have nothing to fall back upon. So, it is better to have slightly second rate arms with a nation behind them and producing them than rely on things supplied from outside, which may or may not come at the right moment, or the spares may not be there in hand. That is why our policy has been to build up defence industries, to build up defence equipment, and all that, and we have done that, not only in rather showy things, such as the supersonic aircraft, HF 24, that we have built at Bangalore—that is certainly a great feat for us to accomplish—but in hundreds of other things. The wartime equipment that we are making in our ordnance factories today were not made before. We started at the time of independence practically from scratch, because the British policy previously was to supply everything to us, everything including ideas, including policies—policies and ideas were made in Whitehall—everything came. Only in the last War some kind of simple ammunition was made in this country, because they could not get it from elsewhere. So, we started almost from scratch, and we have built it up and we have built it up well, and we have got some very fine specialised men, engineers, etc., in the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, so that we have to take all these into consideration.

Some hon. Member referred to Marshal Chen-Yi⁸⁹ talking about 650 million people not doing this or that. Well, with all respect to Marshal Chen-Yi that does not impress anybody, that kind of saying, nor does it impress me.

When somebody tells me that we have got 45 crores of men, that we will stand as a man, it does not impress me at all. That is a source of weakness, not of strength unless those people are well-trained and well-fed and the country's economy is good. That is a source of strength, not numbers.

Numbers have always been a source of weakness to India.

Another thing; Shri Vajpayee referred, and others have referred, to what the Defence Minister⁹⁰ is reported to have said, namely, that a great part of Ladakh was unoccupied. Now, I really am surprised that they do not understand what the simple phrase means. He was asked what part of Ladakh was occupied by the Chinese forces. And the answer was that a great part of Ladakh was unoccupied, that is, even where the Chinese are, they have got only military posts here and there. And you may draw an imaginary line and say that all the land behind them is occupied or not. It may be, to some extent, under their control, but it is not correct to say that they occupied all the land. In fact, since then, part of the area which we thought was under their control, has come under our control. Out of 12,000 or so, about 2,500 square miles have, in a sense, in that vague sense, come under our control because of our posts. So he said "unoccupied", not meaning uninhabited. Their posts are there-there of course it is uninhabited but not actually occupied by the Chinese, which is perfectly a correct statement.

A.B. Vajpayee: May I know then why no contradiction was issued?

The Prime Minister is giving quite a different version.

Jawaharlal Nehru: What?

⁸⁹ The Foreign Minister of China.

⁹⁰ V.K. Krishna Menon.

A.B. Vajpayee: The way in which the Defence Minister's statement was reported, it created an impression that he was referring to our own territory as being unoccupied. We should have issued a contradiction immediately.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Contradiction of what? I do not understand.

A.B. Vajpayee: That the Defence Minister made the statement in reply to a question whether the whole of Ladakh was occupied by the Chinese or not.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I confess I do not know. Perhaps, he is completely right. We should not use the English language—as I understand English, there is only one meaning and no other meaning—if people should pretend not to understand a simple phrase. The question and answer were given in the papers. It never struck me as anything else. But the fact of the matter is, as some hon. Members said today, some people have got an allergy for the Defence Minister, and they try to exploit every little phrase, every word that he says, in an attempt to show off their allergy. As a matter of fact, the growth of modern arms and production in the defence industries, the scientific progress in defence, is almost entirely due to our present Defence Minister who has taken great interest in it. Naturally, it is due to the fact that we have good men, good engineers and others who can do it, otherwise it is all his work.

I would like to say a few words about the background of this frontier trouble. As everyone knows, Ladakh is a part of Kashmir and Kashmir was a State under a Maharaja and the defence of Kashmir lay with the Maharaja except when necessity arose—in British times—the Government of India might be called upon to help. There was no fear in those days of any attack from the Tibet side or from any side in fact on Kashmir. The only fear in the olden days was—the fear of the Britishers, that is, what the British felt was—that possibly Russia might come down through Kashmir to India or through

Afghanistan to India. That was the fear in the old tsarist days. I am not talking so much of the later developments in Russia. Right through the nineteenth century, there was this fear of Russia in the British mind. Anyhow, that has nothing to do with what I am saying. I say that the eastern borders of Kashmir and Ladakh with Tibet were never considered by the Maharaja's Government at all necessary to be protected from Tibet. There was some slight argument about one or two parts. In fact there were three or four villages in the heart of Tibet, far from the Ladakh border, which were the zamindari of Kashmir and every second or third year the Kashmir Government sent a little mission to get some revenue. It was not very much. I think it was Rs 100 or Rs 200. Just to assert its zamindari right it sent them to the two or three villages and the thing was peaceful. No question arose of having any protective apparatus in that border in the Maharaja's time. Of course, as everyone knows, the border itself and all the territory was a very difficult terrain and hardly inhabited.

