

Talks between Nehru and Zhou

June 1954

Conversation with Chou En-lai (I)¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: We have many things to talk about. Where would your Excellency like to start?

Chou En-lai: Wherever Your Excellency wishes to start.

JN: Your Excellency has just come from Geneva and might like to talk about Indo-China.

Chou En-lai: The Geneva Conference has been meeting for eight weeks and the Foreign Ministers have left, but the Conference is continuing. The Korean question was simple—we did not reach any agreement...

JN: That is, so far as the Korean question is concerned, the Geneva Conference is closed?

Chou En-lai: That is true....

JN: I thought Mr Eden said it was not over. There was always the possibility of its being started afresh.

Chou En-lai: Originally the delegation of China made a proposal not to close the discussion and the Belgian Foreign Minister² agreed. That day, Eden was the Chairman, and, if there had been no opposition from the USA, there was a general desire to continue the discussion....

JN: Of course, it is always open to start discussion. Otherwise, the Conference is closed.

Chou En-lai: Yes, that is so.

JN: What about Indo-China?

Chou En-lai: On the Indo-China question we reached two agreements: One was on Vietnam after three weeks of discussion. This was an agreement in principle on a military armistice. The question is now under concrete discussion between the two High Commands. The second was also on a military armistice

¹ Record of five sessions of conversation between Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai held in New Delhi from 25 to 27 June 1954, is printed in this section. The minute of the Conversation were maintained by T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs. This item contains record of the first session, 3.30 pm to 6.15 pm 25 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts. Chou En-lai visited India from 25 to 28 June 1954.

² Paul Henri Spaak.

on Laos and Cambodia. This has also been referred to the Military Commands....

JN: These military talks have been going on for some weeks. Have they thus far achieved any result?

Chou En-lai: On the idea of having two large regrouping areas, the views in principle held by the senior representatives of the French Command and of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam³ Command are quite close, They both agreed that they should not have a number of small regrouping areas because that would be inconvenient and would also result in an unstable armistice. Of course the representative of the Bao Dai⁴ Government did not participate in the negotiations between the senior representatives of the two sides though they participated in the staff talks..., Therefore, I think Bao Dai's representatives may have some other views.

JN: This means that there is going to be a temporary partition, only temporary. Am I correct?

Chou En-lai: Yes. That is the significance of it. Mendes-France has also told me⁵ that a line can be drawn east to west. In connection with this question, the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed that the northern part should be integrated and complete so that it would also include the Red River Delta... The French military representative was also inclined to discuss this question. The unstable position of the French Government caused a suspension of almost three weeks up to now, and so far no reply has been given to the proposal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam...

JN: If there is going to be an east-west line, then both sides will form an integrated area on each side of the line-two solid blocks as it were. Is that not so?

Chou En-lai: Yes. That would be our view.... But the United States is not in favour of this idea. They have expressed their opposition outside but not inside the Conference.

JN: That is, they are not in favour of a temporary partition?

Chou En-lai: As for the attitude of the USA in the Conference on the Indo-China question, it is something like this..., They neither accepted nor objected to any proposals made in the Conference but merely made reservations....So, if we say that the United States is against a determination of areas, we cannot

³ The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Set up under Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi in 1945 was in control of the northern half of Vietnam. This government was recognized since 1950 by China and the Soviet bloc governments.

⁴ Bao Dai, a former emperor of Annam was the chief of State of Vietnam which France recognized as an Associated State within the French Union.

⁵ Chou En-lai had a meeting with Mendes-France in Berne on 23 June 1954 prior to his departure from Switzerland for New Delhi.

say at the same time they are in favour of the unification of the country. Their policy is to obstruct any settlement in the Conference. They are against an agreement. of course the United States would be in favour of surrender by Ho Chi Minh. But that would not be honourable peace for both sides.

JN: Were Bao Dai's representatives in favour of an armistice?

Chou En-lai: The representative of the Bao Dai Government was in favour of an agreement.... However, in discussions the delegates of the Bao Dai Government have put emphasis on the unification of the country under the UN and that the UN should guarantee that Bao Dai will continue as Emperor. But, of course, such a proposal can never be acceptable.

JN: Does Bao Dai intend to govern his Empire from Cannes?⁶... The present question is of drawing a ceasefire line east to west temporarily dividing that country?

Chou En-lai: Yes. That is exactly the question being discussed between the military representatives of both sides.

JN: But in the meanwhile warfare and military operations are going on. How does one determine a fluid situation?

Chou En-lai: ... If both sides agree on the readjustment of regrouping zones and on Laos and Cambodia, we have an armistice and after that, the transfer of troops.... But if there is an armistice now without determining the line, conflicts may arise.

JN: That is so. Once the principle of an armistice is agreed, then all that remains is to draw the line. But once the principle has been agreed to, would it not be possible to tone down the military operations? Otherwise each side will try to have a new line-apart from the desirability of stopping killing.

Chou En-lai: Yes,... I think what you have said about toning down military operations is a very good idea.

JN: If an armistice is agreed to in principle, it helps in creating a climate for an armistice, that is, people staying where they are, subject to some minor changes in the armistice agreement.

Chou En-lai: We hope that both sides will avoid large military operations when they are discussing armistice,... The military operations should not, however, affect the determination of the areas. There may have to be some adjustments. For example, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has many areas in the South from which they may have to withdraw. Gains and losses should not affect determination of areas....

JN: Regarding Laos and Cambodia also, these military talks were going on. I saw a statement by your Excellency in a paper at Geneva that all outside

⁶ Chou En-lai laughed loudly at Nehru's remark.

troops should be withdrawn. Is that so?

Chou En-lai: It is true.

JN: I understand that one point which Your Excellency stressed was that Laos and Cambodia should not provide military bases for attack on Vietnam or China.⁷⁷

Chou En-lai: Especially American military bases. The Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia have personally said to me that if these two countries have peaceful unification, they would not allow United States to build military bases.

JN: What do you mean by unification?

Chou En-lai: They think that elections should be held under their respective Governments. They think that through these elections, the people will ~support royalist Governments there. If this is the people's will, we shall abide by it. The Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia ... told me that they would not allow US to build military bases. Mendes-France also said the same. He told me and Mr Eden that they would like to see Laos and Cambodia to become like other South-East Asian countries, e.g., India, Burma and Indonesia.

JN: That means that Laos and Cambodia should be independent and live their own lives without any interference from outside countries. Am I right?

Chou En-lai: Yes.

JN: In other words, the two countries would feel assured if they were independent neutral countries without being interfered with by other countries.

Chou En-lai: Yes. The States participating in the Geneva Conference and other States should recognize Laos and Cambodia as independent countries and make a declaration that they would not allow interference with them. At the same time, Laos and Cambodia should declare that they will not allow any foreign country to build bases there.

As regards these two countries, we should make a distinction between external and internal problems. Militarily all foreign forces should be withdrawn. On the other side measures should be taken to unify the native forces. For example, in Cambodia, these native forces should be unified and in Laos the resistance forces should...become part of the Government forces... ,

JN: Your Excellency said that at a suitable moment elections should be held in Laos and Cambodia so that Governments representative of the people can be formed. How can unification and military forces affect the Governments? I can understand Governments being formed as a result of elections and then these Governments taking steps to unify the country and military forces. It is an

⁷⁷ After many weeks of deadlock at Geneva, Chou En-lai told Eden on 16 June that he thought he could persuade the Vietnam to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia, and that China would recognize their royal governments, provided there were no American bases in the territories. See Anthony Eden, *Memoirs: Full Circle* (London. 1960). p. 129.

internal problem and can be dealt with by the present Governments or by Governments formed after the elections. These internal developments can take place if external pressures are removed.

Chou En-lai: In Laos and Cambodia there are resistance movements. These have resulted in the colonial war. So, if the war is going to be stopped, not only outside forces should be withdrawn but even internal forces should be controlled. The internal problems should also be settled. In Cambodia the resistance forces are small and the internal problems can be solved early.... In Laos there is a resistance Government. We should persuade both States to make contacts. The royal government should be recognised to have the leading position...

JN: These resistance movements are a result of colonial Governments. If colonial forces are removed then the resistance forces can settle things peacefully with the existing Governments, that is, a settlement should be arrived at peacefully and not by war.

Chou En-lai: Yes. This policy is correct, as you have stated it. The Royal Government in Laos should be in the leading position and take in the resistance forces. In this way a peaceful settlement can be arrived at. Unlike the situation in Vietnam, where there are two opposing Governments.

JN: The positions are different. If there is trouble and conflict in Laos and Cambodia that is a disturbing factor in other countries of South-East Asia.... A peaceful settlement of Laos and Cambodia would produce a climate of peace for larger areas.

Chou En-lai: Yes, Your Excellency has said that these two countries should have neutral status. That is exactly what I said. They should become States of the South-East Asian type. Then they would enable the peaceful forces in South-East Asia to strengthen. It would strengthen peace and avoid internal conflict and external pressure.

JN: Your Excellency considers these two countries as those of South-East Asia, which you consider to be neutral and peaceful and you would like Laos and Cambodia to become part of South-East Asia-neutral and peaceful.

Chou En-lai: Yes, that is true.

JN: I am sure that will have a wider influence for peace in South-East Asia and in other countries also, particularly in Burma and Indonesia, the two chief countries in South-East Asia.

