

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Series II

Volume 55

December 1-31, 1959

(b) China

155. To MEA: Meeting with Ajoy Ghosh¹

Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary of the Communist Party of India, came to see me this morning. He began by saying that he wanted to explain the object of his visit to Peking. It was quite wrong for anyone to think that he had gone there to seek guidance from the Chinese leaders. Naturally, he and his colleagues were keenly desirous of good relations between India and China.

2. He found that the Chinese leaders were singularly ignorant of the strength of feeling in India against China over the recent troubles. The Chinese leaders thought that only a small group of intellectuals was doing the shouting against China. Ajoy Ghosh disabused them about this matter and told them how strong the feeling was in India among all classes and groups.

3. He said that Chairman Mao gave him definitely to understand that he was anxious for peaceful relations between India and China. He was also told that the Chinese had no territorial ambitions in India, but as a matter of principle they could not apparently give up what they considered to be their rights. These talks took place before the recent Ladakh incident and were mainly concerned therefore with the McMahon Line area.

4. When he went to Moscow, he found that the Russians were much disturbed at these developments between India and China and did not wholly approve of the policy of the Chinese Government. Even during the

¹ Note to N.R. Pillai, S. Dutt and M.J. Desai, 5 December 1959

visit of Mr Khrushchev to China during the National Day celebrations there, this was to some extent evident.

5. He then referred to the Communist Party of India and said that there were various view-points in this also and the Bengal group was more extreme. But he hoped that these differences would be ironed out.

6. He referred to the apprehension of the Bengal group that they might be put under ban.² Ajoy Ghosh said that it was hardly likely that a part of the Communist Party would be banned.

7. He then complained of various attacks on communists and Communist Party offices in recent days. He gave me a paper which consists of extracts from newspapers about such attacks.

8. I listened to him chiefly and did not say much.

156. In the Rajya Sabha: India-China Relations³

Mr. Chairman: I have to inform Members that under rule 153 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Rajya Sabha, I have allotted seven hours for the discussion of the Government motion regarding India-China Relations, from 12-00 o'clock to 6-00 P.M. today and tomorrow from 11-00 A.M. to 12-00 o'clock. We meet tomorrow at 10-00 A.M. and the House will adjourn at 4-00 P.M. Instead of from 11-00 A.M. to 5-00 P.M. it will be from 10-00 A.M. to 4-00 P.M. tomorrow.

The Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs (Jawahar1al Nehru): I beg to move, Sir:

² At a public meeting in Hazra Park on 15 November 1959, the Jan Sangh suggested that the CPI be banned and its members socially boycotted. See Hindusthan Standard, 16 November 1959

³ Motion, 8 December 1959. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. XXVII, cols 1705-1722

"That White Paper No. II and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China, laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha on the 23rd November, 1959, be taken into consideration".

Almost exactly three months ago, Sir, there was a debate in this House on the difficulties and conflicts that had arisen on our border, the border between India and China. Since that debate, there has been a serious incident in Ladakh about which the House knows fully. After that there has been some correspondence with the Chinese Prime Minister and the Government of China. And this has been placed on the Table of the House. The Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, made certain suggestions to our Government in a letter dated the 7th November.⁴ On the 16th of November I sent him a reply⁵ putting forward certain proposals-interim proposals. The whole object was that before any further step could be taken to find a way out, there should be some interim arrangement to prevent any conflicts on the border. Now, that letter of mine was sent on the 16th November, and we have received no answer to that yet. In effect, therefore, there has been no major development since this exchange of correspondence. Our Government has received a letter from the Chinese authorities in answer to a previous letter. This relates to the treatment of prisoners after the Ladakh incident. We had complained of the ill-treatment of these prisoners and in their reply they broadly said that this was not true and that they were treated as well as could be expected in the circumstances there. That is how the matter stands so far as the correspondence, etc. is concerned. Now, Sir, after the last debate that we had here, chiefly because of the Ladakh incident and partly because of other developments, there has been a worsening of the situation, and I might say, both actually and in the public mind, and it is natural that there should be this strong public feeling

⁴ See SWJN/SS/54/pp. 663-666

⁵ See SWJN/SS/54/pp. 492-498

when such things happen on our border and a neighbouring country intrudes and pushes into our areas or areas that have been in our possession for a long time. The questions that arise today for the consideration of this House are broadly two of course, there are off-shoots of these questions. One is, this House might again consider and give its opinion and advice as to the broad policies that we should follow and secondly, what steps should be taken in the implementation of these policies. On the last occasion, much was said by other members and by me about these broad policies. Now, it is important, first of all, that this House should give its clear directions about these policies, because after all the steps that we take or follow are the results of those policies. If the policies are not agreed to, then naturally the steps may also not fit in. It is important, therefore, that there should be this clarity of thinking. The situation that has arisen is one of great difficulty and complexity and a situation in which passions-public passions-are roused, quite naturally, and it becomes all the more necessary, when such strong feelings are roused, that there should be calm and clear thinking as to the broad policies and in regard to their implementation. The implementation indeed has many aspects. One is the purely military aspect, others connected with it, and yet, another aspect and a very important aspect is ultimately how we build up the country's strength for the purposes of defence.

Now, in regard to the broad policies, Sir, we have followed, as the House well knows, a policy in foreign affairs of what is called non-alignment or to put it in another way, of not tying ourselves with any military arrangement or bloc, and trying to be friendly with all nations with whose policies we may or may not agree. We follow that and we have raised our voice whenever we could in the councils of the nations in favour of the policy of peace and against the continuation of the cold war mentality which automatically leads to a worsening of the situation everywhere. It is a

curious paradox that today when we are facing certain grave dangers on our own borders, that the very policy for which we have stood for so long is meeting with a large measure of success in the important centres of the world and that apart from perhaps a few lone voices, broadly speaking, the world is moving towards an attempt to put an end to this cold-war and, possibly, even to these military blocs ultimately.

I do submit, Sir that the broad policy we have pursued in the past has been a correct policy and is a correct policy today. A policy of non-alignment or a policy of peaceful co-existence, or Panch Sheel, call it what you like, is not a policy which is followed regardless of changing circumstances; the policy remains but it is adapted to changing circumstances. I say this, I repeat this and I have said it previously too, because some hon. Members on the last occasion had stated that this policy of non-alignment or peaceful co-existence, had collapsed, had failed, I think that, while it is true that in so far as our relations with China are concerned, that policy has not succeeded, i.e., in the sense that our relations with China are not the embodiment of peace at the present moment so far as our thinking and our actions are concerned. What are the reasons, we may seek for them, and according to our thinking, the fault lies with many things that the Chinese Government have done, with a certain expansive, aggressive attitude that they have adopted and the actual fact that they have intruded on our territory. Therefore, that policy has to be met, that action has to be met. But that has little relation to the basic policies that we pursue. I say this because, presumably, some people imagine that this has been the result of that policy. That, of course, is, I would submit, completely wrong. In fact, the big fact of the modern world today is the success, the world-wide success, of the policy that this country has ventured to put forward and tried to pursue. I would repeat this because I should like clear thinking on this issue and clear directions because, after all, we in the Government

necessarily have to follow policies which are laid down or approved of by Parliament. The ultimate judge is Parliament; if I may say so, the ultimate judge is the people of India represented in Parliament, and we have to take our directions from Parliament and what Parliament decides, that the Government will follow, will pursue, if it finds itself capable of doing so. If not, some other Government takes charge and follows that policy. It is important, therefore, that there should be clear thinking and clear directions on these issues, these broad issues, so also, to some extent, in regard to the implementation thereof, although, obviously, implementation of a policy like this, especially in the military sphere, can hardly be discussed in Parliament. Now, Sir, when we consider the implementation of these policies, there is a purely military aspect of it and there is an aspect of it, which has always to be borne in mind. We see Great Powers today, and unfortunately the greatness of a nation today and, perhaps, previously too, is counted in terms of the armed might of that nation. Other factors come in no doubt but a great power is a power which has a big army, navy, air force, etc. That army, navy, air force etc. today have been built up because that country has a big industrial apparatus, because it is what is called a technologically advanced country. In fact, defence today depends tremendously upon the industrial and technological background of a country. All the world knows it. Therefore, in order to strengthen a country for its defence, the major effort is not in merely enrolling people for the army which, of course, is done in a measure but in building up that technological and industrial background in the country. Otherwise, that country is weak from the military or defence point of view.

Now, not today, but ever since we came into existence as an independent nation twelve years ago, this factor has been before us. If any hon. Member thinks that we had forgotten the question of defence or ignored it in our enthusiasm for Panchsheel, then I would submit that he is mistaken. We

may have made many mistakes but the fact of strengthening the country from the defence point of view was always before us. We did not know, and I confess today that I did not expect, that there would be an aggression on the part of China.⁶ Anyway, it has taken place. But the circumstances being what they were, no Government could ignore the aspect of defence and we came to the conclusion then, as now, that the basic factor in defence is the industrial growth of the country, and all the armies in the world without an industrial background could not function adequately in the matter of modern defence. To some extent our five year plans and the like were based on that, not directly on defence but on building up this industrial background. As the House well knows, in the last few years, more especially since the Second Five Year Plan came into being, greater stress has been laid, on the foundations of industry, that is, basic industries, heavy industries, in the country. It is on them alone that defence can ultimately rest, apart from petty methods of defence. There are other things, of course--communications, roads and other things which are important, but all this follows really the development of heavy industries in a country which not only provide the wherewithal for defence but which are supposed to raise the economy of a country to higher levels, thereby making the country and the people strong, putting them in a stronger position, for any emergencies that they might have to face.

I am stating these rather simple facts because I want this whole question to be considered in that context. A country does not normally go about talking about the steps it takes for defence, partly because one does not want to lay stress on it before the world at large and partly because our stress, our public stress, has always been on peace and will continue to be on peace, but that stress does not mean, cannot mean and should not mean any kind of forgetfulness of the country's basic requirements in regard to defence.

