

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Series II, Volume 66

January 1 – February 14, 1961

People's Republic of China

283. To B. C. Roy: Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong¹

Nilambag Palace
Bhavnagar
January 8, 1961

My dear Bidhan,

I have seen your letter of January 4th about the Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong and the situation created by the presence of a large number of Tibetan refugees at Kalimpong. What you have written is important and we shall immediately give full consideration to these matters.

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

284. To S. Dutt: Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong²

I enclose a letter and a note from Dr B.C. Roy.

2. There is much force in what he says about closing the Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong. As there is practically no trade left, there is no obvious reason why

¹ Letter to the Chief Minister of West Bengal.

² Note to FS, Nilambag Palace, Bhavnagar, 8 January 1961.

this Agency should continue. On the other hand, we will have to see this in the context of other events. I have no doubt that this Agency will have to be closed some time or other. Perhaps the present is not the right time.

3. As for the various types of Tibetan refugees at Kalimpong what Dr Roy has written requires careful consideration.

285. In the Lok Sabha: Officials' Report on India-China Boundary³

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Sir, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People s Republic of China on the Boundary Question.⁴

May I say a few words more? This Report consists really of two reports, one report by the officials of the Government of India and the other report by the officials of the People's Republic of China. The latter report, as Members might notice, was originally in Chinese. The translation of it into the English language was also given to us by the Chinese officials and it was marked as unofficial, the official text being in Chinese. I would like to state that when we informed the Chinese Government that we are placing these Reports, according to our custom, before Parliament, they drew our attention to the fact that the English translation was unofficial and that they were revising it carefully and there might be some verbal changes made in the revised translation perhaps. I thought I might bring this matter to the notice of the House.

Shri Goray:⁵ This report may have to be discussed in Parliament and if we discuss this report, the Chinese may very well say that we have discussed the unofficial version. What do we do?

³ Papers laid on the Table, 14 February 1961, Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. L, 14-27 February 1961, cols 25-26. See also SWJN/SS/60/Section I Chou En-lai's Visit.

⁴ See SWJN/SS/66 Supplement.

⁵ N.G Goray, PSP, Lok Sabha MP from Poona.

Mr. Speaker: I am sure we have the Chinese version with us. We can have our own translation.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Our translation would not become the official Chinese translation. There is a full translation here given by them. I suppose the changes are likely to be minor, somewhat verbal. There cannot be major changes.

[Translation begins:

Shri Braj Raj Singh:⁶ Has this report been written in English or Hindi?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It has been written in English.

An honourable Member: It should have been written in Hindi.

Translation ends]

Shri Goray: I wanted to point out that it has been given out in the Press so far as our relations with Bhutan are concerned, when the Prime Minister of China was here, they gave one version to the press and in their own version they said that they have no objection to India having proper relations with Bhutan which again means, one does not know.⁷ The same thing may happen again.

Mr. Speaker: We are going beyond the scope of this. It is only placing on the Table of the House. I am sure the Government will see if there are any mistakes according to us.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: We cannot find any mistakes. We have got their own translation. Who are we to correct it? If they want to correct it, they can do so. It is a fat book. It is not a small document.

Mr. Speaker: Very well.

⁶ See fn 153 in this section.

⁷See SWJN/SS/60/item 34.

Tibet

286. For the Dalai Lama: Cannot Arrange Meeting with Elizabeth II⁸

12 January 1961

I am desired by the Prime Minister to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 9 to him.⁹ The programme of Queen Elizabeth of England has been fixed up in detail in consultation with the members of her staff. This programme is extremely full now and I regret that it will be difficult to find time for your interview with Her Majesty. Otherwise, too, Delhi will be full of visitors from the 20th of January until the end of the month, and all available accommodation has already been booked. In the circumstances, the Prime Minister suggests that you drop the idea of coming to Delhi merely for the purpose of paying a courtesy call on Her Majesty.

Nepal

287. To S. Dutt: The Press in Nepal¹⁰

I agree with you.¹¹ We should carry on with our projects in Nepal. But we should certainly be a little slow in taking up any new work. The initiative should not come from us.