Chou En-lai: On this question of peace in South-East Asia and peace in Asia. I would like to exchange views and to hear whatever views Your Excellency holds.

JN: I hope Your Excellency will be meeting U Nu in Rangoon. I met him about

two months back.⁸ He is a very frank and forthright person. He is a good man. I like him very much. Throughout these past seven years, U Nu and his Government were 'very sympathetic to Ho Chi Minh. In fact in the early stages they sent him some arms, not much, as a friendly gesture. I found two months ago that their attitude had slightly changed chiefly because, shall I say so, of fear of war coming near them. If they can be assured of this area being neutralized and chances of peace increasing, I am sure it will have a powerful effect on them.

Chou En-lai: I have also heard the views of Prime Minister U Nu, which were conveyed to me by Mr V.K. Krishna Menon under Your Excellency's instructions⁹ and for which I wish to thank you.

I think some of the questions may have resulted from misunderstandings. The view-points on some other questions have not yet been brought closer. That is why there is lack of understanding. I hope that if I can meet His Excellency U Nu, these questions can be clarified.¹⁰

Our policy towards South-East Asia is one of peaceful existence. This is our policy towards India, Burma, Indonesia and even towards Pakistan and Ceylon, and now, towards Laos and Cambodia, we have the same policy.... The Foreign Minister of Laos told me that Laos is situated in the middle of so many countries.... I told him therefore that the best policy for Laos was to have neutral status and all countries round about her should respect the independence of Laos and make it a bridge for peace. As for Cambodia, it is more to the South and there is much more reason for it to be neutral.

JN: I entirely agree that if as between these countries of South-East Asia and us we can lay down principles like respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, as we have laid down between our two countries,¹¹ this would create a large area of peace. I referred some time ago to the creation of an area for peace,¹² that is, neutral countries which have no foreign bases in them and accept the principles of non-aggression, non-Interference in internal affairs, etc.,- it would help peace.

Chou En-lai: This is also the policy of the Government of China. Therefore, on this point we have complete agreement. If on this point Your Excellency thinks that we should do something further, we shall only be too pleased to do so.

⁸ Nehru met U Nu at the Colombo Conference of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Indonesia held from 28 April to 2 May.

⁹ The views of U Nu were probably conveyed to Chou En-lai in Geneva in May 1954 after the Colombo Conference. See also *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.25. p. 478.

¹⁰ Nehru sent a message to U Nu on 25 June: "Premier Chou En-lai...leaving 28th morning for Canton via Rangoon. He has expressed a wish to meet you and have talk with you.... Would strongly urge your inviting Chou En-lai to spend afternoon, and night in Rangoon. I consider your having a full talk with him important."

¹¹ These principles which became famous as Panchsheel, were stated in the preamble to the agreement on trade and cultural intercourse between "the Tibet region of China" and India reached between India and China on 29 April 1954.

¹² Nehru said this in a statement in Lok Sabha on 24 April 1954. See *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.25. pp.439-444.

JN. Regarding Pakistan also we want to follow the policy of peaceful coexistence. We do not wish to take any territory of Pakistan or have any conflict with them. We have unfortunately some issues pending with them like Kashmir, canal waters, refugee property, etc. Our policy is that we are not against the existence of Pakistan and we want it to continue as an independent State. Unfortunately Pakistan's policy is allied with that of the USA. It is a strange mixture of fear and aggression. At present there are many American influences there. Therefore, for Pakistan to be a neutral country is rather difficult. Nevertheless, our policy is that Pakistan should continue as an independent country and any outstanding issues between us should be settled peacefully.

Chou En-lai: We understand very well this policy. We have persuaded many times the Ambassador of Pakistan in Peking¹³ to be friendly and peaceful with India and not rely on the help of USA. Pakistan has said several times that they want to be a strong nation. We have no objection to that.

JN: Nor have we.

Chou En-lai: But relying on USA is a different matter.

JN: The difficulty with Pakistan is that they have always relied on others - sometimes the British and sometimes the Americans. If they dealt with us direct, we would have settled various problems. But this reliance on others makes things difficult.

Chou En-lai. Yes. That is the crux of the matter.

JN: When India was partitioned and Pakistan came into existence, that was a terrible blow. So far as the people of India and Pakistan are concerned, they have the same language, same habits and customs. Today there are thousands of families, half in India and half in Pakistan, e.g., a father is in India and the son is in Pakistan; one brother is in India and the other in Pakistan. It is an unnatural division. For instance, there are two brothers, one is a general in the Indian Army and another in the Pakistan Army. Also two brothers - one serving in the Indian Foreign Service and one in the Pakistan Foreign Service.

Chou En-lai: Yes. It is a man-made artificial division.

JN: As Your Excellency knows, there was a powerful movement against British rule for 25 to 30 years. The people who are now running Pakistan were the people who were opposing the movement and helping the British. So the British were helping them to get Pakistan in order to create an area under British control. In Pakistan the persons who came into power came in with British help. They have no roots in the people. Two recent facts are interesting (1) After Independence, about ten thousand British Officers left India. Many of them went to Pakistan and became high officers there. They were very bitter against India because we had kicked them out. They have caused more trouble

¹³ Major General Agha Muhammad Riaza.

between India and Pakistan than the Pakistanis themselves. (2) About three months ago, there were elections in East Pakistan. They were unique. Out of three hundred and nine seats, three hundred were won by the Opposition and only nine by Government, in spite of Government pressure.¹⁴ That shows popular feeling was against the Government. They have now suppressed these popular forces and there is martial law. I said that British influence in Pakistan had set them against us. Now it is not British influence but American influence, because American money is flowing there.

Chou En-lai: Yes. This reliance on outside forces has been most disadvantageous between these two brother States.... They could have been friendly and cordial. but' outside interference has made things worse. However, people still want to have unity with India. East Pakistan elections have shown this.

JN: I have no doubt that many people in Pakistan want unity, but we have deliberately not said anything. Politically Pakistan is backward. Their rulers all belong to the feudal class. Their chief propaganda is that India is going to attack them. If we say anything, they exploit it and fan hostility. That is why we do not say anything.

One result of the situation in Indo-China has been that East Pakistan has become a little more important in their eyes because if there is war in South-East Asia, East Pakistan is more important-otherwise they did not attach importance to East Pakistan. Their propaganda is chiefly by American sources, that East Pakistan is going Communist. There are many people who want to abolish landlordism, etc., but they are not Communists. The Americans bring in the charge of communism and the Pakistan rulers use it to bring in martial law. I mentioned all this about Pakistan to Your Excellency just to clear our position. I am afraid Pakistan will follow American direction so long as the present Government lasts. Any proposal regarding peace we make with the present Government of Pakistan does not come about. Even at the Colombo Conference Pakistan gave a lot of trouble.¹⁵

Now, to come back to South-East Asia, Pakistan considers itself not a South-East Asian country but a West Asian country. Pakistan wants to have alliances with West Asian countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, etc. They are not friendly with Afghanistan. We should consider the real South-East Asian

¹⁴ The elections held between 8 and 11 March resulted in an overwhelming victory for the United Front, an alliance of the Opposition parties which secured 223 of the 237 seats reserved for Muslims and 10 of the 72 seats for the minorities. The United Front's programme envisaged recognition of Bengali along with Urdu as an official language, rejection of the draft Constitution, dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and its replacement by a directly elected body, and complete autonomy for East Pakistan in all matters except defence, foreign affairs and currency.

¹⁵ On 28 April 1954, the opening day of the Colombo Conference. Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, assailed the Indian position in respect of Kashmir and sought to block discussions on Indo-China and world peace by insisting on the Kashmir question being settled first. The Prime Ministers eventually decided that the subject could not form part of the Conference agenda. Pakistan, also strenuously opposed India's suggestion for a call for "non-intervention" in Indo-China or banning of military aid from outside as she seemed to be concerned about not offending the US and also about not compromising her own stand on Kashmir and acceptance of US military aid.

countries from the point of view of bringing about this neutral area of peace.

Chou En-lai: What about Ceylon?

JN: About Ceylon, there is not much to say. It is a small island. They have not had much to do with international affairs. Her independence was an accident which followed India's struggle for independence. There is no background of anti-colonial struggle in Ceylon. It has a rich soil which produces a lot without much effort. The present Government is conservative and needlessly afraid of India because it thinks that India is a big country on top of them. But we have no such designs. The people of Ceylon are the same as Indians and very friendly to us. Ceylon does not count much internationally. But it is a little apprehensive. The real countries in South-East Asia, apart from India, are Burma and Indonesia. I might however mention that in spite of our troubles with Pakistan, our personal relations with Pakistan are quite good.

Chou En-lai: I mentioned Ceylon because the new Government there has not been very friendly to China. As regards our trade with Ceylon, we have been most considerate to them... Their representatives came to China thrice But they have not accepted our representatives, although we said we would talk only about trade. Our regard for Ceylon has been greater because she is a small country. However, the major States in South-East Asia are standing on the side of peace.

I agree with Your Excellency that these are India, Burma and Indonesia. Now we shall try to include in this Laos and Cambodia. As for Ceylon we can make some efforts and enlarge this area of peace.

JN: Yes. Of course. We should make efforts even in the case of Pakistan. Ceylon is concerned really with only two or three things, e.g., price of rubber, rice, etc...

