

## Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

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### China

#### **262. In the Lok Sabha: Chinese incursions<sup>1</sup>**

Speaker:<sup>2</sup> Discussion on matter of urgent public importance, Shri Vajpayee.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Sir, I seek your indulgence and the indulgence of the House in one matter, I do not know how long this discussion will continue.

Speaker: For a couple of hours.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I would beg of you to permit me to reply to what is said tomorrow [sic] morning, because I have to go to Palam, as the President of the Argentine Republic is arriving early this afternoon. That is all I wish to submit.

Nath Pai:<sup>3</sup> In any case, there is a general feeling that the subject that we will be discussing being most important, the time allotted by you at present is very inadequate. In view of the fact that the Prime Minister will be absent, the debate can be continued for the whole of the day.

Speaker: There are also other business-supplementary Demands for Grants. Let us see.

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<sup>1</sup> Discussion, 4 December 1961. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. LX, 2-8 December 1961, cols 2934-2939.

<sup>2</sup> M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.

<sup>3</sup> Bapu Nath Pai, PSP MP from Rajapur, Bombay.

N.G. Goray:<sup>4</sup> Mr Speaker, you were kind enough to say the other day that a map will be put up here showing where the Chinese were in 1956 and where they are today. No such map has been put up yet.

Speaker: I did not say that it will be put up. To enable hon. Members to understand the position correctly, one hon. Member suggested that maps showing the lines may be put up here or in the library. The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs was here and I thought he would carry out that request...

The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (Satya Narayan Sinha): It was put to the proper quarters. The hon. Prime Minister will say what he has to say. Jawaharlal Nehru: Perhaps the House will remember that sometime back we placed in the Library of the House, and it was available to Members too, an atlas of this frontier. It is rather a good atlas showing all these places in the north-east and northern frontier. That is available in the Library still. May be some hon. Members have it too. That is a much better map. The so-called military posts and the rest—some places like Daulatbeg Oldi near the Karakoram Pass—are marked there. Some other places are not marked, but it is generally indicated in the correspondence in the possession of hon. Members.

I have a certain difficulty in this matter, because if I mark such of the posts that we have there, it may not be very secret, but nevertheless, it is not normally done for the information not of this House, but others who may be interested from the other side in knowing where our posts are. As for the rest, almost every information is available in that map and the correspondence I have given. Those maps in the atlas that we have placed are very good.

Speaker: I understood the request to be that there may be several

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<sup>4</sup> PSP MP from Poona, Bombay.

stages when the various incursions or aggressions took place, and maps may be supplied showing the first at a particular time, the second some time later and the third still later and so on, so that hon. Members may have an idea as to how step by step they have been encroaching upon our territory. That was the request.

N.G. Goray: That day the Prime Minister referred to three new check posts put up by the Chinese. We would like to know whether they are to the west of the line in 1959.

Speaker: They want to know when the Chinese started the incursions, in the first year they did this, in the second year they did this, in the third year, they did this, etc.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member referred to what I said the other day. I was dealing with the period of the last, I might say, 18 months, because we had discussed the previous incursions adequately in the House. I said, as he has repeated, that according to our information, three posts have been put up, two of them near the international frontier, according to our information just on this side of the frontier, and one in the north nearer the Karakorum pass which is definitely beyond the 1959 line. That was the important thing. I referred also to Daulatbeg Oldi. It is our post, not far from that, near the Karakorum. So far as these three posts are concerned, it is our belief, it is our information that they had been put up in the course of the last summer. These posts, as a rule, do not suddenly appear in their full shape. There may be a slight beginning, something which is not visible and then gradually built up. Then they become more obvious and they are found by our reconnaissance party during their reconnaissance. So our impression is that these three posts—two a little near the international border or a little beyond the international border, and the one in the north—were put up in the last summer. Our first information came to us about them in September last.

N.G. Goray: Will you, Sir, then request the Prime Minister to show these places on the map? Otherwise, how can we know?

Nath Pai: There is no demand to disclose our posts. That misunderstanding must be removed. We cannot request you, and we never requested you, to show any of our posts. That was never the suggestion. We only wanted to have a map showing their posts.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not mind. If some hon. Members come to my room, I shall show them. Some of the leaders of the parties can come to my room. I have got maps of these posts here.

Rajendra Singh:<sup>5</sup> This is a matter in which the entire country is interested. Speaker: If there is a map, it would be possible to mark them. It may be placed in the Central Hall so that hon. Members can look at it, instead of the hon. Members going to the Prime Ministers' room.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member wants me to produce a large-scale map. I can try to put up a map but it will have to be, obviously, just in outlines only.

N.G. Goray: I requested the Speaker because a map has been already published in the *Times of India* showing the westward movement of Chinese troops. I want to know from the Government whether that map is correct or whether there is some difference between the map produced by this paper and the map they have in their possession.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I saw the map in the *Times of India* only this morning. I was not here yesterday afternoon. The shading given seems to me to be not based on any fact, largely because they have joined up two points to give a fat curve to that. There is no justification for that. But the map itself, apart

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<sup>5</sup> PSP MP from Chapra, Bihar.

from the shading, is presumably correct. The places are marked there and they are helpful, but the shading does not appear to me to be correct.

### **263. In the Lok Sabha: Chinese Incursions<sup>6</sup>**

Speaker:<sup>7</sup> The hon. Prime Minister will now reply to the discussion on the latest Chinese incursions into Indian Territory.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr Speaker, Sir, in accordance with the wish expressed by you, I have had a map or chart of this area placed in the Central Hall, and also—I am not sure if you, Sir, have got it—a copy of the latest Chinese letter. If you would permit me to say, we have received a reply from the Chinese Government to our last protest note, which has been printed, our last protest note dated the 31st October, 1961.<sup>8</sup>

S.M. Banerjee:<sup>9</sup> What was the date of that letter?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The date of the reply is 30th November, but it reached us naturally two or three days later; that is the Peking date; it came to us about three days ago, I think.

So, I should like to place this too on the Table of the House, to complete the record thus far. (See Appendix II, annexure No. 44 (a))

Speaker: The hon. Prime Minister may give the substance of that letter to hon. Members.

Naushir Bharucha:<sup>10</sup> So that our records also would be complete.

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<sup>6</sup> Discussion, 5 December 1961. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. LX, 2-8 December 1961, cols 3237-3266.

<sup>7</sup> M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>9</sup> Independent MP from Kanpur, UP.

<sup>10</sup> Independent MP from East Khandesh, Bombay.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I can give the substance. The substance is that they have, of course, as usual, denied and repudiated the various charges that we had made against them; and they have said that their line of 1956 in the Chinese map was not changed; it was more or less the same in the 1960 map, and the difference was just minor, which is not correct, because that is a factual matter where you can see the differences. Just to draw the attention of the House to this matter, we pointed this out quite clearly in the report of the officials of the Government of India who met the Chinese officials; it has been dealt with there.

Then, they talk about our complaint about Chinese intrusions, more especially, about those three posts that I have mentioned.

In regard to one of them, Dambuguru, they deny the fact that they have got a post there. I have no doubt that they had it, and all I can conclude is that they have withdrawn it, as previously they withdrew another post near Demchok. For the rest, they say that at the other places they have been there all the time or for a long time.

Then they complain of the Government of India's stepping up military activity on the border and establishing new check posts, and generally building up their military position along the border, not only there, but at Bara Hoti. Then they complain, denying our complaint, of Indian aircraft violating what they call Chinese airspace and state that the Chinese forces have been asked not to patrol within 20 kilometers on the Chinese side of the border. Then they sort of hint at the fact that if our military activities continue, they may have to take steps in defence by sending some troops across the Mac Mahon Line. This is broadly what they have said.

May I add that in the map I have placed—it is a very good map, not merely a chart but a regular map—there are two or three lines marked, the international boundary, the Chinese side's 1956 claim and the 1960 map of the Chinese. They are three lines. Three or four places are marked in it. Our post at Daulet Beg Oldi is not printed there, but it is marked there. This is the only post we have marked. We have not marked the other posts that we have, as I stated the other day before the House. The three Chinese posts

are, one on the Chip Chap river and the other two Dambuguru and Nyagzu; they too are marked in this. We have not marked other posts; we did not think it was desirable for us to mark our posts on the map. As for the Chinese side's other posts, some are on the other side of the 1956 line. They are stated in the documents and can be easily traced.

I have welcomed this discussion in the House because I want these matters or any matters that may create doubts in the minds of Members of the House or the country to be elucidated, explained and clarified in this way. So I have welcomed it, and I have found in the course of the debate that a good deal requires clarification. I have been accused of many things, including confusion and lack of clarity. It is rather difficult for me to speak about my own capacity to be clear-minded. My own impression has been that a number of Members, Chiefly on the opposite side of the House, have been singularly lacking in any clarity of thought or expression.

Naushir Bharucha: I take exception to this remark. Repeatedly we are asking Government to furnish us with maps. They do not furnish maps. Then they accuse us saying that we are lacking in clarity. This is not fair.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I have not quite understood the hon. Member.

Naushir Bharucha: You have not given us a single map. How can you say that we are lacking in clarity? It is your fault. You are suppressing facts, you are suppressing literature and then accusing us of ignorance and lack of clarity.

Jawaharlal Nehru: This is an example of utter confusion and lack of clarity. Hon. Members like Naushir Bharucha, as he has displayed now, lack clarity of thought completely.

Naushir Bharucha: I do not understand. Let us make this clear. We have been asking the hon. Minister to give us maps. Maps are not given. One map

is placed there and then he comes up here and says that we are lacking in clarity of thought. May be we are lacking in that. We are ignorant because Government has kept us ignorant deliberately. (Interruptions)

Jawaharlal Nehru: He does not enable me to finish a few sentences and starts protesting. That, I submit, is an attitude of utter lack of a coherent approach to any problem.

Naushir Bharucha: You may say anything. You are no better.

Ila Palchoudhuri:<sup>11</sup> The Prime Minister must not be referred as "he".

Speaker: Hon. Members must be a little more thick-skinned.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I was not referring to Shri Naushir Bharucha. He brought it upon himself by referring to himself.

Now the other Members, two or three of them—Acharya Kripalani and others—repeatedly said that I lacked clarity of thought. As I said, I cannot obviously be a judge of my own virtues and failings. Others have to judge; the House will have to judge. But this charge which Shri Naushir Bharucha repeated, about my desiring to suppress facts, is so patently wrong that I am amazed that anyone should make it unless he himself suffers from some confusion in thinking.

One thing that is correct in that charge—we dealt with it during the previous debates—is that when for the first time, the Chinese started building or using the Aksai Chin road, when we first heard of it, we were not quite sure. So we inquired into it. We sent our people to inquire into it. Some of our people were arrested and things happened. Then we sent a protest to them. That is correct. It may be I was wrong there, that at that time I did not bring this fact immediately before the House because we were inquiring and finding out what the Chinese Government's answer was.

N.G. Ranga:<sup>12</sup> That is only an excuse.

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<sup>11</sup> Congress MP from West Bengal.

