

## Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Series II

*Volume 72*

*October 15 – November 30, 1961*

### **Social Groups**

#### **82. In the Lok Sabha: Settling Tibetan Refugees<sup>1</sup>**

Birendra Bahadur Singh:<sup>2</sup> Will the Prime Minister be pleased to refer to the reply given to Starred question No. 287 on the 10th August, 1961 and state:

- (a) whether the Government of India have since explored the possibility of settling 2000 Tibetan refugees in Sarguja district of Madhya Pradesh;
- (b) What are Government's findings in this regard;
- (c) whether the scheme for the settlement of 1000 Tibetan refugees in Shahdol district of Madhya Pradesh has also since been formulated; and.
- (a) if so, the details thereof?

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru):

(a) and (b). The team of Government of India officers will be visiting Sarguja district in the first week of December for examining the land offered by the Madhya Pradesh Government.

(c) and (d.) Yes. The Madhya Pradesh Government have finalised their proposals for the resettlement of 100 Tibetan refugees in Shahdol district and have submitted a detailed scheme which is under technical scrutiny.

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<sup>1</sup> Written Answers, 24 November 1961. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Second Series, Vol. LIX, 20 November to 1 December 1961, cols 965-966.

<sup>2</sup> Congress, from Raipur.

The scheme provides for allotment of cultivable land to 200 families. Provision is also made for the construction of Housing colonies, school, Prayer Hall, Dispensary, Co-operative centre, minor irrigation and water supply works etc. The land for cultivation is likely to be allotted on lease as for landless persons. Provision will also be made for link road connecting the colony with the Amarkantak Road.

## **Pondicherry**

### **146. To C.E. Bharathan: No Demonstration Against French Delegation<sup>3</sup>**

November 26, 1961

Dear Shri Bharathan,

I have your letter of the 21st November.

I think it will be quite wrong for any attempt to be made to hold a hartal or demonstration against the French Parliamentary Delegation to Pondicherry and Karaikal. That will harm our cause. The delegation has come here after our Government's views were obtained and we agree to their coming as a Parliamentary Delegation. Our own information is that the ratification of the treaty is likely to take place soon in Paris.

We have sent our views in regard to the French delegation to the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry and I hope they will be followed.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

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<sup>3</sup> Letter to the Councillor for Education and Local Administration, Pondicherry. NMML, JN Supplementary Papers. Also available in the JN Collection and NMML, JN Papers, C.E. Bharathan.

## **Bhutan**

### **147. To Jigme Dorji Wangchuk: Bhutan for Colombo Plan<sup>4</sup>**

November 30, 1961

My dear friend,

Thank you for your two letters, one conveying your concurrence to the sponsorship by the Government of India of Bhutan's membership on the Colombo Plan, and the other conveying your kind invitation to me and Indira to pay a visit to Paro for a few days when I visit Bhutan to open the Phuntsholing-Paro Road some time in April next.

I am glad to know that Your Highness appreciates our suggestion for the Government of India to sponsor Bhutan's membership on the Colombo Plan. We will now take further action, in consultation with the appropriate Ministries of the Government of India.

I am grateful for your kind invitation to me and Indira to visit Paro. I wish I could accept it. But I fear that this will not be possible. Our new Parliament will be elected in February-March, and all kinds of new problems will have to be faced by me subsequently. I agreed to be present at the opening of the new road because I have been greatly interested in this project. It will be no easy matter for me to get away from Delhi even for this purpose. But I shall certainly try to do so. To extend my stay in Bhutan will be very difficult at that time. As for Indira, I believe she has to go to Paris to attend the meeting of the Governing body of the UNESCO.

With kind regards and all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

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<sup>4</sup> Letter to the Maharaja of Bhutan.



## **In New York: Press Interview**

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[Nehru's response, beginning with "It is difficult ..." does not appear in the JN Master Files transcript]

Prime Minister Nehru: It is difficult for me because I don't know enough about China. I read what is written, and I get other reports, but I don't know much about internal conditions. But so far as I am concerned I am quite convinced, broadly, about the way we have adopted, which was natural for us. I mean, it wasn't adopting something new. We grew into it. I think in the long run that is the best way and in the short run too, as a matter of fact.

Mr Childs: Mr Prime Minister, when I was in India in December of 1959, your government was very concerned about the Communist Chinese conquest of Tibet and the Chinese invasion of the Indian border. Have you resolved that crisis with China, or is there still apprehension over the aggressive intentions of Communist China?

Prime Minister Nehru: The Chinese government at the present moment occupies a fairly large territory in our mountains in the north-the northeast. [JN Master Files transcript has it: "in the north and northeast."]. And, therefore, the crisis cannot be resolved until they vacate it. As for Tibet, that stands on a somewhat separate footing. We are naturally concerned with the reports which reach us about the treatment of the people in Tibet, but it is not an invasion like in part of our own territory.

Mr Childs: In other words, you are saying you have not been able to persuade them to abandon your own territory?

Prime Minister Nehru: That is so.

Mr Childs: In view of this, Mr Prime Minister, in view of the fact that they are occupying the territory of India, do you believe that Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations at this time?

Prime Minister Nehru: I don't myself see any direct relation between the two. I may say, our relations with China are rather strained, obviously, but I don't see how the major problems of the world—say disarmament—can be dealt with without China, and you can't deal with them unless China is also in the United Nations. Also, I think it does come in the way of the United Nations functioning if a large part of the earth's surface is not included in its survey.

Mr Childs: Do you think they might be less inclined to aggression if they were members of the UN, is that your reasoning, Sir?

Prime Minister Nehru: I have no idea, really. They might be more—well, people will be looking at them more at close quarters, but whether they would be less inclined or not, I really can't say. But I do say, in the course of time, even these revolutions tone down. That is a different matter.

Miss Frederick: Mr Prime Minister, I believe you have talked with Chairman Khrushchev since he started his nuclear testing, this recent series. Could you throw any light on why he has decided to do this testing at this time?

Prime Minister Nehru: Yes, it is true I talked to him, and I expressed my apprehension and the fact we didn't like it at all. He said he didn't like it at all either. It was with great pain that he decided it, and then he gave me more or less the reasons he has given in public. Nothing secret or new about it—which did not satisfy me at all.

Miss Frederick: Could you give us your evaluation as to why he was negotiating with one hand at Geneva for a test ban treaty and with the other

was preparing for these tests?

Prime Minister Nehru: No, I am afraid I can't. Even by guesswork, I really can't.

Miss Frederick: Can you tell us whether you feel Chairman Khrushchev really believes eventually there will be a major war?

Prime Minister Nehru: I am sure and I have been sure for some time that Mr Khrushchev does not want a war. What he believes in about the future, whether there will be or not, I can't say, but he certainly does not want a war.

Miss Frederick: And may I ask you, Sir, how soon you think the People's Republic of China will have nuclear weapons? Do you have any information on that?

Prime Minister Nehru: I have no information about that. There are all kinds of vague rumours about that. Some say 10 years; some say two years. I don't know.

## 227. US Position Paper: India and the Communist Bloc<sup>5</sup>

Prime Minister Nehru's Visit  
November 6-10, 1961  
Position Paper  
Indian-Communist Bloc Relations  
(president may wish to raise)

### Recommended US Position

#### A. USSR

1. The United States Government, especially in the last nine months, has striven to find basis for negotiation with the USSR. On issues such as the nuclear test treaty we believed mutual accommodation possible, but our efforts to accommodate have not been reciprocated. Nor did any avenues open at the Vienna meeting with Khrushchev.

2. We appreciate that India's policy toward the USSR is different from our own. We would be interested in Mr Nehru's analysis of the USSR's purposes. We hope that his assessment of the danger to world peace posed by Communist expansion does not differ radically from our own.

3. So long as the Soviet regime adheres to foreign policy objectives which require for their fulfillment the elimination of non-Communist states as politically independent entities, we cannot anticipate stable and constructive relations with it. Rather, the ultimate objective of our policy must be to stimulate changes in the essential character of the regime-to make it clear that the commitment of Soviet power to expand the Communist system does not serve the regime's best interests.

4. We believe Communist expansionism must be resisted by means appropriate to the tactics the Communists are using in a particular situation. We seek to give the Soviets every opportunity to negotiate. But the negotiation must lead to a real accommodation-something which we still

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<sup>5</sup> Undated copy in JNMF records. US Department of State, NIN D-9.

hope for. We cannot permit the achievement of Communist successes through the use of force. Every such success encourages those Communists who believe that their goals can be attained only by the use of force.

## B. Communist China

1. We recognize that a reduction of tensions between Communist China and the United States is desirable. We have made repeated efforts in this direction during prolonged negotiations with Peiping's representatives.

They have shown no disposition to seek practical means to reduce tension.

2. We agree with Mr Nehru that Peiping's aggressiveness has a large component of national chauvinism. Its continual probing for weaknesses along its border and its efforts to convert neighboring non-communist states into "marches" devoid of other sources of support reflect ancient Chinese imperial strategy. At the same time Communist China is the leader of the extremist militant wing of the Communist bloc. Chinese Communist leaders have clearly stated that they regard even the most satisfactory relation with non-communist leadership in other countries as a transitory phase. We see no reason to question their sincerity when they prescribe Communist seizure of power, with the support of existing Communist regimes, as the universally applicable solution.

3. India has taken the position that it can defend its interests against Communist China only through a combination of firm resistance (including prudent military measures) to Peiping's belligerence across the northern frontiers and tremendous efforts in social and economic development. We believe that this policy has much in Common with the joint efforts being made by other countries to prevent Communist expansion. We hope this may lead to greater mutual understanding in this respect.

4. If Nehru raises the question of US support of India's position regarding the location of its northern frontier, you may say that we have not thought it appropriate to take a public stand on the issue while it was under negotiation. We have studied carefully the Indian views on the border question, as presented in the official reports in particular, and have found

the case set forth by India in talks with the Chinese Communists logical and persuasive. We believed that Nehru would not wish us to become involved in view of the Chinese Communists' probable reaction. We are unequivocally opposed to any Chinese Communist attempt to change the status on the border by force.

### C. Sino-Soviet Relations

1. Khrushchev's all-out assault on the Albanian leaders in the recent Party Congress<sup>6</sup> inevitably becomes an attack on Communist China because of the existence of the Peiping- Tirana axis and because the charges leveled publicly against Albania are in almost every instance the same as those Moscow has made privately or by implication against the Chinese.
2. The Soviet initiative on Albania will exacerbate differences between Moscow and Peiping.
3. Meanwhile, either in concert or not, the USSR and Communist China will continue to pursue their avowed goals of world domination.

### Anticipated Position of India

1. The USSR is fundamentally a progressive nation which wants a long period of peace to achieve its development objectives. Its international behavior is rooted in the sense of isolation inherited from the early years of its friendless existence.
2. Indo-Soviet relations are good; the Soviets are a major supplier of economic aid to India. The USSR has been neutral, despite its close relations with the Chinese Communists, in the latter's border areas controversy with India.
3. Communist China and India are in an impasse in the border dispute which followed Communist Chinese consolidation in Tibet. India is convinced of the legality of its claims to the border with Communist China and intends to remain firm in any negotiations which may take place on this issue.

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<sup>6</sup> The Twenty-Second, 17-31 October 1961.

4. Its aggressiveness and ruthlessness might be moderated if Communist China were exposed more to the rest of the world, including representation in the UN, which India has consistently sought. Six hundred million people and a growing power cannot be ignored in world councils.

5. Mr Nehru may express some concern that the US has never made a public statement supporting the Indian stand with regard to the geographic location of its northern border.

6. Mr Nehru may offer his views on Sino-Soviet relations and solicit the President's.

### Discussion

#### 1. India's Relations with the USSR

India's policy of non-alignment has been partly derived from cultural and historical factors, such as the Hindu religion and British colonial rule. Indo-Soviet relations, however, are largely governed by the Indian view of global power relationships and of the essential needs of the Indian people. As a weak nation, India must reckon with the awesome Soviet military strength so near its borders. Fear of Communist Chinese aggression also provides a powerful motive for maintaining good relations with the senior partner of the Moscow- Peiping axis. Nehru used to believe that Chinese Communist militancy might be weakened by a break between Moscow and Peiping, but this optimistic expectation now appears to have diminished to a mere hope. As a poor nation, India needs Soviet economic assistance, so far totaling \$946 million or one- fifth of all foreign aid received by India (also slightly more than similar Soviet aid to Communist China). Furthermore, India values Soviet support on the regional issues of Kashmir and Goa.

Nehru's attitude toward the USSR is also closely related to his conviction that a collision between the great powers would be disastrous for India. In his desire to maintain a "climate of peace," he is more concerned with the maintenance of negotiable positions by both East and West than with the merits of the issues in dispute. It is one of his pet theses that the questionable aspects of Soviet international behavior are rooted in the

sense of isolation inherited from the early years of its friendless existence. Accordingly, he believes that a posture of independent cordiality will assure India a measure of influence with the Soviets in times of crisis.

Since Khrushchev's rise to power India has increased its trade and cultural contacts with the USSR and has continued to avoid any sharp official criticism of Soviet attitudes and actions (e.g., Hungary). It is unlikely that India will soon effect any drastic change in this basic policy.