Conversation with Chou En-lai (II)¹⁶

Jawaharlal Nehru: We were discussing of how we can make South-East Asia an area of peace.... Of course if peace can be achieved in Indo-China that would be a step forward. What else can be done?

Chou En-lai: I have talked about the question of Indo-China. Now it is up to the two sides...to work the concrete problems within the next three weeks... Another question I did not mention is that of international supervision which was discussed in the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Maybe within the next three weeks it will become crystallised.... But one thing has been decided, that

¹⁶ Second session, New Delhi, 10 pm to midnight, 25 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extract.

is, India will be the Chairman.... This is good and shows that we all have confidence in India. The efforts made by Mr Menon have a great bearing on this.

JN: Mr Eden asked me as to how far, we were willing to take responsibilities in any Commission that may be appointed. We replied that we were prepared to assume responsibilities in the interests of peace -- but obviously we could not come in unilaterally at the request of one party, but only if there was a settlement and both sides requested us.¹⁷ Secondly, we should like to know the terms of the settlement, functions of the Commission, etc. Subject to this, we would assume responsibilities....

Chou En-lai: ...The work and functions and responsibilities of the Commission ... will have to be worked out along with the armistice terms.

If the armistice terms are clear, the functions and responsibilities of the Commission are also clear.

Then we will have to settle the position of the Commission, but in any case India's place as Chairman of the Commission has been settled.... The status of India as a neutral State has been made clear after the Soviet delegate proposed India as Chairman.

JN: Your Excellency said that it has been settled that India should be Chairman of the Commission. Has that been accepted by all the parties?

Chou En-lai: Of course we have not reached agreement on this because the question of the composition is still at issue. But on this question of India's Chairmanship, I have contacted both sides concerned and I have not heard any objection. The US attitude is not very clear --sometimes they want UN and sometimes Colombo Powers....

JN: Did Mr Eden agree to India being Chairman?

Chou En-lai: I have said to him that we have settled the question of India as Chairman.... He did not say anything except that we should make the functions and responsibilities of the Commission clearer.

JN: Did Mendes-France say anything about it?

Chou En-lai: I mentioned this question to Mendes-France.... He did not make any objection....

JN: It amounts to this that until the armistice is settled, the question of composition cannot be taken up and it is still more or less an open question.

Chou En-lai: Yes.... However, according to my judgment, asking India to be Chairman should be acceptable to all....

JN: I suppose the main responsibility of observing the armistice would be on the two armies and the main function of the Commission will be to act as

¹⁷ See *ante*, p. 345.

observers and decide minor cases of infringement. Am I right?

Chou En-lai: If we settle the question of drawing a line in Vietnam and if we also settle the question of Laos and Cambodia, then the international supervision can consist of three kinds of work:

- (i) work of a temporary nature, e.g., to observe whether the line is according to agreement, withdrawal of troops, transfer of prisoners of war...
- (ii) This would take long, e.g., specifying ports of entry in both areas and preventing introduction of new weapons and ammunition. new armed forces or armed personnel for either side...
- (iii) This is to see if there are any activities threatening peace...

Even in Korea, in spite of the continuous clamouring from Syngman Rhee, we still carried out the armistice.

JN: The Chairman will only come in if there is equality of votes, otherwise decisions will be by majority. Am I right?

Chou En-lai: No matter, whether we have five or three States to form the Commission, there will be one or two States closer to one side and the other two States closer to the other side. But India as Chairman would have the final voice.

JN: Yes. Now the various functions Your Excellency has mentioned -- all this would require a large number of troops. Who would supply these troops?

Chou En-lai: As to the armistice line, if we do as the French have proposed i.e., draw the line east to west, it should not be very long unlike in Korea. As for the ports, there will be same number of ports as there are so many States. These will include land, air and sea ports.

JN: True, but who will supply the troops?

Chou En-lai: I have talked over with Mr Menon about this question. I said that troops will not be necessary....

JN: You have mentioned ports. Supposing an allegation is made that arms and ammunition are coming in from China to Vietnam, who is to guard and carry out the supervision?

Chou En-lai: This becomes a political question, as we would have to station troops everywhere in all the three States-along the ports inland -- this would be tantamount to surrounding the three States-which is inconceivable. So this question should be settled by providing guarantees by the participating States. We can check the main ports and the imports through them. If we should be asked to guard the frontier of any one nation, we will have to guard the frontier of every nation.

JN: Of course, that is impossible. The land frontier is different from the seaports. What are they to do on the land frontier except to sit at one place and listen to complaints. They can do nothing except depend on the good faith of the parties concerned.

Chou En-lai: Yes. This depends on the 'two States concerned and also on the States participating in the Conference and others.... Good faith is of primary importance so that no foreign country sets up bases in Indo China.... We feel that if all parties concerned want an armistice, ...then there will be peace.... So the question is whether the US wants to fight; so, there is going to be war.

JN: If other countries do not want to fight, it will be difficult for the US to start the fight.

Chou En-lai: Yes. If other countries do not want to fight, it is possible to prevent war.

JN: I asked these questions to understand the position. I also wanted to point out the differences: (1) We have to deal with Indo-China as a whole and not with Laos and Cambodia only; (2) There is no question of employing large numbers of troops but only a small number of forces for guard duties.

Chou En-lai: Yes. That is just true.

JN: Would other countries supply part of the forces required or does one country supply the whole lot? What is your Excellency's conception of the number required-say 500-less or more?

Chou En-lai: ...As for the number required, that will depend upon the number of ports selected. As for who should supply these forces - one or more powers - when we think about it, we shall convey our views through your Embassy in Peking or your Consul-General in Geneva.... This question is related with the armistice. So we have spent some time in giving Your Excellency some background information....

JN: When I asked these questions, I was thinking of the kind of picture that a settlement would present, e.g., the numbers of troops required.... Generally speaking we are prepared to cooperate with any country even though we may not like that country.

Chou En-lai: Yes. We understand this spirit of India.

JN: The question I put to Your Excellency at the beginning of this session this evening was what are your Excellency's views regarding developing this area of peace -- in this part of Asia.

Chou En-lai: As to making this part of Asia an area of peace, we would like to see the relationship existing between India and China to be prevalent in this

area. For instance, in the preamble of our Trade Agreement on Tibet, between India and China, there were certain principles. If these principles are applied to all States of Asia, that would be very beneficial.... In this way we can prevent US attempts to organise military blocs in this area. As to how to extend this relationship which exists between India and China and how to make it apply to other States, I would like to hear Your Excellency's views, as your Excellency knows these States and their Governments in Asia much better.

JN: I agree with your line of thought-that these principles should be applied. They would be gladly accepted by these States. Certainly by Burma and Indonesia. How to give a more explicit and positive shape to this and when? I think the best time would be after the settlement in Indo-China.

Chou En-lai: Yes, we should make efforts to facilitate its settlement and this should be settled first because there is a war on....However, at the same time we should consider the question of Burma.... I wonder whether Your Excellency considers that China should take the initiative in proposing to Burma a similar agreement as the one with India.

JN: Your Excellency will be meeting U Nu. I think it will be desirable for Your Excellency to suggest to U Nu something on these lines. Of course, our agreement dealt with a number of small matters. I do not know if there are any such small matters between China and Burma. But in any case, affirmation of these principles, even before an agreement is arrived at, a declaration by both China and Burma adhering to these principles, would be a step forward and these could later be followed by an agreement.

Chou En-lai: I thank Your Excellency for your advice. We shall consider it. If on my way back to Peking, U Nu is in Rangoon and willing to talk, I should be willing to take the initiative.

JN: May I suggest that the first step would be for China and Burma to make a declaration of this kind and then follow it up with Indonesia. That is, it is better perhaps to have bilateral declarations rather than joint declarations. For instance, India and China have done it and now China and Burma, then India and Burma, then China and Indonesia and then India and Indonesia and so on. This is the first step. Maybe later, it can take some other shape.

Chou En-lai: Yes. What Your Excellency suggests is a very good idea. I shall study Your Excellency's suggestion....

JN: Your Excellency must be aware of US proposals regarding South-East Asia Treaty Organisation¹⁸ on the lines of NATO. We are totally opposed to it, Now

¹⁸ On 4 April 1954 the US had proposed to Britain and France the establishment of an ad hoc coalition, comprising US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand the Philippines and the three Associated States or Indo-China for organizing the collective defence of South-East Asia in order to check "Communism expansion in the area. The proposal was formalized by the signing of the SEATO treaty on September 1954 at Manila by US, UK, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

Mr. Eden has proposed an Eastern Locarno.¹⁹ We do not know what exactly his idea is.

Chou En-lai: Maybe his idea is that of a fraternity. Mr Eden did not make this suggestion in Geneva but may have thought of it later.

JN: Yes. Re has made it only yesterday.²⁰ I do not remember Locarno Treaty provisions in detail. The treaty was made more than 27 years ago and meant mainly for Germany and France and a kind of mutual agreement,²¹ As far as I can make out, the idea of an Eastern Locarno means that the countries of South-East Asia should think of an area of peace. I do not know if this is what Mr Eden means.

Chou En-lai: It means that Mr Eden in his report to Parliament put these two ideas on the same side – on the one hand an Eastern Locarno and on the other SEATO.

JN: I think he made them as alternative proposals.

Chou En-lai: I merely read news agency reports. If this is so, then there is no conflict.