2. As you know, there has been a virulent Press campaign against India in

⁸ Copy of letter from S. Dutt; salutation and signature not available. MEA, Revolt in Tibet, Dalai Lama's Arrival in India 1959, p. 107.

⁹ See Appendix 13.

¹⁰ Note to the FS, Neelambag Palace, Bhavnagar, 5 January 1961. MEA, File No. 15(4)- Nepal/61, p.1/Note. Also available in JN Collection.

¹¹ See Appendix 7.

Nepal. These Press people are a little queer. I am told that these very people were in favour of Parliament some time back. Whoever pays them the money, they play the tune. It is obvious that they can hardly do so now as the present administration in Nepal will not encourage them. You might consider the desirability of our Ambassador¹² drawing the attention of the present Government to this campaign which is totally false and unjustified.

3. I am informed that Subarna Shamshere is still in Calcutta.¹³ He thinks that the King might lean towards SEATO. What good this will do him is not clear to me. In fact it will do a lot of harm.

288. To Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah: A Lecture on History and Politics¹⁴

January 23, 1961

My dear friend,

A little over a month ago I received your letter of the 16th December which Your Majesty was kind enough to send me.¹⁵ As suggested by you, I informed our President of its contents.

I am sorry for the delay in answering it. I was not quite sure at first whether any special answer was necessary at that stage as the letter was one conveying information of the step that you had been pleased to take. Also I was not quite clear what I could write to you in the then existing circumstances.

Later I learned that Dr. Tulsi Giri, a Minister appointed by Your Majesty in the

¹² H. Dayal.

¹³ Deputy Prime Minister in the dismissed Koirala Government, Subarna Shamshere came to Calcutta two days before the dismissal on 15 December 1960 and stayed on. On 18 January 1961, he addressed a press conference advocating restoration of democracy in Nepal.

¹⁴ Letter to the King of Nepal.

¹⁵ Regarding the dismissal of the ministry in Nepal in December 1960; see SWJN/SS/65/ Appendix 37.

new Government,¹⁶ was coming to India to see me. I decided to wait for his arrival and my talk with him before I replied to your letter.

On the 20th January I met Dr. Tulsi Giri and had nearly two hours' talk with him in the course of which Dr. Giri informed me of your views in regard to the present situation, and I also expressed to him my own views.¹⁷ We discussed also some pending matters between our two Governments. I presume that Dr. Tulsi Giri will inform you of what I said to him. I am, however, taking the liberty of writing to you about the matters I discussed with him. I do so in all frankness, because it will be unfair to you as well as to me for us not to deal with each other frankly and as friends.

First of all, I should like to indicate my basic approach to national and, to some extent, international problems. The two are, to a large extent, interlinked and one affects the other. I am now over 71 years of age. I returned from England in 1912 after taking my degree there at Cambridge and being called to the Bar. Even in England I was greatly interested in political and economic issues, international affairs, and more especially the freedom of India. On my return here, I was drawn into the Indian struggle for freedom. Some years later, when Mahatma Gandhi became the leader of our great struggle, I joined him wholeheartedly, as did indeed my father and the rest of our family, in common with millions of others in this country. My life for 30 years after that was a small part of our great struggle. I was absorbed in it even at the cost of my family life.

Inevitably, all these experiences, with their long periods in prison and at other times my life of hectic activity, had a powerful effect upon me and conditioned me. I thought and read and wrote, and some of my books give some little account of how I felt and grew under these impacts. My earlier ideas took firmer shape in the solitudes of prison as in my activities. I suppose my character was moulded, for good or ill, by this variety of experience that came to me.

¹⁶ On 15 December 1960, Mahendra dismissed the Koirala Ministry and dissolved Parliament; appointed a council of ministers on 26 December 1960; banned all political parties and introduced Panchayat Democracy. See *The Times of India*, 16 December and 27 December 1960.

¹⁷ For Subimal Dutt's summary of the discussion, substantially repeated in this letter, see NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject File No. 62.