## 2. India's Relations with Communist China

From the time it emerged as an independent nation in 1947 until recent years, India strove for cordial relations with the government in power in Peiping in the belief that stability in Asia rested largely on the maintenance of peace and harmony between its two most populous nations. In accordance with this belief, India for many years turned its cheek whenever Communist China displayed self-assertiveness. Following the series of shocks highlighted by the Chinese Communist suppression of Tibet and seizure of Indian border territory in the late 1950's, India adopted a stiffer posture toward Peiping but never approached the brink of breaking off relations.

India has long clung to the view that the major non-Communist countries should maintain relations with Peiping lest it feel compelled to depend wholly on Soviet Russia in the absence of any alternative. Although India's leaders have been aware of the ruthless character of the Mao regime, they have nevertheless believed it possible that Peiping might moderate its policies in response to manifestations of friendship and of willingness to treat it as an equal. To this end, India has consistently sought to expose Communist China to outside moderating influences by promoting Peiping's candidacy for the United Nations.

India and Communist China face an extended period of uneasy relations, even if there is no exacerbation of the border problem, as a deep-rooted suspicion of Peiping will persist. Keenly conscious of its relative military weakness, India is not likely in the foreseeable future to adopt a posture of

belligerency toward Peiping but, rather, will emphasize strengthening its border defenses quietly and developing its industrial, and hence military, potential.

Border Dispute: India and China have had overlapping claims along India's northeast and northwest borders with Tibet and Sinkiang since long before the Communist take-over in China. The northeastern border was settled directly with Tibet by the Simla agreement of 1914, but China claims it has never formally accepted this settlement.

The problem did not become a severe one until the Chinese Communists decided to seal the border militarily in 1959 in connection with their suppression of the Tibetan revolt. They trespassed on Indian claimed territory at Longju in Assam in August and shot up an Indian outpost; they killed or captured twenty members of an Indian force in the Chang Chenmo Valley in eastern Ladakh in November, 1959.

These armed Chinese incursions across India's frontier, coupled with the brutal suppression of the Tibetan revolt, raised such a political storm in India that it has been impossible for Mr Nehru to negotiate a settlement of the border dispute except on the basis that Peiping accept the Indian version of the border as essentially correct. Peiping, which claims the border is undefined, refuses to do this.

No major clashes have occurred for the past two years, and both sides appear for the present willing to accept the current status, with the Chinese Communists in occupation of 12,000 square miles of Indian-claimed territory in Ladakh but otherwise, on the whole, avoiding trespass on Indian-claimed territory.

Indian and Chinese Communist officials have held talks to exchange data on their respective claims. The Indian report on these talks was released in a 550-page book in February, 1961.<sup>7</sup> The book presents an able and persuasive brief for India's claims, but without any actual documentation.

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<sup>7</sup> Published in full as SWJN/SS/66 Supplement.

The US has avoided taking a definitive position on the rightful location of the boundary. The facts in the case are sufficiently clouded so that a true dispute appears to exist. From a legal point of view, conflicting boundary claims are decided by agreement between interested parties, or by decision of an arbitration commission or other judicial body. From a political point of view, we would have some difficulty in taking a definitive position in a dispute in which the US is not directly involved and which ultimately involves India and the Republic of China, two friendly countries. From a political point of view also, we have believed that Mr Nehru does not wish us to become deeply involved, as our involvement could only be provocative to Peiping.

However, our doubts with regard to the border became a matter of public record at a press conference of Secretary Herter's<sup>8</sup> on November 12, 1959 when he said, "We presume that the claims made by the Indians are entirely valid claims, but from the point of view of what you might call an objective reading, we have no basis to go on. We have only the word of a friend." He also made it clear, then and subsequently, that the Chinese use of aggressive force in the dispute was wholly abhorrent to the US.

Mr Nehru has shown some sensitivity on our attitude toward the validity of the Indian claims, and took the trouble to have Ambassador Harriman thoroughly briefed by officials of the Ministry of External Affairs when Mr Harriman visited New Delhi, in March, 1961.

### 3. Nature of Sino-Soviet Differences

The serious differences that emerged between the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes in the post-Stalin era erupted into a critical dispute in Moscow last November before the assembled leaders of the world Communist movement.<sup>9</sup> This confrontation resulted in a mutually agreed truce between the two protagonists to preserve the facade of unity and

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<sup>8</sup> Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State, 22 April 1959-20 January 1961.

<sup>9</sup> At a congress of 81 communist and workers parties's meeting.

avoid the serious consequences of an open break between them. But it did not resolve Sino- Soviet differences which arise from such fundamental factors as the two powers' widely differing historical and cultural traditions, levels of domestic development, geographic positions, and international environments. The recent all-out assault on the Albanian leaders by Chairman Khrushchev at the CPSU Congress is an indirect attack on Communist China and is indicative of the continuing seriousness of the difficulties between Moscow and Peiping.

It is unlikely, however, that Sino-Soviet differences will result in an open split in the Bloc in the foreseeable future. It is also highly unlikely that, despite their differing tactics toward India, the Soviet Union would oppose Communist China in a military conflict with India although it might use its influence and good offices to forestall such a conflict.

#### 4. Sino-Soviet Differences and India

In few areas have Sino-Soviet disagreements been so openly manifested as in the two allies' approach to India and the Nehru government. The significance of this difference is all the greater because both Communist powers view the underdeveloped areas as their priority target, and because India is a key country in these areas, Sino-Soviet differences of approach to India stem from their disagreement on Communist strategy in the underdeveloped areas generally, and their diverging national interests with specific regard to India.

## 228. US Position Paper: China in the UN<sup>10</sup>

Prime Minister Nehru's Visit

November 6-10, 1961

Position Paper

Communist Chinese Representation in the UN

(president may wish to raise)

### Recommended US Position

1. The fact that the United States and India have been in strong opposition in the UN for a number of years as to whether Taipei or Peiping should have China's seat in the UN should be proof that this matter is an "important question." In any event, the United States so considers it, is confident the majority of UN members will agree, and would welcome India's concurrence, or at least acquiescence.
2. We know that Mr Nehru is fully aware of the depth of feeling in the US against the seating of the Chinese Communists. It is not easy for us to forget the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea in which thousands of American soldiers were killed on behalf of the United Nations. We are also struck with the fact that the Chinese Communists today represent the most truculent and intransigent force in the world, that they continue their aggression in Tibet, and show no signs of willingness to accommodate themselves to a situation where there will be no resort to force in the Taiwan straits area. There does not appear to be any evidence that Peiping is willing to accept and abide by the commitments of the Charter. Quite candidly, we would think this fact alone would give India pause as to the wisdom of acquiescing in Peiping's claim for China's seat.
3. We know that the Indian Government feels that if Communist China were permitted to enter the United Nations, the focus of world opinion might alter

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<sup>10</sup> Undated copy in JNMF records. US Department of State, NIN-D11.

its present intransigent policies. We do not share this view. We do not believe Chinese Communist entrance into the UN will have this effect, but rather will be interpreted in Peiping as a reward to and as an encouragement of continued pursuance of the tough Chinese Communist line.

4. We believe India's influence in the United Nations is considerable and its actions and attitudes will be mirrored by a number of other members of the Organization. As Mr Nehru knows, we have not pursued this year the moratorium and have accepted full debate of this issue. Our present approach is twofold: (a) we believe any change in the question of Chinese representation should be considered an "important question" under the Charter; therefore requiring a two-thirds vote. And (b) we believe that a UN study committee should be established which would examine the question of Chinese representation and related matters, including the composition and enlargement of the Security Council, in which India has a deep interest.

5. We hope the UN Committee will make a serious study. The Committee is not intended as an indefinite postponement device. We hope India will adopt a positive and constructive approach to the creation and operation of this group, either by participating (or at least by encouraging others to do so). Although the Soviet bloc may decide to boycott such a Committee, we trust that such a move on their part would not discourage the Indians from taking a positive attitude towards the Committee. We believe a substantial majority of the UN membership will support these proposals.

#### Anticipated Indian Position

India has consistently opposed the moratorium and advocated the expulsion of the GRC<sup>11</sup> and its replacement by the Communist Chinese regime. In August the Indian Foreign Secretary<sup>12</sup> informed our Embassy that India's position on the important question approach was plain and

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<sup>11</sup> Government of the Republic of China.

<sup>12</sup> M.J. Desai.

consistent: the UN seat belongs to Communist China. Whether the vote came on a credentials committee report or on a separate item, the Indian delegation would hold that the question required a simple majority and would support the seating of the Chinese Communist regime.

### Discussion

There is no present likelihood that India will vote for an "important question" resolution or change its position on the seating of Communist China in the UN in place of the Government of the Republic of China. Accordingly, our basic position should be: (1) with an attitude of confidence, to seek to lessen open Indian opposition to our position that Chinese representation is "an important question" (thereby requiring a 2/3 vote in the General Assembly if a change is to be effected); (2) to reaffirm our opposition to the Chinese Communists being in the UN, and to suggest that we appreciate India may have private qualms on the matter.

Despite the adamant Indian stand on seating Peiping, Foreign Secretary Desai's indication that India is "interested" in the appointment of a UN Study Committee may be a reasonable way out of the dilemma facing the present General Assembly. We believe that Indian acceptance of this is predicated largely on the hope that this Study Committee would recommend major changes in the composition of the Security Council, including perhaps the assignment to India of a permanent seat, together with the associated power of veto. We believe we should at present take great care not to encourage Indian hopes in this direction.

## 242. Nehru-Kennedy Talks: M.J. Desai's Record<sup>13</sup>

After a night in New York, Prime Minister went to New Port, Rhode Island, where President Kennedy had invited him to spend a few quiet hours before starting his formal visit to Washington. During the hour or so that they had before lunch and, on the way to Washington in the afternoon, President Kennedy talked almost entirely about Laos and Vietnam.

2. About Laos, President Kennedy mentioned that they wanted a truly neutral and independent Laos and were prepared to withdraw their officials assisting the Laotian Government, as soon as a national government was formed, and the International Commission and the Laotian Government began working actively to maintain the independence and neutrality of Laos.

3. President Kennedy was, however, much worried about the conditions in Vietnam where the Guerilla activities of Viet Cong had assumed alarming proportions. The Guerillas were now attacking in battalion strength. It was estimated that the number of Guerillas was about 16,000 to 20,000, and they were terrorising the people in the villages and forcing them to cooperate. Kidnapping, torture and killing were the normal methods, and the South Vietnam army was more or less immobilised by having to protect villages, etc. in one area, while the Viet Congs transferred their activities to other areas.

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<sup>13</sup> Note, 9 November 1961, by the Foreign Secretary. It is an enclosure to M.J. Desai's letter of 20 November 1961 to Ambassadors and High Commissioners. The source for neither of them is mentioned in the document which is in the NMML but is not part of the JN Collection; but the letter number mentioned is 785-FS/61. Probably the source is MEA, File No. 39/93/NGO. See also Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), Volume 3, p.189, which cites apparently both these documents but does not provide a source.

For the US version, see item 239.

For the account of Nehru's tour by the Indian Ambassador, B.K. Nehru, see his memoirs *Nice Guys Finish Second* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1997), pp. 362-370.

4. President Kennedy stated that General Taylor and Dr Rostow, along with other persons who had gone to examine the conditions on the spot, have reported and the US Government are examining the report. The choice before the US Government seemed to lie between interventions with US Armed Forces in support of the South Vietnam regime, so that the Guerillas can be eliminated or complete dissociation from South Vietnam, which, in effect, would mean the Viet Cong communists taking over the entire area. President Kennedy said that they did not want to intervene with armed forces, unless they were compelled, and requested PM to suggest something mid-way between the two, so that the South Vietnam authorities may be able to intensify their operations against the Guerillas and eliminate them. President Kennedy mentioned in this connection that there was heavy infiltration from the north across the hilly region of the Vietnamese-Laotian border and Vietnamese-Cambodian border, particularly in the supply of military equipment to the Viet Cong Guerillas. It was stated that the Russians were sending supplies to Tchepone on the Laotian- Vietnamese border and these supplies were infiltrated into South Vietnam for the use of the Viet Cong Guerillas.

5. Prime Minister gave President the background of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indo-China, including the previous history of the resistance movement led by Ho Chi Minh against the French. He mentioned that these Indo-China States could only consolidate their independence on the basis of non-involvement with either of the two power blocs. This was the principle incorporated in the Geneva Agreements of 1954. He also explained the role of the Commissions under the Geneva Agreements, mentioned how the removal of the Commission from Laos in 1958 had led to the deterioration in the conditions and to civil war and the present complicated situation both in Laos and South Vietnam. As regards Vietnam, most of the difficulties in South Vietnam were due to President Diem's failure to cooperate with the Commission, on the ground that he had not signed the Geneva Agreements of 1954. President Kennedy reiterated the desire of the United States for

suggestions on the improvement of the present situation in Laos and Vietnam. PM mentioned that FS who knows the area well and who knows most of the people concerned, can discuss these matters with US experts.

6. On 7th of November, there was a formal meeting between President and Prime Minister at the White House with advisers on both sides. In this meeting, the Indo-China problem was only touched briefly, though PM did stress the urgency of giving full support to Souvanna Phouma in the formation of a national government so that the Laotian situation can be established on the basis of the national government and the agreements arrived at in Geneva regarding the functions of the International Commission and declarations regarding Laotian neutrality etc. President Kennedy reiterated US policy on Laos and added that the Indo-China questions will be discussed by Secretary Dean Rusk and other US experts with FS with a view to finding satisfactory practical measures to improve the situation. The President added that he did not believe that it was the duty of the USA to resist any change of regime by democratic means in South Vietnam but the US authorities cannot tolerate the terrorism of the Viet Cong Guerillas and allow the South Vietnamese regime to go under by subversion and terrorism from the North. If the people in the area wanted to go communist by democratic means and not by the use of underground activities, violence and sabotage supported by the regime in the North, US would accept the people's choice and would not intervene. The present position, however, was entirely different.

