

## **A Note of Tibet Suzerainty by Hugh Richardson**

### **1914 Agreement about Indo-Tibetan boundary.**

*Signed with Tibet only.*

### **1914 Trade Regulations.**

*Signed with Tibet only.*

Present Position - Between Britain and Tibet the following treaties are valid: 1914 Convention in so far as it confers no benefits on China. This continues the Treaties of 1890, 1904 and 1906 in so far as they are not modified by or repugnant to it. That is to say: the provisions of the Treaty of 1890 about British relations with Sikkim, and the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, are valid.

The Treaty of 1904 is valid; but Arts. II, IV, and V must be read with Art. 7 of the 1914 Convention by which new Trade Regulations were to be negotiated to put these clauses into effect. Thus, questions of opening new Trade Marts, if instituting a tariff, can strictly be raised only at one of the five yearly periods when the Trade Regulations of 1914 become liable to revision.

Art. IX of the 1904 Treaty must be read with Art. III of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906 and the Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of 1904, and the interpretation seems to be that, as Art. III of the 1906 Treaty would be an advantage to China, and is therefore inoperative by the terms of the Declaration of 1914, China is to be treated as a foreign country for the purposes of Art. IX of the 1904 Treaty. The 1906 Treaty appears to be invalid, as it conveys advantages on China, and was consistently repudiated by the Tibetans.

1914 Anglo-Tibetan declaration.

1914 Trade Regulations.

1914 Boundary Agreement.

Between Britain and China there are no valid treaties about Tibet. The powers of the British plenipotentiary, which were communicated to the other plenipotentiaries, stated that the existing state of war between China and Tibet had rendered former treaties of no effect. Chinese signature of the 1914 Convention would have restored the effect of the treaties of 1890 and 1906 with China in so far as they were not modified by or repugnant to the 1914 Convention. Her failure to sign appears to render those treaties still ineffective so far as British relations with China are concerned. After the failure of the 1914 Conference it was decided not to denounce previous treaties, but to ignore them.

*(Summary para. 44.)*

It may be noted that it was only in 1925 that a definite pronouncement was made by H.M.G. about the validity of the 1914 Convention between Britain and Tibet and of the 1914 Trade Regulations.

*(Summary para. 53 D.)*

The Chinese attitude in 1914 was to decline to recognise any agreement between Britain and Tibet reached at Simla. In 1928 they harked back to the 1890 Treaty which they appeared to consider as valid between Britain and China. Their overtures were ignored.

*(Summary para. 60.)*

It is difficult to assess the effect of British acknowledgments of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet which were made between 1921 and 1937. The Chinese might claim that so long as we recognised their suzerainty our agreements with Tibet were invalid. The Tibetans might claim that the recognition of Chinese suzerainty was an advantage under the 1914 Convention which should not accrue to the Chinese until they signed it. The

only practical limit which we appeared to set on our recognition of Tibetan autonomy was a disinclination to regard China as a "foreign power" in Tibet. The recent policy of H.M.G. to withhold unconditional recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet clears up the situation so far as Britain and Tibet and Britain and China are concerned, and appears to put our 1914 agreements with Tibet on a better footing.

(Summary para. 106.)

It also appears that we have allowed three breaches in our agreement with Tibet;

- a) The establishment of a Chinese representative at Lhasa.
- b) The establishment of wireless at Lhasa.

*(Art. IX. (c) and (d) of 1904.)*

These on the assumption that until China signs the 1914 Convention she is a foreign power in Tibet and (c) Direct negotiations between China and Tibet.

*(Art. V of 1914) (Summary paras. 73-75 and Appendix on Suzerainty.)*

### **Appendix III -Suzerainty**

"Nominal sovereignty over a semi-independent or internally autonomous state", Fowler.

The word suzerainty has been used for some years to describe the British view of the relationship between China and Tibet. It has never been defined and, indeed, appears to be incapable of absolute definition and to take its colour from the particular circumstances of each case. It is not surprising that this chameleon word has caused confusion. This note attempts to show two main lines (1) Official declarations on the subject of suzerainty; and (2) what have been the circumstances conditioning the interpretation of the word as various times.