About two years ago I published a book containing some old letters written and received by me.¹⁸ Reading them, I was surprised to find how my thinking was broadly the same even 30 or 40 years ago as it is today, though I have no doubt developed in various ways since then. This thinking made me a firm believer in democracy and in what might generally be called a socialist structure of society with as much equality as possible. I became opposed to all feudal privileges as I was equally opposed to the amassing of huge wealth by individuals, in trade or industry. All this seemed to me unsocial and rather vulgar. Further, apart from my own views, I felt that there were powerful forces at work in the world towards these changes and ultimately they could not be resisted. The changes could come peacefully or after violent conflict.

My contact with Gandhiji made me a firm believer in peaceful methods and democratic procedures even in a great nationalist struggle.

It is with this conditioning and background that I came into the Government of India over 13 years ago as Prime Minister. I had then to deal with both national and international problems. How far I have succeeded or not, it is for others or for history to judge. I know that I have failed in many respects, but always I have had those ideals before me, and I have endeavoured to act according to them, though I realise that it is often very difficult to live up even to one's own ideals. Our policy of non-alignment in international affairs was not merely due to existing conditions and a practical way of approaching them, but was based on these deeper considerations which I have mentioned above which, I believe, are essentially in tune with India's spirit.

In the early days after our Independence, the question of Nepal came before us. At that time, Nepal, though an independent country, was, in practice, limited and circumscribed in her foreign relations by the British Power. The British Envoy¹⁹ played an important part in Kathmandu and, as a part of his activities, he ran down India. So I was told by your revered father²⁰ and the then Rana Prime

¹⁸ A Bunch of Old Letters (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1958).

¹⁹ George Arthur Falconer, British Ambassador to Nepal, 1947-51.

²⁰ Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, the King.

Minister of Nepal.²¹ We wanted Nepal to be a completely free and independent country in friendly contact with us, as was natural. Immediately, therefore, we accepted this fact of full independence. Our interest in Nepal, which flowed from our general policy, was in its independence. At the same time we felt that past history, culture and geography made Nepal and India inevitably close to one another and, in some matters, chiefly relating to foreign affairs and defence, we should maintain our close contacts by consultation. This was to the interest of both countries; also, inevitably, we hoped that Nepal would develop both politically and economically and grow into a democratic society.

Our first treaty with Nepal was with the old Rana Prime Minister.²² Even though we disagreed completely with the then Nepal Government's political and economic outlook, we did not think it right to interfere. Somewhat later we were happy to learn that the King, your revered father, had liberal ideas.

Then came some internal troubles in Nepal. The King, your father, came away to India.²³ He was, in fact, looked upon as the leader of the new liberal forces. We welcomed him here as an honoured guest. When the situation in Nepal worsened, the Rana Prime Minister came to us and asked us to intervene to bring about a settlement. We were anxious to prevent civil war and to help in establishing a stable and progressive government there under the King. As a result of our advice, the trouble ceased there, the King went back and a new Government was established. That Government was a mixed one. To begin with, the Rana Prime Minister continued. But later it was not found possible for him to do so.²⁴ Since then there have been repeated changes of Government and sometimes there was no Ministry, but always the objective aimed at and stated publicly was a democratic structure, elections and some kind of parliamentary government. There were many difficulties to be faced in Nepal, the chief of them being the lack of trained personnel. Whenever we were asked, we tried to help without the least desire to interfere. We watched with regret that stability did not come and these

²¹ Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana.

²² Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal, 1950.

²³ See SWJN/SS/15 Pt. II/pp. 355-404.

²⁴ See SWJN/SS/16 Pt I/pp.481-491.

repeated Governments functioned rather ineffectively as well as inefficiently.

Then Your Majesty came to the throne, and we were happy to learn of your decision to have a proper Constitution, elections and a democratic Government. We were convinced that this was the only right course, or else instability with all its evils would continue. You carried out your promise to your people and held the elections and formed subsequently a Government as a result of those elections. This was two years ago. Considering all the difficulties in the way, these elections were on the whole successful, and a strong party emerged with a great majority behind it.