Then came independence and together with independence, almost a month or two later, came the trouble with Pakistan over Kashmir-the invasion of Kashmir by the tribals and later by the Pakistani troops. During the whole fighting in 1948, part of Ladakh was occupied by the Pakistani troops. In fact they cut off the main access to Ladakh which is the main road from Srinagar to Leh, passing the big pass Zoji La and we were compelled to use another route, a very difficult route from Manali in the Kulu valley over very high mountains in a round-about way, to reach Leh. We did reach Leh but it was impossible to do much if the main route was occupied by the Pakistanis. It was a remarkable effort of our army to drive the Pakistanis from the Zoji La Pass. In fact, they built the road. Some hon. Members may have seen it. It is a sudden rise of about 3,000 feet, 2,500 to 3,000 feet, and you have to go in a winding way up the mountain, and if you reach the top of the mountain, you see on the one side the wooded valley of Kashmir and on the other bare rocks, treeless rocks of the uplands of Central Asia, the little Tibet as Ladakh is called, and it goes on to Tibet. So they built a road there and took the tanks there and thus drove out the Pakistani troops and

gradually assured the protection of Leh and east Ladakh. Even then, a part of Western Ladakh was in the possession of the Pakistani troops and even now the area occupied by Pakistan in Kashmir is a bit of Ladakh also and when I say the northern part, I mean the border part about which they want to talk to China.

So, this is the background. There was no kind of defence or anything in the Maharaja's⁹¹ time and after that, for a year or two, we were busy fighting the Pakistanis there and we drove them out. Just about this time, the Chinese came to Tibet and without suspecting them of any evil intentions, we saw that the situation had changed. A great power was next to us. It is not a weak Tibet and this would have serious consequences in the future. Our judgment of the situation was that the danger lay from the NEFA part and therefore, from then on, we tried to protect the NEFA border. Gradually we have built up outposts, and much more than that, administration has gradually spread in NEFA. It was an unadministered territory. We also, even at the same time, thought of Ladakh too, not that we realised that they were going to come in such large numbers, but still we thought that this has to be protected, but it was a very difficult task to reach the place where now our posts are. It takes about three weeks or a month's journey by road. We sent some small teams to survey and they did go several times, backwards and forwards from the actual frontier, crossed Ladakh and that is the evidence we have that no Chinese were there at that time. These repeated teams had crossed Ladakh and we established an airfield there,⁹² not against the Chinese there but because we wanted to cover Ladakh and not leave it unprotected and I remember—I forget the year—about six years ago or seven years ago, I went to that airfield and flew there simply through curiosity because our Air Force were very pleased to have made an airfield. This they called the highest in the world. It is about 14,000 feet. You must remember that in the whole of Ladakh, practically speaking, there are no

⁹¹ Hari Singh.

⁹² In Chusul.

trees because trees do not normally grow above 11,000 feet. You can grow them. In Leh there are some trees and we have a farm in Leh too but that is by very special efforts. Normally no trees grow. It is a bare rock or some very small shrubs and sometimes even flowers but no trees. So I went there and it was interesting and I told Mr Chou En-lai: "Yes, I can speak from my own evidence, apart from others." I went to our airfield then, you were not there anywhere near that and I went another time and I saw your people, not at the airfield but at the hill-top nearby. So you have come since." To that he had no particular answer. That is the position. The main thing is, quite apart from any claims based on history, they were not there and they are there. It was a peaceful frontier, it is not now a peaceful frontier, not because we have done something but because they have come here. These are the arguments which we placed before them but I was pointing out how difficult it was for us to organise any defence system in Ladakh. We were doing it and we have gradually done it but you cannot simply put forward a defence post unconnected with the rest. It has to be in tiers, connected especially hundreds of miles from any base. The very first thing necessary was to build the road to Leh. There was not even a road to Leh. That was built and a good road exists now. Other roads have been built. Even now it is far. Roads are being built, but mostly our communications are by air and our Air Force have done a very fine piece of work in supplying these posts by air. And of course, the actual military that are there at the posts, they are a fine lot of men and I should like to express our high appreciation of them. This background may lead the House to understand that just before the Chinese came to Tibet, we could not hold them, I mean to say, we could not hold them at the frontier. There was nobody at the frontier who could help us to hold them. We are proceeding gradually. The one place which we adequately protected, more or less adequately, was the NEFA border. There we succeeded. I am quite sure if we had not held them there, they would have walked in. They did walk in, more or less, on the Ladakh border. First of all they built that road in the Aksai Chin area, in the northern area of Aksai Chin. That was an old caravan route which probably had been used

previously too. They made it a road and they used it for communication between Tibet and Sinkiang. That was in 1957, or may be, a little earlier. But the main advance came in 1959 which coincided with the Tibetan revolution, when large forces of Chinese came over to Tibet. So, to say that we did not protect Ladakh is rather to ignore the circumstances that existed in those times, in the Kashmir Maharaja's time and subsequently.

One thing which has been mentioned—a thoroughly opportunist adventure—is Pakistan and China trying to collaborate together in this matter. It is very surprising that Pakistan which is the champion standard-bearer against communism, and a member of CENTO, SEATO and all that, should now try to club up with China, and that China should, to some extent, appreciate this and meet it, in spite of their utterly different policies. Apparently, the only policy in common between them is a certain dislike of India. There is nothing else in common.