By the end of the Nineteenth Century when the Government of India sought, after nearly 100 years of separation, to resume contact with Tibet, the power of China in that country, which had been waning at the time of our first contacts in the Eighteenth Century, had declined to a mere shadow. Our knowledge of conditions in Tibet was so slight that we proceeded on the assumption that China could exert authority there. The Chefoo Convention of 1856 and the Treaty and Trade Regulations of 1890 and 1893 on the subject of Tibet were concluded with China without the participation of any Tibetan representative. The Tibetans repudiated and stultified those agreements and so demonstrated that China's control was only nominal. It was the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of agreements concluded with China that led the British Government to take steps to secure its rights under those agreements. This fact is recorded in the preamble of the 1906 Convention between Britain and China. The steps taken were the invasion of Tibet and the conclusion of a treaty with Tibet, which was signed and ratified without Chinese participation, although the Chinese Amban was present at the negotiations. A special relationship between China and Tibet was recognised,

and it was described in official correspondence as "suzerainty" although the word does not appear in either the 1904 Treaty or that of 1906. Our action had to be brought into line with this relationship; and we had to take note of international opinion. Not only was Russia interested in Tibet, but the U.S.A. also let it be known that they assumed we had no intention to alter the status of Tibet as part of the Chinese dominions. Chinese concurrence was secured by the adhesion agreement of 1906. The terms of this convention show the interpretation then placed on Chinese suzerainty to include a degree of control over the external affairs of Tibet.

Chinese control over Tibetan affairs had in fact been non-existent during the past twenty or thirty years as was proved not only by our own experiences over the Treaty of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 but also by the fact that the Tibetan and Nepalese Governments had executed a treaty in 1856, without Chinese participation, and by the experience of Rockhill Bonvalot and other travellers who found that in order to enter Tibet they had to make their terms with the Tibetans and not the Chinese.

The Tibetans were not consulted about the terms of the 1906 Convention with China, and they subsequently repudiated it.

It was probably assumed that Chinese control over Tibet would remain as nominal as we found it to be in 1904, and no effort was made in the 1906 Treaty to limit the extent of Chinese interference in Tibetan affairs. But our intrusion into Tibet roused the Chinese Government to an effort to establish real sovereignty there; and our withdrawal after throwing the affairs of Tibet into confusion, provided the opportunity which the Chinese needed.

Between 1905 and 1911 they established in Tibet an authority which was strong enough to exclude British officials from direct communication with Tibetan officials.

The Dalai Lama and his ministers who fled to India in 1910 strenuously denied Chinese suzerainty, and claimed independence, but in reply to an

appeal from the Dalai Lama to His Majesty the King it was stated that His Majesty "could not interfere between the Dalai Lama and his suzerain". At this time the word suzerainty could rightly be interpreted, in its application to the relations between China and Tibet, as including control over external relations, and also internal affairs.

In 1911 and 1912 the Chinese were evicted from almost all of Tibet, and for over twenty years they had no representative in territories under the control of Lhasa. From that time until the present, Tibet has enjoyed independence as complete as that now enjoyed by Eire, and without even a formal link with China comparable to that by which the Governor General connects Eire with the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government continued to recognise the suzerainty of China over Tibet, and in 1912 a memorandum to the Chinese Government stated that while His Majesty's Government had formally recognised the suzerain right of China in Tibet they were not prepared to recognise the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of the country, which should be carried on in accordance with the existing treaties.

This statement contemplated Chinese control over or advice on Tibetan external affairs, and although it did not accord with the facts of 1912, it was then quite possible that the Chinese would take active steps to reassert their sway in Tibet. In fact the Chinese Government, so far from acquiescing in their defeat, issued a proclamation incorporating Tibet among the provinces of China, and made preparations to send an army into the country. In reply to the British memorandum they claimed the right to intervene in Tibetan internal affairs.

But later events made the Chinese Government willing to negotiate on the lines of the British Memorandum of 1912, and this willingness led to the Simla Conference of 1914.

The use of the word suzerainty in the unratified Convention of 1914 has coloured British views on the relations between China and Tibet for many years.

In the Convention as initialled, Tibet agreed to our recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but that clause was only part of a whole agreement in which the Chinese agreed among other things to Tibetan autonomy and to a definite frontier.

The treaty was never concluded, and instead, we signed with Tibet a declaration that the terms of the initialled convention were binding between Tibet and Britain, and excluding China from the benefits of the convention until they should sign it. Among those benefits were the recognition of suzerainty, and the acknowledgment of the Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1906 which Tibet had never recognised.

From 1914 to 1919 the Chinese were still prepared to negotiate with us and with Tibet on the lines of the 1914 Convention; but by 1921 their attitude had changed and, as no progress was being made towards completing an agreement, a memorandum was presented to the Chinese Government, to the effect that, in view of their attitude in 1914 and in 1919 (when they had been prepared to recognise Tibetan autonomy) we no longer felt justified in withholding recognition of Tibet as an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty, and intended to deal with her as such in future.