7. President Kennedy asked about India's relations with China. PM mentioned the present position of the Chinese aggression on our border areas in the northern hilly regions and stated what action we were taking to prevent further Chinese aggression and our enormous border road development programme etc. PM added that if the Chinese tried to advance further, we would naturally resist. Though there was strong popular pressure that the Chinese illegal occupation of part of Indian Territory

should be terminated by force, India did not propose to undertake an adventure of this sort in high mountainous regions, where Indian forces would be at a serious disadvantage till our border road and other developments were completed. In any case, no action of this sort was contemplated unless the Chinese attempted further aggression. PM gave the background history of the Indian-Chinese relations during the last twelve years with particular reference to Tibet and stated that the usual Chinese aggressiveness was accentuated in this region after the incidents in Tibet, and the relations between India and China worsened after the rebellion in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama and some 35,000 refugees from Tibet into India.

8. President Kennedy then asked about Russo-Chinese relations. PM explained the basic difference between Soviet Russia, which had the revolution 44 years back and was now settling down into a stable and comparatively prosperous society and Chinese communism which is still an active revolutionary force, China having a low standard of living with a heavy pressure of population. The Chinese have various economic difficulties and that made them more aggressive as "have-nots", but the Russians were not keen on any adventures which might endanger peace and their further economic and social progress. In brief, the Soviet society was getting competitive and conservative, while the Chinese remained poor economically and were still intense and aggressive revolutionaries. It was because of this basic difference that there had been strains and stresses in relations between Russia and China and difference of opinion on various points, particularly on questions of co-existence and peace. There is, however, no likelihood of a split between Russia and China as long as East-West bloc pressures continue. PM mentioned that on the whole Russia and particularly Mr Khrushchev, do not want a war, whereas the Chinese do not mind if aggressive policies lead to war.

9. President Kennedy enquired whether there was any possibility of

settlement of the Kashmir issue. He said that it was none of United States business to raise this matter but US was naturally concerned as they were aiding both India and Pakistan and they got into trouble every time they gave some military assistance to Pakistan, as the Indian public reaction to any such aid was fairly violent. It was because of this, USA's interest in satisfactory Indo-Pakistan relations and because Ayub had also mentioned this point during his visit that he mentioned this matter. PM gave President Kennedy the background history of the Muslim League and the Congress policies particularly their relation with the National Conference in Kashmir before Partition, stressed the invasion by Pakistan tribal raiders and later by Pakistani Army itself and how India had gone to the UN to avoid a war with Pakistan. He referred to the cease-fire arrived at in 1949 and the resolutions of the Commission and stated that the first essential, withdrawal of Pakistani forces, had not been carried out during the last 13 years and the Pakistani Army was still there occupying one- third of Kashmir. In this context, he stated that the only settlement possible was to leave things alone as they are and fix the line. PM said that Pakistan's claim was based on the religious majority of the Muslims in Kashmir. They had no other legal or other claim while Kashmir, having acceded to India, was part of the Indian Union. India had over 45 million Muslims and it was impossible for India to accept any solution based on religious Muslim majority grounds as that would upset the stability of the entire sub-continent and revive the horrors of communal clashes which occurred immediately after the Partition. Dr Rostow, who was present, said that President Ayub had also mentioned minor modifications, though when a map of Kashmir was given to him, he declined to indicate any details. President Kennedy jokingly remarked that Ayub perhaps was using Sandhurst language when he referred to minor modifications.

[The] President then referred to the advice he had received that US should give only economic aid to Pakistan and leave it to Pakistan to purchase such military equipment as they may desire. PM said that India would not have any objection to economic aid of any size being given to Pakistan. India

wanted Pakistan to be a prosperous neighbour. The President then said it was easy to get allocation for military aid from Congress and Senate. Economic Aid Funds were being reduced by Congress and Senate pretty often. PM made no comment. The President then said they will have to consider this matter and confine their assistance to Pakistan to economic aid.

10. President Kennedy then talked about Germany and Berlin. He said that they are having consultations with their other western allies and Germany and coordinating their views as to the method of approach. They found out, however, during their talks with Gromyko,<sup>14</sup> that the Soviet leaders, while they declare free access to Berlin and a free city of Berlin, are not quite forthcoming, when it comes to details. The President said that the Western Powers were determined to maintain the present way of life of the two and a quarter million West Berliners and their access to the outside world, as well as the access rights of the three Western Allies to Berlin, both East and West. He also added that they cannot recognise East Germany de facto as that will create serious opposition from West Germany. On the other hand, the US Administration was clear that the Soviet occupation of East Germany and East Berlin has got to be accepted and that, therefore, German unification is not a practical proposition today. After they have coordinated their views with the Western Allies, they will seek settlement of these questions by negotiations with Soviet Russia but some of the propositions being advanced now by Soviet Russia regarding stationing of token occupation troops of all the four Powers in West Berlin etc. could hardly be accepted. Prime Minister mentioned that Mr Khrushchev did not want war but he was frightened by the growing economic and military power of Germany, and therefore wanted to settle this matter of German frontiers and of the frontiers between East and West Berlin and East and West Germany before Germany became more powerful. President Kennedy said

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<sup>14</sup> Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister.

that Gromyko had asked them to guarantee both the East German and West German and the East German and Russo-Polish frontiers. This is something which they reiterated, that the United States will be coordinating their views with their Western Allies and Germany and then decide on the modalities of negotiations with Soviet Russia. The President added that a head-on collision between the Western Powers and Soviet Russia resulting in a major war could hardly be of any use to the Germans, both East and West, as they will be the first to be destroyed. War had, therefore, to be avoided.

11. President Kennedy then referred to the Belgrade Conference and to Prime Minister's role there. Prime Minister mentioned that the countries who gathered at Belgrade, were not only non-aligned with either of the Power Blocs but were also non-aligned inter se. Most of the countries which attended had their own local problems which appeared to them a lot more important than the bigger question of peace and war. The new African countries and the Arab Conference, were thus preoccupied with their own problems. They did not like the resumption of nuclear tests by the USSR and expressed their views- some strongly and some in moderate terms-but they then reverted to their own problems. PM said that he pleaded with them to consider the bigger question of peace and war which overshadowed all the smaller problems and when this was put to them, they did turn their attention to this major question. PM illustrated this subjectivity and pre-occupation of the bulk of the countries at Belgrade with their own local problems by referring to similar Indian thinking on Goa. In the context of world problems, the continued occupation of Goa by Portugal was a minor matter affecting less than a million people on the Indian continent. And yet, to the Indian public this was a major political question and their views on international matters got coloured by the attitude adopted by major powers on the question of Goa. He mentioned that similarly the Africans are worried more about the atrocities in Angola and the continued Portuguese occupation in African territories than about nuclear tests and the larger question of war and peace.

12. Both the President and Prime Minister met again on 8th November. This meeting on the 8th was confined to an informal exchange of views on various matters between the two of them and none of the advisers were present. It was during these conversations that the misunderstandings between India and the USA caused by various attitudes taken by the United States and the Indian Delegations at the UN were referred to. The general impression of this meeting conveyed to me by US officials was that President Kennedy was highly satisfied with these frank and free exchanges on the 8th and that there was a meeting of minds between President and Prime Minister during these informal exchanges.

13. There was a formal meeting with advisers on the 9th, but there were no detailed discussions. The Joint Communique was finalised at this meeting and there was general discussion on issues of peace and war.

14. The gist of my discussions on Nepal, Laos and Vietnam with Dean Rusk, Talbot<sup>15</sup> and Dr Rostow is given in the attached note (Appendix A).<sup>16</sup>

M.J. Desai

9 November 1961

### **243. In Washington D.C.: To the National Press Club<sup>17</sup>**

Press Club President:<sup>18</sup>

4966 members of the National Press Club, I extend to you a warm and

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<sup>15</sup> Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>16</sup> Appendix A not available.

<sup>17</sup> Luncheon hosted by the National Press Club, 9 November 1961. NMML, JN Supplementary Papers, File No. 24, Box No. 133.

<sup>18</sup> John Cosgrove, see the report in the *National Herald*, 11 November 1961, City Edition, p. 4 and *The Hindu*, 11 November 1981, p. 10.

sincere welcome. You must have been pleased with the reception accorded you on your previous visits to the Club otherwise I'm sure you would not be here now for this third meeting. And, Sir, may I congratulate you on your good taste. [Applause]

While we may not always agree with you, and frequently we may criticise you, today we are one hundred percent in admiration and respect for your resisting being pressured into changing this meeting to a Government auditorium or elsewhere.

I would like to say also at this time that the Press Club policy of non-alignment will continue. [Laughter and Applause] However, I'm also certain that fraternization between the sexes will also continue to flourish.

And now the immediate business at hand is to introduce to you and to our friends here today, members of the Club, and their guests, the distinguished guests at our head table.

[Introduction of Guests]

A few years ago the daughter of the Prime Minister in a conversation with American newsmen remarked, "No statement about India is wholly true." Gentlemen, this may help us to understand better our friends in one of the most populous and one of the most complex nations on the face of the earth. India and the United States are so very different, and yet there are so many similarities.

Indians speak more than 700 languages or dialects, and belong to at least seven distinct racial types. The Prime Minister as a man is as contradictory as India is as a nation. He'll be 72 years young on Tuesday, November 14. We tried to arrange this meeting on the 14th but we didn't have very much influence with the State Department. So in advance and a little early, Mr Prime Minister, I think we will wish you before this day is over, many happy returns on your 72nd birthday. [Applause]

And as he has during the past year, I'm sure while he's 72 he will continue to work 17 hours a day, year in and year out, seldom taking any vacation or holidays.

And he's fastidious from the fresh rosebud he has in his buttonhole each

morning to the silken handkerchief tucked into his right sleeve.

He's an agnostic and also the leader of the world's most religious peoples.

He's a socialist with a built-in empathy to capitalism, but American

investments are a growing factor in India's economic development today. Of

a mild and pleasant appearance, he will explode with anger at a misplaced

teacup. [Laughter] But he endured more than ten years of imprisonment by

the British with equanimity and aplomb.

I wonder, Prime Minister Nehru, India in general has a sound government, a

stable currency, and a working democracy. The press is free. The restraints

on free speech and assembly are hardly noticeable. More than 40 million

Indians attend school and college and the number is to be doubled within

the next few years. If anyone man can claim the credit, it is Nehru, and all

Indians know it.

Scarcely anyone now remembers the 1947 warning of Winston Churchill

that, "We are turning over India to men of straw like the caste Hindu, Mr

Nehru, of whom in a few years no trace will remain."

Well, Mr Churchill has difficulty picking winners, too. [Laughter and

Applause]

Today Mr Nehru is honoured as a world statesman and the chief architect of

progress and stability in Asia's largest democracy. He has been Prime

Minister and Minister of External Affairs since 1947, and he is also in charge

of India's atomic energy program.

But even before the Prime Minister arrived in Washington for this four-day

visit we were aware of the fine cooperation between India and the United

States. Friendly and mutually beneficial relations between our countries are

increasing in the cultural, technical, and commercial fields. And yesterday,

after the third day of meetings, President Kennedy best expressed the

accomplishments and progress of Mr Nehru's visit when he said, "I have a

high regard for the Prime Minister, and it became even higher during our

conversations."

As you said before leaving India, Mr Prime Minister, "There are no major

conflicts between our two nations." And we hope that those problems-those

minor irritations that we do have or don't understand— we hope, Mr Prime Minister, those problems will be resolved during this visit and that the communique to be released later today<sup>19</sup> will reflect progress in a better understanding and appreciation of our differences in our peaceful fight to realize fully the individual man's inherent right to self-government.

Now I'm not certain, Sir that everything I said about India is wholly true, as Mrs Gandhi pointed out, but if I erred, I hope you will correct me.

Gentlemen, it is my honor to present to you now, His Excellency, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Prime Minister of India. [Applause]

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Chairman, members of the National Press Club, as you have been reminded, this is the third visit I have paid to this Club as your guest. I much appreciate your hospitality and you're giving me an opportunity to see and meet so many distinguished members of your profession.

I must say, it is a slightly intimidating experience to meet so many members of the press whose words not only go across the United States but to all parts of the world. But I was happy to visit you on the previous occasions and I am happy to be here today to meet many people whose names I have read or heard of and to know them in person.

The chairman at the commencement of his remarks referred to something about official or state control and he thought that I had come in the way of that. I didn't quite understand because I had nothing to do with it. I certainly believe in the press being free and not under state or official control, but presumably he referred to something which I heard a day or two ago and received some protests about the exclusion of women on this occasion.

Well, it's not for me. I do not know the facts or the reasons, and anyhow, I would not interfere in your domestic affairs. [Laughter]

But when I first heard of this, I was a little surprised that you were encouraging indirectly something that has been connected with India, that

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<sup>19</sup> See item 244.

is, the system of purdah. [Laughter] We in India have been trying with a great deal of success to get rid of it, and even among journalists, women function on more or less an equal basis with men.