⁶ See SWJN/SS/53/pp. 491 and pp. 492-493

Always the question comes up before countries who are in danger or who may want to endanger others. The question has now been put as to whether they should have guns or butter. Well, we have very little butter in this country. As it is, it is difficult enough to resist the temptation to give more butter, of course meaning not butter only but the necessities of life of our country, the necessary amenities of life. But when this test comes, this problem arises-guns or butter. Where a country is industrially advanced, it has got a broad apparatus either to manufacture the good things of life, or guns and warlike equipment. That choice has to be made as it had been more or less made let us say, in Hitler's Germany, and he decided in favour of guns and he got them and fought a great war. In our case that question, guns or butter, arises, not in that same way, because, as it happens, and perhaps fortunately for us, the same thing, the same basis has to be laid, the same foundation has to be laid, whether it is for guns or for butter. The choice really comes after the foundation is laid, as to how to use that foundation for the future, whether to produce consumer goods, let us say, or the amenities of life for our people, or warlike material. Therefore whichever way we proceed in our thinking, we come to the conclusion that both for guns and butter we have to lay, as rapidly and as firmly as we can, these industrial foundations, and that is ultimately heavy industries. Of course that does not mean that other things do not count. Obviously, whether it is for war or for peace, one wants adequate food. It is obvious one cannot fight with an empty stomach or one cannot work hard even for peaceful purposes with an empty stomach. So what I venture to point out to this House is that that particular choice in that way does not come to us at the present moment even though we are threatened on our borders. The choice as to whether we can give up all progress, that we are envisaging, in favour of fun and guns alone, that would come to us if we decided to give up that building-up process and to rely on guns which we buy or import

from abroad within our resources. Of course we can go and buy-to meet a temporary emergency-warlike material and equipment, but thereby we cut short all our planning and the other schemes that we have in view. I hope it will never come to that. In a very small measure, of course, it may come but not in a big measure, because that itself then would be wrong thinking or rather a very short-term thinking. But the kind of crisis that we have to face today is not a short-term crisis-let us realise that. It cannot be, in the nature of things, a short-term crisis, whatever the next developments might be; it is a long-term affair. And whatever way we may think, we cannot ignore certain facts of geography. If we are concerned today with China, and China is concerned about us, well, whatever our feelings may be, India and China are neighbouring countries bordering on each other for thousands of miles. That border is going to continue and the two countries are going to be next to each other not only now but in future ages; neither country is going to run away from that geographical position. Therefore, we have to think in long distance terms also apart from the short-term objectives that we have. The short term oppresses us, because we have to meet the questions of today and we have to find answers to these questions. Nevertheless I would beg of hon. Members to remember that the short-term leads on to the long-term, and if in approaching the short-term we weaken ourselves in the long-term, that is not a wise policy.

There is a tendency sometimes in the public mind, naturally, to think in terms of the short-term, because of powerful reactions, because of anger and the desire to do something quickly and effectively. Well, naturally one has to give adequate importance to this short-term business and take adequate steps. Nevertheless, whether it is in war or in peaceful development, it is the long-term that counts and not the short term as a reaction of strong feelings or anger. Therefore we have to consider this question. In so far as the short-term is concerned, certainly we must, and

that becomes largely a question of military strategy, tactics, call it what you will. But the moment we get back to the long-term, which is so important, we have to consider two aspects of it, our broader policies, broader policies in regard to other nations, other nations meaning all nations, and how to strengthen the country basically to face those long-term developments, whatever they might be. Now, in that long-term process one has to realise- I repeat that I have said-that the strength of a nation comes from the technological developments of that nation; everything else is not real strength; it is some kind of a temporary or limited strength. Of course I need not say about the other factors that are well known-strength comes from discipline and unity, and all that, of course. That is so essential. But apart from those basic qualities that a nation should possess, it comes from the technological progress of a nation, and all the courage in the world does not ultimately take the place of technological progress in the modern world. That fact I should like the House to remember, because we have to make vital choices, basic choices. We cannot merely react to circumstances without thinking of the future results of our reactions. I said also that our future policy includes not merely this business of building up the nation technologically, industrially and otherwise, but in our relationships with other nations our policy has largely been directed towards building up good relationships in the last many years, and I believe it has borne very good fruit so far as we are concerned, good fruit not only in the sphere of friendship, etc., but in more practical domains also. And if it is said, as it is said sometimes, in criticism or disdain, that we talked about Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai and went on talking about it and ignored the realities of the situation, well. I do not know who exactly started this Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai, but whoever did it, did a good thing, because that should be our attitude to every country. If the House will remember, the same Bhai-Bhai business is repeated whoever comes here from any country often enough.

Of course, it may be over-done; it may be done at the wrong time and the wrong place, which is irritating, but my point is that the friendly approach is always the right approach, whatever happens. I make no exceptions. To the friendly approach must necessarily be allied the watchful approach, the vigilant approach and a preparations approach. But the moment you lose that approach or desire for friendly settlement, you lose yourself in a forest, in a most dangerous forest where anything may happen, and which is bad both from the national point of view and the international point of view. Today, of course, there is this development of mighty weapons which we have not got, but which the Western world and Russia have got. We have moved into a new phase of history. We have wars, cold wars, and cold wars have become abominations, which everybody wants to avoid. Therefore, only tomorrow we are going to welcome the great leader of a great nation.⁷ Why do we welcome him? For many reasons. Not because he is a great leader of a great nation, but fundamentally because he is a messenger of peace today in the world, and the heart of our country, which is so devoted to peace, goes out to him because he comes here with this message on his lips and in his heart. We have welcomed others too in that spirit. It may be that our ideas or views were not reciprocated from the other side, about peace or about friendship. Would this House advise, therefore, to function in a bellicose manner, aggressively, to show that we are strong and we can talk loudly? That surely is not the sign of strength. Strength comes in other ways.

Now, Sir, this is the background. I want to make it clear-let there be no mistake in the minds of hon. Members here-as to what the motive forces of our action and our basic policies are because we believe firmly that peace is better than war, that war is unutterably bad. Nevertheless, if a country's freedom or its integrity or its honour is attacked, we have to defend it with

⁷ Nehru is referring to Eisenhower

war, if necessary, and we have to defend it with all our might and we have to prepare for that. In the ultimate analysis we come to the same conclusion either way. But it does make a difference whether the particular mental and other approach is for peace or for war. Now, that is from a larger point of view.

If you look at it from the strictly narrowest point of view of practical affairs, you arrive at the same conclusion. There are certain facts of the modern world which we cannot ignore, and one cannot, therefore, behave in a rather immature and juvenile way of shaking one's fists at everybody and threatening everybody even though that threat may be justified or the fist may be justified. That is one side of the question.

The other and the more practical side, as things are, is our preparation for meeting this contingency, this crisis in an adequate way, with all the strength so that we can gather and increase that strength. That, as I said, is a military problem to some extent to make the best of our strength today and tomorrow, but it means ultimately-and let this be fully realised that it is not a purely military problem-it becomes a problem of utilising every ounce of energy in the nation. It means putting an end to every species of indiscipline that weakens the nation. It means-I use the phrase which I used in the other place-a nation in arms, not in arms going about with a gun in hand of mental and physical arms for the affray, whatever happens. It means many great things that people have not thought of or talked of. It means our fashioning, whatever it is, our Five Year Plans, our budgets, our everything, in a different way. It means austerity and hard living and hardship. I shall not quote the words of a famous Englishman about blood and sweat and tears, but it does mean that blood and sweat and tears to everyone of us if we have to face this contingency. Therefore, let us not do so light-heartedly, but with clarity of thought and firmness of decision and realising that at this moment these petty quarrels and criticisms are

singularly out of place even though they might have their place at other times, because I find that curious contradiction in all the people so often, in what they are doing.

I find a contradiction in all our young men who sent me letters written in drops of blood to offer their lives for the defence of our country, these young men behaving in a manner which would ruin any country if that behaviour went on for some time. It is utter indiscipline. It does not fit in with a crisis. It does not fit in with anything, crisis or not, but certainly at a time of crisis. It shows utter ignorance or misunderstanding of what is happening. So, let us realise what we are in for. We shall work for peace. We shall work for settlements. We are not, I hope, going by a spurt of anger to be compelled to take wrong steps, but we shall work with all our might also for the strengthening of the country, and for the defence of the country.

If there appears to be in the minds of some hon. Members some conflict between the two approaches, I do not agree with them. I do not think there is any real conflict. Both are essential approaches. And if this House or Parliament thinks that these basic approaches are not correct, that some other approach has to be followed, then obviously the will of Parliament must prevail. But Parliament should then find means of enforcing that will or implementing that will. That is broadly the question.

Now, some little time back I mentioned what our responsibilities were apart from the obvious responsibilities of defending India and Indian territory. I mentioned some names of some neighbouring countries. It is undoubtedly true that our responsibilities extend to these neighbouring countries-and it is not in a light hearted manner that I mentioned them which add to the burdens that we carry, heavy as they are, but because those responsibilities were undertaken by us many years ago. We have to stand by them whatever the consequences our neighbouring countries-Sikkim,

Bhutan and Nepal. Now, each one of them stands on a separate footing and let us not mix them up. Nepal, of course, is an independent country just like India is independent and whatever it chooses to do in the exercise of that independence, we cannot come in the way. But, if I mentioned Nepal on the last occasion, it was because nearly nine years ago, there was a clear understanding between the Governments of Nepal and India on this point. There was no military alliance. It was a clear understanding which was advantageous to both and in order to remove any doubts from hon. Members' minds, I shall read out the words of that understanding. This treaty between India and Nepal, a treaty of peace and friendship, was signed on the 31st July 1950. I shall read the first two articles.