Our interpretation of the extent of Chinese suzerainty was made clear in a verbal explanation that, if necessary, we would deal directly with Tibet without reference to China. The intention of this memorandum seems to have been to hasten negotiations. In the event, negotiations were not resumed, and we had, without consulting or informing the Tibetans, given China a formal, although qualified, acknowledgment of her suzerainty over Tibet, and had not secured in return any formal recognition of Tibetan autonomy.

The Chinese Government soon made it clear that they no longer were prepared to recognise Tibetan autonomy. In 1928 they proposed to negotiate a treaty about Tibet direct with His Majesty's Government. This should have made it evident that the conditions on which we had recognised their suzerainty over Tibet were not being fulfilled; and our attitude might well have been reconsidered. But in 1930 the Government of India were still entertaining hopes that a settlement between China and Tibet might still be accomplished, and did not want to give Tibet the idea that they would encourage her to throw off Chinese suzerainty.

In 1932, when Chinese aggression appeared as a menace to Tibet, His Majesty's Government again reminded the Chinese Government of the British Memorandum of 1921 and made it clear that their interest in Tibet was the maintenance of the autonomy and integrity of Outer Tibet. In 1934 during the negotiations with Lhasa with Huang Mu-sung the Tibetan Government reiterated their adherence to the proposals of the 1914 Convention and were willing to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty if the Chinese would recognise Tibetan autonomy and agree on a boundary. This statement, which was not fully understood at the time, was taken by the Government of India as an unqualified recognition of Chinese suzerainty; but the Tibetan Government strongly denied this, and contended that they had not recognised Chinese suzerainty, did not recognise it and would not recognise it unless the Chinese fulfilled their part of the bargain.

Nevertheless, in 1936 on two occasions the Chinese Government was informed that we recognised Tibet as autonomous under the suzerainty of China. Throughout these years, while we were making pronouncements about our recognition of a suzerainty which the Tibetans did not acknowledge, we were dealing with Tibet as autonomous and without reference to China in such matters as the supply of arms, in arrangements for customs exemption on goods for Tibet, and in cases of Chinese visitors

who wanted to enter Tibet. And in 1934 we told the Tibetan Government that we were "prepared to admit the theoretic suzerainty of China" not that we had done so. It is hard to see exactly what interpretation could be put on our use of the word suzerainty; it certainly did not follow the dictionary meaning quoted at the beginning of this note, for we were recognising Tibetan control over their own external affairs as well as their internal affairs.

In this matter each of the three parties had different views. The Chinese claimed that Tibetan affairs were a domestic concern of the Chinese Government, but expressed informally their intention not to upset the existing arrangement by which Tibet managed her own internal affairs, and had no reason to think that His Majesty's Government considered them other than independent. The Tibetans claimed independence. His Majesty's Government recognized a loose bond between China and Tibet which was far from satisfying Chinese pretensions, but the very existence of which was denied by the Tibetans.

This anomalous situation has been remedied in 1943 by a revision of our policy and by a decision to make it clear that our former recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was always conditional on Chinese willingness to treat Tibet as autonomous, and that our position is that we are prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but only on the understanding that Tibet is considered as autonomous.

One advantage of withdrawing our unconditional acknowledgment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is that we remove an argument by which the validity of our direct agreements with Tibet might be challenged. Of these agreements, that with most practical present day importance is probably the 1914 agreement about the Indo-Tibetan frontier.

In the interval, when our acceptance of Chinese suzerainty was being treated as final, we have permitted without protest what would, under His

Majesty's Government's latest stand on the subject of suzerainty, seem to be a breach of our agreements with Tibet. The Chinese have established a representative and also a wireless station at Lhasa, both of which could under the treaties of 1904 and 1914 with Tibet, be allowed only on the assumption that China is not a foreign power in Tibet.

## Leading References to Suzerainty; and its Interpretation in Practice

- 1904 -China presses for direct arrangements about Tibet. Government of India presses for China to sign an adhesion agreement at Lhasa, and points out that their proceedings (directly with Tibet) have been necessitated by the reach of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. The arrangement proposed was held to recognise fully China's suzerainty.

*(Viceroy to Secretary of State. Telm. 3121-E.B. of 20-9-1904.)*

Suggestion that adhesion agreement might be negotiated in Peking and include a clause acknowledging China's suzerainty.