Now, the chairman has given you what he considers, no doubt, correct information about me. But as my daughter Mrs Gandhi said, almost any remark about India is not likely to be one hundred percent correct. That is so because India is certainly a country with remarkable variety and contradictions, and it is possible to say almost anything of India which may be partly true-good or bad-and partly or largely incorrect.

Anyhow, I shall not take your time in trying to amplify or correct the chairman's remarks except to give you the warning that they may not be wholly correct. [Laughter]

Now, you are newspapermen dealing with the day-to-day making of history in various parts of the world and naturally you are tied up with the present day more than with the past. We have to be, all of us, politicians as well as newspapermen. And yet it is a good thing to sometimes look at things in perspective and try to put oneself in the position of some other country or individual, try to understand what are the springs of action, the ways of thinking.

Now here we are in India, people who have been conditioned in various ways of life, thinking, action, through a very long period of history—whatever that period may be—5,000 years or so. A history in spite of its ups and downs is in a sense a continuing thing because India has a continuous tradition; there is no definite break. Of course it changes, but there's no definite break, and I don't think you can say that of any other country except perhaps China—apart from the recent break that has taken place—because the long history of China was also a continuing one.

That has some importance because this continuing—call it what you like—conditioning of the people leave a powerful impress upon them. And we have been conditioned by that.

In the more recent past we have been conditioned very much by our struggle for independence, more especially under Mr Gandhi. Most people of

my generation certainly have been very much conditioned by it, and it may be a little difficult to understand our reactions to events unless you keep that in view.

Then again, there is what might be called a geographical factor. A country's views about matters are controlled very much by geography. Let me say, if you have some kind of a world view, it does depend from where you look at the world whether from the northern hemisphere or the southern, whether you look at it from somewhere in the heart of Asia or the heart of Europe or America. If you were at the North Pole, you'd have a different view of the world.

It is well to remember this because otherwise you can't get a proper view from the other person's viewpoint or understand the other person. It may be what you may think may be completely correct from your point of view and your experience; it may not be wholly correct from another person's geographical position or conditioning or experience he has gone through. I think it is important to remember that.

We in India ourselves, like the United States, have been a country of great variety, a big country, with large numbers of people coming into the country through the ages from outside. There have been innumerable incursions into India, friendly and hostile, chiefly in the old days by land routes, later by sea.

And these people, who came, except the later ones by sea, largely were absorbed by India, if I may use the word. They affected India very much but they lost themselves in the sea of Indian humanity because India had—I imagine it still has to some degree—the power of absorption, just as the United States has it powerfully. And, you see, large numbers at one time. Apart from Asian people, Greeks came, the Hellenistic—not Greeks perhaps, but Hellenistic people were absorbed. Others came and as somebody said, these rivers flow in, flowed into our history and lost themselves in the Indian ocean of humanity.

India has always sought to absorb and create a synthesis. Now, we were influenced to some degree by the Hellenistic elements long ago. Then came

all manner of people, Turks— not the modern Turks, but the Central Asian Turks— Scythians; Huns, and got lost in India; not quite lost because they influenced India. Arabs came; Persians came; and they all made a difference.

In northern India socially the kind of culture that has arisen is what might be called a mixed, a composite culture, affected by these incoming people who became hundred percent Indians in the course of time.

And we have definitely sought to develop this composite culture. We have not been exclusive in that sense although we have been, as you know, exclusive in another sense to our great disadvantage—that is, the social system was an exclusive one, caste and all that, which did, I think, a great deal of harm to India and which we fight against and try to remove, and which is going fairly fast though sometimes it takes different shapes, political shapes.

So you see this tremendous variety in the country in almost every matter, including language. But I must protest against what the chairman said about 700 languages in India. I really am not aware of them even, if I may say so, even in the strict census meaning of the term.

I remember once in Berlin somebody was talking about the hundreds of languages of India. He said the census said so. And then he was asked how many languages exist in Germany from the census point of view. It was found there were 60 or 70. Of course, Germany is above all a German country, with a German language. But nevertheless the census said there were 70 languages in Germany.

In the same way, all kinds of dialects and little foreign groups are included. Now, if you look at the languages of India, you find that in the border tracts—bordering Burma and Tibet, etc.—literally in those small areas there are hundreds of languages listed in the census; but in India as a whole there are a dozen important languages.

Of the dozen—or eleven or twelve, I forget—most of them are derived from Sanskrit and therefore, they are closely connected with each other. The four southern languages are different but have absorbed large numbers of

Sanskrit words, so in effect, the differences are not too great. But it is a problem undoubtedly, and it's not surprising. You might just as well say that in the whole of Europe there are various great languages. It's an area as big as India— Western Europe.

It has given us trouble, this problem, though essentially it should not do so because we recognize all of them, and we say that those dozen or so languages are national languages of India and we treat them more or less equally and encourage them.

I don't think this problem will trouble us much though there is always some difficulty about dealing with various matters in regard to language.

And the main thing is that India today is passing through a revolutionary phase of her long existence, that is, for a long time past, including the whole period of British rule in India, we did not develop as normally we ought to have developed. If the British had not come there, it is difficult of course to say what would have happened—may be a lot of trouble and all that conflict—but we would have gradually adjusted ourselves to changing times. We could not do that.

The British gave us some good things—peace and political unity—but at the cost of rather petrifying conditions in India, not changing. And so now that the British leave, of course some changes did come—inevitably they came—partly encouraged by the British for their own purposes, partly because it could not be helped. But broadly our economy and our ways of living were petrified, static.

Now things have happened which are changing all that. You hear of many problems in India which are really problems of development and change, which is a good thing, although they may be troublesome problems.

One fact I should like you to remember in regard to development, that political freedom came to us in a big way—that is, the new India, independent India was not only politically free from foreign control, but internally politically free, in the democratic sense, as any country can be—adult suffrage and all that.

Now, this happened before our country was economically advanced enough

to be able to take advantage of that political freedom fully or to be able to satisfy the numerous demands made upon it by political freedom because all the masses of our people having become politically free demanded all kinds of things. And the demands were legitimate, not that they were illegitimate. They wanted better things, higher standards and all that, when we just could not supply them all over, because when political freedom came, we were not economically advanced enough, we had not enough resources.

Now, in the Western countries, in Europe, America, etc., you had advanced very considerably before you got what might be called one hundred percent political freedom—adult suffrage and all that—and you had built up a system with considerable resources which could meet the demands which political freedom made.

Now, this process was reversed in India. We got political freedom without the resources. Well, we work hard to get the resources to develop the country, to increase the wealth of the country, but it takes a little time, and so social and economic problems arise, pressures amass, in every country; I'm not talking about India but in many countries of Asia and elsewhere, and that is the main problem.

It can only be solved really by as rapid development as possible to create better conditions of living and give some satisfaction to the people. We are trying to do that.

As you know, we started to try to do so in an organised way by planning—Five Year Plans—two of them are over, the Third we began about six months back. And others criticise us and we criticise ourselves for many of our defects and failures, but perhaps it is not incorrect to say that by and large, considering the complexity and difficulties of the problem, we have advanced fairly satisfactorily.

And what is more, the process is one of going forward. There's dynamism in India today, in people's minds and activities, in agriculture, in industry, in social service and the like. That is the main thing. And therefore, we have a good deal of faith in the future.

The chairman said something about 40 million people going to school and college there; the figure is somewhat larger. I think it's nearer 47 million now. That's a fairly large figure. I don't think personally the education they get is of the best because of the rapid growth; we have not been able to get good teachers, trained them, and all that. But still, the mere fact of education spreading to all our villages is a tremendous fact; it's a revolutionising fact, going into the village homes which have not changed for hundreds and hundreds of years. All that is happening.

Another very interesting and important feature in India which probably doesn't find place in newspapers as a rule, even Indian newspapers, is a basic change coming over rural India, and that means—oh, I don't know exactly the figure but probably about 330,000,000 people—and that is the spread of a really full amount of self-government to the villages.

That is, we are decentralising authority. Of course we have a centralised government and a strong government. We have states like in the United States with a large measure of autonomy. Apart from some subjects, they are free to pass their laws and do what they like.

But we've carried this further and carried it not to the individual village- it's too small an entity—but to groups of villages of 20 or 30 and given them that authority and those resources. For instance, the land tax is turned over to them so they may have the money. And they are being put in charge of all development of that area, including elementary education, small industry, and so many other things—housing, communications and the like. Now, that is a very big thing both in terms of the population affected by it and the change from the very static conditions, semi-feudal conditions, that existed previously.

I've often said about India that India today is in the bicycle age. Well, this doesn't mean that we have not got automobiles: we have a fair number; nothing, of course, like the number you have here, but we have a fair number.

But I say it is the bicycle age because the bicycle has become the common means of transport in the villages. Every village has got numerous bicycles

and the demand for them is increasing, and we are making the bicycles. Now, the changeover from the bullock cart to the bicycle is a bigger change than from the bicycle to the automobile, and naturally that change will proceed.

So these big things are happening which you can notice immediately which are pulling out our people from that static condition of thinking, of mind, etc. and the process once started is bound to go on. There will be difficulties, there may be some conflicts here and there, but essentially it has been given too much of a push to stop and will not stop, and we don't want it to stop, of course.

I'm not going into our Five Year Plans and the rest. If you are interested, you can find out. But I would like you to realise that we have always attached importance certainly to the big things we are doing, big plant and all this, but essentially we've attached importance to our rural population which is the backbone of India.

The very first thing we did, of course, was land reform. Again there difficulties arose, legal difficulties, which delayed matters, but we have largely dealt with that situation. Some little bits remain which will, in the course of a year or two, perhaps be dealt with properly.

That has released the energy of the rural population, the villager who was under the landlord, and he can now gradually become more self-reliant especially under present conditions.

Now there's another problem in India. Inevitably with this development the landlord system is gone but owing to the big population of India, the growing population, the land holding is a very small one naturally. Normally speaking, it's hardly more than an acre or two acres, sometimes three acres, and one can't really make much progress with an acre or two. The only possible way is for those people to build up cooperatives when a cooperative has facilities for getting modern types of machines and other things which an individual farmer can't, fertilizer, and gradually enter into more scientific agriculture, which they are doing now.

The pace is perhaps not as fast as we'd like, but still it is fairly substantial.

And so the face of rural India is changing. That is a basic thing in India. Of course we have other people, too, higher scales, who are changing into industry and many other ways, and we are fairly well developed in science, we have really very able young scientists, and I lay stress on young apart from some old good scientists. It is the younger generation that is producing these bright scientists.

And so in almost every field we are trying to push ahead. Numerous difficulties and internal difficulties, conflicts with old fashioned people, feudal elements, We removed, as you know, the old princes, the maharajas and the like, and treated them very handsomely—too handsomely, I think—[Laughter] in regard to the civil list pensions we gave them, which are terrific considering the condition of India. But we thought we bought peace with them at a cheap price even then, because costs of conflict are great.

And so now, politically speaking, they're ordinary citizens of India with no authority or power but with a large income for which they do nothing, no work at all. I suppose gradual changes will come there, too. So, we'll build this up.

Now, another aspect of India I should like to put to you to understand it, it is part of this old conditioning that India has had, it's part, if you like, of the basic philosophy of India—it is the fact of tolerance of other people's opinions. They've been used to it from ancient ages. Tolerating others. People came there, driven out from other countries. The Zoroastrians came from Iran, driven out by Islam. They were welcome. They settled down; they are a very prosperous community.

You'll be surprised to know the Jews came there over 2,000 years ago, may be more, I don't know. And they settled down there; they were welcomed. Christians came there in the First Century, long before they came to Europe. Eastern Christianity, as it is called, is well established in South India especially. And they were all welcomed and there was no trouble. They have, in fact, no contacts or hardly any contacts with Christianity outside—some contacts of course they have. They have their own Church

and they carry on and they have lived in peace with the others.

Except recently, when it is not religions in conflict, we've hardly even had religions in conflict in India. Conflicts have come for political reasons. A political conqueror may come. Well, there is conflict, of course. But not because of the religious element in it.

Unlike Europe where there have been so many wars of religion and the rest, so the whole condition of India is one of tolerating others. In fact, one of the earliest edicts issued by a famous emperor of India who controlled nearly the whole of India and part of Central Asia, Asoka, was in the third century B.C. He inscribed his edicts on huge pillars and stones and there they are for you to read today. It was an appeal for tolerance. He said every person should respect his own faith and beliefs, but he should also respect the faith of those who differ from him. If he respects those, the others will respect his faith.

It's interesting to see this idea of tolerance and, if you like, co-existence, goes like a thread through Indian history and it conditions our thinking a great deal and perhaps it explains to some extent many of the things that you do not understand in our approach to questions of today.

Now of course, what with the impact of all kinds of new forces, new conditions, new conflicts arise, but the basic approach to them even has been this. After all, we solved the very difficult problem of the princes in India peacefully. We solved the problem of the big landlords peacefully. In most countries it gave rise to all kinds of internal trouble and revolts, but by and large we solved it peacefully. And we think we can solve other problems, too, in our social and economic advance, peacefully.

Then again you hear that we have said and we say that we aim at a socialist structure of society in India. That is so. It fits in with our old thinking too. It is not exactly opposed to anything, not in the sense of producing conflict; we try to avoid conflict, but gradually in the democratic way bringing about that change.