JN: I have also seen only news agency reports. Re further said that SEATO would have no meaning unless South-East Asian countries joined it.

Chou En-lai: That is true. If it is for peace and not war in South-East Asia these South-East Asian countries should be made parties. Otherwise it should be for war and not for peace.

JN: That is so. I think that Mr Eden has made the Americans' angry and therefore he is putting these alternatives before them. The solution is an organisation essentially based on South-East Asian countries plus some other countries, maybe.

¹⁹ Eden expressed the hope in the House of Commons on 23 June that it might be possible to agree on some kind of a reciprocal arrangement for the defence of South-East Asia in which both sides took part such as Locarno. As reported by *The Times* (London), Eden said, "We could also have a defensive alliance such as NATO was in Europe.... Those two systems would be quite different but need not be inconsistent. He added that there would never be any real security in the region without the goodwill of the free Asian countries.

²⁰ In fact, replying to Nehru's message of 4 May 1954 [see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.25. pp. 435-436], wherein he spoke of the possibility of guarantees by other countries, including India, to help to effect a settlement and ensure its continuance in Indo-China. Eden wrote on 9 May, "As I understand your message you favour an arrangement rather similar to the Locarno Treaty whereby the guaranteeing powers would undertake to oppose violation of the Agreement by any party.... I should certainly like to give it serious study for I have always felt this to be the best solution available."

²¹ The agreement reached in 1925 at Locarno, Switzerland guaranteed post-1919 frontiers between France, Belgium and Germany and demilitarization of the Rhineland. The treaty was signed by France, Germany and Belgium and guaranteed by Britain and Italy. The 'spirit of Locarno' symbolized hopes for an era of international peace and goodwill.

Chou En-lai: I agree that part of Eden's statement was for the benefit of USA.

JN: I think Your Excellency is tired now. You had a long journey last night.

Chou En-lai: I hope we shall have a chance to continue discussion tomorrow.... I am very glad to have had such a rare chance of exchanging views with Your Excellency so frankly and fully.

JN: I also want to take full advantage of this opportunity. Incidentally, we may have to tell the Press something. We may draft a short statement.

Chou En-lai: A joint statement perhaps? Shall we leave it to the host?

JN. Yes. We shall do so day after tomorrow morning when you go to Agra and then you may see it....

* * *

Conversation with Chou En-lai (III)²²

Jawaharlal Nehru: I had a message from Moscow today. Our representative saw Mr Molotov²³. He seems to be partly pleased with the work at Geneva-not wholly. He hinted he may have to go back to Geneva by 10th July.

Chou En-lai: Yes, that is, within three weeks....

JN: Ever since the question of Your Excellency's coming here arose, some or the countries who were in the Colombo Conference were very much interested. I sent them messages²⁴ and I kept them informed, I shall now convey to them-not necessarily everything-but a brief indication of our talks so that they do not feel left out. There is no difficulty about Burma and Indonesia, but anything

JN: I send to Ceylon or Pakistan is bound to get out -- so I have to be careful what to tell them.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Your Excellency has to decide what should be sent to these countries.

JN: One has to exercise one's discretion.

Chou En-lai: I am very anxious to know Your Excellency's views on the present

²² Third session. New Delhi. 10.45 am to 12.15 pm, 26 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Extracts.

²³ P.N. Kaul, Second Secretary in the Indian Embassy in Moscow had conveyed to Molotov Nehru's appreciation of the important part played by him in the progress made in Geneva.

²⁴ Not printed here.

situation in Asia.... I would also like to know Your Excellency's views on East Asia, especially on the Pacific area....

JN: About three weeks ago, I had the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr Casey, with me²⁵. Did your Excellency meet him?

Chou En-lai: Yes, I met him in Geneva when he went there this time.

JN: Australia and New Zealand are, on the one hand, very intimately connected with England-it is more emotion than anything else. But since the last War they have been drawn more to America, for example, the ANZUS Pact. When I met Casey, he said that they were feeling more and more that American foreign policy was unrealistic and would lead nowhere. They don't want to break with America, but he told me they would put pressure on USA to change its policy, to be more realistic, for example, regarding an armistice in Indo-China.

Chou En-lai: Mr Casey told me that he was in favour of neutralising Laos and Cambodia. This was after he heard what Mr Eden had told him.

JN: These countries feel that American policy is not the right one. At the same time, they do not want to break with America. So there are these two pulls. Of course, if something extreme happens, there might be even a break. They want to avoid that.

The countries of West Asia are very backward -- everyone of them. They are small and very much under the influence of those who supply them with money and arms. In West Asia there have been large areas of British influence-now they tend to pass under American influence, chiefly because America is supplying them with money and arms. That is to say, the Governments and not the people of these States are under American influence. The big question for the Arab world is that of Israel. It is a small country, but it is probably strong enough to beat all the Arab countries put together. They are afraid of it. So they have no policy of any kind-they have reactions, they have fears and they do Riot even hold together amongst themselves.

Chou En-lai: When Your Excellency said that Israel is strong enough to deal with the Arab countries put together, did you mean militarily strong enough?

JN: Yes, the reason is not that Israel is strong, but that the others are weak. Israel almost defeated them, but the UN came in the way.²⁶

American policy is very peculiar. On the one hand they are trying to win these Arab countries over from the British, and on the other hand the Jews in America are very powerful. On the one hand they want to win over the Arabs, and on the other they don't want to annoy the Jews.

²⁵ On 10 June 1954, See ante pp 346-347.

²⁶ As soon as the State of Israel was proclaimed on 4 May 1948, she was attacked by the forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. By 7 January 1949, when ceasefire was established under tile auspices of the UN, the Israel forces had not only repulsed the Arab forces but had gained control of 75% of the Palestinian territory and expelled about 800000 Palestinians from their homes.

Egypt probably wants a settlement about the Suez Canal. There has been a strong feeling against the MEDO, but no one can be sure what will happen, partly because of weakness and partly because whoever gives the arms gains the influence in these countries. In fact, in all these Arab countries there have been no popular movements-there have been occasionally popular insurrections.

I was in Egypt last year.²⁷ Our relations are fairly good with all the Arab countries, as well as with Israel, except that Israel is a little distant. We have recognised Israel, but we have no diplomatic relations with them yet. Last year when I met the Egyptians, they told me they wanted to recognise new China, but probably they are afraid of America. They said they would do it later.

Chou En-lai: Is the new Government in Egypt fairly established?

JN: It is firm at the moment, but at its head are young military officers. They are in earnest, but with no experience or political knowledge. They are nationalistic, but with no roots in the people except that they are popular because they kicked out the King.

The whole politics of Western Asia turns round oil. For instance, the King of Hejaz²⁸ gets royalties to the tune of three hundred to four hundred million dollars. Some other small rulers get fifty to hundred million dollars, that is, only in royalties. Iran and Iraq are also oil countries and oil determines everything there. The King of Hejaz came to Pakistan a few months ago.²⁹ He has so much money that he does not know what to do with it. He spent about two million rupees in about ten days in Pakistan giving presents to the Governor-General, the Prime Minister and everybody, like big American cars, etc.

One thing more.... In the old days, that is to say, fifty years ago or more, it was British policy to build up an Islamic bloc to support themselves, in that sense that policy was carried on recently through Pakistan-to have an Islamic bloc. But other West Asian countries did not support it. They are more nationalistic than religious³⁰...

Chou En-lai:Your Excellency said that the national and popular movements in West Asia are not mature. Does that mean that there is lack of mature leaders in these States?

JN: I suppose so. There are many reasons. Middle Eastern politics is one of assassination and *coup d'état*.

Chou En-lai: Is it the present situation that the United States is gradually replacing Britain and US influence is increasing?

²⁷ Nehru was in Cairo from 22 to 25 June 1953.

²⁸ Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (1902-1969), King of Saudi Arabia. 1953-64.' also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. 18, p.207.

²⁹ Accompanied by 22 princes and six ministers, King Abdul Aziz paid an official visit to Pakistan from 14 to 24 April 1954.

³⁰ At this stage, Nehru read out a telegram from Rangoon conveying U Nu's deep appreciation of Chou En-lai's proposed visit to Rangoon and asking him to stay the night there.

JN: In a sense, yes, but only with Governments. The US is not popular with the people.

Chou En-lai: The living conditions of people in this area are still very bad?

JN: Yes, of course, something flows out from oil and something remains behind

Chou En-lai: Afghanistan has very good relations with India. Is it different from other West Asian States?

JN: Yes. Afghanistan has not good relations with Pakistan. That is because of the tribal area in the North of Pakistan. In the last one hundred years the British Government never succeeded in suppressing them. Their profession is riding and kidnapping. The British adopted two methods to deal with them—military expeditions and bribery.

Some of the tribal territory is in Pakistan and some in Afghanistan. It was not technically part of India, but semi-independent. Afghanistan wants this tribal area to be given independence, but Pakistan would not agree. This is a matter at issue between them. We have tried not to interfere in this matter, but our sympathies are with the tribal people. Some of their old leaders were our friends.

There was an attempt by the United States to make a League of Pakistan and Afghanistan,³¹ but they failed.

None of the Western Asian States can be considered very stable. They are not well-organised, nor do they have stable leadership. But there is an emotional urge in the people which does not find satisfaction. The old British policy was to encourage religious sentiment, that is, the policy that Pakistan is following in these countries, to form an Islamic bloc. We are friendly with Egypt and with other Arab countries also. This Islamic bloc policy will not go down with them.