*(S. of S. to Viceroy. Telm. of 1-10-1904.)*

United States Government's assumption that we still regarded Tibet as part of China's Dominions stated to be correct.

*(Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand. Despatch 126 A. of 20-6-1904.)*

- 1906 - Anglo-Chinese Convention  
Preamble stated that Tibet's refusal to recognise 1890 Treaty made it necessary for British Government to take steps to secure its rights. By Art. I China's responsibility for securing the due fulfilment of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 was recognised.  
By Art. II China engaged not to allow any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.
- 1907-Anglo-Russian Convention recognised the suzerain rights of China in Tibet.
- 1908 - Relationship between the Dalai Lama and Chinese Emperor during Dalai Lama's stay in Peking. Dalai Lama showed considerable independence but had to submit to Chinese Decrees expressing

sovereignty.

*(Washington despatch to Foreign Office. No. 347 of 17-12-1908.)*

- 1910- His Majesty's Minister in China instructed to demand that an effective Tibetan Government should be maintained with which we could treat in the manner provided by the treaties of 1904 and 1906.  
*(S. of S. to Viceroy. Telm. p. of 3-3-1910.)*

- 1910 - Dalai Lama after his flight to India claims right to direct dealings with British Government, asks to be restored to the independent position enjoyed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, and repudiates treaties of 1890 and 1906 to which Tibet was not a party.

*(Note of Interview between Dalai Lama and Viceroy, sent with F.D. letter of 19-3-1910.)*

Chinese claim sovereign rights in Tibet, but offer scrupulously to observe treaties relating to Tibet.

*(Prince Ching to Mr. Max Muller. Letter of 18-4-1910. Sent to P.O.S. with Foreign Dept. Memo. 1330-E.B. of 29-6-1910.)*

Viceroy's suggestion that specific assurances should be sought from the Chinese Government considered by His Majesty's Government as going too far towards questioning China's admitted suzerainty over Tibet, which it appeared she was making effective.

*(Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. S164 of 12-3-1910. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Muller. Telm. of 8-4-1910).*

Dalai Lama and Tibetan Ministers deny China's suzerainty.

*(Viceroy's Telm. S164 of 12-3-1910. P.O.S. to Foreign Dept. Letter 218 T.C. of 19-3-1910 and ends.)*

- 1911 - His Majesty the King Emperor "regrets that he is unable to interfere between the Dalai Lama and his suzerain".  
*(Govt. of India F.D. to P.O.S. Letter 113-E.B. of 19-11-1911.) (See also Summary paras. 16 to 28 for 1904 to 1911.)*

- 1912- His Majesty's Government examine policy.

Viceroy contends that Tibet has always been autonomous under Chinese suzerainty, and argues that Tibet is not part of China proper, as in Tibet Chinese treaties with foreign powers are not valid.

*(Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. p. of 23-3-1912.)*

Chinese Decree incorporates Tibet in China Proper.

*(H.M. Minister, China to Foreign Office. Despatch 196 of 27-4-1912.*

*F.D. Memo. 1293-E.B. of 15-6-1912.)*

His Majesty's Government's Memorandum of 1 August 1912.

Recognition of suzerain rights of China in Tibet admitted, but refusal to recognise right to interfere in Tibetan internal affairs. His Majesty's Government refuse to accept definition of Tibet's status as being on equal footing with Provinces of China. His Majesty's Government do not dispute right of China to appoint an official at Lhasa to advise the Tibetans on their foreign policy.

*(India Office to Foreign Office. Letter P. 2607 of 11-7-1912. F.D.*

*Memo. 1876-E.B. of 20-8-1912. S of S. to Viceroy. Telm. of 17-8-1912.*

*Chunking despatch 349 of 17-8-1912 sent with F.D. Memo. 2264-E.B. of 26-9-1912.)*

Foreign Office instructs His Majesty's Minister to make clear to the Chinese Government the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty. But on further consideration attempt to define "suzerainty" is deferred.

*(F.O. to H.M. Minister. Despatch 150 of 17-9-1912. F.D. Memo. 2732-*

*E.B. of 15-11-1912. H.M. Minister to Viceroy. Telm. 194 of 23-9-1912.*

*F.O. to H.M.M. Telm. of 2-10-1912. Summary paras. 30-31.)*

- 1913—Chinese Government willing to negotiate on lines of His Majesty's Government's Memo. of 17-8-1912. They dislike the word suzerainty.