N.G. Goray:<sup>13</sup> That is not the reason. You have stated in your White Paper. You stated that there should be no furores here, there should be no heartburning and that sort of thing.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Quite so. I am saying that we wanted to find out the Chinese Government's answer, etc., before we placed it before the House.

Apart from this particular fact, we have kept this House informed of almost every scrap of paper that has been used in this connection. The book that I placed on the Table of the House the other day White Paper No. V, and the other four fat volumes, contains every letter that has gone and every letter that we have received. Naturally it is not possible or, or, I think, desirable for me to come to the House and tell them of every petty incident that occurs from time to time or of a protest made or a protest received. But every relevant thing has been stated.

Now, a hon. Member—I forget who—said that even on the 20th November, I kept back facts. I have my own failings, but I am not an unmitigated fool and for anyone to suggest that on the 20th I kept back a fact and that on the 27th I should be exposed by the Hon. Member is a bit difficult to understand. How am I exposed by the papers I placed on the Table, which I knew I was going to place on the Table in a few days' time and which I said so? Am I going to keep back a fact which I know is coming up before the House at my instance? The fact of the matter is that in this matter of the fresh incursions, before I went to America, that is to say, just about the time we sent this last reply to the Chinese government on October 31, we thought it was a very important matter and must be placed before this house. And we decided to prepare this White Paper No. V. It has taken some time to prepare it, the House will see it. It is not produced in two days' time, and during this period it was being printed for being placed before this House. I returned from America in the forenoon of the 20th November.

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<sup>12</sup> Congress MP from Andhra Pradesh.

<sup>13</sup> PSP MP from Bombay.

Almost immediately, within an hour or an hour and a half, I had to come to the House, and I came here. It was my intention to make a statement along with the White Paper as soon as it was ready, but the matter was raised as a motion for adjournment, and I made a brief statement then, and I said then that four or five days later I would place the papers and make a statement. That is the position. So, to say that I deliberately kept back anything, when we are giving everything in this printed book, is rather wide of the mark.

In this book there are some references to our Ministry having written about some Chinese patrol being seen somewhere. It is for you to judge, for the House to judge, whether every incident of that type has to be reported immediately to the House, because these petty incidents are occurring sometimes; they have occurred, and we take some action, we get some reply which comes up in a connected form before the House. It would be confusing for every letter that we write to be placed before the House immediately.

So, I do submit that there is a very great deal of misapprehension and misunderstanding about this matter, and I have ventured respectfully to treat this House, in regard to taking it into our confidence, more than is normally done in such matters.

N.G. Ranga: No, no. It did not come to the house early enough.

Jawaharlal Nehru: And I propose to continue to do so because the matter, as the hon. Member Shri Asoka Mehta said, is one of profound importance. Nobody in this House can disagree with that description, and certainly not I or any Member of our Government. Indeed, if the House would remember, sometime back—I forget now—when speaking on this problem, on our border problem in this House and the events that had given rise to it, I laid the greatest stress on the importance of this matter to India, not only in the present but in the future, and I said this problem in some shape or other might pursue us for a generation or more, and we could not consider it lightly or superficially. What happens on our border is a basic problem, it is

a problem of historic importance. So that nobody can charge me with not attaching enough importance to it. I think personally that it is more important basically for us than any other external problem.

N.G. Ranga: Hear, hear. I am glad you have come to that now.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Possibly, the noble Acharya, the gentleman of the Swatantra Party, will further follow my argument and find himself in agreement, though I rather doubt it.

My difficulty has been that this matter, the importance and profound importance of this matter, has not been thoroughly understood by the noble Acharya opposite. I am sorry I use the word "noble." I do not think it is quite parliamentary, and the right expression should have been "the learned Acharya."

So that, I would beg the House at least to accept this statement of mine that we attach the greatest importance to it, and it is not a party matter, it is obvious; it is a matter of national importance, and I would have hoped that we should have all treated it as a national issue of the highest importance.

A curious thing was said by one of the hon. Members opposite, that we had hidden this fact, that some daily newspaper in Delhi had said that a meeting of officials of the External Affairs Ministry was held which decided to keep it dark in view of the elections. I have not seen it, but if it has appeared in any Delhi newspaper, this kind of thing really does little credit to that newspaper. I know of nothing, no meeting, and I have enquired about it in my Ministry. How could it be kept dark for months and months when it is obvious, it is patent, that the thing was being printed to be placed before the House? The whole thing is ridiculous. As for doing it because of the elections, I should have thought that there could be no more foolish thing from the point of view of the present Government than to do this; and if I may say so—and I say so with some hesitation and without meaning or implying anything—certainly the impression created on my mind has been

that part of the heat generated on the other side is due to the very elections in the foreground. Mayor may not be so. The hon. Member Shri Braj Raj Singh asked the Government to resign on this issue and to face the electorate. Well, I am sorry to say I am not convinced by him, as I am seldom convinced by what he says. He demanded this on behalf of the people of India. Of course, I suppose that he is aware of the fact that, as a matter of fact, this Government will cease to exist in a few months, elections will take place, and the people of India whom he represents so stoutly will be given full opportunity to decide who should form the next Government. I do not know, I may guess but I do not know, what their decision will be, and whatever it is, it will be faithfully and loyally followed. But may I venture to say that we all represent, in a degree, the people of India; otherwise, we would not be here. But when Shri Braj Raj Singh stoutly talks on behalf of the people of India, I am reminded of an old story which has stuck in my mind almost from my childhood, of The Three Tailors of Tooley Street. The Three Tailors of Tooley Street issued a manifesto once, declaring "We, the People of England say this and that", it amused me when I heard of it first long ago, and somehow it suddenly came back to my mind listening to Shri Braj Raj Singh.

This is a matter of high importance, and I should like to deal with this matter in all seriousness. Basically, what has happened? A certain aggression has taken place on our territory, and many other things backing it have happened or are happening. And how do we deal with it? First of all, what is the objective? Obviously, our objective can only be to get that aggression vacated. How do we get that aggression vacated?—by diplomatic means, by various measures and ultimately, if you like by war. Now, our policy is to get that aggression vacated fully and wholly. Our policy also is, and always has been in regard to every matter, to try every method, every peaceful method, to gain our objective. It may be that the peaceful method is not successful. Even so, it is desirable to do that for two reasons; one because it is in consonance with our policy, internal and external; and, secondly, it should always be the necessary prelude to any other action.

I have again to refer—I regret to do so—to Shri Braj Raj Singh. I am sorry; but I want to be quite clear that his thinking and mine are not the same in this matter because he says that we should go out and occupy 70 miles beyond the McMahon line and reach the Brahmaputra and the Mansarowar Lake.

Braj Raj Singh: <sup>14</sup> With your permission, Sir, may I correct the hon. Prime Minister? I did not say, "occupy." I said if we are not able to get the Tibetan region, independence, as it is called by the Prime Minister of China, then we should declare that our frontier is from the source of Brahmaputra as it flows to the east.

Jawaharlal Nehru: If I have not correctly reported him, I am sorry. Nevertheless, he says that we should declare that our frontier is the Brahmaputra and includes the Mansarowar Lake. We will not claim that frontier and we do not propose to claim that because it has no historical or other validity. What we claim we claim for adequate reasons pointed out in the officials' Book.

One of the reasons I should like to state here, which is a deeper reason because the Himalayas are not only a part of our territory but, if I may say so, they are part of our hearts and minds; and it is a deep injury to us if anything happens to them. It has been associated with the thinking of our race, our forbears for thousands of years; and our whole cultural tradition is tied up with it; our literature is tied up with it; our mythology is tied up with it. So far it is an essential part of us, something deeper or greater and more important than merely some territorial claim.

When Acharya Kripalani and others took exception to the fact when I have stated several times that this area is a bare mountain, very few people hardly dwell there, there are no trees etc., they seem to think that I am saying that to minimize the importance of this area. (Interruption) They are mistaken. But we must know the facts and I do not understand how you

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<sup>14</sup> Socialist Party MP from UP.

arrive at the truth by minimizing the facts which are known to everybody else but we ourselves refuse to see them properly, ostrich-like. The importance of it is very great for a variety of reasons and more essentially for the reasons which I have just mentioned. But, nevertheless, the fact remains that this area is a most extraordinary area in the world so far as terrain is concerned. At that rate, no tree grows anywhere in this wide area—there may be some shrubs.

Hem Barua:<sup>15</sup> The Chinese Prime Minister when he met Mr Nehru in Delhi used this statement of our Prime Minister against us and he did not take it in the light our Prime Minister has mentioned.

Bal Raj Madhok:<sup>16</sup> There are so many regions like Baltistan and others where there grow no trees. Does it mean that they should be left out?

Mahavir Tyagi:<sup>17</sup> No hair grows on my head. Does it mean that the head has no value?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I was stating our policy about this vacation of aggression and so long as that aggression is not vacated, this basic trouble remains. This is a basic headache. How should we get that vacated? Always through peaceful methods. Apart from peaceful methods, there are pressures short of war and then there is war.

Now, I am free to confess to this House that my whole soul reacts against the idea of war anywhere. That is the training I have received throughout my life and I cannot easily get rid of it at the age of 72.

Acharya Kripalani:<sup>18</sup> Except in Congo.

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<sup>15</sup> PSP MP from Assam.

<sup>16</sup> Jan Sangh MP from New Delhi.

<sup>17</sup> Congress MP from UP.

<sup>18</sup> PSP MP from Bihar.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Hon. Acharya's interjections are sometimes not relevant and at other times have little meaning. He says, Congo. He should know that Congo is an entirely different type of case where in our duty to the United Nations and to the emergent nations of Africa we undertook a responsibility which may involve us in warlike operations; but it is not war all the same (Interruption).

However, how can any person rule out war? Why do we keep our Army Navy and Air Force? We keep them. But the fact is that first of all one should realize that our desire is to avoid it, but not to submit to any evil if the avoidance of that means submission. Therefore, even if we have to take that step, we take it certainly, for defence and certainly for the vacation of any aggression. Because when I say defence, it includes action against an aggressor. Obviously, aggression on our part would be if we cross our international borders outside that is aggression. What we do inside our territory is defence. So, one cannot rule out war and we do not rule out war.

But, then, other facts come too, the factors which might broadly be called military factors. That is, when one takes a step, one does not take a step without being, so far as possible, quite prepared for success in that step, without adequately strengthening oneself in every way and that is what I call adventurist action.

The hon. Acharya Kripalani gave us instances—not very happy instances— of England joining the Second World War or France being defeated by Hitler. I do not quite know what the relevancy is to this. That is why I feel that the charge of confusion and all that may very well apply to some hon. Members opposite.

However, the point is a very simple fact that if you have to take anything in the nature of military action it should be thoroughly prepared and strong action, and not action which may come back upon you if you do not succeed in it; and it may weaken your position. It is a simple proposition which is applicable in war. Of course, if sometimes one has to take action immediately because there is no escape from it, that is a different matter. So, we have followed this policy, aiming at the vacation of this aggression,

at the same time, through peaceful means, realizing that we are not sure how far they will succeed. They may not and I am not ruling out the possibility of their succeeding, because one must not go by all the brave words that are said in these communications to us by the Chinese Government. But other factors work also. Nevertheless we realize that that may not be brought about in that way. Therefore, we are taking all the steps that we can to prepare the ground for other methods to be employed.