Chou En-lai: In this area, the population is not much?

JN: Not much. It is a desert area. The total population of the Arab countries is less than thirty million and more than half of this is in Egypt.

Chou En-lai. Is Afghanistan included in this?

JN: No, Afghanistan is not Arab.

Chou En-lai: Iran and Afghanistan are also Islamic countries?

JN: Yes, they are both Islamic. Iran belongs to one particular sect of Islam

³¹ The US considered bringing about a confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan as of the means of strengthening Afghanistan and countering Soviet pressures. The possibility of some form of confederation was explored at discussions between Pakistan and Afghan representatives in Karachi in March 1954. A policy statement approved by President Eisenhower on 11 December 1954, however, found undesirable positive US efforts in bringing about the confederation due to impracticality and the risk of adverse reaction from India and the USSR, though the concept of an eventual confederation developed logically and gradually, was not ruled out.

different from the others.

In all these countries there is a certain Islamic renaissance movement. Sometimes it takes a narrow bigoted shape, sometimes not so narrow. Take, for example, Indonesia. There is a small revolt still going on there, a kind of very bigoted movement for a religious State.³²

Then there is a big party partly Islamic and moderately socialistic.³³ They call it Islamic Socialism. The present party in power in Indonesia is the Indonesian Nationalist Party.

Chou En-lai: Is it impossible for India to get Thailand into the South-East Asian countries-as it should be according to its position?

JN: Yes, it should be. Nothing is impossible, but Your Excellency knows the position in Thailand.

For the first time, Thailand is experiencing economic difficulties. So far the price of rice was high. Now the price has fallen and there is acute pressure on Thailand's economy which depends on rice. We can try. There is a small group of people on top and the rest of the people are lazy, as they do not need to work.

Chou En-lai: Do they export much rice?³⁴

JN: Yes, we have a Thai delegation here now wanting to sell us rice." But we do not want any.

Chou En-lai: They export large quantities of rice?

JN: Yes. Burma and Thailand are the two large rice exporting countries, but if we have to buy rice, we would rather buy it from Burma. All these countries in South-East and Western Asia are making frequent demands on us for teachers, doctors and engineers, technicians, etc., as they are afraid of getting them from England or America.

Chou En-lai: What is the policy of UK and USA towards Thailand?

JN: Usually we consider Thailand under the thumb of the US. Britain, I do not think, has very much to do there.

A rather interesting development in Africa is the coming of Sudan as a country. We sent an expert to conduct the elections there.³⁵

Chou En-lai: What will happen after the elections? Will it be independent or

³² Dar-ul-Islam, a Muslim terrorist organization aiming at the overthrow of the secular republic and its replacement by an Islamic State. organized armed revolts in several towns of North Sumatra in September 1953 and intensified its activities in West Java.

³³ Masjmi or the Modernist Moslem Party.

³⁴ The official Thai trade mission met Nehru on 4 June 1954.

³⁵ Sukumar Sen was sent to Sudan as the Chairman of the International Electoral Commission that conducted the general elections there from 2 November to 5 December 1953. The condominium of the UK and Egypt over Sudan had come to an end after the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12 February 1953.

associated with Egypt?

JN: England wanted it to be associated with herself and Egypt with herself.

What is likely is that it will become independent.

Chou En-lai: What is the relationship of India to Japan?

SN: There is no special relationship. We have our Ambassador there.³⁶ There is some trade-nothing much. There is some competition in trade matters, because we export textiles and they cut us down.

Chou ~n-lai: how do they do it?

JN: By cutting down their prices. For example, our textiles go to Africa and South-East Asia, and meet with Japan's competition there.

Chou En-lai: Indonesia is going to hold a conference of Asian and African Powers. What is the exact state of affairs?

JN: I cannot understand it myself. It is not clear whether it will be at an official or non-official level.

Chou En-lai: Have there been any open contacts between the Governments in this matter?

JN: In 1947 we had here an Asian Conference³⁷ -- not on political question -- but rather for cultural and other purposes. I convened it as a private person, but when it was held I was in the Government. Therefore, it got a little mixed up. There were representatives of Soviet Asia also. Then, we held a conference on Indonesia in 1949 when the Dutch attacked Indonesia.³⁸ This was at an official level and consisted of Asian Countries and Australia. Actually nothing much happened again. It has been hanging fire. Various proposals have been made from time to time. Suppose, we call a conference, whom do we invite? -- Governments or the people who are oppressed. There are all kinds of difficulties. I think Your Excellency should rest a little before lunch.

Chou En-lai: This morning I asked Your Excellency many questions and have learnt a lot from Your Excellency....

* * *

³⁶ M.A. Rauf.

³⁷ The Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Twenty-eight Asian countries attended the Conference. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 2, pp 501-523.

³⁸ The Asian Conference on Indonesia was held at New Delhi from 20 to 23 January 1949. Nehru was elected Chairman of the Conference. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.9, pp. 143.182.

Conversation with Chou En-lai (IV)³⁹

Jawaharlal Nehru: As Your Excellency was going away this morning you said you had one or two questions to ask me. I have also many questions to ask Your Excellency. Perhaps you would ask me first. Of course, there is not lack of questions.

Chou En-lai: All right. I shall start. It is our hope that after this meeting there will be even greater cooperation between our two countries in the economic, cultural and political spheres. What should, in Your Excellency's opinion, be done in furtherance of this?

JN: I agree with Your Excellency's view that we should work for further cooperation in these spheres. So far as the political sphere is concerned, it is difficult to define. For example, we are cooperating in finding a solution in Indo-China. Of course, we must also cooperate on the cultural and economic plane. The real basis is a feeling of friendly confidence in each other. I am not talking of India and China only but speaking generally.

Speaking of India, there is a slight fear -- not much - whether in Ceylon or Pakistan or Burma-that India is a bigger country, perhaps stronger than these. China is also a powerful country, an integrated and powerful State. Therefore, there is a fear, not in India but in other countries. It should be our effort to remove such fears regarding India and China, 'there is a big propaganda in Africa by Europeans-not by Africans-that India wants to expand, turn out Europeans and set up her empire in Africa.'⁴⁰ We have told our Indians there that they can only stay in these countries with the goodwill of the people of those countries. So we have to create confidence among the people of these Countries.

Chou En-lai: What Your Excellency said is very true.... Although the political systems in our two countries are not entirely alike, yet our countries have been liberated from imperialism and both our countries have certain common characteristics of oriental civilisation. So we can use these five principles to build our self-confidence and also our mutual confidence. This will have a great influence on other countries and will stake them feel gradually that peaceful coexistence is possible....

JN: The way for us to proceed is in the Light of those principles to which reference has been made. Therefore the more we refer to those principles -- and other countries too --the better it is. More than that it is the tangible confidence that we produce which is important. There are outside and internal forces which create fear. Therefore, one has to take positive steps to create

³⁹ Fourth session. New Delhi, 3 pm to 5 pm, 26 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Extracts.

⁴⁰ For example, D.F. Malan, the South African Prime Minister said in the South African Parliament on 4 May 1954, "Mr Nehru is not hiding the fact that he has his eyes on Africa.... He wants Europeans and the white man out of Africa. Therefore he has embarked on a policy of 'anti-colonialism'." He added. "Mr Nehru and I say this deliberately, is an enemy of the white man."

confidence, even more than make declarations. In the world at large today, there are conflicts and tendencies to expand, but, more than anything else, there is a fear which leads countries to misbehave. If we could get over that fear -- first in our own area of South-East Asia and then elsewhere-it would help to solve the world's problems.

If I may strike a personal note-because I want to be frank -- if I may say so, I do not consider myself much of a politician -- not the normal type of politician. Politicians differ no doubt. Your Excellency has gone through very great experience and hardships throughout your life. In our life, we have also gone through hardships and spent many years in prison. Some factors may be different, but there is a certain commonness, and so I do not find any difficulty in understanding and appreciating the background of China -- the recent developments during the last ten or twenty years. Unfortunately, I have not been there and I want to go there. It is my earliest desire that China and India as they are circumstanced today, can play a considerable part in security peace in the world and helping each other. I am very anxious to further that end -- it is a selfish end too because want my own country to be part of the area of peace. We want to build our countries. I have not the least conflict in my mind. All our effort is towards constructive purpose and there is no conflict. I am, therefore, very happy that Your Excellency has come here not merely because of the Indo-China problem but because of this larger background. I have been influenced and my whole generation in India has been powerfully influenced by Mr Gandhi. And we achieved our results in a rather different way from what we ourselves imagined. For instance, we gained our Independence, and, at the same time, we did not become hostile to England. We decided to maintain some kind of a loose and vague link with the Commonwealth. It is very vague and is not even mentioned in our Constitution. We can break it by merely writing a letter to England. We decided to continue the link not only to derive some benefit but because we thought it would contribute to world peace. For instance, we have broken our relations with South Africa.⁴¹ Our relations with Canada are not much though they are closer than with Australia. In the Commonwealth India's influence has become more and more and we have influenced the policy of the Commonwealth considerably. Therefore, we have tried to gain our objective without breaking away from the Commonwealth. As I told Your Excellency last evening, we wiped out all the Princely States peacefully by giving the Rulers pensions...not that the pensions will last long. We could have wiped them out by force also, but we did not do this. This is due to Gandhiji's approach. We make mistakes, but we try to learn from our mistakes.