So we have to face this situation, and in facing it remember that it is not merely a frontier incursion or aggression. That is bad enough. But it is something much deeper that we have to face. It is the future relationship of two of the biggest countries of Asia, namely, India and China. It means a great deal, what that relationship is going to be. An hon. Member said that some Chinese gentlemen had told him that they would wait for centuries for a solution of this problem. Well, the world moves much faster now. Still it may be a long time and it may involve some years before we can solve this. But in this changing world frontiers may cease to have significance. Of course, we see these cosmonauts and others flying all round the world and no frontiers count. The world is changing very rapidly. But apart from this, it is an important matter for us to consider, the future between our two countries, because continuing hostility for generations will affect us, affect China and affect Asia and have other far-reaching effects. It will be a tremendous burden for all countries concerned. When this world is changing very fast to something different-I hope something better-for us to be tied up with these continuing wars, would be unfortunate. At the same time, it is obvious that no country worth its strain, and certainly not India, can submit

to bullying tactics, can submit to force being used to take away its territory and otherwise to show that it can be treated casually, by any other country. It is impossible, whatever the consequence might be. So we have to face this difficult situation with our courage and strength. And may I say, strength, of course, depends on what we do on the frontier, but strength ultimately depends upon our unity of effort in the country, and everything that comes in the way of that unity of effort is really weakening the country and our campaign or the efforts that we make on the frontier. I would particularly like to say this, because some people live in compartments. They talk about our unity in connection with the frontier and yet, in our work for economic growth and so on, they come in the way all the time-work for industrial growth, economic growth and all that. The two do not fit in. I do not mean to say that everyone should agree with the Government's policy. But there are certain broad features of it which we must keep in mind, features which go towards the unity of the country and the growth of our economy and industrial progress.

I am grateful, Madam, for the general support that hon. Members have given me. I regret I am wholly unable to accept Mr Vajpayee's amendment which is a negation of all that we have done. As for Mr Mani's amendment, part of it is unexceptionable, but part of it does not appear to me to be right.⁹³ I shall accept Mr Satyacharan's amendment.⁹⁴

A.D. Mani: On a point of information, Madam. May I ask the Prime Minister whether the latest claim has been staked by the Chinese for

⁹³ Probably the part of A.D. Mani's amendment unacceptable to Nehru was a clause that he wanted to be added to the Motion:

"(ii) that no useful purpose would be served in Government offering to negotiate the border dispute with the Government of China unless the Government of China give clear and unambiguous indications that they are as anxious as the Government of India for a settlement of the border dispute on the basis of the traditional boundaries as indicated in the Government of India maps, and further the Government of China are prepared to vacate aggression on Indian territory;"

⁹⁴ The amendment by Satyacharan, Congress, approving of the Government's policy.

3,700 square miles in the Pakistan-held part of Kashmir? I understand that they have now staked a claim for 3,700 square miles which is an area now occupied by Pakistan in Kashmir territory. I would also like to ask him whether this area has been shown in the 1960 map which the Chinese have prepared, or whether it is outside the 1960 map.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I don't know exactly where their map line goes, but they have claimed part of this territory, I don't know how much. In fact, it may interest the House to know that when I went to Pakistan two years ago, or may be two and a half years back,⁹⁵ I tried to profit by that occasion and I discussed China and the frontier issue with President Ayub Khan, because whatever our differences were on Kashmir or elsewhere, I thought it would be advantageous to have a uniform policy with regard to the Chinese aggression. And we showed them various maps and other things, even in regard to the territory occupied by Pakistan, the Kashmir territory, and they told us what their line according to them was. There was some slight difference between them and us. There was another question which related to the area which belongs to the Mir of Hunza. We discussed that too. But I am sure that the Chinese map claims some area which according to us, even in the Pakistani-occupied territory, should be on this side.⁹⁶

412. In the Rajya Sabha: Defence Minister Meets Foreign Minister

⁹⁵ Nehru visited Karachi in September 1960 to sign the Indus Water Treaty, 1960.

⁹⁶ At the end of Nehru's reply to the debate, Bhupesh Gupta, CPI, requested A.D. Mani and A.B. Vajpayee to withdraw their amendments "as a good gesture and indicate to the world that we have a broad agreement here." To this Vajpayee quipped, "Provided my friend is prepared to call China the aggressor." The original Motion was eventually adopted after A.D. Mani withdrew his amendment and Vajpayee's amendment, put to the vote, was negatived.

of China⁹⁷

Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state whether any reference was made to the aggression committed by China during the talks recently held between the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Minister of China in Geneva; and if so, what has been the outcome?⁹⁸

The Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs (Dinesh Singh): During his talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, the Indian Defence Ministers⁹⁹ had expressly referred to the serious situation created in Ladakh by the unlawful intrusion of Chinese forces. The Chinese Foreign Minister had, however, refused to accept this and tried to place the onus on India. There was no specific outcome to these discussions.

[Translation begins

Ram Sahay: May I know your views on the possibility of emphasizing our stand during this type of talks which may be held from time to time?

Jawaharlal Nehru: This is done when the occasion is appropriate. But this is not specially required.

Translation ends]

A.B. Vajpayee:¹⁰⁰ According to a Bombay weekly the initiative for this particular meeting came from the Chinese Foreign Minister. May I know if it is a fact?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know what the hon. Member means. The

⁹⁷ Oral answers, 24 August 1962. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. 40, Nos. 9-16, 17 to 29 August 1962, cols 3032-3034.

⁹⁸ Question by Ram Sahay, Congress.

⁹⁹ V.K. Krishna Menon.