Article 1 states: "That the two Governments agree to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other."

Article 2 says: "That the two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations existing between the two Governments."

Now, apart from this treaty-but it is an essential operative part of that there was an exchange of letters between the two Governments in identical language, as was the custom. In these letters there is this sentence:

"Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two Governments shall consult with each other and devise effective counter-measures."

This was the clear understanding arrived at and therefore I thought it desirable to state that. In fact I was a little surprised that people did not know this. The words may not have been known but the position itself was pretty well known and I want to make it perfectly clear that this understanding has nothing to do with any kind of unilateral action on our

part. We cannot do it, we will not do it. We are going to take no step in regard to Nepal or in Nepal. That is for the Government of Nepal to decide but it is in mutual interest it is stated in these letters and the treaty-for us to associate ourselves, first of all in knowledge as to what is happening, and secondly, in the counter measures that might have to be taken. The Prime Minister of Nepal, the other day, said something on this subject and may I say that I entirely agree with his interpretation of this position. Now for the last many years, we have laboured through five year plans and the like, to build up the prosperity of this country as well as its strength because the two are allied. You cannot separate them, though of course you can lay far greater stress on one aspect than on the other but the base is the same, more or less. One may lay greater stress on arms production and less on such measures as may bring some relief to our people but the foundation is the same. We have arrived at a stage now when some kind of words which have lately come into common use, are often applied to India. That is, we are approaching what is called the "take-off" stage, "take-off" into a more or less modernist economy.

Out of traditional economies, we march through various stages into an industrial and technological stage of production etc. It is a very basic stage and stage which, by the very virtue of the fact of our advance, brings all kinds of new problems. The problems that we face in our economic world are evidence of the progress we have made and are making and you will find that type of problem in every country which reaches that stage. When you cross a river, your hardest effort is when you are in the middle of the river facing heavy current, not when you are near one of the banks. That is where we are, and it is recognized, I think, in the greater part of the world that the progress we have made has been rather remarkable. We are not comparing with other countries like China. It may be, it probably is, that the progress China has made industrially, I mean the rate, is faster and the

results are greater. I do not exactly know and I am not prepared to accept that as a fact but we have also, tied up with our industrial and economic progress, certain other conceptions of human dignity, individual freedom and all that and I take it that we are not prepared to give up those conceptions which we value. It is not for me to say what China or some other country might do but it is for us to lay down our own basic conceptions. Now, one has to pay a certain price for these conceptions of human dignity and freedom. In fact those conceptions can only flourish, broadly speaking, in peace time. One of the first things that a war brings is the suppression of much that an individual stands for, and the progressive degradation of the human spirit. That is the result of a war, not only among those who fight but among others because nowadays wars are total wars, affecting every human being. In peace time one may argue about controls and all that. In war time they inevitably clamp down on everything because it is a matter of life and death for the nation. No individual counts, no individual's freedom even counts except within limitation. It is not a good state of affairs. Let us realize that. The two great wars, the World Wars, have undoubtedly brought in a good deal of degradation in human relations, towards violence and hatred and all that. So we have to try to hold to our anchorage and to the ideals we hold and yet make good. That is the basic problem before us and that problem comes up before us at a time when there are new horizons all over the world. We live in an extraordinary and in a most exciting time when these new horizons are opening out, scientifically and otherwise.

Old conceptions even, whatever they were-whether they were conceptions of military or other conceptions-are out of date with modern weapons. Economic conceptions are out of date in the modern world, with new forces coming into play. Whether they are conceptions of the capitalist world or

communist world, both today are out of date in this new horizon that is opening out and the new horizon that is coming into play.

I am mentioning all this because you have to consider every problem and more especially a grave problem like this, in this wider context of a changing world. We are changing in our own country. We are perhaps not so conscious of that change because we are in the middle of the change. Others see it better but we ought to be able to see the changing world at least and not be led away by old slogans and older concepts because people are in the habit, nations are in the habit, of repeating certain concepts and slogans to which they are used. They go on using the old rhetoric when the reason for that rhetoric is past. So, you find in the world today a great ideological conflict that was taking place between the so-called communist world and the non-communist world still being referred to in brave phrases and words and yet progressively losing its edge.

Countries adapting themselves to the new world when it is growing, go on using the old rhetoric sometimes, if I may respectfully say so, as men of religion sometimes go on using their old rhetoric, whether it is to the point or not. Although they adapt themselves to the new conditions, the words remain the same. So we find it here. Now in this state of affairs, when the world is in a fluid state, changing and new ideas and horizons are opening out, it is a peculiar misfortune that we should be confronted with a situation which threatens military conflicted war. It is not of our seeking, as the world knows. But whether it is of our seeking or not, we have to face it and we have to prepare ourselves for it with our strength, all the time trying to find peaceful methods of solving all these problems. If those are denied and if those are not available, then there is no choice left and we shall face that. But we shall face that, I hope, even then keeping the ultimate objective in view and not entirely letting go the old anchorage which has held us together.

Great wars take place, bloody wars, but after the war comes peace. Nations come together to find some kind of peace, for they cannot fight for ever. I remember a phrase which Mr. De Valera⁸ long years ago said in my presence. He said was very odd how after each war people came together for peace. Why don't they come together before the war and settle it? It seems a simple way out but it is a very wise thing. You first go through blood and disaster and then you come together and talk of peace. Anyhow, in the world as it is developing today, it would be a great misfortune if there was a world war. And that is why the major countries of the world and particularly the leaders among those countries, seeking peace today are the United States and the Soviet Union, and I believe the United Kingdom. These countries, all powerful countries, all highly developed countries, have come to this conclusion that the way of war is not a good way, and I believe that all three of these are determined to find a way out. We welcome that, and I would not like to do anything which comes in the way of that. It may be that some other countries are not so keen on these settlements. They live in some kind of fever or excitement. They have developed a kind of neurosis because of the fever, may be. But I do not want my country to develop any neurosis of that kind because it is not only bad in itself, but it is really discarding everything that we have stood for, and if we discard that, then we become without roots, national or anything. So I hope that however we may face this contingency and these dangers, we shall remember that basis, that root of ours which has helped us so much in the past.

For the present, Sir, that is all I wish to say in this connection. I shall listen very carefully to the advice and criticisms of hon. Members and then, if I may, venture to have my last say on this. Thank you.

⁸ Eamon de Valera, President of Ireland

157. In the Rajya Sabha: India-China Relations⁹

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am grateful to hon. Members for all that they said in the course of this discussion even though some of it was in criticism of our policies and what I may have done. I am glad of their criticism because it enables me to deal with certain aspects of this matter and to remove, possibly, some doubts that may remain in Members' minds. Naturally it is rather embarrassing for me to discuss personal matters, whether the personal matters refer to me or to a colleague of mine.

Now the hon. Member opposite, Mr. Ganga Sharan, after paying me some compliments, mostly undeserved, said that-well-I was suffering from certain rust, mental or otherwise, or bodily. Well, I am no judge of my mental or other condition, and if I have, in his opinion, lost the luster that I once possessed, that is my misfortune. But Mr. Ganga Sharan¹⁰ perhaps wrongly thought that I was endowed with certain qualities or misjudged me in the past I cannot function today as I functioned forty or fifty years ago. That is a natural result of the lapse of time. But so far as the policies are concerned, which I seek to pursue hard, I believe that they are in line with all that I have said and done in the last forty years, whether it was in the course of our struggle for our independence or later. I am too much rooted in those thirty years of our struggle to start on a new line in the later years of my life. Nevertheless, whether it was twenty or thirty or forty years ago, I was always trying to look to the future, trying to look to the future for which we were attempting to prepare India. That question always loomed before me-what of Indians future, what do we want India to be, what do we

⁹ Motion, 9 December 1959. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. XXVII, cols 1967-1991

¹⁰ Ganga Sharan Sinha, PSP

want the world to be, although I was involved very deeply in the then din. Nevertheless, the future occupied at least half of my mind. I wonder how far that is the case with Mr. Ganga Sharan or Dr. Kunzru.

Mr. Shiva Rao¹¹ gave a very relevant quotation from a speech by Sir Winston Churchill, the first speech he delivered when he became the war premier because of the last great war, when he said "If the present sits in judgment on the past, it may lose the future." It is a wise saying from a man of great experience of war and peace, both. It does seem to me that the hon. Dr. Kunzru is always so wrapped up in the past that he hardly has any idea of the future. Now it has been my misfortune not to have been able to agree with Dr. Kunzru in the course of the last forty years. I am not talking about minor agreements or disagreements-they may occur anywhere-but of rather a basic approach to life and its problems, a basic approach to India and its problems, a basic approach to national and international problems; for forty years we have differed, and forty years ago the hon. Member differing from these new policies left the great organisation to which I had the honour to belong and have belonged all this time. He did not agree, he had every right not to agree of course, as everybody has the right. But he cut himself away from the national current of the day because he did not look at the future; he did not look at the currents of life that were convulsing Indian humanity.