We talk a great deal about it and we want to go ahead but as Ambassador Galbraith pointed out, in India if socialism is state control, well, there's more

of it in the United States than in India today. Well, I don't know. Are those facts? He speaks from knowledge, I suppose. [Laughter]

But certainly we want to go ahead because there is no other way in our society. First of all, we have to plan because we have to start if not from scratch somewhere near scratch. We have no resources; we have to build them up through state effort. So we have evolved, we tried to evolve what we call a mixed economy, public sector, public enterprises, which themselves create corporations, autonomous corporations, the policy being guided by the state. And we try to fit them both into our national plan because unless we plan, our resources may be wasted on inessential matters, and our resources are very limited.

So we are functioning in this way, and even before independence, years before independence, our national organization used to pass resolutions and the rest about foreign policy. You'll find that the roots of our foreign policy today were laid long before Independence even, and before present day questions had arisen. We followed that and it is in keeping with both Indian tradition and the way of our thinking.

Sometimes it is said we are called "neutral". Well, it's not correct. I don't like the word neutral. It's a word used in wartime-belligerent and neutral. But certainly you may call it an independent policy and non-alignment is a more correct word, that is, not joining a military bloc. But of course, cooperating with a country or a group is a different matter, because that is the background, as I said, in India, and logically we think that is more helpful for us and for others in this world of conflict, that the less the approaches of conflict, the better.

The chairman reminds me that you are likely to have a large number of questions so I shall now, well, refrain from continuing and wait for the questions.

Chairman: Thank you, Mr Prime Minister. As we had discussed earlier, we would have approximately twenty minutes for questions but we probably should have asked for almost forty-five minutes, we have sufficient

questions here. We'll not lose any further time. The first question: As the acknowledged leader of the neutralist bloc of nations, what is your opinion of the continued nuclear blasting by the USSR?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, the answer is, there is no neutralist bloc. Secondly, I'm not the leader of anybody. If you like, my people have done me the honour of putting me in a very responsible position in India, so I can claim to speak on behalf of India but not on behalf of any other country. And I don't presume to be leader of any other, and I don't desire to be leader of any other country. My desire is to cooperate with them; certainly try to influence them sometimes according to my thinking.

As for the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, I've often stated that I have thought it a very harmful, disastrous thing for a variety of reasons. Apart from the harm it actually causes, it brings about a war psychosis.

Question: Do you believe the smaller nations of the non-aligned bloc have been completely fair to the United States in the matter of atomic testing?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It's rather difficult for me to answer in behalf of every country, but please remember that these countries, more especially many of the newly independent countries are full of their own problems. They are, in theory, intellectually, some of them may say, "Yes, yes, this is good (or bad)" in regard to any major question like Berlin or Germany, but really it's at the fringe of their mind; they are full of their own problems. And let us say Belgrade, at Belgrade, there were many of these newly independent countries, chiefly from Africa. The African problems were dominant in their minds-no other problems. I ventured to point out to them that some other questions, such as war and peace, were really basically more important. Well, intellectually they accepted that position; they were good enough to accept it. But emotionally they are full of their own problems. You must try to understand their minds. Only then perhaps you might understand their reaction to events.

Question: Speaking of their problems, Mr Prime Minister does the downgrading of Stalin by the Soviet Government raise or lowers your hopes for world peace?

Jawaharlal Nehru: They raise my hopes for world peace. [Applause] I think that the Russia of today is certainly aiming at or desires peace. I have no doubt about that and Mr Khrushchev especially. His policy may not agree with you in many things but so far as war and peace is concerned, I think he's definitely desirous of peace.

Question: This question follows: Do you think you can deal with Russia and the US on the same moral plane.

Jawaharlal Nehru: One doesn't deal with countries, one deals with problems. One can't answer a question like this about a country being dealt with on a moral plane. It's the action of the country that may be considered; you may agree or disagree with it.

Question: For many years I have been trying to decide whether you are on our side or that of the Communists. Do you consider this an indication of a true neutral? [Laughter]

Jawaharlal Nehru: Does it mean that the questioner wants me to give an opinion of his neutrality? [Laughter, Applause]

Question: Well, shall we try it from another angle. [Laughter] Why are there no neutral countries behind the Iron Curtain?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Because they are all aligned. [Laughter, Applause]

Question: And I think this will clear up the neutrality question-this one: How

can you be neutral between right and wrong?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I suppose it is not always easy to deal with questions which can be clearly defined as right or wrong. Sometimes it can be done, and certainly when the choice is between right and wrong, one should side with the right. It's obvious. But there are far too many greys in this world and therefore the problem becomes much more difficult. Also a saintly person may take up an attitude regardless of consequences-right is right and wrong is wrong. A politician can hardly ever do that. He may aim at the right; he may even have perception of the right, but especially in a democratic country, he must convey that perception to others in order to function. A saint need not; therefore, he's stoned often to death and there the matter ends.

But you see, in the opening remarks the chairman talked about Mr Churchill's fierce opposition to Indian Independence and his prophecy as to what might happen to me in the course of time. The fact of the matter is what happened was, that we converted Mr Churchill to our viewpoint and he and I are good friends today. [Applause]

Question: What safeguards for Indian trade do you hope to obtain if Britain joins the Common Market? Does the US support India in this regard?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The common market idea has not been welcomed with enthusiasm in India because the apparent immediate effect would be harmful to us, to our exports, and exporting is most important to us for our development. Now, how it can be fashioned so as to allow our exports to continue or to flourish, I don't know. We try to do that but it will have to change its immediate conception somewhere so that that might be done.

Question: Would you comment on the progress, if any, of the program to control population in India?

Jawaharlal Nehru: We are one of the very few countries, perhaps two or three, perhaps Japan is another country, where there is an organized policy

for population control, family planning, etc. It has made progress and I have no doubt it will make more progress, and ultimately it will have some effect on the population; but it takes time because we can't do these things by decree. We have to convert the people, and they are being converted in a large way.

Question: Mr Prime Minister, when you appeared before our Club in 1949, you said your policy would be to live with Red China with which your country shares a large border.<sup>20</sup> Do you feel after twelve years your policy has been correct?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Our policy has been completely correct. It is the policy of China that has not been correct.

Question: What steps do you advise to guarantee the independence of Laos and South Vietnam?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Six years ago there was a conference in Geneva in regard to the Indo-China states and that conference unanimously—that consisted, if you'll remember, of a large number of countries including the Indo-China states and some of the great powers—they all agreed that the future of those states could only be if they were left to themselves and away from world powers and world conflicts. It was on that basis that it proceeded and International Commissions were appointed.

Well, things didn't work out exactly the way intended, but broadly, that was the only policy that could succeed there, otherwise they'd become an arena of conflict and that would be disastrous for those countries as well as for the world situation.

The Commissions did a great deal of very good work, I think, and did prevent many conflicts arising. Cambodia was dealt with more or less

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<sup>20</sup> See SWJN/SS/13/pp. 305-307.

satisfactorily, Laos not so satisfactorily, but still, for years nothing happened. Unfortunately, two years ago, the Commissions were asked to leave, and you'll see as soon as the Commissions left, there's no connecting link left and troubles arose until they came to a crisis.

I hope that crisis will be resolved soon by building up a national government there and Vietnam—if this is done in Laos—Vietnam could be affected by that too.

Unfortunately in Vietnam the Commission has not been made to work. Sometimes there has not been even partial cooperation; obstructions have been placed in its way and that is one reason why it couldn't be so helpful. I think that if the Commission functioned satisfactorily and got the cooperation of the countries concerned, and this Laos position were changed, and various other steps were taken, probably the deterioration of the Vietnam situation would be checked.

Question: We're back to somewhat domestic problems, Mr Prime Minister. What is your thinking now on a plebiscite to determine the status of Kashmir?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is now thirteen years, more than thirteen years, since there was a ceasefire in Kashmir—14 years or more from when the trouble arose. The trouble arose—I'm sorry I have to go back a little—because Kashmir had legally joined the Union of India. There's no doubt about that and that was the view of the UN Commission. But through Pakistan an invading force of tribals came in and started destroying, looting, raping, all kinds of things like that. They created a great deal of commotion in India and ultimately we intervened, sent some of our forces. We drove back these raiders but the Pakistan army came in and since then there has been a deadlock there. We think that Pakistan has no business to be there. The United Nations Commission passed a resolution which we accepted which laid down a number of steps, one of the first steps being that Pakistan army should withdraw in the whole of the Kashmir State. Others followed.

There was a reference to some kind of a plebiscite also after all kinds of steps had been taken.

The Pakistan army never withdrew and is still sitting there and creating trouble for us. I needn't go into details, but all kinds of sabotage and other kinds.

Meanwhile, vast changes have taken place. Kashmir—that is, the part we occupied, about two-thirds, has progressed very considerably, economically and socially and the rest. It has had—you talk about a plebiscite—it has had two general elections and the third is coming in three months' time where everybody—there's adult suffrage—can vote. It's as nearly a plebiscite as you can have though there are some slightly different conditions.

On the other side there is no question of any elections or plebiscites.

Plebiscites only seem to be good for others, not for territory in Pakistan.

Question: I think you've answered this question, but you might want to hit it head on: Will the spirit of Indian tolerance apply to Pakistan? Do you believe in your lifetime that India and Pakistan will be united in a common market and a unified nation?

Jawaharlal Nehru: We have always wanted to be very friendly and cooperative with Pakistan. It's in the nature of things, not only neighbour countries, but countries with essentially common background and common languages, common ways of living, common ways of dress and so many other things. And please remember that there are tens of thousands of persons whose families are split apart, in Pakistan, half in India, even in the highest ranks. Let's say our Governors; may be the Governor has a brother in Pakistan; our general in the army has a brother or a cousin in the Pakistan army; our ambassadors—two brothers, one an ambassador of India, one of Pakistan. You see how intimately we are connected.

And broadly speaking, I think the bitterness engendered by Partition and subsequent happenings have died down. Among the people on both sides there's not any ill feeling left, only a feeling of regret that all this took place. It was largely a political question at the top.

I would welcome closer cooperation with Pakistan, in what form I don't

know. I would not like even to suggest any kind of a political unity because that would immediately lead Pakistan, our Pakistan friends, to imagine that we want to swallow them up, which we don't. It would be a terrible burden to us if we did that. No, but we do want as close cooperation as possible.

Question: Mr Prime Minister, this meeting wouldn't be complete without a reference to Berlin, of course. The question: Are you in favour of dealing with the East Germans over Berlin? Would you have the present German frontiers fitted definitely by international agreement?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The Berlin question, of course, is a highly complicated question, politically, historically leading back to the end of the War, subsequent developments, but above all what troubles me is the human aspect of that problem and how to deal with the situation in as human a way as possible.

You talked about frontiers. The frontiers that were determined as the result of the War even though they were not absolutely finalized, temporarily they were determined. In the course of time, of course, these last fifteen to sixteen years, certain permanence comes into it. I rather doubt if frontiers can be changed there. They can only be changed in two ways. One is by war, the other is by a gradual process of these fears and apprehensions lessening. There's no other way to do it. Any attempt to force it will lead to war. Everyone wants to avoid war.

But I would like, if possible, greater contacts between these different parts of Germany and they have co-operation in many things. In fact, even the last few years they have been, in spite of these conflicts, cooperating in so many ways—for that to increase. All that can only come by a change in the atmosphere and by some attempt at solution of some of the major problems.

Question: Mr Prime Minister, we've just about exhausted our time but we have one quick question and then the last one. The quick question is: Would you prefer to see the UN Headquarters moved to some site outside the United States.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I suppose there would be some advantages in moving them. On the other hand, it's a terrific business to move them as they are. Some people have been proposing as part of the German question that some organs of the United Nations should move into Berlin and make that progressively a more international center. There's something in that. I don't think you can move the UN Headquarters straight off there, but many organs may go there and gradually more and more can go.

Question: Mr Prime Minister, before asking the last question we want to thank you for coming here today, as I said earlier, for the third time and with our appreciation we present you this certificate and also a copy of the Press Club book, *Shrdlu*,<sup>21</sup> which may be a good Indian word, I don't know, [Laughter] the first fifty years of the National Press Club between two covers there.

And now, Sir, the last question. We usually strive for a humorous one but today we don't seem to have a very humorous audience.

Mr Prime Minister, that's typographical error. It's the compositor's trademark of error which comes out of the linotype machine, and the Press Club really came about in somewhat the same sort of fashion about fifty-three years ago and that's the name of the book.

But the last question, Mr Prime Minister: Have you invited President Kennedy to India and when might be a good time for him to come?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, first of all, thank you for giving me a certificate of appreciation. I value that very much. And this book with the name that cannot be pronounced. It is almost all consonants.

As for President Kennedy, I have certainly spoken to him and said we'd be very happy if he could come to India. He said that he'd be very glad to come

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<sup>21</sup> *Shrdlu: An Affectionate Chronicle*, National Press Club, Washington, 50th Anniversary, 1908-1958.

there but couldn't just say when he could do so. I suppose it was not feasible for him, and if I may say so, for us, because we have our elections and all that, for him to come this winter, but I hope he'll be able to come during the next winter.

Press Club President: Thank you, Mr Prime Minister. Gentlemen, the meeting is adjourned.