¹⁰⁰ Jan Sangh.

initiative in a sense came from me. That is, the Defence Minister and I naturally spoke to him. He will see many people there and the Chinese Foreign Minister would be there and it is desirable for him if he has an opportunity to discuss the critical situation that had arisen at that time from the firing that had taken place in the Ladakh area. He went there and talked, I believe, in the lobby of the Conference room. The Chinese Foreign Minister asked him to come to his house and discuss the matter. So in a sense the invitation came from the Chinese Foreign Minister.

Bhupesh Gupta:¹⁰¹ Is the Prime Minister aware that this initiative taken by him and the talks that took place in Geneva have been welcome in many countries by progressive sections and favourable reports appeared in the newspapers?

A.B. Vajpayee: Which countries is he referring to?

Bhupesh Gupta: Because such steps enhance our prestige. I saw it in the newspapers; I was abroad then. Outside the country many newspapers have published favourable reports and have welcome this. It is not a fact?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Generally that has been so.

Bhupesh Gupta: May I know why the Ministry of External Affairs is not taking steps to make some of these comments available to some Opposition Members in order to relieve them of the burden of putting such questions and supplementaries?

(No reply.)

¹⁰¹ CPI.

A.D. Mani:¹⁰² At the same time—there was a Charge d'affaires¹⁰³ in Peking—did he make any representation to the Chinese Government because the proper place for making such a representation was Peking and not Geneva?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The proper place is every place where an occasion arises.

413. For the Lok Sabha: Confederation of Himalayan States¹⁰⁴

Short Notice Question Dy. No. 162

The following may be sent to the Lok Sabha Secretariat:

"I regret I cannot accept this Short Notice Question, It relates to an independent country with Treaty rights with India and our discussing this in the Lok Sabha will be embarrassing both to us and to the Bhutan Government.

2. The Prime Minister of Bhutan¹⁰⁵ has been visiting Switzerland, Sweden and London. The object, as far as we know, was to seek some technical and other aid from friendly countries for development projects in Bhutan.

3. So far as we know, China has not made any proposal for a Confederation of Himalayan States.

4. According to our information, Chinese troops on the other side of the China-Bhutan border are relatively small in numbers."

¹⁰² Independent.

¹⁰³ P.K. Banerjee.

¹⁰⁴ Note, 29 August 1962.

¹⁰⁵ Jigme Dorji.

414. From Government of China: Indian Provocations¹⁰⁶

Of late Indian troops which have intruded into Chinese territory in Western Sector of Sino-Indian boundary, have repeatedly fired provocatively at Chinese Frontier Guards against which Chinese Government has lodged a number of protests. In its notes of 3rd and 5th August, 1962,¹⁰⁷ Indian Government resorted to its usual practice of denying the indisputable facts cited by Chinese Government, but this is entirely futile. Indian Government even doubted the truth of the two incidents of firing by Indian troops of 16th and 19th July, 1962, to which Chinese side referred on ground that it was not until 23rd July, that Chinese side lodged the protest. This is even less worthy of refutation. It is commonsense whether a protest is lodged a few days earlier or later does not at all affect the truth of matters concerned in protest. In advancing a sophisticated argument on that ground Indian side is in no way taking an attitude of dealing with things earnestly and seriously. It is particularly regrettable that Indian Government in its notes further falsely counter-charged Chinese side. Now Chinese Government will confine itself to refuting the three specific charges made by Indian side.

1. In its note, 28th July, 1962,¹⁰⁸ Indian Government charged that on 27th July, a Chinese patrol opened fire at an Indian patrol at approximately 33° 57' N, 78° 46.5' E. This place mentioned by Indian side is in Nyagzu area in Tibetan China. Strange, however, that eight days later in another note, dated 5th August, 1962, Indian Government stated that "no Indian party was in that area (Nyagzu)" on 27th July. This inconsistency clearly shows

¹⁰⁶ Note, 29 August 1962, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of China, to the Embassy of India in China. Government of India, MEA, Historical Division, *Sino- Indian Border Dispute*, Volume VI-Part III, (Chinese Incursions into Indian Territory), (April 1962-October 1962), Correspondence, p. 7.

¹⁰⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, July-October 1962. White Paper No. VII* (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs), pp. 12 and 19 respectively.

¹⁰⁸ *White Paper No. VII, ibid.*, p. 7.

that the charge Indian side made in its former note is not in conformity with the facts. The fact is that on 27th July, an intruding Indian force fired sixteen shots in the Nyagzu area at a Chinese post there. It seems that after failing to abuse Chinese side, Indian side tried to resort to quibbling, but in so doing unwittingly disapproved its former charge. As paper cannot wrap up fire, a lie is bound to show up.

2.

2. In its note of 30th July, 1962,¹⁰⁹ Indian side charged that on 29th July, Chinese troops opened fire at Indian troops in the vicinity of Yula in the Pangong Lake area. Chinese Government has satisfied itself by careful checking that the Indian charge is a downright fabrication. It can be mentioned here that the Indian Government further trumped up the story of a clash at Yula between Chinese and Indian sides in its note of 15th August, 1962, which Chinese Government basing itself on the facts, has already refuted by its note of 18th August, 1962. The purpose of Indian side in repeatedly preferring such framed up charges is clearly to cover up its activities of unlawfully setting up a strong post and expanding its military intrusions in Yula Tibet and to further aggravate deliberately the tension in that area.