Your Majesty may remember that I have said to you more than once that there were two major stabilising factors in Nepal: there was the King and there was the Nepali Congress, which was the only organised political party with popular support. Neither, by itself, could be successful as the conditions were difficult and Nepal was very underdeveloped. It seemed to me essential, therefore, that these two stabilising factors should give the fullest cooperation to each other. The alternative was continuing instability and lack of progress. I laid stress on this because I feared that a conflict between the two would be bad for Nepal. You were pleased to tell me, at least on two occasions, that you were dissatisfied with the way of the Government's working and there was much corruption, and administration was not working satisfactorily. I was sorry to hear of this, but I remembered that all the previous administrations were even guiltier of these failings which, to a large extent, were the results of the backward state of the country in many ways. The only way to remedy them was to push the country forward, at the same time fighting corruption and maladministration.

No real major change could take place without the wide approval and cooperation of the people. My own impression from a distance was that the last Government of Nepal, with all its failings, was a great improvement on previous administrations. What is more, the doors for further improvement and progress were opened.

When Your Majesty issued a proclamation dissolving the Cabinet and both Houses of Parliament and taking over the whole administration of the country, I was grieved. That was inevitable because of my thinking and conditioning throughout my life and because of my conviction that this course of action could

not bring about the objectives you had. This feeling that I had was shared in a greater or lesser measure by large numbers of our people. My Government or I had no desire to interfere in Nepal. But in the system of Government that functions in India, I was asked repeatedly in Parliament and I had to give some reply, which I did in restrained language.²⁵

Apart from my unhappiness at this new course of events in Nepal, I was much concerned at the fact that a number of newspapers in Nepal were carrying on a virulent and wholly false campaign against India. Many of the charges they made were patently absurd and rather insulting. I know that the press in Nepal has been and continues to be inexperienced and irresponsible. It has been a favourite pastime of theirs to blame India, but the new turn of events carried them much further in this direction than at any time previously. It was clear that, in the circumstances existing in Nepal now, no newspaper in Nepal could take up this attitude without the tacit approval or at least the acquiescence of the present authorities in the country. Even official publications of the Nepal Government reproduced some press articles which were highly critical of India.

It is said that in India criticism was directed in the press to the recent changes in Nepal. This is true. Even so, that criticism was much milder and was based on some principle. As you know, the press in India is continually criticising our own Government. Being a free press in a free society, we do not interfere. We are, however, glad to see that your Government have now issued an official appeal to the Nepali press to cease vilifying India.

What then is the present position? I asked Dr. Tulsi Giri what Your Majesty had in mind about the future. He told me that you aimed at democracy, out before there could be a reversion to this, you wanted economic progress to be made. Economic progress is a long drawn out and rather painful affair. It has to grow from the activities of the people, from ordered and efficient government, from cooperation between the administration and the mass of the people, and from certain policies aiming at certain objectives. India is working for her own rapid economic improvement, industrialisation and much higher standards of living. We

²⁵ See SWJN/SS/65/item 233.

are far more advanced than Nepal; we have a strong industrial base; we have rapidly spreading education at all levels, we have trained personnel, and so on. And yet, we have had tremendous difficulties to face. In Nepal education is very backward; trained personnel are lacking; and the administration is also very backward. How then is any progress in the economic field going to come? Foreign help is useful, but only to a very small extent. Indeed, the process of economic reform, which was slow enough under the previous Government, might well become slower still.

The world does not stand still, nor does any country. If a country does not advance with it, it creates new political and social problems which lead to repeated crises which themselves prevent progress. I could not, therefore, understand how any economic progress worth the name could take place while Nepal is in a state of continuing internal crisis. The position would be one of deadlock, with the energies of the nation being consumed in internal conflicts, weakening the country.

I see no way out to a stable and progressive structure of government if present conditions continue. The situation would progressively worsen and Your Majesty and your country would have to face ever greater problems. In these difficulties you may think of external help. This may be available to some extent, but even this creates new dangers and new weaknesses in the country.