Hon. Members will say that we are giving some information to the Chinese which will give them strength. But the fact of the matter is that we are dealing with a physical situation which was completely neglected for the last 100 years or more. And we are dealing with it pretty well, I think, administratively, militarily, building it up, preparing the ground for advance: we are advancing and we are putting up our posts, administrative centres, and others. It is a neglected part and the whole of a hundred years is responsible for it; we started doing it ten years ago and did it fairly effectively in some parts of the frontier which is, remember, over 2000 miles. In other parts we did something which, let us admit, was not adequate to stop this aggression. It is true also—we say—that we did not expect this type of aggression from the Chinese, although we knew right from the beginning that fundamentally the change in the situation in our borders was a historic change that would affect our frontiers and bring danger to them. That is why we took it. We did not expect that danger to come in that particular place, especially Ladakh, at that stage. All this came because of various developments in Tibet. Anyhow, we have been taking those steps and hon. Member says that we must jump into this fray in some other way without adequate preparation. I would submit that this is more from exuberance of his mind and excitement than from clear thinking.

Acharya Kripalani: In two years China may have the atom bomb. We will not have, because we do not want to use such weapons.

Jawaharlal Nehru: What conclusion does the hon. Acharya draw from that?

Acharya Kripalani: They are not so ready if we oppose today they will be more ready to oppose when that happens.

Mahavir Tyagi: Shall we risk all our strength, all our army, in this?

N.G. Ranga: For fifteen years, the hon. Prime Minister says, we have been preparing. Yet he himself says that they were not adequate to prevent that aggression. Is that our preparation?

Nath Pai:<sup>19</sup> Why go on advertising unpreparedness?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I knew that you would say that; I prophesied that you would say it. I said that for hundred years nobody in India has thought of that frontier.

N.G. Ranga: That was because Tibet was protected there on our behalf by the British. But you allowed the Chinese to come there and you made no arrangements.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I find it a little difficult to follow the tortuous wording of the hon. Acharya's mind. I am talking about things about a hundred years ago. He talks about the British Government protecting Tibet all the time.

N.G. Ranga: All the time Tibet was there to protect us: Tibet was looked after by the British (Interruptions).

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not understand what the hon. Member is after. Some Hon. Members said that Tibet should not have been given up, as if it was our property to keep or give up..... (Interruptions). I really cannot understand how else or what other policy we could have adopted. We could have

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<sup>19</sup> Bapu Nath Pai, PSP MP from Bombay.

adopted two policies. One was the one which we have adopted. The other also involved our walking out of Tibet. We were in Tibet not in any great armed force; we had a couple of hundred soldiers protecting the line, somewhere in Yarun or Yangtze; just a few. They could not possibly remain there. It was an impossibility. We could not march our armies into Tibet. We had to come out of Tibet. There was no way and not all the power in the world could prevent that. That is admitted. Therefore, the objection is not of the step that we took but of the fact that we justified it by certain historical and political reasoning. The step had to be taken; there was no doubt about it.

Nath Pai: That is not the objection. You came back; that was the correct thing you did. But you agreed to the Chinese walking in; that is the objection. We wanted an independent and free Tibet, as it was always.

Joachim Alva:<sup>20</sup> Yesterday, we heard every one of these hon. Members, with the utmost patience..... (Interruptions).

Nath Pai: He can take care of himself you sit down.

Speaker: Order, order. Let there be no interruptions.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The objection, as the hon. Member said, is that while the Chinese came there, we should have withdrawn such elements of forces we had there—we had to and the Chinese would have come in as they came in— but we should have registered our protest about their coming. It comes to this.... (Interruptions.) Whether that protest would have been of the slightest help to us or to the Tibetans is another matter... (Interruptions).

N.G. Ranga: It is a matter of conscience.

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<sup>20</sup> Congress MP from Mysore.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Am I to speak or not, Sir? I cannot have half a dozen of them talking at the same time. I submit that I should like the hon. Members opposite to think what exactly could we have done, except if they think that we could have affected the fate of Tibet by condemning them in the United Nations or elsewhere?

N.G. Ranga: Even that we did not do in the United Nations.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Hon. Member talks about the matters of conscience. There are many matters of conscience. If we enter into the field of conscience, we may lose ourselves because not much of what has been said here relates to conscience. Many things happen in the world and in our borders. If we are looking at it from the point of view of India's interests, as we must and, naturally, from the point of view of doing the right thing, I regret to say that I am completely unrepentant about the policy we adopted towards Tibet. In practice, we could not have adopted any other policy except of course that foolish policy of accepting what has happened and bewailing our lot.

Bal Raj Madhok: We are suffering as a result of that policy.

Hem Barua: You have said that Tibet is independent in your book ...  
(Interruptions).

Speaker: Order, order. I am not going to allow this sort of thing. Let there be no running commentary in this matter.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is a sign of bad conscience.

Hem Barua: My problem is this, Sir. He has written in his book, *Glimpses of World History*, 1939 edition, page 842 that "Tibet was independent." Why is he withdrawing from that original position?

Speaker: I will have to ask him to withdraw if he interrupts like this...

(Interruptions)

Rajendra Singh:<sup>21</sup> I request you to direct the Prime Minister to withdraw his remarks.

Hem Barua: I am quoting from the book written by him.

Rajendra Singh: Are we sitting here with a bad conscience? That is the most objectionable thing he must withdraw it now.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member perhaps does not understand English language adequately .... (Interruptions)

Rajendra Singh: I understand as much as there is need to understand.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I said "bad conscience" because I did not wish to impugn the quality of the mind opposite. I have to find some explanation and so I gave the most charitable explanation.... (Interruptions)

Hem Barua rose—

Rajendra Singh rose—

Speaker: Are the hon. members here intent upon disturbing and not allowing the Prime Minister to go on with his reply?

A Hon. Member: It is a question of conscience.

Speaker: Order, order. The hon. Members had no hesitation in saying things the whole of yesterday; they were saying a number of things against the hon. Prime Minister and he has to explain. In doing so, he referred to this question of conscience and so on. Somebody referred to it; Prof. Ranga said

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<sup>21</sup> PSP MP from Bihar.

so. Now, is the hon. Prime Minister to say: yes, mine is a bad conscience? I cannot understand.

Rajendra Singh: Are we discussing foreign policy or conscience?

Speaker: The hon. Member is not the only Member of the Opposition. There is the Leader of his Party. Let him keep quiet for some time.

Rajendra Singh: He is the Leader of the House, Sir and we expect good manners from him; not bad manners.

Speaker: Nothing is gained by being rather unruly like this. I would advise the leaders of his group to just check him.

Rajendra Singh: On that side also, let them check.

Speaker: It is improper. If he continues like that, I will have to take more drastic action.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I submit that to suggest that a person has a bad conscience is not an offensive statement at all. I may also submit, with respect, that it is not only parliamentary but it is almost on the verge of extreme politeness.

Apart from that, I can very well understand hon. Members feeling strongly on the Chinese incursion and aggression. I understand that. We all feel it. Only there is a difference in our expression. We have to express ourselves, some of us at any rate connected with the Government, in a somewhat restrained way, because, normally civilized governments function in that way. We agree with the broad objective. There may be differences in the ways we reach the objective. I have analyzed, poured over and listened carefully to some of the speeches made.

First of all, Shri Asoka Mehta said that I create confusion and ambiguity

by calling the check-posts military posts. I really do not understand what the hon. Member is after. I cannot understand it. I thought that by calling them military posts I gave them a greater significance.

Asoka Mehta:<sup>22</sup> It was the other way about. What I had said was, what were military posts originally had been characterized as check-posts; that you have been consistent in your attitude of understating the facts by using words which did not really express the real position.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not remember Shri Asoka Mehta raising this point ever before. It was I who raised the point and said they should be called military posts. He did not say so. As a matter of fact, frankly, I may say that in this description, which is more correct, there is nothing down in the position, whether you call it check-posts or military posts. But it was a more correct description, and therefore I am using it.

Then he said, "Why did you not use it before?" I do submit that it is a prevarication, and it has no importance. That is my difficulty. Except a strong feeling and, if you like, passions, I do not get any logical line of reasoning. First of all, I am accused of what happened ten years ago in regard to Tibet. Well, good or bad, there it is; it is over. We are dealing with the present position. (Interruption)

A Hon. Member: It is not over.

Speaker: Order, order.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Then, my difficulty is, Acharya Ranga cannot move up beyond ten years. He does not seem to realize that we are living today and facing all these problems and not ten years ago still.

N.G. Ranga: We are facing problems today and this is the legacy of your rule.

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<sup>22</sup> PSP MP from Bihar.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Therefore, does he propose somehow to change the course of history of the past ten years? What does he propose to do?  
(Interruption)

Speaker: Order, order. Let us discuss the present.

Jawaharlal Nehru: We are a mature, responsible body. Take again Shri Asoka Mehta. He talked about the chain of events and our prevarication, etc. I really and honestly submit—I do not claim to be a very brilliant person but I have an average intelligence—that I am quite unable to understand this. I can understand some errors here and there, but charging us with a course of prevarication during all these years is something which I cannot understand. I do submit that something should be done and if he wants to do it, I shall be grateful to him. Let him write out an essay and we shall deal with it and we shall improve ourselves and get rid of our mistakes. Then there was the question, "What have you done for the last ten years?"

Asoka Mehta: I never used the word "prevarication." I do not know who has taken down notes for you.

Nath Pai: I remember what was said. You sent the Secretary-General to China. It was asked as to what you gained in return for this gesture of friendship. The Secretary-General is charged by the Chinese of indulging in prevarication. That is what was said. We did not charge you with prevarication, nor did we doubt your brilliance.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Thank you. But then you have accused us, that we have allowed to create an atmosphere, and in spite of all this trouble, of China being right and reliable. I do not know how in our usual attempt at being friendly with every nation, we have opposed and objected to many things done by other countries. But we have avoided, nevertheless, shouting loudly against them. That is our broad policy and I think it is a right policy.

That does not mean this, that is, sometimes people imagine that politeness is subservience. That is a sign, if I may say so, of some hidden fears in one's hearts and not a brave, straightforward attitude to the world. We are friendly with every country in the world including China, but we will fight China if necessary. That is the whole lesson that I have been taught during the last 40 or 50 years of my life by Gandhiji and others: always to be friendly and never to give in. That is how we have carried on our campaign. The gentlemen opposite perhaps have not had that training and therefore they cannot appreciate what I say. But I propose always to avoid saying or doing things which are unnecessarily offensive and which are not necessary. Sometimes an offensive thing has to be said, but ultimately, what I am aiming at is, either winning over the other party or weakening the other party in its own opinion and in the world's opinion and in my own. This is the normal practice.