Our relations with the United States are not good. We follow our policy but we avoid publicly denouncing the USA. Of course, our policy is different. We follow our own policy as clearly as possible without denouncing any one because

⁴¹ On 26 June 1954, the GOI announced their decision to close the Indian High Commission in South Africa, after the Union of South Africa informed them on March 1954 that the Union could no longer accept the 'anomalous position' that India had maintained representation in the Union for eight years while continuing trade sanctions against her. In February 1946, India had terminated her trade agreement with South Africa as a protest against the introduction in the Union Parliament of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill prohibiting the occupation and acquisition of property by Indians in Natal and called her High Commissioner back when the Bill was passed on 25 May 1946.

there is already too much denouncing in the world today. Why should we add to it?

Chou En-lai: ...If we want to construct peace and prevent war. I agree entirely with your Excellency that China and India bear great responsibility in making this effort especially in Asia.

JN: If we consider the present moment, perhaps no country is more afraid than the USA. It is a powerful country and yet it is afraid,⁴² and it is more afraid than any country in Europe although, actually, if there is war, England will be in greater danger. It is mainly fear and pride in sticking to wrong policy. Their policy is based on their fear of what they call "international communism" which they think wants to conquer the world. To some extent, though to a much less extent, people in Western Europe are also afraid. On the other hand, the United States is building hundreds of bases around Soviet Russia and China thereby creating an impression in the minds of Soviet Russia and China that they will be attacked. Thus we get this vicious circle of fear.

I cannot influence American thought very much although I get large numbers of letters from ordinary people from America against American policy at present and appreciating India's policy. But, apart from America, Asia and Europe act and react on each other.

Chou En-lai: Yes, we must make efforts to remove such entirely groundless, baseless fear which exists in Asia.... If we can do this in Asia, we can. First of all in Asia, frustrate this attempt of the United States to create fear. That will have a good effect on the rest of the world.

JN: That is so. Revolution, that is, real revolution, cannot be exported. The kind of fear in certain countries is of a conspiratorial character which may or may not lead to a revolution but which upsets the balance. American propaganda against "international communism" has not much effect except in some countries. For example, certain groups of people belonging to the Communist Party are thought to act according to the dictates of a foreign country. This rubs against the nationalist feeling and is, therefore exploited.

Chou En-lai: do not know exactly the activities of the Communist Parties in different countries The second question is regarding propaganda. After World War II, the USA has monopolised propaganda. We had American propaganda also in China for a few years, but it failed because it was not popular....As Your Excellency talked to me frankly I also told you frankly what I know about the actual situation.

JN: United States propaganda has been on the whole remarkably unsuccessful. They think they can win over the minds of people by money but the minds of masses cannot be won over by money. What I was referring to was not the attitude of great States like Soviet Russia and China but rather the attitude of local Communist Parties which some times rub up against nationalist feelings. Thus, they would run down their own country and leaders and praise others

⁴² Chou En-lai laughed at that remark.

outside and appear to be more interested in others than in their own country and people. I shall tell you an interesting thing. For instance, about a year or two after the Chinese revolution, the Communist Party of India criticised the Communist Party of China and called it deviationist, but later they realised their mistake and praised the Communist Party of China.⁴³

Chou En-lai: That is exactly why the Communist Party of India has not yet achieved anything

JN: To come back to our particular problem of India and China in South-East Asia, there are three factors involved:

- (1) We are both big countries, and, to some extent, actually strong and potentially strong or going to be strong. Therefore, there is apprehension in some small countries about us.
- (2) Many of our nationals have gone abroad. In South-East Asia, there are more Chinese than Indians while in West Asia and Ceylon, there are more Indians. That is also a cause of fear in these countries.
- (3) Fear of "international communism" through the activities of local Communist Parties.

We have been discussing how to meet these difficulties. If we can remove these fears, the task becomes easier. Each country has to be considered separately.

Does Your Excellency know the Burmese people?

Chou En-lai: I had no chance to know them.

JN: They are a very friendly people rather childlike. They have the virtues and failings of children. They are calm and composed. They are very proud, and, therefore, sometimes take offence very easily. But they are a very nice people and hospitable and friendly. U Nu is different from the average Burman. He is a very fine man. It is not U Nu but some of his colleagues in his Cabinet who have been causing trouble. When I was in Colombo, he said to me, "You can agree to anything you like, but I have to refer everything to my Cabinet." If I may say so without conceit -- of all these people in South-East Asia, the Chinese and Indians are the most mature, individuals apart. So one has to be very careful and to be friendly with the others so that they may not get ally inferiority complex.

Tomorrow when Your Excellency goes to Agra, we shall try to draft a statement.... What should be the contents of this statement?

⁴³ B.T. Ranadive, General Secretary, CPI, had been opposing a trend within the Party towards "right" deviation urging collaboration with the peasantry and 'soft-peddling of the proletarian dictatorship. He also condemned Mao Tse Tung's theories as 'horrible and reactionary.'" After the Cominform journal. *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, editorially announced on 27 January 1950 that the path pursued by the Chinese Communists was the only correct path for colonial and dependent peoples and the CPI had to learn a lot from them, the CPI journal, *Communist* in its issue of February-March 1950 declared the adherence of the Party to the Cominform line. On 19 July 1950, Ranadive was replaced by Rajeshwar Rao as General Secretary.

JN: ...I certainly agree that these principles should be mentioned. Certainly. we should say something about the desirability of a speedy ceasefire in Indo-China and that that should lead to a settlement. In this connection, shall we say in regard to South-East Asian countries, more especially Indo-China, that we would like to see them as independent neutral States which are not used for any aggressive purposes?

Chou En-lai: If you are going to make a reference to the Indo-China question, then we have to mention...that all the three States should be independent, and that none of these States should be used as military bases by any foreign country or to use. Your Excellency's phrase, "None of these States should be used for aggressive purposes."... Your Excellency has said, "neutral". I say, "of the South-East Asian type." We have to consider how we should word this....

JN: Could we not say that each of these countries should be independent and should be allowed to develop according to its wishes and genius and should not be used for any aggressive purpose? I quite appreciate that "neutral" is used loosely and has no clear significance. What I mean is that they should have the freedom to develop according to their light and not be used for aggression against their neighbours. We need not name any countries. It would include the countries outside Indo-China too.

Chou En-lai: ...And as to the third point regarding neighbouring countries, could we not say this? -- "Any of the three countries should not be used for aggressive purposes by any of the three Countries or other countries besides them" or something like that.

JN: This statement should be helpful for a settlement in Geneva, that is, it should be friendly in approach and not condemnatory as that does not help....

* * *

Conversation with Chou En-lai (V)⁴⁴

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Jawaharlal Nehru: Did Your Excellency see the draft statement?

Chou En-lai: Yes. I saw it a few minutes before I went to see the picture,⁴⁵ I is a good picture. It is in technicolour.

JN: The story is not so good.

⁴⁴ Fifth session. New Delhi, 3 pm to 5.15 pm, 27 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

⁴⁵ The reference is to "*Jhansi ki Rani*", directed by Sobrab Modi and released in 1953. The film is based on the life of Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, one of the leaders in Bundelkhand and Central India of the Uprising of 1857.

Chou En-lai: It is quite good and represents resistance against foreigners.

JN: It was a resistance by the feudal elements against foreigners.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Resistance always starts from the upper classes....

We are translating the draft statement into Chinese so that we may study it carefully.... In order to decide the exact formulation we may take some more of Your Excellency's time.

JN: Certainly.... Can we finalise it in the evening?...

Chou En-lai: Yes. With Your Excellency's permission, I should like to discuss the following: If we two are to issue this joint statement, then after my talks in Burma, a joint declaration of a similar nature may be issued.... Then there may be a similar joint statement with Indonesia. If there is any difficulty regarding a meeting, perhaps contact could be made through diplomatic channels....

JN: I think that any such step would be conditioned by a settlement in Indo-China.

The next step is that Your Excellency is going to Burma and alter your talks with U Nu, you may be in a position to state -- or U Nu may state--that you are in general agreement with the statement, or the principles of our statement should be applied to the relations as between Burma and China....

As regards Indonesia, as Your Excellency is not going there just now, diplomatic approaches would be desirable. I propose to write to the Prime Minister of Indonesia, telling him about these talks and send him a copy of our joint statement.⁴⁶ Maybe then we could inform you through his Ambassador that he is in agreement with the general principles. That would be the next step. Thereafter the settlement in Indo-China will partly condition what is to be done later.

Chou En-lai: If as a first step China and India issue this joint statement and China and Burma, and Indonesia and China issue a similar statement, that will make a great difference in Asia, There may be other countries also wishing to make similar statements....If peace can be restored in Indo-China, there are a number of possibilities. Therefore it is more practical not to restrict the form now. On the other hand we should have this understanding that this step we are taking is in the interests of peace in Indo-China. Therefore we should continue such efforts even after we have achieved success in Indo-China....