3.

4. In its note of 5th August, 1962, Indian Government not only tried hard to deny the fact that Indian troops which had intruded into Chip Chap River Valley in Sinkiang, China, fired on a Chinese post there on 27th July, but falsely counter-charged the Chinese side with firing at Indian troops on the same day and asserted that India had already made this charge in its note of 28th July 1962. But in fact Indian note of 28th July, does not touch on the Chip Chap Valley area at all. It seems that the Indian side has landed itself in a jumble in cooking up charge.

It can be seen from the above that it is not we, but India itself which has distorted the facts and reversed the right and wrong. As for the Indian side's

¹⁰⁹ *White Paper No. VII*, *ibid.*, p. 8.

usual practice of describing Chinese territory as Indian territory in an attempt to explain away Indian troops intrusions and provocations and of even false counter-charging China with aggravating the border tension, the Chinese Government has refuted all these absurdities again and again and do not intend to repeat it here. To ensure tranquility along the border and ease the tension, Chinese Government urge Indian Government to desist from making statements which reverse right and wrong, strictly restrain the Indian troops so that they stop all provocations against the Chinese side and order them to withdraw immediately from Chinese territory.¹¹⁰

415. For the Lok Sabha: Chinese in Ladakh¹¹¹

Short Notice Question Dy. No. 160.

Please inform the Lok Sabha Secretariat that I regret I cannot accept this Short Notice Question.

2. It is not quite correct to say that the Chinese occupy a certain area in Ladakh or that we have recovered any part of this area. The actual occupation of any party is of the military post. Roundabout that military post, there is an area of control exercised by that post. To some extent, it may be said that the area behind the Chinese military posts is under their control, although not occupied. In the same way, because we have put up military posts, some area has come within our control.

3. No change has happened in these areas since the matter was last discussed in the Lok Sabha.

416. Abusive Chinese Communications¹¹²

¹¹⁰ See also item 416.

¹¹¹ Note, 29 August 1962.

I enclose the latest Chinese note.¹¹³ These notes are becoming progressively more and more abusive. In your reply, I think, you might point out this fact.

I do not quite understand how they can make so many specific charges about our troops firing on them without our men having done so.

We might mention these notes at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting tomorrow afternoon.

417. In the Lok Sabha: Chinese Military Posts in Ladakh¹¹⁴

Speaker:¹¹⁵ About the subject regarding the establishment of 30 new posts in Ladakh, I made enquiries, and I learnt that the Prime Minister was going to make a statement, I will allow Shri Hem Barua¹¹⁶ question.

Hem Barua (Gauhati): When is the Prime Minister making the statement?

The Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (Lakshmi Menon): Unfortunately, the Prime Minister is not here now. I would make a statement.

Speaker: Does she want to make the statement now?

Lakshmi Menon: I want to make the statement.

Hari Vishnu Kamath (Hoshangabad):¹¹⁷ Is it in answer to a Short

¹¹² Note, 30 August 1962. Government of India, MEA, Historical Division, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, Volume VI, Part III (Chinese Incursions into Indian Territory), (April 1962-October 1962), Notes, p. 35.

¹¹³ See item 414.

¹¹⁴ Statement, 3 September 1962. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. 8, Third Series, cols 5530-5537.

¹¹⁵ Hukam Singh.

¹¹⁶ PSP.

¹¹⁷ PSP.

Notice Question or a Calling Attention Notice?

Speaker: A Calling Attention Notice was received. But before that could be ascertained, the hon. Prime Minister has sent me an intimation that he was going to make a statement voluntarily. I have allowed that. But because I had also received a Calling Attention Notice I will allow Shri Barua to put a question.

Lakshmi Menon: *White Paper No. VI* published by Government gave some details of Chinese military posts established upto 26th July against which we had lodged protests.

Since the publication of *White Paper No. VI*, we protested on 22nd and 24th August against the establishment of some more posts.¹¹⁸ The total number of these posts established by the Chinese since May 1962 comes to 30.

On 28th August, we protested against the establishment of four more posts.¹¹⁹ Our information is that one of these Chinese posts has since been withdrawn. But there is some evidence of the establishment of two more such posts in the neighbourhood.

I have had occasion to mention earlier in the House that a large number of these posts, particularly those established in recent months, are extensions of old posts a few miles further and generally within the defensive perimeter of the earlier posts. This is the case particularly in the region of Daulat Beg Oldi and the Chip Chap river valley where the Chinese posts are separated only by a short distance from each other.

In the Galwan river valley there are a number of Chinese posts that are close together and are interconnected. These, as I have said before, hamper our line of supply to our post by the land route. Another attempt to interfere with our supply line was made by the Chinese by the establishment of a Chinese post on the 23rd August in the Pangong lake area. We have

¹¹⁸ For the Indian notes of 22 and 24 August 1962, see *White Paper No. VII*, pp. 32-33 and p. 40 respectively.

¹¹⁹ See *White Paper No. VII*, p. 47.

protested against this and taken necessary measure to prevent interference with our line of supply in the Pangong lake area.