Hem Barua: We have done neither.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is for the hon. Member to judge. Others also judge differently. However, there it is. Then Shri Asoka Mehta referred to Panchsheel. Take this question of Panchsheel which the people seem to think is a kind of red rag to the bulls of the Opposition,—

Asoka Mehta: The bulls are on that side.

Braj Raj Singh:<sup>23</sup> They have got the bulls as symbols.

A.B. Vajpayee:<sup>24</sup> It is their election symbol.

Jawaharlal Nehru:—or anybody else. Gradually, hon. Members are

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<sup>23</sup> Socialist MP from UP.

<sup>24</sup> Jan Sangh MP from UP.

beginning to see and sometimes even say, as Shri Asoka Mehta said, that the principles of Panchsheel are quite good but they should not be applied to China! Now, if Panchsheel is good, it is good, and Panchsheel is a method of international relations which I think is essential, unless you have war, ultimately. You may have intermediate stages too.

Hem Barua: But China has not lived up to that.

Jawaharlal Nehru: If you say that China has not lived up to that, I entirely agree. Because China has not lived up to that, we are taking all these steps aimed at it and this situation has arisen. That is a different matter. But it is no good talking of Panchsheel. You might even say: "Truth is a good proposition, but it does not pay. Therefore, we lie all the time because somebody else is lying!" I say that in the Panchsheel, the principles laid down are the only principles which a civilized society can have in its international affairs. The alternative leads to war. If you have war, there is no Panchsheel then it is war, out there it is. That is completely right for us to adopt it here and elsewhere. Our grouse is that China has broken its word, and in that sense betrayed its word. That is our grouse. But you seem to be annoyed at the mere fact that Panchsheel is mentioned or the five principles are mentioned. It is to our advantage that it is mentioned. I am only pointing out that they have broken their word.

Raja Mahendra Pratap:<sup>25</sup> What about my three peaceful solutions?

Jawaharlal Nehru: As far as I remember, Shri Asoka Mehta said and most people said that they do not want war if possible. Of course, if it comes it cannot be helped. Shri Asoka Mehta does not even want us to break our diplomatic relations with China. I think I am right in saying that he said that. What then? Not indulging in a campaign of slanging—we do not want that—

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<sup>25</sup> Independent MP from UP.

and instead of that, we exchanged notes which are sometimes strong notes, and we go on strengthening our position to deal with the situation whenever we think it is strong enough to be dealt with by us and not from a weak position.

Now, when we have arrived at this stage of preparation, etc.—we lay down the policy—the other matter goes inevitably into the hands of our military or air or defence advisers—the so-called experts. It is for them to decide what steps to take, naturally in terms of our broad policies, taking directions from us. But ultimately it is their decision and we have to follow that. We have been doing that and building up our strength from the base upwards. The roads that we decided to build and have built today to a considerable extent are over 2,000 miles, all roads in mountainous areas. Just imagine the task we have undertaken— 2,000 miles of roads—and we have built them. A great deal depends to them, because without those roads, that basic build-up does not come into play.

I have talked about adventurist action. Adventurist action is taking some action, without having a base to support. That is not fair to our men. They are brave and fine men, but it is not fair to put them in that position and not fair for the nation to take some action which cannot be supported and therefore which ends abruptly. So, that is the broad policy, the rest becomes a question of military tactics, strategy, and the resources one has at one's disposal.

Some hon. Member said, put the whole resources of the Five Year Plan there, which again shows an extraordinary lack of intelligence. If I get together all the engineers and others and dump them in Ladakh, what are they to do there? A variety of things are necessary—material is necessary, this and that— which has to be carried by air. Every little screw is to be carried by air. So, more aircraft is necessary. We get new aircraft, we have got it. The moment new aircraft come, new airfields are necessary, because they are too heavy aircraft to be supported by the old airfields. So, there are a hundred and one aspects of things. One seems to think that India should rise as one man and sort of oppose it, and if I may add, be about as capable

as one man. These are phrases may be for political meetings, but when we are considering this very dangerous and highly important situation, one has to plan and do things which will lead to success.

Take again the most extraordinary statement made by Acharya Kripalani that according to his information, we have issued orders that none of our people are to fire unless fired upon. It is absolutely wrong. There are our military posts and obviously they are there to defend, to attack or do whatever the position may demand. Then, there are reconnaissance parties—usually small parties—whose objective is to gain information and report to us. If this small reconnaissance party gets involved in some trouble, we do not get the information and the main objective is denied. Where we want to fight, we fight; the posts fight and others fight. But so far as the reconnaissance parties- Which may consist of 3, 4 or 5 persons—are concerned, we have told them to concentrate on getting information and telling us about it. They do not go spreading about, 10 persons spreading about, to engage themselves in major warfare; that is writing them off which is unfair to them and we do not gain. So, we must distinguish between reconnaissance, getting news, whether publicly or secretly, and fighting. These are obvious things which Members may perhaps forget.

Much was said about friendship with Burma, Nepal, etc. I do not think we have ever been quite so close friends with Burma as we are now. Does that mean that we are to dictate Burmese policy? Take Nepal even. Much has happened in Nepal, which we have not liked and we have expressed ourselves about it. But we have not interfered, because we want to maintain their friendship. We are still continuing to help them. Some hon. Members opposite have expressed themselves very strongly against the present regime in Nepal, which has irritated them. We have restrained ourselves, although mildly we have said so and we are friends with Nepal still. It is true that things have happened there which are not to our liking and we have made it clear; we shall continue to make that clear. We cannot order about these things, because the mere act of doing that has the reverse consequences.

Broadly speaking, I think all these countries are in terms of quite close friendship with us. The Malayan King is coming here, the Malayan Prime Minister is coming here within a few days. The hon. Member, Shri Asoka Mehta, should not attach too much importance to what a few students might have said to him in Rangoon or Singapore, I forget, or someone else there in Singapore or Malaya.

Somebody said that we should not sponsor the Chinese case in the UN. As a matter of fact, even last year, we did not sponsor it, but certainly we voted for it, because that has nothing to do with China being good or bad. In fact, we think that unless China is in the UN, we cannot proceed with disarmament or any major matter. There can be no disarmament, China being left out to arm. There are other reasons. It has nothing to do with our trouble with China. We shall deal with it.

Then, a number of statements by the Defence Minister were apparently not approved of by some hon. Members opposite. But again I would submit that they do not seem to have read them before disapproving of them, apart from headlines or may be something else. He was on the eve of coming back to India. He was asked something at the New York airport. That very morning something had appeared in the newspapers. I had made a statement here on the 20th November and there were big headlines there. He was asked, what is this about? In relation to what was said in Parliament, he said, "I do not know the latest developments". He knows of course, all the others. He said he did not know what was happening just now. It was in relation to what happened in Parliament that morning that he said, "I do not know what the latest development there is."

Nath Pai: He referred to developments on the China-India border.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It was in relation to the news that appeared that morning in the papers.

Nath Pai: The news was about the Prime Minister's statement about 11 new

incursions.

Jawaharlal Nehru: In relation to what happened in Parliament, he said, "I do not know if anything happened in the last day or two." The concept there was, large armies were facing each other in Ladakh, to which he said that there are no active hostilities of this kind going on, not "hostility", but "hostilities" going on in this way, i.e., large-scale fighting.

Asoka Mehta: Pardon me I am interrupting because the Defence Minister said that I have misinterpreted him. Actually, the words quoted in inverted commas are "active hostility" and not "hostilities". So you will have to stick to that expression "active hostility" if you are quoting from the newspapers.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know, but surely the newspaper is not more reliable than what I am telling him.

Asoka Mehta: He says something and the newspaper reports it in inverted commas. He may remember having said something, but the only thing we have before us and you have before you is this. His actual words were not heard by you. All you have is the evidence in the newspaper. I am prepared to accept that he did not use those words, but until he makes that position clear, it is not fair to say that we have misinterpreted him.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not accusing hon. Members...

N.G. Ranga: Why not allow the Defence Minister to defend himself? Why do you come to his rescue?

Jawaharlal Nehru: With such gallant crusaders as the Acharya....

N. G. Ranga: You are the gallant crusader for him.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is on his instructions that I am saying so. Anyhow, it is

immaterial. He says that he used the word "hostilities." Nobody can be absolutely dead certain as to what was said every word casually said when one is going to the airport. But the whole point was that the concept there was of large armies fighting, and he wanted to say that this kind of thing is not happening there now.

Sir, I was saying something about sponsoring China. Last year we did not sponsor it but we supported that, and that is our position this year too.

Well, Sir, there are many minor matters but the major position is this, and I hope that apart from our minor arguments that we throw at each other this question of our border and Chinese aggression there is of the most vital importance—I repeat—not only for India's integrity but for the future of Asia and of world peace. It is a matter of tremendous importance, and unless the world takes some other course in the next few years, which it might—I mean disarmament—and takes a vital turn, this will be one of the major trouble spots of the world, and we have to prepare ourselves not for today only but for tomorrow, the day after and years ahead. That is why anything that we want to do we want to do with full preparation.

I think, as I said the other day, that we have improved our situation in the border very much in the last year and half. I do not say that it is as good as we want it to be, but it will become that good progressively, growing better and better, and our policy can only be to get this vacation by the Chinese forces from India's territory. We work to that end, and therein we all agree.

Ultimately, if you analyse the situation, Sir, it becomes one of, possibly, some military tactics. We may differ on that. I may have some opinion, but I have to abide by the opinion of my military advisers. I know they are anxious to achieve results and they are working to that end. It is a difficult task. Anyhow it is no good saying that. When I say it is a difficult task, the Chinese will think we are afraid. We are not afraid, we are not accustomed to be afraid of anything. But that does not mean that we should function without due care, due preparation and due thought. That is what we venture to do. And, we have to see it in the context of a developing world situation.

It is bad enough here. But the developing world situation has to be kept in view. You cannot isolate it. We are trying to do that, and I think that in doing so we have served the cause of India. We hope—we are not without hope—which we shall be able to succeed in getting this land vacated through pressures, through other things, whatever they may be, and without engulfing the whole world in a major war. These things are connected with each other. We cannot isolate them. In effect, therefore, there is little difference, except for strong accusations here and there, in the approach to this question from any side of the House.

I think—you may say that I am to blame for that— that even though I, right ten years ago, foresaw these developments I, nevertheless, trusted—perhaps that is not the right word—I thought that the Chinese Government would not function exactly as it did later. It is true. You may say I was mistaken in feeling that way. But I think that all the time basing one's policy on suspicion is not also a good thing. Sometimes one may be mistaken as one was in this case. But the success we have had in our foreign policy the world over is because we have tried to keep every country a friend and succeeded in creating that impression. Rightly, it was not that China specifically was isolated from others. China was one of the countries we dealt with as a great country, a big country and a country which is our neighbour. We have to adopt that policy; there is no other way, though otherwise all the trouble would have come perhaps sooner or in a worse form.

Anyhow, Sir, we have to face the situation as it is, and we propose to face it stoutly and with courage.