He judged me, Mr. Ganga Sharan, and tells me about public opinion. I should bow to public opinion, I should be of course. What am I here except as a representative of public opinion, and the moment I do not represent them. I shall bow my way out and seek some other occupation-that is obvious. Of course opinions may differ as to what public opinion is. Naturally and there is no single public opinion, it varies and agrees very seldom. There are varieties of public opinion as there are varieties of

¹¹ Congress

groups and classes and occupations and all that in a great country. Undoubtedly Shri Ganga Sharan represents a body of public opinion. Undoubtedly Dr. Kunzru represents a body of public opinion. Whether that body is small or big is another matter. The question therefore is when we talk about public opinion—to what public opinion we refer to. Is it the opinion of the masses or the city folk? Is it the opinion of a number of intellectuals? Is it the opinion of a small group or a big group? All these things arise. Is it the opinion of a few newspapers? All that arises. I venture to think that I have, among my many failings, one quality, and that is judging public opinion, having my hand or my mind on the pulse of public opinion, affecting and changing public, opinion. Of course, it is wrong to be swept away by public opinion. If you consider it wrong, you have to resist it. But broadly speaking I try to keep in touch with public opinion and the public have been generous to me in this matter, not only in their affection but also in accepting often the advice I gave them. Therefore, I would submit, let us not discuss here in balance what public opinion is. What I am afraid of in the present instance, and I shall be quite frank with this House, is that here we are facing the gravest problems that a country can face. There was a brief but very important reference to this in Mr. Panikkar's short speech yesterday. We are facing one of the major historical changes of the world, of Asia, and of India, That is what we are facing. It is not a minor matter. Some people argue, some people say, that it is a minor matter, a border raid, some killing. It is something very big, not in terms of that invasion or aggression or border raid, I am not going now into semantics and legal, wordy quibbling, as Dr. Kunzru was pleased to do yesterday as to whether any violation of the frontier is more or less not expansionism. Is that the way we deal with major problems of the day when the whole picture of the world is changing so far as India is concerned and India's borders are concerned? That is a major issue that we have to face, to which reference

was made by Mr. Panikkar. Here is a historical change of the greatest magnitude. For the first time two major powers of Asia face each other on an armed border. For the first time a world power or would be world power sits near our borders and frontiers. It is quite immaterial whether we are friendly or not. Even if we are hundred per cent friendly with them, the fact remains that here is a mighty power sitting on our borders. That itself changes the whole context, the whole picture. That we have to observe and see. And we are not a mean country or a weak country. So, we face each other there and we face each other in anger at the present moment, and we are going to face each other, not today or tomorrow but for hundreds and hundreds of years. Neither China nor India is going to walk out of Asia. That is the question of the present and the future and that is the broad aspect. And I am glad that Mr. Panikkar, with his great experience of both these countries, drew attention to this major historical fact; that is, we are sitting or we are looking at these problems at a turn of history's wheel, a major turn which has never taken place in the past. Look at it from this point of view-not this petty, quibbling point of view of a little area being here or there, of what somebody has said and somebody has not said. Behind this, look at this other picture-both China and India trying with more or less success to move out of a traditional form of society with traditional structures as they used to be, into something new because all over the world for the last hundred years, 150 years if you like or more, there has been this change from traditional forms to what might be called modern forms-I am using the word 'modern' rather technologically modern, scientifically modern-which has changed the face of the world, which has made the great powers as you see them today because of the technological advance, scientific advance. Now, I am not going into another and a deeper question as to whether technological advance is enough for a country. I should say not. The other forms, call them what you like ethical, moral,

spiritual, are necessary to give a country any sound foundation. And surely in the case of India, a country which has believed in that kind of thing, it is important. But I am not going to discuss that. The major fact that I am pointing out is that here is this mighty change which has come over the world, over the Western world to begin with and now spreading over the Asian world-the advance of science and technology changing the ways of living, the methods of life and bringing the problems of higher standards, more food, more clothing, more of everything that a man needs. And in the course of all this not only a nation's prosperity increases, but its armed power increases. Armed power today is above all based on technological advance. It does not matter how brave the people are in a country. If they are technologically backward, they are supposed to be weak and they are weak in that sense. Now, we see those changes coming over Asia, tremendous, mighty waves of change coming over every part of Asia in various degrees. You see in China a revolution, "one of the most basic and fundamental in history, taking place, something convulsing 600 millions of people. We see mighty changes in India, in the 400 millions, not in that violent way, not with those abrupt and violent methods, which we have seen in China, but nevertheless big changes, tremendous and revolutionary changes taking place in the whole streetcars of life here. And I doubt if even we who are today sitting in Parliament fully realise how the base of life in India is changing by a variety of ways, by the spread of education, by the spread of industry and all that. Now, in this background each of these countries is groping forward and when a country like India or a country like China gropes forward, it makes a change-too big not to affect the world here these two mighty countries come against each other and face each other in an armed way, in anger. That is a major event of the world. What is happening today perhaps in the world is that the centre of gravity of conflict is shifting from Europe to Asia. All these are major historical things

and cannot be disposed of by petty arguments, petty criticisms and this or that. Here is the future unveiling itself, unraveling and bringing tremendous new problems which cannot be answered by any traditional way of thinking, whether in war or peace. Therefore, I would beg of Mr. Ganga Sharan Sinha to keep this in mind because I have great respect for Mr. Ganga Sharan Sinha. But I do think that he is too rooted in traditional ways of thinking to realise the present or think of the future. And as for Dr. Kunzru, whom I have respected always and respect now, I have always somehow felt this difficulty that he loses himself in innumerable details and the big thing passes by unnoticed. So, this is my difficulty. I shall deal with some of the points that Dr. Kunzru raised in so far as I can. But I do wish this House and this country to realise what has happened and what is happenings dislike it, this House dislikes it. I appreciate and I welcome the surge of emotion that has passed through this country, because of these border troubles. A healthy community ought to react in this way, and having reacted in this way we should turn this energy, this enthusiasm in the right, constructive direction, to build up and strengthen the country to face any peril or adventure that might come our way. But what troubles me is this turning of this enthusiasm into wrong channels, into effervescent channels which do not last, and sometimes cries are raised which I have fought against all my life when they were raised in other countries. And I am not going to accept those cries being raised in India because I am an Indian; I dislike jingoism, whether it is in England or America or Russia or China or India. I am not a jingoist; I do not want my country to be jingoist, and especially when the jingoism has not even any basis of that great strength to enforce it, it becomes ridiculous to talk in that way. We are not weak. I do not accept it when anybody says we are weak. We are strong enough to face any contingency partly because we have developed industrially and otherwise; we are stronger than we were some years before, much

stronger and may I say that the principal strength to which I attach importance has come to us, to our war machine, during the last two or three years and I wish Dr. Kunzru did appreciate this fact.

H.N. Kunzru: I appreciated it much earlier than you. Have a little modesty. That will befit you.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Why? If I may say so, why should I be modest when I think of India? I am not modest when I think of India. Our war machine, as all war machines, depends on an industrial apparatus behind it. I am not talking about the general industrial apparatus of the country, but of the specialised, broad industrial apparatus. That has progressed more in the last two or three years than at any previous time, because more attention, organised attention, has been given to it. That is a thing which comes from a new approach. In this country in whatever line we move we are restricted, limited, constrained, and cabined by our old habits of government and everything. Whether it is the army, whether it is the civil structure—we have the advantage of carrying on with every kind of structure, but there is a very grave disadvantage of being cabined and confined by all this structure. It takes up at the time and we have to consider this matter today, more especially when we talk about policies and other things. But the real difficulty that comes in our way is the delay in the implementation of any policy whether in the States or the government were because of procedures, all kinds of procedures. It has to go through so many grades of officials and others to get through, noting and all that. We all complain against it and yet, we find it exceedingly difficult to get out of it. This kind of thing does not apply, of course, to the Chinese Government. There is no Parliament to discuss anything there. They decide and they order and it is done. And I am not talking that Parliament should

not discuss it-of course not-and I was really talking about the difference in the whole approach there, how things can be done rapidly, whether rightly or wrongly. Our procedures have been inherited from the old British times. The delay is there. Good procedures are there, good in the sense that theoretically they are good, good in the sense that they aim at perfection, perfection of the official procedure, checks and counterchecks this must not go wrong, that must not go wrong. But they result in great delay and that is a very vital matter when we have to do things quickly whether in a peace situation or in a war situation. In a war situation, of course, all that has to go in a chain. So we are tied up. In the same manner, I submit, we are tied up in our mental processes, most people are. It is difficult to adapt ourselves to a world which is rapidly changing, and we are tied up in our mental processes also, because we represent, by and large, as we should not only the urban people, the technical people in India, the new type of human being that has risen in this technological world in India, but we represent above all the rural masses of India. They require representation, of course. That is the principal problem. But we bring with that also the traditional mind. We see that great forces are at work which are changing India, changing China, changing Asia, changing the world. Therefore, we have to look at these problems in this wide perspective and realise that we have to prepare not for some trouble on the border today.

But, of course, we have to, to the best of our ability, protect our integrity, but this is the major problem of the future, of two nations armed facing each other. People say, why don't you drive them out? "Why don't you" as if it is some kind of a children's game and not realising what this means. If we can drive them out, they can drive us out of some place and we enter into theirs. So, I do beg of this House to get this broad picture of the vast historical change that has come in and that has to be faced, and that.

Jaswant Singh:¹² They drive us out, all right.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There speaks the traditional mind again. I cannot get rid of it, I can't. I cannot really deal with the situation if he goes on repeating some pet ideas.

We have got here to face a situation which can only be faced by strength. If that is so, we have to build up that strength as rapidly as possible, and we have to find out how to build up that strength. That strength can be built up in many ways-armies, etc... but basically again, it has to be built up by the industrial background that you have. And remember always, this is not a question of today or six months or a year; years ahead we shall have to face this problem, peace or war. Apart from peace or war, whatever it may be, the facts are that two great nations face each other across a tremendous frontier and they are both pretty strong, stronger than in the past. Then how are we to live?