In regard to the incident on August 14th, the factual position is that there was an exchange of fire between our post in the Pangong lake region and the Chinese detachment. No casualty was suffered by our post. We protested to the Chinese against this incident on the 15th August.¹²⁰

Hem Barua: The Chinese have by now established 30 new posts and the *White Paper No. VI* only mentions details of 20 posts. That means that they have built at least 10 more posts. On the other hand, because of the posts that we have established, the Prime Minister was pleased to say that we have recovered about 2,000 square miles from the Chinese. The Chinese advance is most patent by the establishment of these new posts. May I know whether the establishment of these new posts demonstrates any further advance into our territory by the Chinese?

The Minister of Defence (V.K. Krishna Menon): The number of these posts is not synonymous with the territorial advance. It is a matter of tactical disposition, whether our Commanders think that it is better to split up one post into two or the Chinese Commanders do the same. The answer to the question is, the establishment of these posts by itself does not mean advance into our territory.

Hem Barua: My question has not been replied to. Our argument is that because we have been able to establish a few more posts, we have reoccupied certain territory.

Speaker: Why should he place so much emphasis on that part?

Hem Barua: My point is, the establishment of new posts to the extent

¹²⁰ *White Paper No. VII*, p. 24.

of 30 means that the Chinese have advanced into our territory. It may be a tactical move.

Speaker: What I understood was, the Defence Minister has said that there has not been any further advance by the Chinese in that area. It is for the Commanders to see whether it is expedient to split up one post further into two or three posts.

Hem Barua: That is not clear.

Speaker: Then I might not have understood him all right. Let me ask.

V.K. Krishna Menon: What I said was, the increase in the number of posts by the Chinese, as mentioned by our Prime Minister, taking into account the difference in the dates of the two announcements, does not by itself mean any further advance into our territory. The increase in the number of posts is the distribution of personnel into one, two, three or four posts, according as the Command desires. We may not consider it necessary or possible, whatever may be the reason, to increase the number of posts, when one post would do the job. That is a tactical decision.

Speaker: The increase in the number of posts might not by itself mean further advance by the Chinese. But the question that the hon. Member insists on is whether in fact there has been further advance according to the information available with the Government.

Lakshmi Menon: It is already stated in the statement. I have said there: "I have had occasion to mention earlier in the House that a large number of these posts, particularly those established in recent months are extensions of old posts a few miles further and generally within the defensive perimeter of the earlier posts".

This has already been stated. (Interruption).

An Hon. Member: Have they made any advance?

Speaker: Order, order. We are trying to understand each other. Hon. Members should not be impatient.

Ram Chandra Bade (Khargone):¹²¹ How many miles further have they advanced?

Speaker: Should all of them stand up simultaneously? Let them put their questions one by one.

Ram Chandra Bade: It is a serious question.

Speaker: Order, order. I should not be forced to have a departure here, though the subject is very important. Hon. Members can seek a further discussion by another method. But I am trying to make it clear so that the anxiety of the hon. Members might be removed. They should allow me to have that cleared rather than force me to allow a further discussion by allowing other hon. Members to put questions. I am not allowing any question to be put by other hon. Members whose names do not appear on the Calling Attention Notice.

Hari Vishnu Kamath: I am not putting another question. May I request you to clarify another aspect of the matter closely connected with this one? In disallowing a similar question by me, Sir, you were pleased to state that the Prime Minister would make a statement regarding the correspondence between the Government of India and the Government of China recently. Is that statement coming before the end of this Session to bring the battle of notes up to date?

¹²¹ Jan Sangh.

Speaker: I cannot say that. If he tells me what that promise I made is, certainly I will get it checked up.

Now, coming to the other matter, again and again the same question is being put, whether the Government can give any further information on this fact as to whether the Chinese have made any further advance into our territory and, if so, by how many miles.

V.K. Krishna Menon: I said, Sir, that increase in the number of these posts does not mean any advance. (Interruption).

Surendranath Dwivedy (Kendrapara):¹²² That means there has been advance; it is clear.

Hem Barua: May I ask, Sir.

Speaker: Order, order. Would the hon. Members kindly resume their seats? The difficulty with the hon. Members is that they are feeling perturbed. They have these apprehensions that probably there have been some further advances in our territory by the Chinese. The question, though it was confined to the posts, is whether there has been any further advance. The hon. Defence Minister has said two or three times—probably I have not been able to make myself clear and, therefore, that ambiguity still exists—that the setting up or the increase in the number of these posts by themselves does not give any indications whether there has been any further advance or not. This is admitted, and everybody is satisfied so far as the increase in the number is concerned. Independently of that, the question is,—whether there has been an increase or not—whether the Chinese have advanced further into our territory. This is what the hon. Members want to know. If the Government has got that information that might be given.

¹²² PSP.

V.K. Krishna Menon: If you will permit me to say so, Sir, it is not possible to hold territories without posts. If they will advance they will put up posts. That is why I said that these posts do not represent advances. There are no posts put up by the Chinese which represent advances into our territory.

Hari Vishnu Kamath: Why is the Minister shilly-shallying and beating about the bush? Why can't he say "yes" or "no"?

Mahavir Tyagi (Dehra Dun):¹²³ Let us say: "No advance".

Hem Barua: Sir, I rise to a point of order. I have been listening to the two statements by the two different Ministers. Shrimati Lakshmi Menon has admitted that there has been an extension of posts a few miles further. The Defence Minister has also said that there has been a splitting up of posts. Supposing I split your chair, Sir...