Ram Subhag Singh:<sup>26</sup> I want to seek one clarification regarding the latest communication. The Prime Minister said that China has intimated India that she will march her troops on this side of McMahon line. May I know whether we will repel the march of these troops if it happens?

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<sup>26</sup> Congress MP from Bihar.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The answer is obvious, if that is done we shall resist and repel.

Nath Pai: Mr Speaker, a question which we had expected him to reply and which has been exercising the mind of all is what attitude Government is planning to take, intending to take with regard to the treaty with China which is about to lapse in June.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am glad the hon. Member has drawn my attention to this, because I wanted to mention it myself. Yesterday we received a communication from the Chinese government pointing out that this treaty is expiring or will expire in a few months and the time for renewal of it ended, I think, day before yesterday, and suggesting that we should try, we should discuss the terms of a new treaty. That is what we received yesterday. We have, naturally, sent no answer to it. Well, in the course of the next few days we shall send an appropriate answer.

Rajendra Singh: What will be that answer?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I can't exactly say that. We have to consider it in our foreign affairs committee and the rest. But it is obvious that when such a request is received—unlike other Chinese communications that we have been receiving, this is a very polite communication expressing the hope that this and that will happen—merely to say that we will not discuss with you, prima facie seems rather wrong. Obviously, we cannot just say "yes" and go and discuss it. That too is wrong. Therefore, whatever we may say will have to be conditioned, and on certain conditions being satisfied we may.

## 264. In the Rajya Sabha: Chinese Incursions<sup>27</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Deputy Chairman,<sup>28</sup> Sir I am grateful for the comments and even the criticisms and the suggestions of the hon. Members who have spoken. Yet, with all respect, may I say that apart from some remarks made by some hon. Members, the debate has not helped very much in throwing light on the present situation and the problems we face there? It is not perhaps very easy to throw so much light, further light, because this matter has been discussed repeatedly and I find that some of the arguments used were almost the same that were used a year and a half ago and previously. Presumably, that signifies that there are no further arguments to put forward. The position we are discussing is, if I may say so, broadly a limited one, that is to say what has happened in the course roughly of the last year. I forget when we considered this matter last—maybe it was about a year ago perhaps, or a little less. In considering these developments in these border areas, we have to remember that normally speaking, it is hardly possible for any marked movement to take place during what are called the winter months. Whether it is summer or winter, they become places where only hardened mountaineers can go; anyway they try to climb high mountains. Therefore, it really means what is done there in the summer months—five or six months mostly—when that movement takes place there. Now, this matter was brought to the notice of Parliament say, on the 20th November, the very day I returned from abroad. In fact, within an hour of my landing at Palam, I tried to come to Parliament. Before I had gone abroad, end of October, this had come to our notice—a little earlier—and we had sent that reply to the Chinese Government dated the 31st October, which is given in the White Paper.<sup>29</sup> And we decided naturally to place all these papers and explain the new position to the two Houses as soon as they met. That is why we started

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<sup>27</sup> Motion, 6 December 1961. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. XXXVII, Nos 1-15, 27 November-15 December 1961, cols 1339-1352.

<sup>28</sup> S.V. Krishnamoorthy Rao.

<sup>29</sup> See Appendix 1

getting the White Paper printed just then. I mention this because for some reason which I am unable to fathom, repeatedly I am accused of withholding information. And Shri Dayabhai Patel quoted from some letter I wrote perhaps to Mr Chou En-lai or somebody, which is given in some old White Paper, to the effect that because of friendship with them, we had not placed certain facts before Parliament at a certain time. Now, I have dealt with this matter pretty fully previously here in this House. This referred to the northern Aksai Chin area where the road was built. It took us some time to verify it and then we wrote to the Chinese Government and we wanted to wait for their reply before placing it. It was not this major incursion or aggression that has taken place a little later. We did that then, and we thought that we should know facts a little more first. It took us three months in getting the reply of the Chinese Government to the building of the Aksai Chin road. I may be wrong there I might have acted incorrectly beginning, because we thought it better to find out what they said about it because that road is an old caravan route. It had been used. But it is one thing to use a caravan route which had been used for centuries past. It is another thing to consider it your own and build a road. So, we did that. But after that incident came the Tibetan rebellion and then all kinds of new factors came in and that rebellion resulted directly in the occupation of the eastern part of Ladakh which is a major aggression that has taken place. Since then Shri Dayabhai Patel admitted it, we had flooded this House and the other House with White Papers and a large number of other papers, correspondence, etc. We have put before this House, before Parliament, every little thing that we have been doing. We cannot obviously come here every day and say that a report has come, that a small patrol has been somewhere. That too comes up here, of course a little later, in the shape of the White Paper. But we cannot come up about these minor incidents that occur. We receive complaints from the Chinese of our patrols going there, of our aircraft flying over their territory. It is complaint and counter complaint and it has gone on. But I do submit, Sir that we have put more facts about this in every single letter or Note that has been written before the House from time to

time, and we propose to continue to keep Parliament fully informed. I do not think it is normally the custom in Parliaments in other countries to be kept informed like this of almost the day-to-day developments or month-to-month developments in matters involving the military situations and developments. Nevertheless, we thought it better to do that. And so, we decided to place all these facts before Parliament as soon as it opened. It so happened that I came back an hour before and I could not get those papers ready. The matter came up before the House, in the other House, in another shape. I said that in four or five days' time I would make a statement which I did. In fact, I have placed this White Paper. So the point we have been considering is what has happened in the course of the last year—that is a narrow issue—and if you like in that connection, what our broad policies are. I stated that what has happened in the course of the last year on the Chinese side was, so far as we knew, that three check-posts or military posts had been established. We cannot give the exact date, it is not possible. We can only say that it was not there on one day and later it was there or some other day when our reconnaissance party went there. Or, in other words, we got to know about it then. We heard about it in September— in the beginning or middle of September. And so, we mentioned these three posts one, rather in the north, not far from the Karakoram and not far from an important post that we have—a long name, I forget it at the moment—and their post is on the Chip Chap River, about fifteen miles to the east of our post, and two posts in the southern region of northern Ladakh, which we mentioned and which we said were round about the international frontier.

Now I am sorry Dr Kunzru<sup>30</sup> is not here, he raised this point that I described this as of no great significance. I never said that at all. What I said was this. First of all, I had distinguished between the northern Chip Chap post and the two southern ones, distinguished in the sense that the Chip Chap post was well in advance of their previous post and, therefore, it is a

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<sup>30</sup> H.N. Kunzru, Independent MP from UP.

serious intrusion. The other posts, I had said, are not important in the sense that they are an intrusion because they are near the border, they are just across the international border. That we admit. But we objected to that also because the near-building of them, even on the international border was objectionable. From our point of view, it was an aggressive act and it was quite contrary to the assurances they had given that they would not do any such thing. It was from that point of view. So, we made a difference. The Chip Chap border post was highly important from every point of view, while the other ones were important also, but to a lesser degree. They are on the border and they did not involve much intrusion. Dr Kunzru apparently got rather mixed up between what I said about the northern and southern posts. What I said about the southern posts, he thought, applied to the northern posts, which did not. Now, in the reply which the Chinese Government had sent, they have, of course, justified this but they have denied the fact of having one of the southern posts. They said, we have not got it. And probably they have not got it now. Probably, they have withdrawn from it just as they have withdrawn from one or two other posts. But in eastern Ladakh, near Demchok, they have withdrawn during the last few months or so. That has been happening. But the main thing was, which I described as the sign of aggressive intent, not the northern one but the southern one. Although it was right near the international border, the mere fact of building up roads seemed to us very wrong. But the northern one certainly is much more than a question of intent, and I entirely agree with Dr Kunzru, the fact of certain roads being built, connecting it, is also of importance. It ties up with the system of defence or aggression, call it what you like. That is perfectly true and we recognize it.

Now, one word about building of roads. A hon. Member has asked why they have built thousands of miles of roads on their side and we have not done so still. The broad answer to that question is that the terrain they have to pass through is far easier to build roads than the terrain we have on our side. That is to say, there are broad plateaus, ups and downs. Road-making in Tibet, apart from the high mountains that come in, is merely pulling out

trees and leveling and nothing else, no application of anything, because the moment it is leveled, it is a road. Owing to extreme winter the ground is so hard that nothing more is done. We have ourselves built one airfield at least in these high regions in Ladakh which cost us at that time, I do not know, exactly Rs 400. Practically nothing. It meant really sweeping the place and removing little boulders and stones and pulling out shrubs and it became an airfield, not a first class one, but good enough for use. So that road-making on the other side has been a very much simpler undertaking. Then on our side we have to cross high mountain peaks, passes, up and down precipices. Hon. Members who have cared to see photographs of some places—even the Himachal Pradesh roads that are being built—will realize the extremely hazardous nature of this road-making. That is one reason. I think we have proceeded fairly well with road-making in these mountains. The real difficulty has been that we have to take everything, I mean every machine, every screw has to be taken by air and that led, naturally, to our trying to acquire bigger transport planes, big ones to carry these things. We did that and matters have been progressing fairly well and I can assure Dr Kunzru that it is not in an attempt to save a few crores of rupees that we allowed, or we are going to allow this to suffer.

But there is another fact. Apart from any temporary affair, in any major conflict anywhere with any country, our first and basic defence is the industrial position we hold behind it, what we are producing. I am not talking about other things, of war material and the rest but everything—whether it is aircraft, whether it is guns, whether it is other things. That is the basic thing. If one does not have it, one depends on external sources which are not very reliable and not forthcoming at the time. It is better, I have always held—and that has been the opinion of some of the highest military advisers that we get from abroad to advise us—it is better to have second class weapons which you produce yourself and have them in abundance than an improved weapon which you do not produce and which may be denied to you at the time of need and which may get out of order and you cannot put it right and then you are helpless. However, that

is a matter of opinion.

Anyhow, the basic thing for defence is the Plans. All these Five Year Plans are basic for the defence of India. People seem to think that the Five Year Plans are something isolated from the defence of India. Some people in the other place said, "Oh, scrap the Five Year Plans and go in for defence" which showed how little understanding there is as to what is required for defence. All this is required may be some odd thing or may not be-but whether we want an iron and steel factory, it is essential for defence. All that defence wants is steel. So, in building up defence, in building up the strength of India for protecting the security of India, building up this industrial apparatus is highly important. We may give a twist to the industrial apparatus so as to build more of defence. That is another matter. But essentially the things are common whether it is defence, or whether it is any kind of civil advance. So, as I said, in considering the position as it is, arising during the last year this has happened to the best of our knowledge and we consider it as a serious matter, not merely as an intention or intent but as something that has been done.