*(H.M. Minister to Foreign Office. Telm. of 31-1-1913. Summary para. 34.)*

- 1913-1914- Simla Convention.

Powers of Sir H. McMahon stated that the existing state of war between Tibet and China had rendered previous treaties of no effect. (Tibet Series, October 1914, No. 6.) The Tibetan Government claimed that the relation between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Emperor was a personal relationship of Lama and Disciple. They claimed independence, and repudiated the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. *(Tibet Series, October 1914, No. 6, Annexure IV).*

Political status of Tibet discussed, but no definition of suzerainty attempted.

*(Tibet Conference 1914 Series, passim.)*

The Convention initialled by all parties included recognition by His Majesty's Government and Chinese Government that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and also the autonomy of Tibet.

Declaration between His Majesty's Government and Tibetan Government denied to China all advantages under the Convention until she should sign.

*(Tibet Series, Nos. 124 and 212, Summary paras. 35-38.)*

- 1919 - Chinese Government reaffirm their acceptance of the 1914 Convention except for the boundary clause. They want inclusion in the Treaty of a statement that autonomous Tibet recognises the suzerainty of China.

*(H.M. Minister, Peking, Memo. 4338-19 of 12-6-1919. F.D. Memo. 414-E.B. of 21-7-99, Summary para. 48.)*

- 1920 - His Majesty's Government decide that 1907 Treaty with Russia is no longer valid.

*(Summary para. 44.)*

- 1921 - Memorandum presented by His Majesty's Government to Chinese Government August 1921. His Majesty's Government "do not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China and intend dealing with Tibet in future on this basis".

*(Foreign to Bell. Telm. 2203- S. of 16-9 1921.)*

Tibetan Government not informed of this memorandum; but the new policy entailed supply of arms to Tibet although there had previously been objection to this on account of international agreement of 1919 not to import arms into China.

*(Bell to Foreign. Telm. 80-S. of 12-10-1921.) (Summary para. 50 D.)*

- 1924- His Majesty's Government decides that Washington Agreements cannot apply to Tibet without her consent.

*(Summary para. 52.)*

- 1928- Emergence of 'Nationalist China'.

His Majesty's Government ignore Chinese Government proposal to negotiate new Treaty about Tibet with reference to the Treaty of 1890.

*(F.D. to P.O.S. Telm. 2399-S. of 15-11-1928.) (Summary para. 60.)*

- 1930- "Tibet's practical autonomy has been maintained since 1921".

*(Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. 2245 S. of 11-7-1930.)*

"His Majesty's Government have consistently recognised Tibetan autonomy as subject to Chinese suzerainty". Resumption of negotiations at some time is contemplated, until then we do not want to give Tibet the idea that we are anxious to encourage her to throw off Chinese suzerainty.

*(Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2587-S. of 3-8-1930.)*

- 1932 - Chinese advances in East Tibet.

Tibetan Government consider that Simla Convention is the surest basis for an understanding with the Chinese Government.

*(P.O.S. to Foreign. Telm. No. 10 of 20-9-1932.)*

His Majesty's Government instruct H.M. Charge d'Affairs, Peking, to remind Chinese Government of our Memorandum of 1921 and to make clear the extent of His Majesty's Government's interest in Tibet- viz., the preservation of the autonomy and integrity of Outer Tibet.

*(Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2208 of 5-10-1932, para. 2. Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2217 of 6-10-1932. India Office to F.O. Letter P.Z. 5636/32 of 21-9-1932.)*

Mr. Ingram rejects Chinese claims that Tibet is a domestic matter.

*(Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2283 of 12-10-1932.) (Summary para. 67.)*

- 1933 -His Majesty's Government reaffirm their policy of dealing with Tibet as an autonomous state (to H.M. Ambassador, Peking).

*(India Office to Foreign Office. Letter P.Z. 1630/ 33 of 3-4-1933. F. and P. Memo. F 1 X/ 33 of 28-4-1933. Summary para. 70.)*

- 1934- Huang Mu-sung's Mission to Lhasa.

Tibetan Government prepared to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty to the extent provided in the Simla Convention, as part of a general agreement guaranteeing among other things their autonomy.

*(P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(8) PI 34 of 10-11-1934, para. 4, Summary paras. 73-75.)*

- 1935-Government of India say that we admitted Chinese suzerainty in 1914 and that the Tibetan Government admitted it in 1934. But in same letter propose an assurance to the Tibetan Government that we are prepared to admit the theoretic suzerainty of China but will continue to regard Tibet as autonomous.