Hari Vishnu Kamath: God forbid.

Speaker: Order, order. There ought not to be any surprise if the chair is split on account of what has been happening.

- Hem Barua: Suppose, Sir, your chair is split into two parts and one part remains here; the other part either goes to the front or goes back.

Speaker: They can remain parallel also and I might fall down!
(Interruption). The two portions may be behind each other.

V.K. Krishna Menon: You cannot hold a territory without army or posts. The question is directly in relation to the 30 posts, about the discrepancy between the statement made by the External Affairs Minister. That, I

¹²³ Congress.

understand is the purpose of this question. Therefore, naturally, when she speaks about the increase of posts, a doubt arises whether they advanced. I said there was no advance.

418. Supply on NEFA Border¹²⁴

[Note, 4 September 1962, by M.J. Desai, the Foreign Secretary, begins] Shri M.G. Kaul's¹²⁵ note of 11th August, 1962, gives the full background of the current supply arrangements to our border posts on the NEFA- Tibet border and to various administrative centres in the interior of the NEFA. The Indian Airlines Corporation and the Indian Air Force have not been participating in these supply operations for sometime because of their other preoccupations and the air drops of these supplies have been arranged under contractual arrangements with the Kalinga Airlines.

2. The Kalinga Airlines have been air dropping these supplies with their fleet of Dakotas. The opening, however, of the 26 new check posts at high altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 17,000 feet on the NEFA- Tibet border this year and the opening of new administrative centres nearer the border by the NEFA administration has posed a new problem so far as the supply drops are concerned. The Dakotas cannot operate at these high altitudes, particularly during the winter months, and if no special arrangements are made to get aircraft like the Caribou, all these new check posts and the new administrative centres opened nearer the border will have to be withdrawn. Any withdrawal of this sort would immediately expose these areas to Chinese penetration and this is a risk which cannot be taken with our experience in Ladakh. The Chinese are as a matter of fact in close proximity of the border in some strength all along the NEFA-Tibet border.

3. The question whether foreign exchange facilities for the purchase of a

¹²⁴ Noting, 4 September 1962. MHA, (MEA, File No. 14(6)-Nefa/61, pp. 71-72).

¹²⁵ Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

Caribou aircraft should be given to the Kalinga Airlines to meet this special need or the responsibility for supplies to all these check posts on the NEFA-Tibet border and the new administrative centres in NEFA nearer the border should be placed on the Indian Air Force was discussed on 1st September. The minutes of this meeting at slip "Y" give the recommendations of the Secretaries.

4. The Defence Ministry have as agreed at this meeting—"A" of para of the minutes—examined their foreign exchange position. The result of this examination is given in minute 10 dated 4th September 1962, in the Defence Ministry's file placed below. In brief the Defence Ministry will require additional allotment of foreign exchange.

5. As the check posts on the NEFA-Tibet border as well as the NEFA administrative centres nearer the border must be maintained to prevent any Chinese penetration in this area, I seek PM's approval to the recommendation made by the Secretaries in the meeting on 1st September, that the Indian Air Force should be made responsible to supply the check posts on the NEFA- Tibet border and the NEFA administrative centres in the interior. The Defence Ministry are prepared to accept this responsibility.

6. So far as the question of requirement of additional aircraft of special type, Caribou or any other, of the Indian Air Force to meet this extra commitment, is concerned, that is a matter which the Indian Air Force technicians must decide; also the question of additional foreign exchange requirements for these aircraft is a matter to be settled between the Ministries of Defence and Finance. After PM has seen, I will mark the papers to Defence Secretary and Secretary, Finance (Economic Affairs) for the information of Ministers of Defence and Finance.

M.J. Desai

4.9.1962

PM

[Note, 4 September 1962, by M.J. Desai, the Foreign Secretary, ends]

[Note, 4 September 1962, by Nehru, begins]

Our holding on to our frontier posts both in Ladakh and in NEFA is an absolute necessity. We cannot leave those posts, whatever pressure on them may be from the Chinese side. Thus, we have to maintain them and give them the necessary supplies. Apparently, this can only be done by air.

2. I do not fancy the idea that a private airline should take our supplies to our frontier posts, unless there is no help for it. I have no complaint against the Kalinga Airlines as such, and perhaps they have done their work satisfactorily. But it does not seem proper to me that the new and higher check posts should also be put in their charge so far as supplies are concerned.

3. It should, therefore, be the duty of either the IAF or the IAC to carry out these supply operations, preferably the IAF. With the new transport aircraft that the IAF is getting, I should have thought it possible for them to carry these supplies. But I am no judge of this. Apparently, by a process of elimination, we arrive at the Caribou aircraft. As far as I can gather, it is suggested that only one Caribou aircraft should be purchased for this purpose.

4. I realise the great difficulty of the Finance Ministry in regard to foreign exchange and I would not like to add to it. And yet there seems no other way out. FS will, therefore, please refer this matter to the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Finance (Economic Affairs) so that the Ministers might consider this matter.

J. Nehru

4-9-1962

FS

[Note, 4 September 1962, by Nehru, ends]

419. To H.J. Bhabha: China as Member of the UN¹²⁶

September 6, 1962

My dear Homi,

Your letter of September 5th.¹²⁷

We are still of opinion that the People's Government of China should be accepted as a member of the United Nations. But we do not want to propose this ourselves for obvious reasons. We shall, however, support any proposal to this effect that is made by any other country.