Are we to live in permanent hostility or are we to find some way of existence as friends, if not as friends, as people who tolerate each other? Now, look at this picture even in the wider context of the world. What is happening? All the world is talking about President Eisenhower's visit here. The visit of President Eisenhower would have been important at any time because he represents a great nation. He is a great man. But particular importance attaches to his visit today here, not because of our trouble on the border, but because he is moving about all over, at great trouble and inconvenience is visiting numbers of countries in Europe and Asia, because we feel that he is pursuing an ideology of peace. And that is why wherever he goes, he finds a tremendous welcome, not only from governments, but from the people, and that is why I have no doubt that this afternoon or tomorrow or the day after the people of Delhi will welcome him in their vast

¹² Independent

numbers, but not a formal welcome, but a welcome from the heart, because we welcome the messengers of peace, the builders of peace, and we feel that he is trying his utmost to achieve peace in spite of great difficulties. Why is all this turn taking place in the Western world? Why suddenly-not suddenly, but nevertheless, very rapidly-has the cold-war mentality gradually changed? It has not gone, of course-of course not-but the change has been remarkable in these last years or so. And everybody is hoping that as months pass, more progress will be made on the question of disarmament, on the question of stoppage of nuclear tests, which is so vital and in putting an end to this cold war. All over the world the masses of people hope that this will happen. They have had that hope, of course, for a long time past. But today a change is taking place with even governments; stolid as they are, they have been moved somewhat by popular emotion and by the facts of life facing them, and so, Governments are also moving in that direction. Now, they are doing so, I take it, not because of, shall I say, humanitarian reasons or just love of everybody, and I hope this element of humanitarian reasons enter into them. But really Governments function, shall I say, not for humanitarian reasons. That is supposed to be rather tough-the government way of dealing with a national question. A Minister may not be tough but Governments are tough and I suppose they have to be tough but Governments have come to the conclusion that this toughness in the present day does not pay. Toughness leads to consequences not on the other party but on themselves. Toughness might lead to utter destruction of themselves and their countries. Here is a great power, England, a nuclear power. What is the fate of England in a nuclear war? Every Englishman knows that. They are brave people; they do not shout and complain. In a major nuclear war, England is destroyed just like any other country---of course not only England. I am merely mentioning England. Here is one of the greatest countries in the world, a most

advanced country, one of the most prosperous countries and even a member of the so-called nuclear club. Even that country cannot protect itself if there is war. They can destroy others but they cannot protect themselves. A curious situation has arisen in this world. Therefore, these statesmen of the world of many countries are trying their hardest to get rid of these fears and suspicions and find some way of living with the people across their borders, some way of co-existence. There is no other way. And let us hope that they win succeed. Now I refer to this matter because you have to consider even your problems from the context of these larger developments because those larger developments will affect us, will affect China. It is not a question of, as some people say, 'how can you put your trust in China?' It is not a question of trust at all.

Frankly, first of all no country finally puts its trust in any other country. They may be more favourably inclined or less but in the ultimate analysis, they have always to keep a loophole in their minds that the other party will not play up or that other things may happen or national interests may come into play. The safer thing is for the national interest to be more or less in line with international interests. Where they conflict, you do not quite know what will happen. So it is not a question of my trusting China or not trusting it but it is a question, nevertheless, of my realising that China and India, two great countries, are going through enormous changes which are strengthening them, making them powerful, modern power States and they will be and they are next to each other and have to remain for millennia to come for geological ages, next to each other. All these questions come up. This does not mean, of course, that we should think of what will happen hundred years hence and forget what is happening today. In the context of today, you have to take every possible step to protect your integrity, your freedom and your self-respect. That of course is so. That is common ground. I need not argue that. You may go into details as to how you do it

but it is common ground that we should face this position and protect our country's territories, to the best of our ability and in that comes again a certain morale of the nation, a certain discipline, a certain unity and not constantly nibbling at each other and nagging at each other and blaming each other, because that is just the thing which undermines that very basis when you have to face a national crisis. Then you prepare for tomorrow also by our developing industrial growth and the rest. That is admitted. I do not refer to it because it is no good going on repeating the same phrases, but the basic thing remains. What is your picture of today, and what will be the picture tomorrow and the day after and you have to prepare for it because basically and fundamentally I know that we must work for peace in the world. We must work for peace on our borders and we must work but at the same time not talk about peace-if I may be forgiven for saying so in a Utopian way, just reciting a Mantra of peace and doing nothing. I do not believe that the weak can do anything worthwhile. A weak nation cannot do and even the cry of peace from a weak nation or individual has no influence on others. It is only when there is strength behind it, the strength of will and the spirit of the nation and organized strength of the nation that its voice counts. It has been an amazing thing and a surprising thing that India's voice has counted for so much in the councils of the world in the last several years since independence. Progressively it has counted for more and more without the material background of strength behind that voice. It has been a surprising thing how that has happened. We may have been taken in by it that we are getting bigger and bigger. We may have become conceited about it-there was some room for conceit, I admit-but the fact is, that a country like India, which, in the modern world is in terms of physical might not to be compared with the great powers or with many of the armed nations, which cannot be even called great powers, a country which is poor and which is struggling hard to get rid of its poverty, how has this country's

voice, with no great military might, with no financial or other resources has counted for so much in the world for the last few years. Whether it is in the United Nations or whether it is elsewhere, we are respected all over the world; let us remember that. Now there must be some reason for it. Maybe, you may say well, I am not saying it but somebody may say that-that it is clever diplomacy, it is cleverly putting ourselves across to others. Maybe, there is something in it, not wholly. It may be due to the remembrance in the world of a mighty personality like Gandhiji and we shine by it or we have got something of the radiance that he possessed. It may be that we have spoken with conviction and earnestness and sincerity about peace and our desire for peace and our desire for tolerance and when we have talked about coexistence and all that, it was not a phrase in our mouths and lips. It was a deep feeling from inside our hearts and it was a deep understanding of the world as it is today because there can be nothing else but co-existence in the world.

I do say it-because the emphasis is deeper-that there can be nothing else but Panchsheel in this world. I say it with all the emphasis at my command. It may be broken by individuals or nations. They will suffer if they break. The world will suffer. It is a different matter. So we have followed a policy not of the day, not of the moment, but a policy which looked into the future and millions and millions of people in other countries were affected by that. They looked up to India in a sense-they could get nothing out of us, not money, not arms they looked up to us because they felt that India did have the change to stand for something even though it was a poor country and a lightly armed country. There was something in that. It was the policy we pursued, the policy of nonalignment, the policy of co-existence of the policy of Panchsheel, call it what you will, basically. It was-I will not say immaterial-largely immaterial all the same what China did or some other country did about it. In so far as China is concerned, if China breaks that

policy, that type of contact with us breaks between China and India but the policy is not wrong. So we attained a measure of stature among nations which normally nations do not attain unless they have financial power, industrial power or military power. We had none of these three, to any large extent. We attained that because of the policies we have pursued, the policies which some hon. Members here seem to think have been wrong ab initio, which, Dr. Kunzru seems to think is completely wrong and even if it was right basically, it was implemented wrongly. Therefore I am pointing out...

H. N. Kunzru: I never said that the principles underlying Panchsheel were wrong. All that I said was that the manner in which the Prime Minister had interpreted it and implemented it was wrong, is quite wrong and I repeat it now.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am glad that Dr. Kunzru has made it clear beyond any shadow of doubt. That is exactly what I meant, because he said that the policy in theory was right but the manner the Prime Minister has interpreted and acted upon it has been wrong, wrong and wrong-three times. Now so far as the world is concerned, the world judges of that policy not by some Sastric document preserved in our ancient archives. The world has heard of this policy from what the Prime Minister has said about it and the world has reacted to it from learning of it from my lips, from my writings and from statements made by me. Therefore, the world has fallen out of step with Dr. Kunzru. That is my humble submission. Of course, Dr. Kunzru has a habit of falling out of step. He fell out of step forty years ago with the national movement. He cannot keep pace with the advance of our nation or of the world. He is so deeply engrossed in the vast extent of his old learning that the new learning passes by.

Now Sir, I would beg this House to keep these to keep these broad pictures in mind, I shall briefly repeat them. There is the broad picture of the world undergoing a tremendous change. As I said yesterday, new horizons, new visions come up, something almost going outside the scope of physical existence, when you talk of going to the moon and of scientific developments today. They almost take you to something which I do not know how to describe. I may call it dimensional the fourth dimension. We live in a three dimensional world and now we might almost be on the verge of the fourth dimension for aught I know.

Anyhow there are two types of existence, two types of experience which are beyond the normal experience of humanity, individuals apart. That is happening in the world today. Science says matter and energy is one and the same thing almost. We do repeat these phrases, not understanding them. So there is this change. Then there is this big change in the world; the change away from the cold war, in which the lead has been taken by these two great, the two biggest and strongest nations of the world—America and the Soviet Union. That is one aspect of it. The other aspect is this particular problem that is raised when China and India, if I may say so come to grips with the problem of historical significance. That is represented today by the aggression or invasion of our territory, or call it what you like, by the violation of our territory and all that. But behind that question—that is important enough and we have to face it but actually behind that stretches this vista of the future which I see all the time and I try to evolve or meet this equation or see how to solve this problem. But I want this House and not only this House but millions of our people must have some glimpse of this, for otherwise they will decide wrongly. Otherwise they will lose all the enthusiasm and energy that they possess by taking shelter in jingoistic and chauvinistic cries. That would be a tragedy, a very grave tragedy, because we shall become a nation not of depth but of

effervescence. We shall become a nation which has lost its anchorage. I am afraid of that kind of thing and that is why I talk about this sometimes in public and elsewhere. People think I am afraid of China or I am afraid of this or that, because I do that. I am elsewhere. I am not afraid of anything of that type. I am only afraid of our nation losing grip of the fundamentals in which it has believed. That is the only thing I am afraid of.