#### **244. Joint Communiqué<sup>22</sup>**

The President and the Prime Minister have had four days of especially pleasant and rewarding conversations. These began in Newport, Rhode Island, on Monday, were continued for several hours Tuesday morning with senior Indians and US officials present, with further private discussions Wednesday and a brief final meeting today. Subjects covered amount almost to a map of the troubled areas of the world. The problems of getting a peaceful settlement in Berlin, of securing the peace and liberties of the people of South-East Asia the problems of control of nuclear testing and disarmament, of the Congo, on how to strengthen the United Nations, and of United States and Indo-Pakistan relations were among the topics. Prime Minister Nehru used the occasion to go deeply into the philosophic and historical background of Indian foreign policy. The President similarly went into the goals and objectives of American foreign policy as they have been moulded and shaped over the years.

The President and the Prime Minister examined in particular those areas where peace is threatened. They discussed the dangers inherent in recent developments in Berlin and in South-East Asia. Concerning Berlin, President Kennedy reaffirmed the United States commitment to support the freedom and economic viability of the two and one-quarter million people of West Berlin and the President and the Prime Minister concurred in the legitimate

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<sup>22</sup> 9 November 1961, issued by the MEA, XP Division, Press Relations Section. Also available in NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File No. 15. The White House press release is available in NMML, JN Supplementary Papers, File No. 24, Box No. 133.

and necessary right of access to Berlin. The President also assured the Prime Minister that every effort would be made to seek a solution of the Berlin problem by peaceful means, and underlined the importance of the choices of the people directly concerned.

With respect to South-East Asia, the President and the Prime Minister confirmed that it is the common objective of the United States and India that Laos be a genuinely neutral state, free of domination by any foreign power, and that each nation in the area have the opportunity to make its own choice of the course it will take in seeking to solve pressing economic and social problems under condition of peace.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's efforts for the improved well-being of her people. The President reaffirmed the United States' interest in the success of this great effort.

They exchanged views on the desirability of a cessation of nuclear testing. The President referred in this connection to the recent resumption of tests by the Soviet Union which broke the previous moratorium and reaffirmed the United States unwillingness to accept a further uncontrolled nuclear test moratorium. The Prime Minister and the President agreed on the urgent need for a treaty banning nuclear test with necessary provision for inspection and control.

The President and Prime Minister stressed the high importance of measures to avoid the risk of war and of negotiations in this connection to achieve agreement on a program of general and complete disarmament.

India and the United States share in the fullest measure their common objective to develop the United Nations as the most effective instrument of world peace.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the United States and Indian contributions to United Nations operations in the Congo, which they regard as an illustration of how that body, even under extremely difficult conditions, can help bring about conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Both the Prime Minister and the President strongly share the hope that as the result of the efforts of the people of the Congo and the United

Nations a peaceful and united Congo will be achieved. The President expressed his special appreciation of the role played by the Indian soldiers in the Congo, who comprise more than one-third of the United Nations force there.

The Prime Minister and the President noted the cooperation and exchange of information between United States and Indian scientists in space science research. They agreed that this activity, which has the aim of peaceful exploitation of outer space for the benefit of mankind, could be usefully developed.

The Prime Minister and the President consider that their talks have been highly useful in the pursuit of their common objectives of an enduring world peace and enhanced understanding between the Governments of India and the United States. They intend to keep closely in touch with each other in the months and years ahead.

## China

### 273. In the Lok Sabha: Boundary Agreement between Nepal and China<sup>23</sup>

Question:<sup>24</sup> Will the Prime Minister be pleased to refer to the reply given to Starred Question No. 1229 on the 5th September, 1961 and state:

- (a) Whether the Government of India have received a copy of the agreement regarding the Sino-Nepalese boundary;<sup>25</sup>
- (b) Whether the same has been studied with a view to find as to the principal that have been generally followed in deciding dispute points; and
- (c) Whether decisions regarding tri-junctions of Nepal, India and Tibet are to the satisfaction of India?

The Deputy Minister of External Affairs (Lakshmi Menon):

- (a) Yes, Sir.
- (b) The Sino-Nepalese treaty not only accepts but affirms the principles of customs, tradition, known geographical features and watersheds as basis for determination of international boundaries, vindicating our stand on the boundary question.
- (c) Although the description of the two tri-junctions in the treaty in a general way points out the tri-junctions as on our maps, it is not as precise as the geographical coordinates of these points. The maps attached to the treaty have only now been received and are under study.

Shree Narayan Das:<sup>26</sup> May I know whether the Government of Nepal consulted the Government of India with regard to the position of the tri-junctions of Nepal, India and Tibet and, if so, what was the suggestion given to the Government of Nepal?

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<sup>23</sup> Oral Answers, 24 November 1961. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Second Series, Vol. LIX, 20 November to 1 December 1961, cols 903-906.

<sup>24</sup> By eleven Congress MPs and one Ganatantra Parishad MP.

<sup>25</sup> The Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty, signed in Peking in October 1961.

<sup>26</sup> Congress.

Lakshmi Menon: On a previous occasion, I have answered that we have given definite information about the tri-junction to the Nepalese Government.

Ram Subhag Singh:<sup>27</sup> The hon. Deputy Minister referred to the principles of custom and tradition. May I know what has been the tradition and custom regarding Mount Everest and what is the position that the Government of India in regard to that?

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): The question of Mount Everest was not referred to us by the Nepalese Government or by any other authority. We are not directly concerned with it. That is a boundary between Nepal and Tibet. The matter does not require our consideration directly. Indirectly, of course, we are interested.

Ram Subhag Singh: I would like to know what position we have been observing so far in regard to Mt. Everest.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The question never came before us. Broadly we have always considered Everest as within Nepalese territory.

C.R. Narasimhan:<sup>28</sup> Has the Sino-Nepalese Proposal, emerging from these talks, to have a road link between Nepal and Tibet, been examined by the Government of India from the point of view of defence strategy and Indian views communicated to Nepalese authorities?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is a different question. There is no question of any close examination. Broadly, of course, we considered this and even

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<sup>27</sup> Congress.

<sup>28</sup> Congress.

communicated informally with the Nepalese Government; informally because, formally it was not considered necessary.

Hem Barua:<sup>29</sup> In view of the fact the traditional boundary and the watershed principle were accepted as basis for negotiations so far as the Nepal-China agreement was concerned, may I know whether it has been ascertained from China what are the reasons for not applying the same principles in the case of the border dispute between India and China? If so, have they replied to it?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member is quite right in applying the same principles and we have been laying stress on this. I do not quite understand to what he is referring. Do we again refer this matter to China?

Hem Barua: My question is, the principle of traditional boundary and custom was accepted as also the principle of watershed in the case of Nepal. I want to know whether it has been ascertained from China why the same principles could not be accepted in the case of India as well?

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is a question really for the Chinese Government to answer the hon. Member. His point, I think, is perfectly legitimate that though the same principles have been accepted in the case of Nepal boundary or for the matter of that in the case of Burma boundary also, why they should not be applied here. We say they should be applied.

Speaker:<sup>30</sup> He wants to know why after this arrangement was entered into between Nepal and China on this basis, once again negotiations were not started on this basis. If it is good for Nepal, it should be good for India also.

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<sup>29</sup> PSP.

<sup>30</sup> M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is, whether we have broached this question again on this basis?

Speaker: Yes.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Not since this matter. In between, we have done so several times. No doubt if an occasion arises, we shall do so again.

Nath Pai:<sup>31</sup> Mr Speaker, Hem Barua never mentioned that new negotiations should be started. [Interruptions] I am here present for my party. All he maintains, as the Prime Minister rightly understood, is this. My party spokesmen did not suggest that fresh negotiations be started once again, because we have had enough of negotiations. As the Prime Minister pointed out, we have been defending the position that the watershed principle should have been accepted.

Speaker: It does not arise out of this. All questions that are put must be understood by all people alike. Nepal matter arose after our negotiations practically ended, and no more negotiations are being carried on now. Again and again, the hon. Member asking the Prime Minister, "Why it was not done?" would only create the impression that we must take it up again. Unambiguous questions must be put hereafter, not leaving doubts even with respect to me.

Raja Mahendra Pratap:<sup>32</sup> There is some little doubt in our minds. How is it that Burma and Nepal can negotiate and settle the matter and we have not been able to settle the question so far? May we know the reasons for that?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is a pertinent doubt in the hon. Member's mind. I fear I cannot remove that doubt from my part.

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<sup>31</sup> PSP.

<sup>32</sup> Independent.

Hem Barua: In the case of India, there has been actual aggression. In the case of Nepal and Burma, there was no aggression; there was only a claim. Therefore, it was easier of solution.

#### **274. In the Rajya Sabha: Sino-Nepal Border Treaty<sup>33</sup>**

Ram Sahai:<sup>34</sup> Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

- (a) whether Government have any authentic information with regard to the Sino-Nepal border treaty recently signed in Peking; and
- (b) whether this treaty will have any special consequences for India.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): (a) Yes, Sir.

(b) India is concerned only with the two tri-junctional points of the Sino-Nepal Boundary Treaty. The verbal descriptions of these tri-Junctions in the text of the treaty point out the tri-junctions as on our maps but are not as precise as their geographical co-ordinates. The maps attached to the treaty have been received only recently and are being examined by experts. Government of India has noted the reaffirmation in this treaty of the principles of customs tradition, known geographical features and watersheds as basis for determination of international boundaries which vindicates its consistent stand on the boundary question, As to other consequences, it is inadvisable at this stage to speculate on what may or may not follow from the treaty.

#### **275. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Relations<sup>35</sup>**

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<sup>33</sup> Written Answers, 27 November 1961. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. XXXIX, 27 November to 15 December 1961, cols 87-89.

<sup>34</sup> Congress.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): I beg to lay on the Table a copy of *White Paper No. V* containing Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China between November, 1960 and November, 1961. (Placed in Library see No. LT-3355/61).<sup>36</sup>

You were pleased to tell me the other day that I might make a brief statement today. May I make it now?

Speaker:<sup>37</sup> Yes.

Jawaharlal Nehru: As you have been pleased to fix, I think, the 4th December for a discussion on this subject of our border, more especially in regard to the renewed activities and aggression of Chinese authorities there, I do not propose to say much. But, I should like to help hon. Members to know the facts as far as they are in my possession so that it might help them in the course of their discussion.

This *White Paper* that I am placing today contains a large number of letters, charges and counter-charges made by one Government or the other and the replies. That will give them some picture of the relations of the two Governments which are obviously very far from friendly. It consists of charges and counter-charges being made of this kind. In one of the letters sent more or less recently on the 31st of October, 1961<sup>38</sup> —it is a long letter sent by our Ministry to the embassy of China here-various matters are dealt with, various charges made by the Chinese Government against us are replied to and repudiated. Then this letter says, I shall read out a paragraph from it:

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<sup>35</sup> Statement on *White Paper No. V* Re: relations between India and China, 28 November 1961. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Second Series, Vol. LIX, 20 November to 1 December 1961, cols 1846-1861.

<sup>36</sup> See also item 276.

<sup>37</sup> M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.

<sup>38</sup> See *White Paper V*, pp. 51-54.

"Reports received in August-September 1961 show that the Chinese forces have spread even beyond the 1956 Chinese claim line in Ladakh to establish the following new posts, and that they have constructed roads to link these posts with rear bases: -

Post at E 78.12 No. 35.19 - this is the location of the post.

Post at Nyagzu.

Post at Dambuguru.

These fresh instances of violation of Indian territory by the Chinese establish conclusively that the Chinese are guilty of further aggression against India and their protestations to the contrary are only a cloak to cover up these renewed incursions and aggressive activities."

Therefore, we rejected their note. I read out this brief reference because this particular matter has been before us now.

I should like to explain because there is much confusion on this issue. On the one hand, quite rightly and inevitably, there is a strong feeling in this House and in the country about these Chinese aggressive activities in Ladakh and elsewhere, a feeling that is obviously completely shared by the Government and by, I take it, almost everybody in India, and further that active and effective steps should be taken against these activities. What has happened? I wanted, first of all, to make that clear. In the course of the last two years-I am not referring to the period previous to two years as that has been fairly well discussed here and the facts are known-in the course of the last two years, we find that three Chinese posts have been established. I have myself used the word "checkposts" for their posts or our posts. It is not a correct description. They are military posts; they are not checkposts. Checkposts are normal police posts. Whether they are our posts in these mountains or the Chinese, they are regular military posts. In the course of the last two years, three posts have been established.

As a matter of fact, so far as we are aware, they were established during the last summer, especially one important post to which I shall refer. Of these three military posts, two of them, one at Dambuguru and the other at Nyagzu in the Kongka La, Khurnak Fort sector of Ladakh, are practically on

the international frontier between Tibet and Ladakh; I am talking about the real frontier, not where the Chinese have come in. They are actually on the international frontier. We are not quite certain whether they are a mile or two on this side or on that side, because it is rather difficult in these high mountain regions to be precise about the actual line. But, broadly speaking...

Nath Pai (Rajapur):<sup>39</sup> Then, they must be on this side. If there is doubt, then they are obviously on this side.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Let us presume that. We have presumed that. But I am merely saying that they are near the international frontier. And it is an objectionable thing, the Chinese having built them, not because they have included any particular area of territory there by coming a mile in but because that is a sign of aggressive mentality behind it and aggressive activities. What I mean to say is that to consider or to think that, as has been said, a large area-I do not know how much, thousand or two thousand square miles-has been further occupied is not a correct statement. What is correct is that in so far as these two posts are concerned, they are, as I said, almost on the international frontier, and it is objectionable, because the mere erection of these posts even on the international frontier is an aggressive activity and not in keeping with the assurance given to us, The third post is a more important one, that is, a post in the northern part of this Ladakh area. Presumably, this was put up during this last summer. It is very difficult to give exact dates, because we find out about the existence of these posts by reconnaissance. When a reconnaissance occurs, we see that it is not there; when it next occurs, it is there or it is being built, so that all we can say is that on a certain date, it was there, and on a certain date it was not there; and roughly, we can, therefore, say that it must have come into existence between those two dates.