The two countries on the border of Nepal are India and China. Nepal has been tied to India by religion, culture, history and geography. Those are permanent factors which do not change much by changing times. So far as India is concerned, we are so conditioned as not to commit any aggression on Nepal. Our whole outlook is opposed to it, and our structure of Government and people would oppose it. We gain nothing by it.

On the other hand, China follows a completely different system and at present is aggressive in outlook. We in India want peaceful conditions on our frontier with China and, indeed, have always aimed at friendly relations with that great country. But the Chinese Government has adopted a policy of aggression against India and that we cannot tolerate. We are to a large extent strong enough to deal with China's aggressions. Nevertheless, we aim ultimately at friendly relations

with China, however long this may take.

Nepal's case is different. She is weak and would be unable to meet any serious danger on its northern frontier. It is possible that in the immediate future China will make friendly approaches to Nepal in order to isolate her from India. It is for Your Majesty to consider whether ultimately this would be in Nepal's own interest since there is little in common between China and Nepal. We feel that friendly relations with India would itself prevent any possible Chinese aggression.

I am, therefore, greatly troubled at recent developments in Nepal, because they seem to me to lead inevitably, if things continue as they are, to internal trouble. There is no way out of this tangle except to go back as soon as possible to a democratic structure. The more this is delayed, the worse will be the problems facing Nepal. There can be no constitutional progress when the way to it remains blocked. People will then think of unconstitutional means, and Nepal may well be rent by civil conflict.

I have ventured to write quite frankly to Your Majesty because of our great friendship for Nepal and our conviction that that friendship is necessary in the interest both of Nepal and India. As I have said above, we have no designs on Nepal and no desire to interfere. Our interest lies chiefly in the growth of an independent, democratic Nepal. We are naturally also interested in our own security, and what happens in Nepal may affect that security.

I would, therefore, earnestly beg of Your Majesty to consider the situation not only from the point of view of the present, but also in some perspective in relation to the future that will be unfolding itself. My own advice to Your Majesty, if I may venture to give it, is that the present situation should not be allowed to remain as it is, and some early step should be taken to enable the people of Nepal to express their views. If the existing Parliament cannot be recalled fresh elections might be held. If there is corruption anywhere, then it should be dealt with strongly by the processes of the law. If there is maladministration this should be rectified. But merely making vague charges is not likely to satisfy the people.

You may have seen criticisms even in the British press, which is friendly to Nepal, about the recent developments in Nepal. World opinion today does not easily tolerate a complete reversal of the processes of democracy.

With regards,

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

289. To S. Dutt: Freedom to Demonstrate²⁶

I agree. We cannot come in the way of any peaceful agitation or expression of views in India in regard to the conditions in Nepal. But we should follow our normal practice of preventing movement of arms. Some special organisation is necessary for this purpose.

2. As usual, movement between India and Nepal should continue to be free.

²⁶ Note to the FS, 31 January 1961.

DEFENCE

297. To V.K. Krishna Menon: Lockheed Proposal²⁷

This morning, I received a brief note from the Ministry of Defence about the Cabinet paper relating to the Lockheed proposal. As you know, this question was postponed. It will come up before the Cabinet probably in about two weeks' time. I suggest that the Ministry of Defence might prepare a careful paper dealing with this matter. This will help us in considering it.

298. To V.K. Krishna Menon: Border Roads²⁸

This matter may be placed before the Board,²⁹ as suggested by the Defence Minister. I should like to have information about (1) the respective expenditures on the two roads and (2) the time taken to build these roads, separately.

2. What the Chief of Army Staff³⁰ says, has force. This point, however, was mentioned at the last Board meeting. My own impression is that there was a considerable difference both in regard to expenditure and time taken to construct, between the road to Chusul via Pangong Lake and the road from Shyok to Chusul.