Now, may I refer briefly to some of the points raised? Dr. Kunzru referred to a certain Border Committee that was appointed. I shall tell the House about this Committee. But I suppose enough facts have come out in the papers, in the White Papers and in the speeches here and in the other House to indicate that right from 1950, or at any rate from 1951, when the Chinese forces came into Tibet, we have had this problem before us. It has not suddenly come up before us this year or last year. We have had this problem before us and this developing picture which I have put before you, of two power States emerging, two power States coming face to face with each other on a tremendous border. Ever since 1950, this has been the picture before us. We may have differed as to the timing in our minds, as to when this will happen, whether in five years, ten years, twenty years, fifteen years, it was difficult to say. But we had that picture. And looking through my old papers when this occurred, I was surprised myself to see how we had referred to these contingencies, eight or nine years ago, in our papers and how we had written to our ambassadors in Peking and others, especially at Peking and asked for his reactions. In those early years of this present day Republic, the Chinese Republic, Mr. Panikkar was our ambassador there and I read through his notes on the subject and our notes to him and our decisions. From the very first day and all the time this problem came before us, about our frontier. It is not a new problem. The question was whether we should raise it in an acute form at that stage. We decided-whether it was right or wrong you can judge now, it is easy to be

wise after the event, for hind sight is always easy to take—we decided not to, and still we do not see how we could have decided otherwise. We might have done so, of course, but I do not see any reason yet. But with all the material that was before us at the time, we decided that we must make clear in every possible way what our frontier was in our opinion, clear in our maps, clear in our statements, clear to the world and clear to China and clear to our own people, of course, and hold by it, stick by it. Why should we go about asking China to raise this question when we felt sure about it? Why invite discussion about a thing on which we had no doubt? But as I said, we might, with hind sight say that that was not a very wise policy that is a different matter. The point is this was discussed repeatedly in our notes, in our papers, and despatches. I believe, if I may say so, Mr. Panikkar himself advised us at that time, "Yes, you need not raise it; but declare it openly". We declared in Parliament. We declared it before the Chinese Government and all that. And during all this period, remember, the only way this question came up before was because of the Chinese maps. When we saw the Chinese maps we protested and the answer always was "These are old maps which require revision and we shall, when we have leisure, revise them." But at no time during this entire period did they challenge our map. They did not accept it in so many words but they never challenged it. And they never raised this question themselves and all that they said about their own maps was that these had to be revised. Now, I wish to admit that a lingering doubt remained in my mind and in my Ministry's mind as to what might happen in the future. But we did not see how we were going to decide this question by hurling it in that form at the Chinese at the moment. We felt that we should hold by our position and that the lapse of time and events will confirm it, and by the time perhaps, when the challenge to it came, we would be in a much stronger position to face it. I may be perfectly frank to the House. It is not as if it was ignored

or that it was not thought about. After the longest and clearest thinking and consultations with those who were concerned, between our Ambassadors and others, our Foreign Affairs Committee and others, we came to this decision. This was discussed again and again, after two or three years, whenever a new contingency arose.

Then came the period of the Tibetan Treaty or the Tibetan Agreement of 1954. Again we considered it at length. Should we bring this question positively into the front-the recognition of the McMahon Line? A hon. Member-I forget who-asked, "Why did you not ask them to recognise it?" Well, what exactly was the quid pro quo? They were sitting in Tibet. Our telling them that we did not recognise it would mean nothing. What were we supposed to say? It is not clear to me. Was it a question on non-recognition of the Chinese Government? Were we going that far? "All right, we do not recognise you. We break off relations with you because you do not recognise the McMahon Line" or, as some people going on saying, we do not recognise the Chinese sovereignty or suzerainty over Tibet. They were sitting there and our saying anything to them would make no difference. It is rather infantile to think that they would have been frightened by our saying something. The result would have been that they would have achieved their dominance over Tibet completely and the only thing is that we would have quarreled with them and we would have come near breaking point with them. The trouble on the frontier would have come immediately, not now but years back we would have had to face it. So, this business of saying that we should have insisted on this and insisted on that, we should have asked them to guarantee this and guarantee that, we should have made them commit themselves to this or that envisages all kinds of ultimatum and the like being issued by us and their being compelled to accept that ultimatum. It does not fit in with the facts of life, with the facts as they are in Asia, in India, in China and in Tibet. I can

imagine some argument being based on some high moral principles, regardless of what happens to India or to Tibet or to anybody. That, of course, may be advanced but such an argument usually by itself does not influence Foreign Offices.

Now Sir, Mr. Ganga Sharan and others sort of seemed to have an idea that there has been negligence and said that past negligence should not be repeated. I really am not ashamed to confess errors; maybe we had been negligent here and there in various places but in our broad policy in regard to our frontiers I do claim that we have not been negligent keeping this broad picture in view because any other step of a major character would have created a crisis earlier than we would have been prepared for it. You may say, and you would be right in saying, that we could have pushed ahead with more of road building or building lines of communications, etc. I think we have been going on fast there.

Ganga Sharan Sinha: That is what precisely I said in my speech.

Jawaharlal Nehru: But then, you should remember another aspect. It always becomes a question of balancing things. Here we are struggling with our five year plans and the like. We have to balance and to see whether we should spend so much more on the development of a frontier area or in some other area which will bring in quicker results, say a steel plant or a fertiliser plant. One has to balance all these things. Maybe the balancing is wrong. One makes a guess; one has to judge. There is the danger of slow progress in one direction and the dangers in the frontier. All these things have to be done and one makes a guess about the future and goes ahead. Now, Dr. Kunzru referred to the Border Committee Report. There was another Committee also. Last evening I got the report and looked through it again. The North and the North Eastern Border Committee was appointed

in 1951. This committee made a large number of recommendations and these recommendations were examined by an ad hoc committee of Secretaries and finally by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. An overwhelming number of recommendations made were accepted and implemented. Among the major recommendations were the re-organisation and expansion of the Assam Rifles, the extension of administration in the NEFA area, development of intelligence network along the border, development of the border areas, development of civil armed police, development of communications and check posts. Our position in regard to Nepal was considered separately. All these recommendations, barring a few, were accepted and they have been implemented some time ago. So far as the development of the border areas was concerned the Ministry of Home Affairs took up this question with the State Governments concerned and provision was made for these in the Five Year Plans, the Centre giving substantial help. This development included road communications, schools, hospitals, tribal welfare, animal husbandry, etc. The construction of a number of roads was entrusted to Army engineers, especially in NEFA. The Ministry of Transport was also entrusted with making a number of roads. Some of these roads have been completed, some are being constructed and a few were not accepted or not proceeded with, either for tactical reasons or because expenditure on the construction of such roads was colossal and out of proportion to the good that they may do. So, Sir, broadly speaking, it may be said that nearly all the recommendations made by the Committee were accepted and implemented.

Dr. Kunzru referred to what our representative said in the United Nations in regard to Tibet. He was surprised at it. First of all, I am afraid our representative did not say the words which were quoted by Dr. Kunzru. That is neither here nor there but our policy in regard to Tibet was laid down after full discussion in Parliament long before the question came up in

the United Nations, I stated it-I am not quite sure if I stated it here or in the Lok Sabha-in answer to questions. We have discussed this clearly and we have laid it down also. We declared it publicly, in Parliament, in Press Conferences and the like and that is exactly what was repeated there. You might disagree with that policy; that is a different matter. I think that was a right policy and the only policy to be pursued but to state that this is something new evolved there is not correct. There is, Sir, an intimate relation between the domestic policies of a country and the foreign policies of a country. Sometimes they diverge a little but broadly speaking presumably because there is the same mind behind both-they act and interact against each other and I have a feeling that the difficulty that some hon. Members may have in appreciating my argument for the foreign policy we pursue really relates back to their difference in view about the domestic policies we pursue. I have no doubt about it in my mind. Not always, but in varying degrees it is there and you will find that even today, while I have ventured in all humility to say that the foreign policy that we pursue is supported by the widest measure of public opinion that you can have in India-it has been supported and it is supported-there are minor criticisms. The critics of that foreign policy, you will find-the major critics-are critics of our domestic policy also. They are tied up-the two things-and I can understand that. That happens; some people think differently; it is not necessary for everyone to think alike in the country. There are parties that think differently-honestly, sincerely. But we must realise the urges behind it, the roots of the thoughts which govern their domestic outlook as well as their international outlook. And if they are different, they can convert me I shall be happy. I try to convert them, sometimes with success, sometimes I fail.

Now Sir, I have ventured to take up nearly an hour of this House and for the rest all I wish to say is that so far as the present situation is concerned,

obviously we have to prepare for it to the best of our ability. On the one hand I have referred so much to our industrial development even from the Defence point of view. How I want to expedite it, to hurry it up; I want Government procedures to become quicker in doing these things. I try to do it but it is a very difficult thing in a machine, in a huge machine that has grown up from generations to change it quickly. We have been changing it; we have changed it partly; we will change it more, I hope, and make it a swift-moving machine. We have to think again of the future, the next few years, how we are to face that future. We cannot deal with the issue today; we have to deal with it in the military sense today and we propose to give opportunities to our young men to be trained in the N.C.C., the Territorial Army or the Special Force that we may raise.

Sir, there is one fact which might be remembered when people think so much sometimes of obtaining outside aid. Maybe they imagine that in my conceit I say that I will not take outside aid. Well, it is not for me to judge myself but I certainly have a little conceit about India's standing on its own legs. Of course I cannot say what in an eventuality we may do; that is a different matter but I do not want this idea to go out to our people that others will preserve our freedom, that others will help us. I do not want India to go on crutches. We have faced grave difficulties, grave crises, and survived them and I have no doubt at all in my mind that we shall survive not only because of the development we have got now and the way we are developing but more so because I have got a fundamental faith in the Indian people. Therefore I am not worried; certainly I have to think and I have to take counsel in Parliament and we have to devise general ways of meeting such tests. So what I was saying was it is an odd thing you talk of aid. The type of warfare we are dealing with is warfare which requires stout men, not machines very much. Certainly, some machines you want, not big machines. The type of aid that one gets from abroad are machines and in

these mountain areas those machines do not reach. If they are big machines there is little good. We want stout and trained men, not only stout and trained men, but men of the mountains who are used to high altitudes, who are used to terribly cold climates, who are used to hardship. We want young men who physically are in A-1 condition. From the physical point of view our conditions are not generally A-1 or A-2 even. So this is the type of thing we want and we have got enough of them, I am sure, and I hope that we shall build up for the present our defence as much as possible in this way and build up our industrial apparatus for the future and while doing all that always aiming at a peaceful settlement, always, aiming at peace, and not losing ourselves in some kind of vague chauvinistic or jingoistic ideas which will do enormous injury to our country and to the larger causes that we have supported.