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<sup>39</sup> PSP.

Balraj Madhok (New Delhi):<sup>40</sup> What was the date or the month at least when Government came to know about it? Summer is a long period.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The month in which we discovered it? Early in September, our reconnaissance took place and discovered this post, which is a post a little further to the west of their last post, where it was. This is towards the Karakoram range. As a matter of fact, we have built an important post, military post, right near the Karakoram pass, which is a very important route of entry. Although now it is not used very much, it used to be a very important route from India to Singkiang and Central Asia. We have built a very important post there at a place named Daulatbeg Oldi which is about ten miles from the Karakoram pass, and which is a post at about nearly 17,000 feet altitude. The Chinese post, which they have built up, is to the east of this, ten to twelve miles to the east of this, it is this one single post that is a little further, from the frontier line, and must be put in a different category, as compared to the two other posts that I have said, which are more or less on the international border. We object to these posts of course, for reasons which I have stated. But to this post, our objection is greater because it has moved west two miles. But even that does not imply that the Chinese have taken possession of any large area. A post is just a post at that point; to the right, to the left or to the east, they are not in possession; nobody is in possession except any Armed Force that goes there for the time being. And as I have pointed out, we have got an important military post ...

Raja Mahendra Pratap (Mathura):<sup>41</sup> About how many soldiers are there in one post?

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<sup>40</sup> Jan Sangh.

<sup>41</sup> Independent.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I cannot say how many people the Chinese have put there. Roughly speaking, about fifty is the outside limit on a post; it may be sixty or it may be forty, I cannot say, because every such post, so far as we are concerned, has to be fed, and everything has to be supplied, by air. Ever since these troubles became marked in our frontier regions, we have been trying to build rapidly roads, and in order to facilitate this process, we have taken it out of the normal channels and routine methods of building roads by the PWD's which, however good they may be, are rather slow-working. And we have created a special division of the Army for building roads in these high mountains, with good engineers and the rest. They have done very good work, and proceeded more or less according to schedule. But it has been a tremendous task, in this sense that every little match-stick, every screw, and everything else has to be carried by air, even to build the road; every person whom we station there has to be supplied with everything he needs by air. So, it was for this purpose that we purchased a number of very good transport aircraft from various countries. It has been of help to us. And this process is continuing well. This was the base because we have normally been to thinking of preparing for such effective steps in a thorough way. We cannot take adventurist action which may land us in greater military or other difficulties.

It is not an easy matter to conduct warfare in these regions, but it has to be done, and, therefore, we have to prepare for it, if necessary, and the base of that preparation is this system of roads that are being built rapidly, not only there, but over a large part of the border. After that, of course, in the ordinary military sense.

Tyagi (Dehra Dun):<sup>42</sup> On a point of order. I do not to think that army strategy will permit Ministers to talk so openly about the preparations which they are making, whatever the demand of the Parliament may be.

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<sup>42</sup> Mahavir Tyagi, Congress.

Raghunath Singh (Varanasi):<sup>43</sup> Especially, the number should not be disclosed.

Naushir Bharucha (East Khandesh):<sup>44</sup> The Prime Minister knows his job better.

Speaker: I have always felt that it is the privilege of the Ministers to say, whenever they do not want to disclose anything to the House, that it is not in the public interest to disclose the information. I do not know if it is open to an Ex-Minister to claim that privilege.

Tyagi: It is based on conventions observed in many Parliaments. It is not an ordinary matter.

Speaker: It is somewhat curious. On the other hand, the complaint has often been made here that sufficient information is not being made available and that it is not being given in public interest.

Tyagi: Let photographers also be sent to China. It would be better!

Nath Pai: The Chinese know much more than we.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member Shri Tyagi has rightly drawn attention to the fact that we should not help those who are opposed to us to get information which might help them; that is an obvious precaution that every country takes. They may know, as Shri Nath Pai hinted, much of this, as we know a good deal about their activities. Nevertheless, they do not know everything. It is no good helping them to know a little more than what they know. I acknowledge that my general tendency, more especially in the

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<sup>43</sup> Congress.

<sup>44</sup> Independent.

House, is to take hon. Members into my confidence and say things which perhaps ought not to say. From that point of view, I was, in fact, thinking of inviting some hon. Members, leaders of parties, to see me privately when I should talk to them with a map in front of me and try to explain these matters a little further which I cannot do in the House.

Tyagi: Let us have a closed sitting of the House. A debate can be had in that way and let all the members know.

Speaker: He wants a Secret Session.

Jawaharlal Nehru: No, Sir. I am very sorry. A Secret Session or public session, these things cannot be discussed with hundreds of people present obviously, however secret it is it only means that it does not go to newspapers. But otherwise, it becomes semi-public.

N.G. Ranga (Tenali):<sup>45</sup> That is the general weakness all parties.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is not a weakness of ours. That is a well-known fact everywhere. I was merely stating something that is not terribly secret. The locations may be secret, but obviously, we have been engaged to the best of our ability to strengthen our positions all along the borders. In fact, as I once said, we were engaged in doing this, to some extent right from 1950 onwards. One error—if you like—we made in our judgement. The frontier is a tremendous frontier of 2,000 miles, and it is a very difficult frontier, in the sense that there is no means of communication sometimes for hundreds of miles on the frontier, because this was a dead frontier in the past. The old British Government did not take much interest in it, and it remained so. But the moment we became independent, both because of that and because of the fact that at that time the Chinese came into Tibet, we were alerted by

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<sup>45</sup> Elected Congress MP in 1957, moved to Swatantra Party which was formed in June 1959 under his presidency.

this fact, although nothing had happened against us so much directly. But this frontier became a live frontier and we began taking military and other steps, "other steps" meaning development of communications etc.

We concentrated rather on the North East Frontier Agency because we thought that that might be threatened more than any other place. The problem was so huge, we succeeded not only in bringing a large part of the North East Frontier Agency in a system of regular administration and communications but in establishing many posts there which have done good work and which have, in fact, prevented any incursion there.

References have often been made to Longju, which is a small village of a few huts only and which, according to us, lies in our territory just on this side of the border. According to the Chinese, it does not. We are even now within about four or five miles—that is, our posts are—from Longju. Of course, the four or five miles are not just straight going. It is mountainous territory and is very difficult going. We have been asked why we have not occupied Longju, although Longju has been vacated by the Chinese. Why they vacated it, I do not know. They are four miles beyond on the other side. It is not a difficult matter, I suppose, for us to go four or five miles ahead and sit there. But it is of no particular importance.

Tangamani (Madurai):<sup>46</sup> Have they reoccupied Longju? On a former occasion, we were told that they vacated it because of a certain epidemic there.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There was some story about an epidemic. They left it. They have not, so far as we know, reoccupied it. What their reason is, I do not know. But it is of no particular importance to them or to us.

Hem Barua (Gauhati):<sup>47</sup> On a previous occasion also, the Prime Minister

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<sup>46</sup> K.T.K. Tangamani, CPI.

<sup>47</sup> PSP.

made statements like this about Ladakh and I objected to that. Here also I do not want the Prime Minister to say that Longju is not of much importance to us because this may be taken advantage of by the Chinese. Let us not be shaky about our borders.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not speaking a lie. I am not going to tell a lie. It is not the method of our Government.

Hem Barua: My trouble is that in regard to border disputes the Prime Minister has a tendency to act like an umpire in a cricket match rather than as one whose interests are involved. That is the trouble.

Speaker: The hon. Member ought not to interrupt like this.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is perfectly clear that Longju is of no military importance to either party. Of course, it is our territory. That is a different matter. It is an obvious fact. I am not telling anybody that. We can, and we may perhaps occupy it, but if we occupy it we must be prepared to do many other things too all along the border. When we want and when we are ready for it, we will do it. What I mean is that we have to see things in the large context and perspective, military strategy and the rest. We have to go by the advice given to us by our military chiefs and advisers, that it is not of great importance from that point of view. For instance, Ladakh or any other part is, far more important. So, my point is that we hold the entire North East Frontier border, well, except this little village of Longju which, at the present moment, nobody holds. At one time, we have even suggested to the Chinese, before these various developments had taken place, that they should retire from Longju and it should be left unoccupied by either party. That was some time ago. But we have every right to occupy it, if we so choose and if it is in keeping with our general military strategy. That was the point I was making. But it is not, from the military or other point of view, of extreme importance.

Hem Barua: These are unfortunate remarks about Longju.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It may be unfortunate, but I am trying to make factual statement. That is my difficulty if I have to be frank to the House. I hope this House will never compel me to speak lies to this House because they consider that lies are good for this country. We may delude ourselves with a lie. We do not delude the opposite party by our lies because they know the facts as well as we do, and perhaps more.

That is what I venture to say. We are taking even from 1950 onwards steps to protect our borders, trying to build roads etc. We attached importance to the NEFA border for various reasons, and we have succeeded in protecting it adequately. We are now building up a system of roads right up to the border.

In the other parts, specially the Ladakh part, difficulties were greater, far greater, for us to build roads. Take, for instance, even a single road, which leads from Srinagar to Leh. Leh is a very important part of the Kashmir State. Even the building of that road had caused great difficulties to us. It is now completed. That is one of the big things we have done, and that helps us to move material and men into Ladakh.

So we have been building these roads and building bases at suitable places for our armed forces. Out of the bases go forward posts etc. The whole thing is being built up in an organised way, paying special attention to the logistic demands of the situation because the whole thing depends on that.

Napoleon or someone else once said that an army moves on its stomach. That is true, not only stomach but other supplies and all that.

We are a modern army. We are not just an adventurist group going in and taking undue risks in doing it, undue risks for our soldiers and others.

Therefore, we have been proceeding step by step, building up our strength in these areas, and we have gone a good distance in doing that.

I was talking about the last two years. That is where, in keeping in mind what Shri Tyagi has said, it is not proper for me to mention places of our

posts etc., the military posts we have set up. But we have set up more than half a dozen new posts, important posts, in various parts of the Ladakh border. I have mentioned one already, an important one which is right near the Karakoram Pass, a very important, one.

An hon. Member asked what is the strength of each post, and I said that normally it is forty or fifty men. But I should like the House to remember that behind these forty or fifty men is a huge apparatus to feed them, to supply them and so on, involving ten to twenty times that number of persons. So, all this has to be built up like this, with a solid base, so that nobody is left unconnected with the bases and therefore weakened. That has been our general policy, which, I think, has been proceeding more or less satisfactorily, in spite of all these difficulties that have taken place. Now, it is clear that from the point of view of feeding alone, these areas in Ladakh cannot support large armies, either Chinese or ours or anybody else it just can't. Roughly speaking, 50 men require a thousand men for their support somewhere behind the scenes, to feed them etc. You can imagine how any large army can be supported. May be, I cannot say, great country like the United States of America or the Soviet Union may be able to do it with their vast resources, but certainly neither the Chinese Government nor any other Government can support large armies in this area.

It is not a question of large armies manoeuvring and crushing each other. It is a question of small armed groups, yes, relatively small groups going and either taking possession of a place or removing somebody from some place. That is, the whole strategy has to depend on that conception, but with strong base and logistics and good supplies and all that. So, all that has to be taken into consideration.

As I said, I recognise the strong feelings in the House over these matters. We entirely share them, but the House will not expect the Government, feeling strongly as it does, nevertheless, to take some step which cannot be fully carried out. We are ready for it, we are perfectly prepared for it.

I do not think the last two years, with which I am dealing, have changed the situation to the advantage of the Chinese in these areas. If I may make a

broad statement, I think the situation has broadly been changed progressively in favour, not as much as we want it to. It is a fact that they are still in the areas which they occupied, that is true, but progressively the situation has been changing, from a military point of view and from other points of view, in our favour, and we shall continue to take steps to build up these things, so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover such territory as is in their possession.

I am sorry I took so much time, I did not intend to, but the matter, as you were pleased to say, will be discussed a few days later in the House.

Nath Pai: May I ask one small question of the Prime Minister? If the setting up of a base on our territory by the Chinese Republic he does not think will lead to war, why should we [be] less worried that destroying the bases set up by them will lead to war?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is not a question of leading to a war. We do not want a major war, of course. It is no small matter to have a war between two of the biggest countries in Asia. It is not a question of liking or disliking. It is a major historical fact that one gets entangled into when, whatever steps we take, we have to be strong enough to pursue it to the logical end. Every military administration has to think of that. It must be pursued to the logical end, and has to be prepared for that, whether it is there or elsewhere in India, whether it is in Goa or whatever it is. A step has to be taken knowing what the second, third, fifth, twelfth step should be. We should be prepared for all this. We do not take a step and then find that we are not prepared for something that follows.