3. Undoubtedly, the Shyok to Chusul road is safer. The other road would be untenable in case of hostile action. If, however, this other road by Pangong Lake can be built fairly rapidly and there is no immediate prospect of hostile action, then it might be preferable to build the Lakeside road. This will give us immediate results. The other road can be taken up later when considered necessary.

4. Anyhow, these matters should be considered by the Board, when all aspects

²⁷ Note to the Defence Minister, 11 January 1961.

²⁸ Note to the Defence Minister, 18 January 1961.

²⁹ The Border Roads Development Board, set up in March 1960 for expeditious construction of roads in border areas; see SWJN/SS/59/items 203 & 204.

³⁰ General K.S. Thimayya.

can be kept in view.

299. For the Indian Air Force: Air Marshal Mukherjee³¹

My good wishes to the Indian Air Force on its Annual Day. We are proud of our Air Force and the bright, able and devoted young men who manage it.

It was a deep grief for all of us to lose suddenly the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee,³² who had done so much to build up our Air Force and who was so devoted to his great responsibilities and to India. Such tragedies have to be faced bravely and the work of the country has to go on. I am sure that the officers and men of the Air Force will remember Subroto Mukherjee's example and labour for the good of India and its Air Force.

300. To Nathu Singh: Our Perspectives Differ³³

23rd January, 1961

My dear Nathu Singh,

I have your letter of the 19th January. I think that our respective approaches to the various problems that confront us differ. There is nothing surprising about this because approaches do differ. That is why often in politics different parties are formed of honest men. So far as the Army is concerned, apart from its being a matter of discipline and normal training, there has to be a certain outlook and perspective as to what we are aiming at which again depends upon world

³¹ Message, 21 January 1961, forwarded to Shri S.D. Nargolwala, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence. PM's Office, File No. F9/2/61-PMP, Vol. IV, Sr. No. 73-A. Also available in JN Collection.

³² On 8 November 1960 in Tokyo; see SWJN/SS/64/items 80-83.

³³ To Lieutenant General Nathu Singh; address: Gumanpura, Dungarpur, (South Rajasthan). The retired Lieutenant General had been Eastern Army Commander.

developments and our own analysis of them. This is an important matter and I have given a good deal of thought to it and we will go on giving it.

I shall gladly meet you, even though I do not think we shall convince each other. But I am very heavily occupied now-a-days and the burden on me grows and I may not be able to give you a great deal of time. The next month begins our Budget and Parliament. You can come and see me on Saturday the 18th February at 10 o'clock in the morning in my office in External Affairs.³⁴

Yours sincerely,
[Jawaharlal Nehru]

301. To V.K. Krishna Menon: A Sainik School for Jhajjar³⁵

I am forwarding to you a letter received by me. This contains a proposal to establish a sainik school at Jhajjar. Jhajjar is in Rohtak District of the Punjab, not far from Delhi. There is a large number of ex-servicemen there and these people have shown much enthusiasm in starting a degree college there for which they collected a good deal of money.

302. To Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit: Rajiv Gandhi's Education³⁶

Raj Bhavan,
Bombay
January 1, 1961

[Nan dear,]

I have come to Bombay today and tomorrow I am going to Bhavnagar.

³⁴ He met Nathu Singh on 18 February 1961 according to Nehru's Engagement Diary but no record of the meeting is available.

³⁵ Note to the Defence Minister, 28 January 1961.

³⁶ Letter to the High Commissioner in London. NMML, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers, Subject File No. 61.

I am writing to you about Rajiv.³⁷ Indu³⁸ is rather worried about his future education. I think she has written to Tikki Kaul³⁹ something about it. When you come here you can discuss this matter with her fully. But she wanted some enquiries to be made in England even before you come here.

Rajiv appeared for his Senior Cambridge examination a few days ago. The result will come out sometime in March. The question is what he should do now. He is a little over 16 years old. That is a bit too early for the University. It is possible for him to carry on at the Doon School for 18 months or two years as they have some special courses there for senior students after the Senior Cambridge. But Indu is not too keen on this, though she has not rejected the idea.