There are some amendments, Sir. I need not say that I will gladly accept the amendment which is in my favour, that is, Mr. Samuels.¹³ Thank you, Sir.

Mr. Chairman: The question is.

"That at the end of the Motion the following be added, namely and having considered the same, this House regrets

(1) the failure of Government to take prompt and active steps to check Chinese aggression;

(2) the failure of Government to protect the time-honoured trading and other rights of Indians in Tibet which have been wiped out by the Chinese."

The motion was negatived.

Mr. Chairman: The question is:

¹³ M.H. Samuels, Congress

1. "That at the end of the Motion the following be added namely: and having considered the same, this House approves of and endorses the policy of the Government in this regard'."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. Chairman: I will now put the amended motion. The question is: "That White Paper No. II and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China, laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha on the 23rd November, 1959, be taken into consideration and having considered the same, this House approves of and endorses the policy of the Government in this regard."

The motion was adopted.

158. To Chou Hsiang-Kuang: Promoting Chinese Culture¹⁴

December 15, 1959

Dear Professor Chou,

Thank you for your letter of the 12th December.¹⁵

I can well understand your loving China, not only because she is your home country, but chiefly because of its high culture. There is no reason why we should not admire the culture of more than one country.

As you must know, we do not recognise the Government in Formosa.

Because of this, it is difficult for us to agree to the acceptance of any grant from the Formosa Government for any purpose in India.

Yours sincerely,
[Jawaharlal Nehru]

¹⁴ Letter to a Professor of Chinese, University of Allahabad. Copied to S. Dutt.

¹⁵ Professor Chou wished to establish a College for Chinese Culture in India. He had spoken to the Chinese Government in Formosa and they had agreed to make a donation. He wanted Nehru's views in the matter

159. To Kesho Ram: Chinese Pavilion at the New Delhi Fair¹⁶

In case the Speaker is pleased to admit this notice calling for a statement by me, I shall make the following statement:

"We have enquired about the allegation made by the Peking Radio that the Chinese Pavilion in the World Agriculture Fair in New Delhi was stoned by some people. This allegation is wrong. We have fully enquired into this matter and found that there is no truth in this statement that the Chinese pavilion was stoned. What happened was that some unknown person made some objectionable remarks in the Visitors' Book which is maintained at the pavilion by the Chinese authorities. Apparently a few visitors also gave expression to their displeasure.

Steps have been taken to have a constant watch on the Chinese pavilion in the Agriculture Fair and every precaution has been taken to see that no untoward incident occurs there."

160. To Amrit Kaur: Peace Mission to China¹⁷

December 20, 1959

My dear Amrit,

Your letter of today's date. It is true that I did not like the idea of the so-called "Peace Mission" going to China under the leadership of the Vice-President. In the circumstances that we are facing, a peace mission has no meaning when there is complete difference of opinion in regard to history

¹⁶ Note, 19 December 1959

¹⁷ Letter to Rajya Sabha MP

and facts. Would the peace mission discuss all these complicated facts or would it merely offer our goodwill for a settlement?

Apart from this, any such move would be very strongly resented in India at present.

[Jawaharlal Nehru]

Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India

Peking, December 17, 1959.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of November 16, 1959. Although the Indian Government's opinions regarding the prevention of border clashes are still a certain distance away from the Chinese Government's proposal of November 7 and part of them obviously lack fairness, it is heartening that in your letter you have indicated the desire of trying to avoid all border clashes and to settle the boundary disputes between the two countries by peaceful methods.

The Chinese Government's proposal of November 7 for the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two countries 20 kilometers respectively along the entire border is aimed at thoroughly eliminating the risk of border clashes not wholly foreseeable, completely changing the present tense situation on the border where the two countries are facing each other in arms, and creating a favourable atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two countries. These aims are unattainable by other provisional measures. Furthermore, the adoption of this measure pending the delimitation of the boundary will in no way prejudice the advancing by each side of its claims

when negotiations for the settlement of the boundary question take place. Therefore, the Chinese Government still earnestly hopes that we can reach agreement on such a measure for the sake of friendship between our two countries in the past and for hundreds of years to come. As to how far the armed forces of each country should withdraw, the Chinese Government is entirely willing to decide on a distance which will be deemed appropriate by both sides through consultation with the Indian Government.

Pending the above-mentioned agreement, the Chinese Government, in a conciliatory spirit and out of the desire to move toward the withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border, is prepared to agree first to reach a partial solution by applying the proposal you have made in your letter for the non-stationing of the armed forces of both sides at Longju to the other disputed places on the border as well. In the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel once occupied Longju and are now still in occupation of Khinzemane. In the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel are up to now in occupation of Shipki Pass, Parigas Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal. Most of these places which definitely belong to China were occupied successively by armed Indian personnel after the signing of the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India in which China and India for the first time put forward the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence. Among them Puling-sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari area of the Tibet region of China as specified in Article II Section 2 of the 1954 Agreement. Now since the Indian Government holds a different opinion on the ownership of these places, the Chinese Government proposes that no armed personnel of either side be stationed at any of them.

Pending a further agreement between the two sides, the Chinese

Government also welcomes the Indian Government's proposal for the frontier outposts of the two sides to stop sending out patrols. The Chinese Government has, in fact, instructed the Chinese frontier guards to stop sending out patrols from all their outposts on the Sino-Indian border after the Kongka Pass incident. Now that the Indian side has also taken the same step, this is of course a happy progress in safeguarding the tranquility of the border between the two countries. But the Chinese Government would like to ask for clarification on one point, that is: The proposal to stop patrolling should apply to the entire Sino-Indian border, and no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.

The Chinese Government is very much perplexed by the fact that Your Excellency put forward a separate proposal for the prevention of clashes in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh. The Chinese Government deems it necessary to point out the following: (1) There is no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case. The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector. Except for the Parigasa area by the Shangatsangpu River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary. (2) This proposal of Your Excellency's represents a big step backward from the principle agreed upon earlier by the two countries of maintaining for the time being the state actually existing on the border. To demand a great change in this state as a pre-condition for the elimination of border clashes is not to diminish but to widen the dispute. (3) Your Excellency's proposal is unfair. Your Excellency proposes that in this sector Chinese personnel withdraw to the east of the boundary as shown on

Indian maps and Indian personnel withdraw to the west of the boundary as shown on Chinese maps. This proposal may appear "equitable" to those who are ignorant about the truth. But even the most anti-Chinese part of the Indian press pointed out immediately that, under this proposal, India's "concession" would only be theoretical because, to begin with, the area concerned does not belong to India and India has no personnel there to withdraw while China would have to withdraw from a territory of above 33,000 square kilometers which has long belonged to it, its military personnel guarding the frontiers and its civil administrative personnel -of the Hotien County, the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and of Rudoh Dzong in the Ari area of the Tibet Autonomous Region -respectively. (4)

This area has long been under Chinese jurisdiction and is of great importance to China. Since the Ching Dynasty, this area has been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang and western Tibet. As far back as in the latter half of 1950, it was along the traditional route in this area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Ari area of Tibet from Sinkiang to guard the frontiers. In the nine years since then, they have been making regular and busy use of this route to bring supplies. On the basis of this route, the motor-road over 1,200 kilometers long from Yehcheng in southwestern Sinkiang to Gartok in southwestern Tibet was built by Chinese frontier guard units together with more than 3,000 civilian builders working under extremely difficult natural conditions from March 1956 to October 1957, cutting across high mountains, throwing bridges and building culverts. For up to 8 or 9 years since the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang and Tibet when units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army began to be stationed in and patrol this area till September 1958 when the intrusion of the area by armed Indian personnel occurred, so many activities were carried out by the Chinese side in this area under its jurisdiction, and yet the Indian side was utterly unaware of them. This is

eloquent proof that this area has indeed always been under Chinese jurisdiction and not under Indian jurisdiction. Now the Indian Government asserts that this area has all along been under Indian jurisdiction. This is absolutely unconvincing.

If the Indian Government, after being acquainted with the above viewpoints of the Chinese Government, should still insist that its demand in regard to this area is proper, then the Chinese Government would like to know whether the Indian Government is prepared to apply the same principle equally to the eastern sector of the border, that is to say, to require both the Chinese and Indian sides to withdraw all their personnel from the area between the so-called McMahon line and the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary as shown on Chinese maps (and on Indian maps too during a long period of time). The Chinese Government has not up to now made any demand in regard to the area south of the so-called McMahon line as a pre-condition or interim measure and what I find difficult to understand is why the Indian Government should demand that the Chinese side withdraw one-sidedly from its western frontier area.

Your Excellency and the Indian Government have repeatedly referred to the historical data concerning the Sino-Indian boundary as produced by the Indian side. The Chinese side had meant to give its detailed reply to Your Excellency's letter of September 26 and the note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of November in the forthcoming talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries, and thought it more appropriate to do so. Since the talks between the two Prime Ministers have not yet taken place, however, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs will give a reply in the near future. I do not wish to go here into the details of the matter. I would only point out again the simple fact that, according to objective history, the entire boundary between our two countries has indeed never been delimited; and it is impossible to deny this.