JN: We should certainly continue our efforts but my own mind is not very clear as to the form it may take, because there are a number of uncertain factors. In increasing the area of peace and strengthening the forces of peace, if we arouse, directly or indirectly, other forces opposed to it, then we create or tend to create obstacles. Therefore the steps we take should strengthen peace without having the other adverse effect. There is a set of difficult

⁴⁶ Nehru sent a message to Ali Sastroamidjojo on 27 June giving a gist of his talks with Chou En Lai. Similar messages were also sent to John Kotelawala and Mohammed Ali. For the joint statement of Nehru and Chou En-lai, see *ante* pp.410-412.

circumstances which makes it difficult to lay down exactly as to what we should do. These matters have naturally to be considered in the larger context of what is happening. For example, there is in USA today a violent reaction 'against what Mr Eden said three days ago regarding an Eastern Locarno.'⁴⁷ It is interesting because the British Government's thinking' is getting further apart from the American Government's. Probably British Government's thinking in this matter is supported by Canada,⁴⁸ Australia⁴⁹ and also New Zealand. In this context we would like to encourage some of these countries. One should not like to do something now which gives a handle to the British or Americans to line up against what one does. The present development is helpful in the cause of peace. UK, France, etc., are thinking differently from the USA, but there are internal conflicts in them and they may either line up with, America or go against her.

I referred the other day to Mr Eden's reference to Locarno. I was looking into this. Locarno has no great importance but represented the coming together of opposing countries to guarantee something. Mr Eden's idea is to bring together opposing countries, which would be France, America, China, USSR and others. This is a different approach from that of Americans, who do not wish to cooperate. Therefore I feel that without making any commitments we should encourage Mr Eden's approach.

Chou En-lai: I agree with the analysis made by Your Excellency. At the Geneva Conference, France made a proposal that the States participating in the Conference should jointly guarantee the States of Indo-China. Mr Menon assured me that if this is agreed to, maybe the number of countries joining this guarantee could be enlarged. China and USSR supported this proposal. But the USA kept quiet....
Regarding Eden's Locarno pact, I suppose he used this phrase because it is more easily understood in Europe.

JN: Yes. I think so. Locarno is well understood in Europe. United States are occupying an extreme position and they do not want to change that position either by themselves or by others. They would like surrender and not a settlement. Other countries like the UK and France are more realistic and want a settlement. Now, in these circumstances, it is desirable to encourage these countries as long as they feel a settlement is possible. In this, Canada has played an important part. Although it is chiefly associated with USA, we have found much easier to talk through Canada, as it is much easier to get it across that way.

⁴⁷ In a letter to President Eisenhower, twelve members of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee advised him to reject Eden's call for a non-aggression pact in Asia or face a complete review of foreign aid, as such a pact would in their view not only accept Communist conquests but 'guarantee' them. On 25 June, the *New York Times* remarked that no "Locarno" could guard against the methods used by the Communists, like subversion, infiltration and the use of "volunteers".

⁴⁸ Escott Reid. Canadian High Commissioner to India at this time had strongly recommended to the Canadian Government the formation of a Locarno-type pact with Indian participation. instead of SEATO.

⁴⁹ R.G. Casey said in New York on 26 June that he was "not particularly horrified" a Eden's idea of an Asian Locarno pact.

Chou En-lai: Can we clarify the matter in this way? We should facilitate collective peace in Asia and, first of all, in South Asia.... The number of States participating in such efforts... should include as many States as possible on both sides to make USA feel that it must also participate....

JN: Yes. That seems to be a way to look at it. I might tell Your Excellency that before the Geneva Conference Eden sent me a number of messages asking if India would be prepared to become a member of a collective system of defence.⁵⁰ He did not define that system. When Krishna Menon was going there, I told him: (1) We cannot be members of a collective system, which is unilateral; (2) The other question was whether it was a collective system. I told him that although we are keen to be a party to peace, we are reluctant to commit ourselves to any possible entanglement in war. That is broadly speaking India's position. Some kind of a collective system is good to have, but it must be clear what kind of system it is.⁵¹

Chou En-lai: ... What, if we take the French proposal, add to it Eden's proposal and add to that Menon's proposal, would such an organisation be possible even if USA objected? ... US may oppose it at first, but may be pressed to accept it in the end.

JN: Your Excellency must remember that the US Constitution has many things bad in it.... There are many stops and checks. Therefore, even if the Government wants to do it, Congress may stop it. There are always some elections going on in the States. Casey told me that he had told Dulles:⁵² You cannot stop the trouble in Far East without recognising new China and giving them their place in the UN". Dulles replied that he could not do this because of the November elections. Whatever America does or does not do, her policy is confused, If the USA was isolated, the possibility is that she would go isolationist. They cannot do it of course, but that will be a tendency. Actually, as they realise the real situation, they may come in with the others. American politics are so confused that no one knows what is going to happen. No one can speak with authority in America-not even the President, because the Congress may pull him up.

Chou En-lai: Yes. All these things are complicated. However, we cannot just wait and see. Once there is peace in Indo-China, the question of guarantees will come up. If US refuses to participate, and that leads to failure, then it will

⁵⁰ In a message sent from Geneva on 28 April. Eden said that he was anxious that any settlement over Indo-China should be acceptable to Asian opinion as a whole and added that Britain had made it clear to the US and France that she would be prepared to guarantee any such settlement. He asked Nehru whether he could contemplate associating India in any form with such a guarantee or any other action which the Commonwealth countries could take either individually or collectively to reinforce the settlement.

⁵¹ Nehru in his message of 4 May 1954 assured Eden that India would assist in promoting and maintaining a settlement in Indo-China, but expressed his inability to make commitments or guaranteeing a settlement until more was known about the nature of the settlement and of the guarantees required. See *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. 25. pp. 435-436.

⁵² John Foster Dulles (1888-1959), US Secretary of State, 1953-59. also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. I, p.572.

be regrettable as it may lead to war.

JN: What USA will or will not do cannot stop our efforts. But one has to do what is best. We are in the most crucial period of Anglo-American relations and should like UK to feel that they have the broad support of other countries so that they are not isolated.

Chou En-lai: I agree with the last point Your Excellency has made.... I wonder if we can constantly exchange views in future, as that would be a great force for peace.

JN: Of course, I hope so. There is one corollary that follows from what I said before. The American people are terribly frustrated as no one is following them, and one never knows what a frustrated person may do. I do not know what Your Excellency has decided, but I believe some talk between the Chinese Government and the UK Government is highly desirable.

Chou En-lai: Yes. At the Geneva Conference, relations between China and UK have had a good start.... We shall go step by step, but in our talks with Britain, we cannot be as frank as with you.

JN: Yes.

What I wanted to know is if the Chinese Government is going to have diplomatic Ambassador in UK.

Chou En-lai: It is possible. Just now we are sending a Chargé d'Affaires. The specific question is, as Your Excellency knows, that the attitude taken by UK in the UN should change.... However, we expect UK to make her attitude clear.

JN: That is quite true. However, if I may say so, UK's attitude is not quite clear-though they are in favour of your representative sitting in the UN, they are also afraid of USA. They have to balance these two attitudes. London is still an important diplomatic centre -- even more important than Washington-in some ways. Washington may be more powerful, but London is more important, especially for Europe. Therefore, it would be useful if Your Excellency had an able representative there.

Chou En-lai: Yes. The Chargé d'Affaires we are sending and the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking are no longer mere "negotiating representatives" but will be in the diplomatic list and can look after trade, nationals and other diplomatic matters, etc. Thus it may be considered a transitional stage. It is a peculiar solution to a peculiar situation.

JN: As long as they have someone to talk with and to deal with, it is all right. I should like to tell you that two weeks after your Government was set up on the 1st of October 1949, I went to UK and USA. I asked Bevin⁵³ about recognising

⁵³ Ernest Bevin (1881-1951): Foreign Secretary of the UK, 1945-51: also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.2, p.472. Nehru met Bevin on 12 November during his visit to Britain from 8 to 13 November 1949.

it and he said, "We shall see what others do and we shall then recognise." When I met Dean Acheson⁵⁴ in USA, he said "Yes. I realise we should do it, but we cannot, because our public would not swallow it."⁵⁵ There is one matter, which is entirely different.... Your Excellency said that the Korean question was closed. The USA are very annoyed and frustrated by the developments on Indo-China at Geneva, as their colleagues have deserted them. They have suffered a diplomatic defeat on Indo-China. They seem to have become more rigid on Korea. That is my feeling. Now, if Korea goes before the UN, nothing will come of it, not at present anyway. In my opinion, therefore, it may be better not to bring it formally before the Geneva Conference now, as then there may be a complete break-up.

Chou En-lai: Yes....

I wish to come back now to another question regarding relations between India and China.

JN: Yes. But I should like to say just one thing more. These countries talk loudly in USA -- countries like France, UK, Australia, etc.-but they do not mean all they say. Mr Casey told me, "I have told USA privately that they are wrong, but I cannot tell them this publicly."

Chou En-lai: Yes. We have seen this especially on the last day of the Korean question at Geneva....

JN: Now, Your Excellency must have seen what has happened, in Guatemala.⁵⁶ England and France did not vote in the Security Council, although they were against USA in this 'flatter, and New Zealand voted against USA.⁵⁷ Churchill is in USA now and the British are unpopular there at the moment. Therefore they could not vote against USA. I had a telegram from the Foreign Minister of Guatemala yesterday, but what can I do about Guatemala?⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Dean Acheson (1893-1971); US Secretary of State. 1949-53: also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. I. p. 511. For Nehru's conversation with Acheson held in Washington DC on 12 October 1949, see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.13. pp. 295-298.