We have meanwhile also put in a number of posts, check-posts, military posts. It is not quite proper for me to give the exact locations of them except the one I have mentioned, which is right near the Karakoram and which prevents any flanking movement from that side. The position is that, when people ask how much territory they have taken over, committed aggression on—the Chinese—and vaguely they say ten thousand miles, fifteen thousand miles or two thousand miles. It is difficult to say that because it is not occupied in the ordinary sense of the word although it is true that a certain influence is exercised over a certain territory by these check-posts, and one may say that where there is a succession of check-posts they are, in a sense, in possession of the territory behind them. That is so. On the other hand, there are some check-posts which are like a zigzag. They are check-posts and it cannot be said that they have occupied that territory. I do not wish to make much of the facts. It really does not make very much difference. The point is how much strength they have to control that place

because occupation there is not occupation of territory where people live. They are just mountains and other things and in that sense I had said that it was not correct that the building up of one check-post in the north— that is one in the north really, the other is on the frontier—had given them a larger area under occupation, but it has given them a stronger position in that area. That is correct.

Now, how are we to deal with these matters? Obviously we have to deal with them, whatever step we take, with some strength behind what we do and with the capacity to follow it up. It would be opposed to all intelligent military approaches—leave out any other—to jump into the affray without adequate preparation, adequate base lines etc. Having decided our broad policy, the implementation of the policy, naturally has to be carried out under expert military advice such as we have, and we have been following that. We have been trying to build, first of all, roads, secondly camps, base camps, other camps, etc., and we propose to pursue this as fast and as efficiently as we can.

The hon. Member, who moved this Motion, loosely talked about—I am really surprised at the lack of understanding of the position. Many people talk about our populating this place, these areas, sending people from here and making them live there, a sort of warriors living there, ready to spring up at any intruder. Well, Mr Jairamdas was good enough to describe something from his own experience on the NEFA side, people having to go up by ropes—leave out roads—but actually climbing a rope for hundreds of feet on mountain sides and on the Ladakh side. I doubt how many Members of this hon. House can even sit there for an hour and a half or two. They will get hard breathing difficulty at 10,000 to 17,000 feet. That is the normal height we are functioning at, from 15,000 ft. to 19,000 ft.

As for taking people from here, from India, to live there, there will be very, very few. Unless you exercise some kind of authoritarian regime and push them there, keep them there by force of arms, it is very difficult to develop these areas. There is very little growth.

I might mention in this connection that for the first time in history we

have at Leh succeeded, with the help of our scientists and botanists, to build up a very fine farm there. People said that it could not be done. This we have done this last summer. It has been quite an achievement and it will help us in many ways and we propose to go on doing this. But, to imagine that we can populate that place is not very helpful advice. What is, again, our policy? Obviously, aggression having taken place, to vacate the aggression by whatever means are feasible to us. To begin with and not only to begin with but even afterwards— to try every method, negotiation, etc. because, if your intention is war, even then you have to do this and at the same time to strengthen your position to meet any contingency, and development that might arise and for any steps that you have to take. That is the only policy anybody can pursue. Any policy of jumping in without that adequate preparation and background may be dangerous because such attempts, if they do not succeed, weaken one and cause much greater loss in morale, etc. That is the broad policy we are pursuing. I do not see any kind of peace in the frontier so long as all recognized aggression is not vacated. In this business of building up, one of the really outstanding achievements of our Government and, more especially of our defence apparatus, has been the building up of defence industry, defence, science, to a remarkably successful extent. Fortunately we have good scientists in Defence. Fortunately we have some fine technical people in our defence, in our ordnance and defence factories, and it is that that is really giving the basic strength to the nation from the point of view of war and from the point of view of other things too. So, when people talk, as Mr Dahyabhai Patel loosely talks, about Defence Ministry or Minister, I regret to say that it simply shows that he does not know his subject at all. The progress made by our Defence Ministry in the last few years has been quite remarkable, as people who know say and the people who have come from abroad are astonished at what we have done and what we are doing. It is no good getting hold of some odd sentence here and there and hanging the whole argument on it without understanding the context. Again Mr Mukut Behari Lal, who, I regret to say, did not bring any fresh idea or fresh thought at all

into the debate, repeated what he might have said two years ago. He seemed to object to our repeated professions of friendship with China. That surprises me, or perhaps it should not surprise me. The fact is that is the normal way of addressing countries always, every country—unless you are at war with that country. The strongest thing you can say about a country is that country is unfriendly to that country. In diplomatic language, that is the strongest word we use. That is the word which preceded a war almost. Of course, nowadays I must admit, in these days of cold war, diplomatic language has undergone transformation and it has come down to abuses of the lowest kind often, but one is always expressing—and honestly I hope, expressing—the desire to be friendly. That does not mean that you take down your armour or weaken or live in a state of confluence that nothing could happen to you. It is absurd to combine the two things. The two have to be taken together. Always the attempt is at friendship and., attempting to carry on, to keep ready for any hostility from anywhere.

Some hon. Members talked about reorienting our policy. In a sense one is always reorienting policies, depending on facts, not only local facts I mean facts on the frontier but world facts too, which are very important in a matter of this kind. We are always doing that to an extent, but I am not aware of any major thing which requires a major reorientation of our policy. That is a different matter.

Now many or some of the hon. Members said—I forgot who did it but it has got into a favourite expression—that we have no friends in the world. Anything more ridiculously false is difficult to imagine. Our country has got more friendship in the world—I say so with all due respect to people who may hold a contrary opinion—than any country in the wide world. It is true that, if you measure that friendship by the amount of arms we get from them, we do not get any arms except what we buy, because that is opposed to our policy and we are not going to do that; but is quite extraordinary, considering what we are. We are a relatively underdeveloped country, a poor country, and militarily we are not too strong, compared to the bigger countries—the amount of respect that we got and the friendly interest that

is taken in our country is out of all proportion to the physical facts that normally condition this respect and friendship. So I am quite amazed at these charges being made by people who know nothing about the other countries of the world. Mr Dahyabhai Patel said that we have no friends in the United Nations, that we have become the most unpopular nation. I would submit to him that he might undertake some study of the situation before he speaks in this august assembly on such matters about which he seems to know nothing.

Casually I say—it has no reference to this matter and I do not know what Mr Pyarelal<sup>31</sup> may have said in his book but if it is a fact, I want to correct it here—that when we sent the Kashmir matter to the Security Council, I took Gandhiji's advice myself. I read out to him, as far as I remember, even the document we were sending and he approved of it. So, to say that we sent it against his wishes is quite wrong, and if Mr Pyarelal has said it, he is mistaken.

Just one or two words more. I do not think or imagine that there is hardly anybody in this House who disagrees with the basic position that I have given here. They may disagree with the emphasis here and there.

They may say that we must be quicker or faster—that is a different matter— except perhaps, I do not know, what the attitude of the Communist Party is in the country. What Mr Bhupesh Gupta said was that the Communist party is more or less in the line with the country's sentiments. I am very glad to hear it. That has not been my information in the past. It is pretty well known that the Indian Communist Party is rather split on this issue, some siding with the more nationalist aspect of it, and some siding with the more Chinese aspect of it if I may use that word. It is a fairly well-known fact. If they are undergoing some sea change, I am very happy but it is an important thing that in this matter, as I think some Member pointed out in a matter of this kind, we may criticise each other in our minor aspects of policy, but in the main, the country should hold

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<sup>31</sup> Secretary to Mahatma Gandhi. See item 85 and appendix 11.

together and pull together and so we build up a kind of psychological state of the nation which helps in bearing burdens and sharing difficulties. Some people say, imagine that we must go out into the country with a raging campaign, presumably, for the coming war. I think that will be completely a wrong thing. This is the kind of thing which is sometimes done elsewhere which we criticise in other countries and which has led the world to the brink of disaster today. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to follow the example of many other countries, great countries and small, which have learnt to live on this brink of atomic disaster and nuclear warfare. And although no one wants war, yet inevitably one drifts to a state of possible war. But even in considering our own problems, we can isolate them from the rest of the world. Having isolated them and considered them as such, we have to consider them in relation to the rest of the world. And the rest of the world is undergoing tremendous changes in arrangements and rearrangements and all kinds of things. The major problem before us now is whether in the course of two, three, four or five years there is going to be a nuclear war or not. That is the big problem of a war which will destroy everything, which will affect every country, including India, even though we may not be joining any war. And so we have to see this problem in this context, because when we see it in that context, it does make a difference, what China can do to us and what we can do to China. In spite of some people thinking that we are isolated in the world—we may be isolated from the point of view of non-alignment and not being a party to some military alliance—there are other ways of contacts, close contacts and close friendships. And apart from any such ways, there are reactions. Is it imaginable that a war between India and China will remain confined to these two countries? It will be a world war and nothing but a world war. I am not saying that it need necessarily be a war between India and China. Other steps can be taken and may have some effect. But we have to think of every aspect, of every possible development and prepare for it and avoid developments which may be very harmful not only to us but to the world.

I hope, Sir, that the House will agree with this assertion of our position,

that this aggression has taken place on our territory and we must do everything in our power to get that aggression vacated. We must try to use every diplomatic and all peaceful devices to that end, whatever they may be that is to say, avoid war to that purpose, because war between India and China would be one of the major disasters of the world, for us and for the world, for it will mean world war. It will mean war which will be indefinite. We would not be able to limit it in time, because it will not be possible for China to defeat us and it will be impossible for us to march up to Peking across Tibet. These things are not done. Things function differently and for us to jump into such things would be the reverse of wisdom. If it is to be done, if it is forced upon on us, it is a different matter. Therefore, we should be prepared and prepare as fast as we can and in the best way we can, keeping in view always the larger situation in the world and how it is developing and how that is affecting our own problems in India. Thank you, Sir.

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Question: Some time back you also suggested that there would be no negotiations on Kashmir unless they had vacated the territory they had occupied.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is just it. We may start with the assumption, as we do, that there is not much room to talk about the Kashmir problem if what is intended is an upset of everything in Kashmir. We can talk about anything, but we are not going to invite something which will upset the whole of this continent and instead of bringing peace bring war all over. Our view has been what we should start with the acceptance of things as they are and let us talk about adjustments etc.

Question: Will you take Aksai Chin—occupied by the Chinese—back by force or by peaceful means?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Both courses are open to us and should be used by us according to suitability, opportunity and other factors. About Goa I could say with some assurance that the military factor was a limited one. The other factors came in our way. The military might of Portugal did not come in our way, but other factors, consequences elsewhere. One has to consider all these things and prepare for them and then take action in a suitable way.

Question: Have you considered the latest Chinese proposal for a fresh treaty on Tibet and have you replied to it?

Jawaharlal Nehru: We have sent them our reply. Broadly speaking, the reply is that for years we desired and worked for friendly relations between India and China, and the last treaty on Tibet was a result of that. But to our great regret, the Chinese Government did not fully act up to the terms of that treaty.

For us to have a new treaty with this background is not going to be helpful.

They have actually occupied our territory etc. in spite of that treaty. Therefore, before this can be considered, there has to be a change in all this business. I am, of course, speaking from memory, I do not know the words, please remember that, but in effect we have said that it is not a question of simply having treaties but by their action they should justify that they will act up to the treaties we have something like that we wrote them to which we have had no answer yet.

Question: Will you be in a position to say something about the people's car project?

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Nath Pai: No, no.