Yours sincerely,

[Jawaharlal Nehru]

420. To H.V. Kamath: China Border Situation¹²⁸

September 28, 1962

Dear Kamath,

I have received the letter of September 24 jointly signed by you, Farid Ansari¹²⁹ and Chandrasekhar,¹³⁰ in Rome today.¹³¹

The situation in our frontier both in Ladakh and the North East is undoubtedly serious. We are trying to meet it to the best of our ability and will continue to do so. I do not understand what you mean by "India's unilateral Panch Sheel towards China". Panch Sheel is a bilateral policy and

¹²⁶ Letter to the Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission of India.

¹²⁷ Appendix 60.

¹²⁸ Letter to the deputy leader of the PSP group in the Lok Sabha; address: 18 Windsor Place, New Delhi. Sent from Rome.

¹²⁹ Faridul Haq Ansari, PSP, Rajya Sabha MP.

¹³⁰ Chandra Sekhar, Rajya Sabha MP.

¹³¹ The joint letter has not been traced. According to a PTI report in the *National Herald* of 8 October 1962, "the three PSP MPs had expressed concern over the Sino-Indian border situation. They had suggested the summoning of a special session of Parliament to consider it and had also sought information on developments on India's border with China."

cannot be exercised unilaterally. There is no Panch Sheel between India and China now because of China's aggression and numerous petty conflicts that have taken place.

As for making adequate arrangements for the supply of information, I do not quite understand what kind of information is desired. The type of developments that have taken place recently are petty incidents chiefly on the NEFA border and on our part strengthening our defences there. We cannot obviously give publicity to what we do in regard to strengthening our defences. It would be wrong from our Army's point of view.

You are right in saying that we should avoid anything which may lead to fear and panic. That is the policy we have been pursuing. I would suggest that others also should keep this in mind. I shall be returning to Delhi in a few days. Although I have been kept fully informed of developments during my tour, I shall naturally discuss them fully on my return.

I do not think it is necessary at this stage to convene a special session of Parliament. That in itself will create the fear and panic which you deplore. If, however, necessity arises, we shall certainly recommend a special session later.

I shall be glad to meet leaders of political parties some time after my return.

Yours sincerely,

[Jawaharlal Nehru]

(I) Pakistan

421. To M.C. Chagla: Status Quo in Kashmir¹³²

August 2, 1962

My dear Chagla,

Your letter of July 27th. I entirely agree with you that we cannot possibly subscribe to the Two-Nation theory or to anything which upsets our

¹³² Letter to the High Commissioner in the UK.

secularism.

I said some time ago that my offer to Pakistan for the acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir had lapsed. I said so because it seemed to me to be a little absurd to go on repeating this in the face of Pakistan's curt refusal of it. But, as a matter of fact, I do not think there can be any other final solution of the Kashmir problem except that of the status quo with possibly minor adjustments. That continues to be our policy although I shall not go on repeating it.

As a matter of fact, Galbraith, US Ambassador, told me some time before the Security Council meeting that we must proceed on that basis and try to explore some other avenues also, such as, economic, etc. You can therefore certainly proceed on the line of the status quo with the UK Government. Tell them that we have more than once made that offer without any result and we do not wish to go on publicly repeating it. But that is the only sensible approach.

Pakistan is at present tied up with her own difficulties, especially East Pakistan, but there is always the possibility that because of these very difficulties, she may indulge in an adventure. President Ayub's¹³³ grand strategy now appears to be to wait for India to get into trouble with China and take advantage of it. Pakistan newspapers continue to talk about war. It seems to me that most countries do not realise the essence of the Kashmir question in so far as we are concerned. Any acceptance of the Two Nation theory in regard to Kashmir will have the most disastrous consequences in the whole of India. Not only will our secularism end, but India will tend to break up. I have noticed that when this is clearly stated, it produces a marked effect on the hearer.

Yours sincerely,

J. Nehru

¹³³ Ayub Khan.

42. Galwan Post and Fraternising with Chinese Troops¹³⁴

[Refer to item 410]

Submitted with reference to Prime Minister's query on the special sitrep regarding Galwan Post, dated 19th August.

2. It would appear that the Chinese have decided not to interfere with our communications by land to the Galwan Post. On the other hand, it might be a ruse to see what we do and get us to act with Chinese permission in this area.

3. I discussed this matter this morning with the Chief of Army Staff, General Thapar, and suggested to him that our supply column which is sitting some eight miles from the Galwan Post should now test the Chinese intentions and make an attempt to go through by road with supplies to the Galwan Post. I also told General Thapar that the Commander of the supply column should be told not to take notice of any Chinese that he might meet en route and should not fraternize with them, not even have a cup of tea or coffee, but just attempt to go through ignoring the Chinese en route. We will know in a couple of days how the Chinese behave.

M.J. Desai

20-8-1962

¹³⁴ Note, 20 August 1962, from M.J. Desai, the Foreign Secretary. MEA, Historical Division, *Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, vol. VI, pt III, (Chinese Incursions into Indian Territory), (April 1962 - October 1962), notes, pp. 30-31.