Braj Raj Singh (Firozabad):<sup>48</sup> The Prime Minister has been saying that the versions given in the press about the territory which has been recently occupied by the Chinese are exaggerated. Some papers say it is 1500

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<sup>48</sup> Socialist Party.

square miles or so. We were expecting that the Prime Minister would clarify the position, and tell us what, according to the estimate of the Government of India, is the extent of the territory which has been freshly occupied by China.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I thought I had made that clear. There is no occupation of territory except in so far as you put a small group of forty or fifty men in a particular point. That particular point is occupied, and from that area they may exercise some control round about, but there is no other territory occupied at all.

The one place that I have mentioned where they have opened these check posts, about which we got to know in September last, is a place on the banks of a river with the happy name of Chip Chap river. It is seventeen miles southeast of our post which is Dauletbeg Oldi. This is connected by road to their previous post behind which Jilga which was established two years ago. So that the question of occupation of territory does not arise, excepting as I said, they have got a few soldiers sitting at one post in a sheltered post, which has been created.

A.B. Vajpayee (Balrampur):<sup>49</sup> That is occupation!

Hem Barua: Occupation and exercising control!

A.B. Vajpayee: Are we to have a new definition of occupation? After the Chinese post is created on our territory, it is occupation.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member, I am afraid, when he deals with these matters, will have to exercise a little patience. I did not say that is not occupation. I said it is incorrect to say 1,000 or 500 sq. miles have been occupied. That is ridiculous, that is not true. Where they occupied a

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<sup>49</sup> Jan Sangh.

particular point, because they have occupied that point, they can exercise some influence round about in those mountainous areas, but to draw a line and say east or west or north of it is occupied is not a correct statement. That is what I ventured to say in answer to the hon. Member.

Bal Raj Madhok: It seems they set up some check posts two years ago. How many miles are the new check posts from the old ones?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I cannot precisely say, but it may be ten or twelve miles.

Bal Raj Madhok: They have advanced ten miles. It means 10 x 100-1000 miles of the border.

Jawaharlal Nehru: You can also draw a line from our post of Dauletbeg Oldi, and say that we have already driven out the Chinese, because the line drawn would cover all that area. The area is an extraordinary area where our posts and their posts go in a zig-zag line to some extent; somewhere zig-zag, somewhere something else over that area where they have occupied and where our posts are increasing in number to control that situation.

N.G. Ranga: Does not this mean at least that they have advanced to certain positions and established their checkposts there, whereas even the one checkpost that they had vacated we have refused to reoccupy, that is Longju? They vacated it a long time ago and you have refused to go and occupy it again.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am very sorry. It is difficult for me to deal with the hon. Member, Prof. Ranga's military approach to this problem.

N.G. Ranga: I do not know whether my hon. friend knows anything, the difference between a straight line and this kind of geometrical description that he gives. He may know much better than the generals themselves, but

he knows how to keep the generals silent.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I shall invite the leader of the Swatantra Party to improve his military education, I invite him to come. I will take him to that base myself.

N. G. Ranga: When the Prime Minister becomes a Field Marshal.

Tyagi (Dehra Dun): And please leave him there until the elections are over!

### **276. In the Rajya Sabha: India-China Border<sup>50</sup>**

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): I am grateful to you, Mr Deputy Chairman,<sup>51</sup> for allowing me to intervene at this stage. This morning my colleague, the Deputy Minister,<sup>52</sup> laid on the Table of the House a book called *White Paper No. V*, containing Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China.<sup>53</sup> I should like in a few words to explain certain recent developments there which have naturally and rightly caused apprehension in the minds of the public and Members of this House. There is a brief reference to this matter in the *White Paper* and I shall read it out. This is contained in a letter addressed by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Embassy of China in India. The letter is dated 31st October, 1961.<sup>54</sup> It deals with many matters which the Chinese Government had raised many objections they had taken, deals with them and, rejects their protests. At the end of this letter, near the

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<sup>50</sup> Statement, 28 November 1961. *Rajya Sabha Debates*, Vol. XXXVI, N. 1-5, 27 November to 15 December 1961, cols 358-365.

<sup>51</sup> S.V. Krishnamoorthy Rao.

<sup>52</sup> Lakshmi Menon.

<sup>53</sup> See also item 275.

<sup>54</sup> See *White Paper V*, pp. 51-54.

end, it is stated:

"Reports received in August-September, 1961 show that the Chinese forces have spread even beyond the 1956 Chinese claim line in Ladakh to establish the following new posts, and that they have constructed roads to link these posts with rear bases."

These posts are described precisely: Post at E 78: 12 N 35:19, that is one thing; the second Post at Nyagzu, and the third Post at Dambuguru. Then it goes on to say:

"These fresh instances of violation of Indian territory by the Chinese establish conclusively that the Chinese are guilty of further aggression against India and their protestations to the contrary are only a cloak to cover up these renewed incursions and aggressive activities."

Now, Sir, I have just read three posts. Sometimes we have referred, I myself have been guilty of that, to them as checkposts. That of course is not a correct word. A checkpost is usually a police post to check people coming and going. These are military posts just as our posts there are military posts. Two of these three posts are situated roughly along the international frontier between Tibet and Ladakh. These two are the Dambuguru and Nyagzu in the Kongla Khurnak Fort sector of Ladakh. As I said, I cannot be quite certain about the precise location, because in these mountain regions there is no marked boundary, but they are broadly on the international frontier, not the new lines drawn by the Chinese or by anybody else. We think they are just on our side of this international frontier. Hence they have committed aggression. The importance of these two is not they have led to any occupation of any further territory by the Chinese but that the mere fact that they have been built there is a sign of aggressive intent.

Now, the third post belongs to a different category because that is definitely in our own territory, well within it. It was an extension of the last post nearby which was called Tehsil Jilga which was established by the Chinese about a year and a half ago or two years ago, more than two years ago. So, this Post has been established further inland, if I may use that word. That is a more serious matter because it is definitely a post right in the heart of the

territory of the Indian Union.

Now, in the last two years this has been the development. I am referring to two years, two years before we have discussed this matter adequately here and the position is fairly well known as to what it was then. During the last two years, so far as I know, these three Posts have been established, two more or less on the international border, rather south-by south I mean south in the Ladakh sector—and this other one which is not very far from the Karakoram Pass of which, I repeat, there are two different categories. The important thing is this new post near the Karakoram Pass. Earlier and during this period especially, we have also established a number of military posts along that frontier line. I do not propose to enumerate them, I do not think it will be quite right for me to do so, but one I shall mention, an important post which has been established at a place which is called Dauletbeg Oldi which is at the base of the Karakorum Pass at an altitude of 16,800 feet. It is an important post because of its location and otherwise too. Now, the new Chinese post that has been established is seventeen miles south-east of Dauletbeg Oldi. Information reached us early in September last about the establishment of this post. The only way we can get to know of this is by reconnaissance whether by land or by air, and we were informed then that this place had been built or was being built. These are of course small places, and I suppose normally speaking they contain thirty, forty or fifty men, all posts or outposts, because of difficulties in feeding, the distance difficulties, and the rest. Small numbers of people are kept there. This is the major event that has happened, and it is a highly objectionable thing from our point of view. At the same time I should, like to make it clear that the establishment of a post like this does not involve control of any large territory. Of course, where it is established, it does involve control of that particular piece of land and round about it may control to some extent, but for the rest it does not involve any large territory as has been stated. I want to make that clear.

Hriday Nath Kunzru (Uttar Pradesh):<sup>55</sup> Can the Prime Minister tell us what the exact area of the new territory occupied by the Chinese is?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The exact area is the area of the Post. There is no other area. They sit on a post. Now, the influence of that Post round about is not occupation, but its influence. They do not occupy any other territory, actual occupation. It is just that post, whatever it may be, a few hundred yards or so, but naturally a Post has a certain influence round about. How far round about depends upon many circumstances. It is not occupation, any other area is not occupied. This whole area of Ladakh is at the present moment developing into one crisscross of military posts, that is, our posts and Chinese military posts. And as for our posts, I have mentioned one important one. We have a number of other new posts that we have put up, and this process is continuing. The establishment of a post involves not merely sending some men to sit in a particular place but fairly complicated logistic arrangements. Normally these posts have to be fed from the air, supplies have to be given to them from the air, and even those supplies have to be carried partly by air, partly to the rear base by roads where roads exist.

Now, we have been, in the past two years specially, but even before that, building up our general military strength in these frontier areas. Originally even as long ago as ten or eleven years when this frontier appeared to us to become a live frontier after the Chinese had entered Tibet soon after the success of their revolution in China itself, we realised that this frontier had become important, and so we planned to build up communications. We gave first priority at that time to the North East Frontier Agency frontier. It seemed to us that that was possibly more in danger, and I think, if I may say so, that the development of the North East Frontier Agency has been rather remarkable, the spread of the administration there to the border, some roads that we have built, and these posts, military posts or check posts, being put on all along the border, with the result that although our system

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<sup>55</sup> Independent.

of roads was by no means complete—we are building them there still—but all that border has been a relatively well defended border and no real incursion has taken place or has been allowed to take place. In one relatively small matter there incursion did take place, and there was argument as to whom it belonged to; that was the village Longju which is situated almost dead plum on the border, and there was argument as to whether it was on this side of the border or the other, and the Chinese occupied it. Later, last year, they withdrew from it three or four miles right near there and we are about four or five miles from this side. Although they withdrew from Longju, we did not occupy that. Chiefly, it was said that they had withdrawn because of an epidemic. Possibly it was there, but the real reason was, if we occupied—that act of occupation is not a very difficult one—but unless we can support that occupation in a variety of ways afterwards strongly, we may be put in an exposed position. The place itself has no value, I mean military value, and therefore, thus far we did not occupy that small village where practically nobody lives now. Apart from this, the whole of the northeast frontier was well protected because of the steps we had taken to put up these posts, etc. But the Ladakh side was not so well protected because it was more difficult for us to build—the distances were far greater, the mountains far higher and more spread out. But we had to put up some check posts and we are in the process of doing it. And in fact, it was an attempt to put up these posts that led two years ago to that conflict with the Chinese there who had come from the other side. In the last two years special efforts have been taken to this end, to put up posts there, which involve the building up of rear bases, the building up of intermediate bases. There are the logistic requirements of those people who have put up there. Every road built there involves taking every single article necessary for it by air—big machines, small machines and the like. Every human being there has to be supplied with everything he requires, food, etc., by air, and there are many articles required. Take even the terrain. And the climate is furious and there is no wood available there. It is bare land. There are no trees at that height. So even for warming and heating, everything has to be

taken there. So, we had to build this up from base upwards which we have been doing, and I think the progress made has been rather creditable considering the difficulties. Our position has been strengthened all along that border and it is in the process of being strengthened.

So far as the roads are concerned, we took it out of the normal routine agencies like the PWD because they were rather slow moving and created a new department in Defence for this road-building which takes the help of the PWD and builds the roads itself. Because of the necessities of transport in these regions, we had to purchase a number of transport aircraft which would carry large loads; they have been very helpful. So, all this process has been going along during these years. Naturally, during the winter, all these building programmes are slowed down; in some areas they have to stop practically because in these areas which vary in altitude from 15,000 to 19,000 feet, it is extraordinarily difficult for any human being to go and work. Nevertheless, the posts are continued to be put there even in the winter but the work is slowed down. In the so-called summer months there—five or six months in the year— work proceeds apace. How, in the course of tillis period, we have built up a fairly thorough base, important base, because we must have a base whatever step we take. If there are fifty men in a base, those fifty men have to be supported by hundreds of men behind the lines; there are logistic reasons, transport and otherwise. Fifty men may have to be supported by thousands behind. So, we have to proceed in a sound and thorough way to strengthen our position and not merely take some adventurist action which may perhaps not be successful. That is the broad policy we pursue, we hope to pursue, we continue to pursue, and we hope to complete our system of roads before very long. So, Sir, at the present moment, as I said, the important thing that has happened on the Chinese side is tillis one particular military post which has been extended to the west towards the Karakorum Pass and which lies between the line of the Chinese claim of 1956 and the 1960 claim—which is highly objectionable, and we have taken strong objection to it. And this creation of this post does not entail any large area going over because we

have other posts which control those areas. That is the present position I must clear up. Naturally, our aim is to build up or strengthen those areas in every way—that is, in front, in the intermediate places and in the rear, in the mountains, apart from the base further down, so that we can easily take any action that is required and with strength, and keep it up. And normally speaking, we avoid any such action which may not be followed up by us because of our lack of material, etc. which we have to store up at every stage.

I may say that our post which I mentioned at the base of the Karakoram Pass—Dauletbeg Oldi—is about ten or twelve miles away from the Pass and the Chinese post which was probably put up during the last summer is about seventeen miles south-east of our post. There have been other incursions by the Chinese—that is patrols—and this *White Paper* which I have placed will show the number of protests made by us to the Chinese and by the Chinese to us; they go on protesting that we are sending our patrol because we have been constantly sending our patrols to those areas as we have every right to do in our areas. But since they claim it is their own, they go on protesting.

That is all I wish to state at this stage, Sir.

Dahyabhai V. Patel (Gujarat):<sup>56</sup> Are you giving us any time to discuss the *White Paper* that is put before us and the Prime Minister's statement?

Deputy Chairman: You table a motion for it; you give notice. I will see about it.

Hriday Nath Kunzru: All that we want is that the discussion of this problem should be separate from the discussion of the international affairs generally, and I hope that the Prime Minister will agree to it.

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<sup>56</sup> Mahagujerat Janata Parishad.

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is a question of the convenience of the House and you, and I am perfectly agreeable if there is time for that.