Jawaharlal Nehru: In regard to Tibet Shri Tyagi referred to an old British treaty with Tibet. I wonder if Shri Tyagi has read the old so-called British treaty. It was a treaty which, among other things laid down that as the routes were unsafe, till they were made safe by the Government there, we could keep 200 men here to guard our couriers and postmen and others, a few men in Lhasa, in Yangtse and Yatung. That was one part of the treaty. As soon as the routes were declared safe, then, we had to remove them. They were not an army of occupation; they were to protect our couriers. We had a telegraph system and it was to protect the telegraph system from marauders and others. In any event, quite regardless of whether a revolution took place in China and the Chinese came to Tibet or not, we had to remove those people after we became independent. It is not at all in keeping with our aim that we should keep 200 people there; it is not good at all; they could not fight; they cannot carry on any major operation: they were there only as a kind of guard. And when the communist revolution came in and they started coming in there, obviously we had to remove

them; we did not want them to be left there to be arrested and then march an army to release them. The whole thing could not be done; there is no question of doing it. The old Tibetan treaty lapsed by the efflux of time. We cannot stick to it.

Tyagi: I was only answering them by arguing that our stay in Tibet would have been ineffective in stopping China entering, even if we had stayed; even then that would have been the position.

Jawaharlal Nehru: You were completely right; that is what I am saying in a slightly different language. The hon. members go on saying that we betrayed Tibet, we came away from there. There is no basis for saying so; I do not understand it. One can say things like a brave knight though we had to come away from there and there was no chance or possibility of our staying there unless of course we wanted to declare a war against China and send the whole of the Indian Army across the Himalayas which is beyond our desire or capacity. We had to bring back the 200 or 300 people we had there; we had to hand over the telegraph and postal system there; we could not run them if they were there. The only other change that took place—major change—was that instead of the British representative there, in future our representative was called the Consul-General in Tibet. One thing we could have done perhaps and that was to say that we disapproved of all that had happened in Tibet; the Chinese are a bad people; we will have nothing with them. It is conceivable. We may have,

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of that revolution their hold on Tibet collapsed. Then the Dalai Lama went back.

I am merely pointing out this. It is almost a repetition of history, forty or fifty years ago, and this thing happened there, with one big difference: that what emerged now was a strong, powerful central Government in China, not

with that confusion of the revolutionary period as fifty years ago.

There is one thing more. Shri Nath Pai referred to Himmatsinghji's report and asked what has happened to it. I sent for the papers; I cannot read the whole report, but I shall read the note on it, when the report was sent—not the report sent previously—

"The President has recently seen the report of the North and North-Eastern Border Defence Committee. He has asked for a note indicating the action taken on each of the Committee's recommendations." This note is dated in September, 1959. Another paragraph is:

"It will be seen that almost all the recommendations of the Border Defence Committee have been implemented. The only important recommendation which has not been fully implemented is with regard to the construction of certain roads."

In this connection, some other paper should be seen, because, subsequently, this was taken up. Indeed, as the hon. Member knows, apart from the border Committee, we took up this question in a biggish way just about then or a little later.

Shri Nath Pai and others asked us not to be misled by the mirage of friendship with China, and asked us also not to keep on to the treaty; they further said that if we consider any treaty with China certain pre-conditions should be laid down about the vacation, etc. Some other hon. Members went a little further and said that we should have no treaty, presumably even if they vacate or accept the condition we lay down.

It really is a question obviously not of accepting their proposal, but I would submit also not of merely saying "No", because it has no meaning, but of replying in some conditional form; the conditions naturally would relate to their aggression, whatever it is—something like that. I cannot say now, because one has to give thought to it, because I do not know exactly what we will do. But when I had said that, I had some such thing in mind. About this mirage of friendship with China, I do not know if the hon. Member has concluded from the various discussions we have had, in the course of the last year or so or more than one and a half years, that we are

overwhelmed with this image of a friendly China next to our border. Obviously we are not. I am trying to explain my thinking on this subject. Quite apart from friendship or hostility, looking at it objectively, ten years ago, soon, after the revolution, we came to the conclusion that our borders were going to be, well, threatened in some way. In what way, of course, we do not know. From that moment we had this picture, because national policies are often based on certain objective considerations apart from the views. The views may expedite a certain direction or delay it. But from that moment we had this in view.

This report of the Himmatsinghji Committee is dated soon after the Chinese Revolution and soon after I think the Chinese had come to Tibet in 1951, a year after, but long before any other development. They discussed it at length about this matter, about the fact of these new developments, on the border situation and they gave their views. So these facts have long been before us. You may say, and you may be right in saying, that we were overtaken by certain events, possibly; but we never doubted that these questions were arising and will arise in the future. And, as I have said previously, we took steps too. Again you may say that the steps should have been more and more strong. We took steps chiefly in the North-East Frontier Agency border and partly in Ladakh. But certainly we did not take all the steps we should have taken. It was very difficult for us to take all the steps because of various difficulties—terrain etc. We did take those steps. So the question of our losing all perspective, thinking of a friendly China sitting there and taking no steps is a wrong view, because from the very beginning we had been thinking of this regardless of Chinese friendship or not. The fact of a huge elephant of a country sitting near our border is itself a fact that we could not ignore, and a country which has a different policy and a country whose, even apart from communism, past history has been, whenever strong, one of expansion. After all, some time or the other most of these countries round about us paid tribute to China—Burma paid tribute to them, Nepal paid tribute to China—and they can easily twist that thing and say: "Well, you are subordinate to us." If you take that long period of

several hundred years, all kinds of things have happened in history. So we were not at all complacent about China's presence near our border. We were constantly thinking about it.

Our thinking ran on two lines. One was that this was a reason to strengthen our country as rapidly as possible, to strengthen it industrially. That is the real strength out of which armies come, out of which arms come, aeroplanes come and not merely by buying aircraft from America or Russia or England and training some people. That is superficial. Where you are thinking of the future in some perspective you have to think of building it yourself. So there is the importance of the Five Year Plan, the importance of our developing our defence industry, our defence science. It was thought of in this connection that defence science is highly important, because it is science that gives rise to these things. One of our hon. Members on this side, on our side, suggested "scrap the Five Year Plan and do this" If we scrap the Five Year Plan we scrap India, we

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except normally Punjabi—and that is not of much help in England—and who are not acquainted with any custom, anything there, but because of their demand for labour there, they get good wages and they are employed. Then, social problems are created. We did not like this. So, we have been discouraging them, as the House probably knows. On this question of these people going they were so anxious to do so the lure was so great that they used to pay thousands of rupees to people for forged passports. It was Rs 8,000/- in one case. So, so far as we are concerned, we limited this very greatly and, in fact in the last year or two, there have not been many. The figures are fairly big, still but those figures include the students who, of course, are bona fide people and they anyhow go there, and some other bona fide persons. But the real immigrants who want to go there to get some business have gone down very much so far as India is concerned. I do not know about Pakistan. But the West Indies still sends a large number of

people, and it is true that, if you go to London now, you see these West Africans or Indians in large numbers all over London, and you can hardly go anywhere without seeing a few round about. So, our position in regard to this immigration bill broadly has been that we do not want to encourage our people to go there, but any step taken based on colour, whether in theory or even in practice, we object to, and as you know, it is not we only, but some other countries in the Commonwealth have taken strong exception to this. And there was the question of the Irish immigrants. Now, the Irish people cannot be kept out on the basis of colour. That is one reason, I think why there is no definition of who is to be kept out except that he should have a certificate of employment, or some such thing. But there is a strong demand in England from certain more or less conservative groups that the Irish be also eliminated from coming. Others opposed this very much, so, the position now is not a clear one, because the opposition to this immigration bill, even from the official Government Party there, is considerable, apart from the Opposition parties.

Now just one word about Nepal. Well, when we heard about the Lhasa-Nepal road, well, we did not like it; it opened out possibilities which were not desirable, apart from everything else, from the point of view of smuggling goods from India via Nepal to Tibet, goods we had forbidden the export of but which could go to Nepal.

We pointed this out to the Nepal Government, and there the matter stands. We cannot order them about in this matter, but to say that they have not consulted us is partly true and partly not so; that is, from time to time, they talk generally about these matters, but about these specific matters there was no reference to us, and as the hon. Member who spoke about this matter said, there has been a good deal of anti-Indian propaganda in Nepal. Now, I come lastly to the China border ...

border. It is the normal rule that the reconnaissance party finds out and does not get entangled; otherwise we would not know what is happening. If we want to fight, we send a fighting party. Of course, if they are interfered with they have to fight, but in self-defence. The reconnaissance parties normally do not fight; they gather information, come back quickly and then report. Then one takes steps, whatever steps may be necessary. But it is quite wrong to say that they have orders not to fire or not to resist.

Then there was a question about shooting down aircraft which come here. We have orders that aircraft should be shot down but it is not very easy to shoot them down. These aircraft that are talked about cross—they have often crossed—a tiny stretch of our eastern border with Burma. Between Burma and Tibet there is a little bit of Indian border. Now, the Chinese authorities have maintained that they are not their aircraft and have told us to shoot them down. It is very difficult for us to find out whose aircraft they are. They are very high, sometimes above the clouds. We only have a glimpse and off it goes across; it is a small area. But some months back one of these aircraft got into trouble and was brought down near our border, but by the Burmese in their territory. It turned out to be a Formosan aircraft going towards Tibet. Whether the others are also from Formosa or not, I do not know, but this particular one was from Formosa. There was no doubt about it because it fell down. There is absolutely no question of our being soft to any aircraft that flies on our territory; it is our business to shoot it down if we can catch it, but it is not always easy to catch it. If it is caught it should be brought down.<sup>32</sup>

Mr Gurupadaswamy referred to a map appearing in the October 1961 issue of the *National Geographic Magazine*. I am informed that there is no such map in this issue at all. But in the September issue a month before of the magazine there was a map and it showed our boundary line correctly according to us.

Dr Kunzru referred to various factors or some hon. Member referred any

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<sup>32</sup> See also item 269.

way to...

M.S. Gurupadaswamy: May I just point out that in the issue of October 1961 on page 540 there is the map?<sup>33</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: I shall look it up again. I just got a note to this effect. I have not myself seen it. About these maps appearing at various places, we draw u

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unfortunately this had not been acted upon in recent months. We have not thought it desirable to offer our advice frequently because it might be thought that we were interfering with Nepal's affairs. So far as the Treaty with China was concerned, it was well known that our relations were rather strained. We were not against any treaties, but there were some aspects of this Treaty, notably the proposed road from Tibet to Nepal, which were matters of some concern to us.

3. The Minister said that if they could have frequent consultations, these difficulties would not arise.

4. I said we were always prepared to have consultations. As for the King's<sup>34</sup> visit to India, I had suggested some dates, but they were apparently not convenient. We would be glad to have him here but I shall be out of Delhi for most of the time because of election work and other engagements. But if a suitable time could be fixed for his visit, we would be glad to welcome him.

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<sup>33</sup> For Nehru's clarification about these maps, see item 254.

<sup>34</sup> Mahendra.