*(Foreign Secy. to Secy. of State for India Letter F 1 X/35 of 28-6-1935, paras. 2 & 6.)*

His Majesty's Government doubt whether it would be consistent with our recognition of Chinese suzerainty to give a formal undertaking to

Tibet to regard the Chinese official there as a foreign representative.  
*(Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 2166 of 20-8-1935, para.5.)*

They want to be represented at any general negotiations between Tibet and China for recasting the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China.

*(Ibid., para. 6.)*

The assurance that we are prepared to admit China's theoretical suzerainty over Tibet, etc., was given by Mr. Williamson to the Tibetan Government.

*(P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(7) P/35 of 18-2-1935. Report paras. 19 & 20.)*

The Kashag categorically denied having admitted Chinese suzerainty.

*(Ibid., and P.O.S. to F. and P. Letter 7(5) P135 of 16-12-1935.*

*Summary para 79.)*

- 1936 - British recognition of Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty restated formally to Chinese Government on two occasions regarding customs arrangements with Tibet and supply of arms to Tibet.

*(Foreign Office to H.M. Ambassador, China. Letter 5715/4/10 of 28-9-36. F. and P. Memo. D 5973 X/36 of 17-10-36. H.M.A. to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Memo. of 23-12-36. F. and P. Memo. D 498 X/ 37 of 5-2-1937. Summary para. 92.)*

- 1937 - Government of India suggest reminding the Chinese Government again of our recognition of Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. India Office to Foreign Office Letter P.Z. 3562/37 of 8-6-1937. E.A.D. Memo. F I X/37 of 2-6-1937.)

This was done in September 1937.

*(F.O. to H.M.A., China. Telm. 182 of 10-6-1937. S. of S. to Viceroy.*

*Telm. 2385 of 30-9-1937. Howe to F.O. Telm. 504 of 1-10-1937. Summary para. 83.)*

- 1939 - Chinese Government apply to His Majesty's Government for facilities for Mr. Wu to visit Lhasa. Tibetan Government are consulted and refuse.

*(Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 625 of 17-4-1939. P.O.S. to Foreign. Telms. 77 and 78 of 27-4-1939. Summary para. 94.)*

- 1942 - Chinese Government refuse to allow their officer in Lhasa to deal with new Tibetan Foreign Office.

*(Ludlow to Gould and Foreign Telm. 875 of 15-10-1942. Summary para. 98.)*

- 1943- His Majesty's Government reconsider their attitude towards China's suzerainty over Tibet.

*(Interdepartmental correspondence sent to Foreign Secy. with India Office D.O. 2252-43 of 8-5-1943. Viceroy to S. of S. Telm. 4313 of 1-6-1943.)*

- Prime Minister says at Pacific Council Meeting in Washington that "no one contests Chinese suzerainty".

*(Foreign Office to Chungking. Telm. 492 of 26-5-1943.)*

U.S. Government has never raised questions regarding Chinese claims to suzerainty over Tibet, or to the inclusion of Tibet in the areas constituting the territory of the Chinese Republic.

*(U.S. State Dept. Aide Memoire to H.M.A., Washington. Dated 15-5-1943.)*

His Majesty's Government inform H.M.A., Chungking, of their decision not to give any unconditional admission of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

*(Foreign Office to Chung-king. Telm. 656 of 23-7-1943.)*

- Mr. Eden gives Dr. T.V. Soong an informal memorandum containing the above statement of policy.

*(Mr. Eden to Dr. Soong. Memo. 4468/43 of 5-8-1943. Summary para. 106.)*

Tibetan Government ask for definition of suzerainty. Government of India and His Majesty's Government do not attempt a definition, but Tibetan Government may be told if necessary that suzerainty is a term used to describe the relations, frequently ill-defined and vague, existing between one state and a second which, to a greater or less degree (to be assessed by the special circumstances of each case) is dependent on the first, or better "owes some degree of allegiance to the first".

*(Gould to Crichton. D.O. 7(3) P/43 of 6-11-1943. Weightman to Gould. D.O. 11585 of 2-12-1943. Peel to Caroe. D.O. Ext. 245/44 of 20-1-1944.)*

Mr. Shen, Chinese representative in Lhasa given facilities for travel across India to the Indo-Tibetan border, as a matter of international practice, and without previous reference to the Tibetan Government.

*(Foreign to P.O.S. Telm. 3187 of 23-3-1944.)*