⁵⁵ The question of American citizens under arrest in China was also taken up during the talks with Chou En-lai, Nehru wrote in a letter to Amrit Kaur on 21 July 1954. He (Chou En-lai) said that there were 10,000 Chinese students in the US and the American Government was refusing to allow any of them to return to China.... Chou En-lai said that he had permitted thousands of Americans to go back from China. Some few had been kept back, partly because they had offended against some law and partly because the Americans would not allow the Chinese students to go back. I think there is much force in his argument."

⁵⁶ On 18 June, Guatemalan insurgent forces advanced into Guatemala at several points, crossing the frontier from Honduras. The Guatemalan President, Arbenz Guzman in a broadcast the same day accused Honduras and Nicaragua of conducting an "open aggression in conjunction with the US.

⁵⁷ On 25 June, the UN Security Council refused to adopt by five votes to four, an agenda containing Guatemala's demand for action against Honduras and Nicaragua. The US and its supporters wanted the matter to be first dealt with by the Organisation of American States.

⁵⁸ With reference to the request of Guillermo Toriello, Foreign Minister of Guatemala, for India's intervention, Nehru telegraphed to Krishna Menon in New York on 27 June. "Obviously we cannot intervene. Perhaps you might convey our deep concern.. to Secretary General and some representatives of countries at UN, more especially UK and Canada. This should be done informally and privately as we do not wish to get entangled in South American affairs."

One small thing about Burma, U Nu is an ardent Buddhist and spends several hours every day in prayers and does his rosary. He often says he is becoming a monk, but I do not think he is going to do it-not in the near future-because there is no one else to take his place.

I told Your Excellency that I shall keep the so-called Colombo countries informed. But I deal with them in two ways. I give broad general information which appears in the Press to all the four, but to Burma and Indonesia I write more intimately. That is how I deal with them.

Chou En-lai: That is fine.

I come back to the relations between our two countries. We wonder if Your Excellency can visit our country before the end of this year.

JN: I should love to visit your country. But it is difficult to fix the time now.... Partly it would depend on our Parliament session, as I should like to be present during the session and it would be better to have it at a suitable time, for example, after an armistice in Indo-China....

Chou En-lai: Well, of course, we have to suit your convenience. Maybe we can fix the date later, but we hope Your Excellency's visit to our country will take place this year, as we have been expecting your visit for a long time-more than one and a half years.⁵⁹

JN: I should very much like to come-if possible, this year.

Chou En-lai: As far as trade and cultural exchange between China and India, it is our view that we should do more work and have more contacts; frequent visits are most important,

JN: I agree entirely.

Chou En-lai: At this Press Conference, if the correspondents should ask me about our talks, can I tell them that we are going to issue a joint statement or a communiqué. Of course, I would not tell them the contents of the statement yet.

JN: Yes, of course.

Chou En-lai: In the evening after we finalise the statement, would Your Excellency like to announce it in a Press Conference?

JN: It will be too late tonight. Your Excellency is going away early tomorrow morning and I am leaving ten minutes later.⁶⁰ Besides, it is better that they

⁵⁹ Chou En-lai had told Vijayalakshmi Pandit, during her visit to China in May 1952 as the leader of an Indian cultural delegation, that the Chinese Government regarded Nehru as one statesman who had unwaveringly and constantly spoken for them and that they were anxious to invite him, to China immediately after the conclusion of the Korea's war and honour him in a befitting manner.

⁶⁰ Chou En-lai left for Rangoon on the morning of 28 June. Nehru took off for Ambala on his way to Mashobra near Shimla.

read and absorb the statement⁶¹ and then I can hold a Press Conference a week later after I come back.⁶²

Chou En-lai: At today's Press Conference, with quite a number of correspondents, I will not be able to answer any questions. I did not hold any Press Conference in Geneva.

JN: I myself have not held any Press Conference for some time and have refused to see Press correspondents although they have come especially from abroad for this purpose and gone back.

Chou En-lai: Yes, exactly. May I say that in deference to Your Excellency's wishes. I agreed only to meet the Press?⁶³

JN: Yes. Your Excellency knows it of course that the best way to deal with the Press, if you do not, want to answer a question, is to be humorous....

* * *

Sino-Indian Cooperation for World Peace⁶⁴.

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Fifteen years ago, I went to China⁶⁵ and had hoped to stay there for a month or more. Among the people I had particularly hoped to meet there was Mr Chou En-lai. But before many days were past, war broke out in Europe, which developed into the Second World War and I had to hurry back to my country. To my regret I did not meet Mr Chou En-lai then. Now, after these fifteen years of storm and stress and change, my old wish has been fulfilled. I am happy to meet an eminent statesman of our neighbour country and I am happier still to meet the distinguished representative of a great people.

We meet as individuals but we meet also as representatives of great nations, India and China, both with a tremendous past. It is a matter of interest and significance, not only to our two countries, but to Asia and even the world, how these countries behave to each other, how far they can cooperate for the peace and well-being of the world.

The past two thousand years stand witness to our mutual relations. We have been neighbours during this long stretch of years and we have been vital countries throwing out our thought and culture to each other and to other neighbouring countries. Our people have come into contact in many lands, more especially in South-East Asia, yet there is no record of war between us.

⁶¹ The joint Statement of Nehru and Chou En-lai was issued on 28 June 1954.

⁶² Nehru did not address any Press Conference during the period covered in this volume.

⁶³ Later in the day, Chou En-lai addressed a Press Conference lasting half an hour during which he gave answers, in written form, to five questions among the many submitted to him in advance. He declined to entertain supplementaries.

⁶⁴ Speech at a State Banquet given in honour of Chou En-lai. New Delhi, 26 June 1954. From Press Information Bureau.

⁶⁵ Nehru visited China during August-September 1939. See *Selected Works (first series)* Vol.10. pp. 73-114.

This long period is of the peaceful commerce of ideas, of religion and art and culture.

Both China and India have their particular and individual backgrounds. Each has her own special cultural inheritance. In many ways they are different. They have grown according to their own genius. Yet, in spite of these differences, we have been good neighbours and friends and have not come into conflict with each other during two millennia of history.

This is the witness of the past and as we stand on the fine edge of the present in this turbulent world of ours, we can learn a lesson from that past, which will help us in the present and in the future. Both our countries have recently succeeded in achieving freedom and the opportunity to work out our destiny according to our will. We achieved our freedom under different circumstances and by different methods. Our great leader and master, Mahatma Gandhi, led us by peaceful methods through travail and many bitter experiences to freedom. China's course was differently fashioned. Both our countries have placed the good of the common man before them and are aiming, in their different ways, to raise millions who have suffered so much in the past and now live in the hope of a better future. That future for us or for any country in the world depends primarily on the avoidance of war and the assurance of peace and security.

The major question before the world today therefore is how to get rid of the spectre of war and fear and hatred which oppress so many countries and peoples today.

You have been recently engaged, Sir, with other eminent statesmen, in wrestling with these great problems of war and peace. We have been happy to learn that some success has attended your efforts and the efforts of the other statesmen at Geneva. We congratulate you and the others who participated in the Geneva Conference on this happy turn of events. We earnestly hope that this will lead to an early termination of hostilities in Indo-China and that this will be followed by a settlement which will ensure peace and freedom to all the countries there.

If we can remove the fear of war and aggression that oppresses people and ensure that each country will have freedom to work its destiny according to its own wishes without interfering with other countries, we shall have served our generation well and laid the foundation of enduring peace in the world. Peace is necessary for the entire world and peace is indivisible today. But in Asia, peace is even more vital and necessary than elsewhere, for we have to build our nations and we want to utilize all our energies in the task of construction and not of destruction.

There are divisions and differences in the world, but there is also a sense of unity and of growing oneness. I earnestly trust that our minds will be directed towards this growing feeling of oneness and to the pursuit and realization of the common ideals that animate humanity today, instead of laying stress on the divisions and differences.

Recently India and China came to an agreement about certain matters,⁶⁶ and in the case of that agreement, we have laid down certain principles, which have governed the relations of our two countries. These principles are recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country, of

⁶⁶ An agreement in regard to Tibet was signed on 29 April 1954.

mutual non-interference with each other's Internal affairs, of equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These principles are not only good for our two countries but for others as well, for whom they might well serve as an example. If these principles can be recognized in wider spheres, then the fear of war would disappear and the spirit of cooperation between nations would develop. Each country would have freedom to follow its own policy and work out its own destiny, learning from others and Cooperating with others, but basing itself essentially on its own genius. Modern science offers us an opportunity to rid the world of the evils that have oppressed it in the past. Unfortunately, that science is utilized more for the works of destruction than for the works of construction. If we seize the present and give to it a turn in the direction of peace and cooperative effort and make science serve good of humanity instead of being a curse, we shall make the minds of men turn away from fear and hatred towards understanding and cooperation. Thus we shall build a climate of peace and change the face of the earth. Destiny beckon to our countries and I hope that neither of them will be found wanting at this great moment of history.

I earnestly hope that your efforts, Sir, and those of other eminent statesmen at Geneva will meet with success and I hope also that our two countries will stand for peace and will live amicably together and cooperate together in the cause of peace and human advance as they have done through the past two thousand years of human history.

Source: Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume 26