She does not fancy sending Rajiv to a university in India. Therefore, she would like him to go to a foreign university, preferably in England. There is some idea at the back of her mind for Rajiv to go to Germany for engineering training. But that too cannot take place now. Possibly Rajiv could go to England, and after some period there, go later to Germany.

All this is rather vague, and I am not quite sure if Indu herself has any clear ideas on this subject. For the present what she would like you to do is to enquire about his joining a good college at Cambridge. Presumably he could only go there, at the earliest, in October 1962. If some such arrangement is made, that is, his name is put down, then the question arises as to what he should do till then. Would he have to prepare for some entrance examination for Cambridge, and should he, therefore, prepare for that from now onwards? Would it be desirable or worthwhile for him to go to England some time before he joins the university there and prepare for his entrance?

These are some of the questions that arise in her mind, and when you come here we shall discuss them. If it is possible, however, you might find out from Cambridge about his going there later when he is, say, 18 or so. Also what they would advise his taking up till then.

After some initial step that you might take Tikki Kaul might follow it up.

³⁷ Rajiv Gandhi.

³⁸ Indira Gandhi.

³⁹ T.N. Kaul, Deputy High Commissioner for India in London.

[Love,
Jawahar]

27. From S. Dutt: Land for Tibetan Colony in Mysore⁴⁰

[Refer to item 143]

I have discussed this with Shri Jaipal, Deputy Secretary in our Ministry,⁴¹ who has visited this area. The 175 bighas of land to which Shri Birla has referred is in the middle of the area which the Mysore Government have given us for Tibetan settlement. If the Tibetan colony grows in the manner intended by us, it will certainly be an advantage to have this area of 175 bighas. At the present moment, however, only 600 refugees have proceeded to Mysore. Our scheme provides for a settlement of 3,000 refugees. There is, therefore, no urgency about having this area immediately. Besides, we do not propose a [to] finance a school for Tibetan children in Mysore. If the colony grows to its full strength, a school will be needed for the local children and we can then request Shri Birla to let us have the land. Meantime his experiment with flax growing may continue. Shri Jaipal was informed locally by the Mysore officials that the experiment has failed.

Shri Birla may, therefore, be told that the land is not needed urgently for the Tibetan settlement, and there is no proposal, so far as we are concerned, to start a residential school there immediately. If the colony grows to its full size, it will be an advantage to have the additional 175 bighas and start a school for the children of the colony. But it will be some time before the need for this will arise.

⁴⁰ Foreign Secretary's note to Nehru, 18 January 1961. NMML, S. Dutt Papers, Subjects File No. 47.

⁴¹ Rikhi Jaipal.

28. (a) From K. Ram to K. N. Sharma: Imported Cars⁴²

[Refer to items 11 and 130]

January 20, 1961

Dear Shri Sharma,

At the Prime Minister's Press Conference on January 18, 1961, you put a question about 200 American cars which you said had been imported for the use of the Governors. Necessary enquiries in the matter have been made and the position is as follows: -

2. For the first time since 1956 the Government of India last year permitted the import of 96 luxury cars for the use of foreign tourists. These were allotted to the taxi trade by the Director-General of Tourism for the use of tourists visiting India from abroad. In addition, Government had also imported 36 cars from U.S.A. for use in Raj Bhavans to replace the existing fleet mainly intended for visiting dignitaries.

3. It is, therefore, not quite correct to say that the Government have allowed import of luxury cars for the use of Ministers, Governors and Officials.

4. For your information I might also add that in September last year, Shri A.D. Shroff, President of the Forum of Free Enterprise, had also made a statement that the Union Government had placed an order with a firm for the import of 160 Dodge cars for distribution among Central and State Ministers and officials. This statement was contradicted on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the contradiction was carried by all important newspapers.

Yours sincerely,
K. Ram

⁴² Letter from the Principal Private Secretary of the Prime Minister to K. N. Sharma, Correspondent, Assam Tribune; address: 7/35, Daryaganj, Delhi. PMO, File No. 44 (55)/61-PPS. Sr. No.2-A.