## APPENDICES

### 1. MEA to Embassy of China in India<sup>35</sup>

*[Refer to items 263 and 264]*

The Ministry of External Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note (No.61) PU Yi Ya tzu No. 648, dated August 12, 1961, handed over in Peking to the Charge d'Affaires of the Indian Embassy have the honour to state as follows:

2. Despite a searching enquiry into the allegations about encroachments into Chinese territory and violations of Chinese air space by Indian armed personnel and aircraft including an on-the-spot survey, Government of India have not discovered a single instance where Indian forces or aircraft transgressed into Chinese territory. The existing border establishments of the Government of India are well within India territory unlike a number of border posts of the Chinese Government unlawfully established on India territory in Ladakh. Indeed, according to recent reports, Chinese troops have made further inroads into Indian territory.

3. The specific allegations of intrusion mentioned in the Chinese note are dealt with below: -

*Allegation 1:* At about 1200 hours on July 9, 1961 thirty-odd armed Indian personnel allegedly approached the traditional customary boundary line to the west of Spanggur in China's Tibet region etc.

*Comments:* The customary boundary line, as the Chinese should be well aware, does not run to the west of Spanggur but cuts across the eastern part of the Spanggur lake. It follows that had nine Indian Army men reached a point approximately 3336 N.7846 E, which is not a fact, they would have been 10 miles west of the Indian boundary. It has been further alleged that

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<sup>35</sup> Note, 31 October 1961, *White Paper V*.

about 1630 hours on the same day two armed Indian personnel reached a point approximately 3335 N. 7847 E, and while this too is factually incorrect, had it been so, the two men would have been still well within the customary boundary line. All the locations mentioned in paragraph I of the Chinese protest note are on the Indian side of the international border and demarcated so in Indian maps. The allegation that Indian troops are intruding when they go to a part of the Indian territory is manifestly absurd. As to firing by Indian armed personnel on Indian territory, on careful examination, it has been established that no shots were fired from or near the locations in Indian territory mentioned in the note.

*Allegation II:* The Chinese note alleges that India troops have recently "pushed further into Chinese territory" in the Demchok area and patrolled up to the Guje sheepfold and Rato, etc.

*Comments:* Both Demchok and the other locations mentioned in the Chinese note are well within India's international border in this sector. The Chinese note refers to the setting up of a checkpoint at Oga. The Ministry do not see why the Government of China should have any concern with measures India adopts inside her territory for the defence of India territories. As regards patrolling up to Kargo and Charding La, while Kargo is well within Indian territory, Charding La is on the border, and has been under Indian control for several years. The Chinese Government would appreciate that it is illogical to expect the Government of India to leave their territories unprotected to facilitate Chinese incursions, and indeed unlawful occupation by the Chinese has already occurred in wide areas of India's Ladakh.

*Allegation III:* Six Indian armed personnel crossed Thagala and penetrated up to 1 kilometer deep south-east of Salan for reconnaissance etc.

*Comments:* Nilang which is called Tsungsha in the Chinese note has been a part of India for many years. It is several miles south of the border pass of Thagala. Detailed enquiries have revealed that no Indian patrol crossed the Indian border pass of Thagala or any other part of the

international frontier in this sector.

*Allegation IV:* Last June, some fifteen Indian personnel intruded into the Wuje area etc.

*Comments:* It would be recalled that, in the discussions held on August 19, 1958, on Barahoti—which the Chinese call Wuje—between the Chinese and Indian delegations, it was mutually agreed that the two sides would refrain from sending armed personnel to Barahoti, while the area remained in dispute. The Indian side had further proposed that the civil authorities of either country should not extend their jurisdiction over Barahoti until the dispute had been finally settled. This suggestion was not found acceptable to the Chinese side. The Government of India have therefore been continuing to send their civil officials to Barahoti just as they used to do before in exercise of their traditional jurisdiction.

*Allegation V:* Violations of Chinese territorial air by Indian aircraft.

*Comments:* The Government of India, after a very thorough investigation, are in a position to assert positively that no Indian aircraft was involved in the flights mentioned in the Chinese note. However, the Government of India must enter a caveat to the unfounded Chinese claim that the air space over Digra and the point 35.19 N and 78.12 E [(b) and (c) of paragraph 5 of the Chinese Note] are Chinese. These locations are in Indian territory, so is the Chip-chap river. If, as it seems from the Note, the Chinese are establishing posts on this river, the Government of India must denounce this further incursion into Indian territory.

4. It is surprising that the Chinese Government should draw up a list of groundless allegations against the Government of India based on false assumptions and imaginary provocations and conclude therefrom that the activities of the Indian side have 'once again caused tension in the border area'. The facts are clear and they clearly establish that the tension in the border areas is caused by acts of transgression committed by the Chinese.

5. As late as December 17, 1959, H.E. Premier Chou En-lai writing to the Indian Prime Minister had, *inter alia*, said that "as a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956 to which Your Excellency referred correctly

shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector (Ladakh- Tibet/Sinkiang)". The Chinese forces consolidated their hold on that line in 1959-60. Since then, however, aggression is being added to aggression and instance of China's misbehavior against a neighbor bound to her by the Five Principles of co-existence are increasing.

6. It is not true that the Chinese 'are continuing to desist from sending out patrol parties'. Nor is there any factual basis for the ascertain that the 'Chinese are devoting themselves to maintenance of the status quo'. There are reports of intensive Chinese patrolling on the frontier, of numerous incursions into Indian territory, of new military roads close to the frontier in the middle and eastern sectors and deep inside Indian territory under unlawful Chinese occupation in the western sector and new army posts closer to the border than those of 1959. Of instances of recent Chinese intrusions into Indian territory, some are cited below: -

*Western sector*

- (1) In April 1960 Chinese military personnel posted at Khurnak Fort patrolled the Suriah (E.7852, N.3347) area inside Indian territory.
- (2) A Chinese survey party visited Suriah on June 25, 1960, and returned towards Khurnak Fort the same day.
- (3) On October 13, 1960 two mounted Chinese soldiers were seen about 1 ¼ miles east of Hot Springs (E 7857/N 3419).
- (4) Four Chinese soldiers were seen at MR. E.7901.N. 3417, about five miles from Hot Springs in the second week of October, 1960.
- (5) Sometime in May 1961, the Chinese intruded into Indian territory near Chushul at MR E.7848, N.3331. A section of Chinese troops was also seen on May 22, 1961 towards the east of this location.
- (6) A Chinese patrol intruded into Indian territory at MR E.7758, N. 3523 near Daultebeg Oldi sometime in the autumn of 1960.

*Middle sector*

- (7) On September 22, 1960, a Chinese armed patrol party consisting of one officer and ten soldiers crossed the Sikkim- Tibet border near Jelepla and came 200 yards inside Indian territory.

(8) On April 20, 1961 an Indian army patrol at Jelepla noticed three Chinese wearing khaki uniforms, approximately 80 yards within Indian territory.

(9) On September 12, 1961, 12 Chinese armed personnel in blue uniforms came 100 yards inside Indian territory from Jelepla.

Eastern sector

(10) On June 3, 1960, a Chinese patrol party consisting of 25 soldiers intruded four miles within Indian territory and came to Taksang Gompa (E.9150, N.2745).

(11) In the first week of July 1961, a Chinese patrol entered a point about one mile west of Chemokarpola in Kameng Frontier Division.

As against these, there is not one instance of Indian intrusion into Chinese territory.

7. This is not all. Reports received in August-September 1961 show that the Chinese forces have spread even beyond the 1956 Chinese claim line in Ladakh to establish the following new posts, and that they have constructed roads to link these posts with rear bases: -

Post at E. 78.12, 35.19.

Post at Nyagzu.

Post at Dambuguru.

These fresh instances of violation of Indian territory by the Chinese establish conclusively that the Chinese are guilty of further aggression against India and their protestations to the contrary are only a cloak to cover up these renewed incursions and aggressive activities.

8. The Government of India reject the Chinese note of protest, dated August 12, 1961, and urge on the Government of China to stop further incursions into Indian territory and withdraw from areas of Indian territory illegally occupied by Chinese forces.

The Ministry of External Affairs take this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurance of their highest consideration.

[Enclosure begins]

Points regarding Shri Krishna Menon

1. During the war Shri Menon toed the Communist line of "People's War."
  2. In 1942 he opposed the "Quit India Movement."
  3. He wanted to hand over Korean prisoners who were in the hands of the UN to the North Korean Communists and China without permitting these prisoners to choose where they wanted to go. This was also the Soviet line.
  4. He described the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as a minor riot comparable to that which had taken place in Ahmedabad at that time. He did not condemn the massacre of Hungarians by Soviet tanks.
  5. On the issue of Chinese aggression, you have taken an unequivocal stand from the beginning, characterising the Chinese action as naked aggression. Shri Menon, on the contrary, has been lukewarm and ambiguous. He took a very long time even to describe the Chinese action for what it is. In November 1959, for example, he even refused to describe it as an act of aggression on the plea that the word "aggression" has not even been defined by the United Nations though he had no hesitation in rightly describing Pakistani occupation of Kashmir as aggression. At the Youth Congress Convention at Dadri Shri Menon even compared the Chinese occupation of Tibet to our own action against the Princely States like Hyderabad.
- When the question of discussing the outrages committed by the Chinese Communists against the people of Tibet came up before the UN, he argued that Communist China was in no way bound to observe human decencies because she had not signed the Human Rights

Charter. He pointed out that a discussion of the Tibetan issue would increase cold war tensions. He also stated that Tibet was a part of China for 4,000 years.

6. If Shri Menon always correctly interprets your policy, how is it that it is only his statements that create so much misunderstanding and not yours?
7. Whenever Shri Menon comes to Bombay, he mostly moves about in the company of communists and pro-communists like Shri Rajni Patel, Shri A.S.R. Chari and Dr Baliga. All these persons are prominent in Communist front organisations. What is more, Shri Menon's engagements in Bombay are arranged by these people directly and sometimes even the Pradesh Congress Committee is not informed or aware of his activities.

At the Youth Congress level he is befriending and encouraging disgruntled workers in our ranks, giving them extra importance and encouraging them to build groups within the Youth Congress.

8. After the General Strike in 1960, recognition of Unions which had joined the strike was withdrawn. In re-granting recognition, Shri Menon gave precedence to the Communist dominated A.I. Defence Workers Federation over the claims of the INTUC—affiliated Indian National Defence Employees' Federation.
9. Recently, there has been evidence of increasing Communist infiltration into the Congress all over India. In Bombay this trend has become more marked with Dr Baliga and Dr Mulk Raj Anand and others joining the Congress. There is ground for suspecting that Shri Menon is spearheading this process of infiltration into the Congress.
10. If Shri Menon is not pro-Communist, one wonders why the Communists of India are pro-Menon. The Communists never criticise him or his department whereas they criticise all others including yourself. They have publicly declared that they are going to support Shri Menon even though he is a Congress candidate. It is well known that the Communists of India do not support anyone unless their

purpose is served in one way or the other.

Ramakrishna Bajaj

[Enclosure ends]