I have noticed that the Indian side has, in its account of the boundary between the two countries, purposely left out many obvious basic facts. For example, it does not mention the fact that on the official maps compiled by the Survey of India in the past, up to the 1938 edition, the delineation of the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary still corresponded to that on Chinese maps while the western section of the Sino-Indian boundary was not drawn at all; even in its 1950, 1951 and 1952 editions published after the founding of the People's Republic of China, both the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Indian boundary, though incorrectly drawn, were clearly indicated as undelimited. The Chinese Government cannot see on what ground the Indian Government began suddenly in recent years to change the undelimited boundary in both the eastern and western sectors on its maps into delimited boundary. I have made a detailed study of the heap of data cited in Your Excellency's letter of September 26, still I cannot find any satisfactory answer.

The Chinese Government has pointed out many times that the boundary between China and India is very long and has never been delimited by the two Governments, that there are discrepancies between the maps of the two countries, and that therefore it is natural that the two countries should hold different opinions regarding the boundary. A reasonable settlement of this outstanding historical issue should not be difficult at all to achieve provided it is sought through friendly consultations. The People's Republic of China is a socialist country of the working people, where the exploiting classes and pro-imperialist forces who attempted to profit by outward expansion and provocations against other countries have long lost for good their footing for carrying out their activities. The People's Republic of China is consistently faithful to the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence; it absolutely does not allow itself to take an attitude of big-nation chauvinism towards other countries, let alone encroach one inch upon foreign territory.

Further, China has such a vast expanse of territory, more than half of which, moreover, is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. It would be extremely ludicrous to think that such a country would still want to seek trouble in some desolate areas of a neighbouring country. Therefore, although there are some undelimited sections in the boundaries between China and some of its neighbouring countries in South Asia (whether they are big or small, friendly or unfriendly toward China), China has not taken and will never take advantage of this situation 'co make any change in the state actually existing on the border by resorting to unilateral action. China is moreover prepared even after the settlement of the outstanding boundary issues, to work in unison and co-operation with all its neighbouring countries for the creation of a most peaceful, secure and friendly boundary. Your Excellency is aware that the so-called McMahon line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border has never been recognized by past Chinese Governments, nor by the Government of the People's Republic of China, yet the Government of the People's Republic of China has strictly abided by its statement of absolutely not allowing its armed personnel to cross this line in waiting for a friendly settlement of the boundary question. It is quite obvious that China, which has not even stepped into the vast area south of the so-called McMahon line which, not long ago was still under the jurisdiction of the local government of the Tibet region of China (part of the area up to 1951), would of course not think of stepping ~on to Indian territory at any place along the western sector of .he Sino-Indian border. The Chinese military and civil administrative personnel over there, just as in other areas along the border, are only stationed on and guarding their own territory. However, the Indian Government has not only taken an unreasonable attitude of refusing to discuss the eastern sector of the border, but also laid territorial claim to an area in the western sector of the border, which has never been under

Indian rule. This has indeed greatly surprised the Chinese Government and people. In the interest of upholding Sino-Indian friendship, the Chinese Government has always exercised the utmost self-restraint in the hope of settling these disputes with the Indian Government through friendly negotiations. Even after armed Indian personnel intruded into Chinese territory and provoked successively the incidents in the areas south of Migyitun and south of the Kongka Pass, the Chinese Government still maintained a conciliatory spirit, avoided aggravation of the situation, and dealt in a friendly manner with the armed Indian personnel captured in the Kongka Pass incident. Yet the Indian side, disregarding the objective facts, arbitrarily asserted that both incidents were provoked by China. that China maltreated the captured Indian personnel, and even unscrupulously abused China as aggressor, imperialism, etc. I must say that both our people and Government feel extreme regret at such a serious state of affairs.

Your Excellency expressed welcome to my November 7 proposal for the holding of talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. Here indeed lies the hope for a turn for the better in the relations between the two countries. Although there are differences of opinion between our two countries on the boundary question, I believe that this in no way hinders the holding of talks between the two Prime Ministers; on the contrary, it precisely requires its early realization so as to reach first some agreements of principles as a guidance to concrete discussions and settlement of the boundary question by the two sides. Without such a guidance, there is a danger that concrete discussions of the boundary question by the two sides may bog down in endless and fruitless debates. I therefore make the concrete proposal that the two Prime Ministers begin talks on December 26. If you wish to suggest any other date I am also willing to give it consideration. As to the site of the talks, if you agree, any place in China can be chosen, because there are in China no activities hostile to Sino-

Indian friendship and you will be welcomed and respected by our people as a distinguished guest .of the Chinese Government. Should you find it inconvenient for you to hold talks in China, Rangoon can be fixed as the site of the talks, subject to the consent of the Burmese Government.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister! Both our countries are still very backward economically and culturally. We urgently need to engross ourselves in long-term peaceful construction at home so as to free ourselves step by step from the present state of backwardness. We have no need to create tension between our two friendly nations or between us and any other country, thus dissipating and diverting our people's attention from domestic matters. The peoples of our two countries and the overwhelming majority of the people of the world are inspired by the fact that the world situation is developing in a direction favourable to peace. But unfortunately there are still not a few influential groups in the world who obstinately oppose this trend; they are trying to poison the international atmosphere continuing the cold war and creating tension to place barriers in the way of east-west talks; they are slandering the peace policy of the socialist countries and inciting discord between the Asian-African countries and the socialist countries, so that they may profit thereby. At present, they are obviously exerting their utmost to sow discord between China and India. Under these circumstances, the speedy holding of talks between the two Prime Ministers is our unshirkable responsibility not only to our two peoples but also to world peace.

With high respects,

CHOU EN-LAI
Premier of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China.

Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister China,

New Delhi, December 21, 1959

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of December 17 the text of which our Ambassador in Peking has telegraphed to us. I deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November.

They were intended to secure an immediate lessening of tension along the Sino-Indian border by eliminating any risk of border clashes and to create the necessary atmosphere for a peaceful settlement of the border problem. Your present letter once again reiterates claims to extensive areas which by history, by custom or by agreement have long been integral parts of India.

I am particularly sorry to find that you have based your claim on recent intrusion by Chinese personnel into parts of Indian territory. It is these intrusions which have brought about the present situation and created apprehensions. You have not sent an, reply to my letter of September 26 to you and our note of November 4 in which some salient facts bearing on the situation had been mentioned.

I only wish to say forces have occupied aggression at Kongka post was attacked by that cannot accept your allegation that Indian any part of Chinese territory, or committed Pass or at Longju where our established check Chinese troops.

Your letter also speaks of the 'friendly manner' in which Indian personnel who were captured in the Chang Chenmo valley were treated. Shri Karam Singh whom you returned to us has made his statement of the treatment that he and his colleagues received while they were prisoners in the custody of the Chinese border forces. This statement will show you the deplorable treatment to which the Indian prisoners were subjected by the Chinese forces.

Your Excellency has suggested that you and I should meet on December 26 so as to reach an agreement on the principles which are presumably to guide the officials on both sides in the discussion of details. As I informed you in my letter on November 16 and earlier; I am always ready to meet and discuss with your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts? I would, therefore, prefer to wait for your promised reply to my letter of September 26 and our note of November 4, before we discuss what should be the next step. I wish to add that it is entire impossible for me to proceed to Rangoon or any other place within the next few days.

I would not like to end this letter to you without referring to the sentiments which you have expressed in your last paragraph. I am in entire agreement with you that the principal concern of our two countries should be "with the programme of long-term peaceful construction to lift ourselves from our present state of backwardness", to which you have referred. I equally agree with you that we should not be parties to the increasing of tension between our two countries or in the world. India has welcomed the fact that there is some lowering of world tensions and that "the world situation is developing in a direction favourable to peace". It is for this last reason, even apart from the imperative need to improve the relations between our two countries, that in spite of all recent events I have continually stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of our problems.

With kind regards,

I am, Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

162. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Relations¹⁸

Mr. Speaker: Before we take up any other matter, the hon. Prime Minister wants to make a statement.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, three days ago, on the 18th December, I received through our

Ambassador in Peking, Premier Chou En-lais reply to my letter of the 16th November.¹⁹ This letter has already appeared in the Press and so I need not give any details about its contents.

I read this letter with regret. It does not accept the reasonable and practical proposals which I had made to Premier Chou En-Iai in order to secure an immediate lessening of tension along the Sino-Indian border and to create the necessary atmosphere for a peaceful settlement of the border problem. It is merely a reiteration of claims to extensive areas in our territory which by history, by custom or by agreement have long been integral parts of India. It does not contain any reply to the detailed letter which I had sent to him on September 26 and the note of November 4 in which some salient facts bearing on the situation had been mentioned. Premier Chou En-Iai has stated in his letter that he would send a reply to this previous letter and note of mine in the near future.

I have today sent a reply to Premier Chou En-lai referring to the above facts and stating that I am sorry to find that he had based his claim on recent intrusions by Chinese personnel into parts of Indian territory. It is, in fact, these intrusions which had brought about the present situation and created apprehensions. I have further stated that I cannot accept the allegation that Indian forces had occupied any part of Chinese territory, or

¹⁸ Statement, 21 December 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXXVII, cols 6266-77

¹⁹ See Appendix 12

committed aggression at Kongka Pass or at Longiu, where our established check-post was attacked by Chinese troops.

Premier Chou En-lai in his letter has spoken of the "friendly manner" in which Indian personnel who were captured in the Chenmo Valley were treated. I have referred him again to the statement of Shri Karam Singh about the treatment that he and his colleagues received while they were prisoners in the custody of the Chinese border forces. This statement clearly indicates the deplorable treatment to which the Indian prisoners were subjected.

Premier Chou En-lai had suggested that he and I should meet on December 26 so as to reach an agreement on the principles which are presumably to guide the officials on both sides in the discussion of details. I have repeated, what I have said previously, that I am always ready to meet and discuss with him the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. I have, however, pointed out that I do not see how we can reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts. I would prefer to wait for his promised reply to my letter of September 26 and our note of November 4 before we discuss what should be the next step. I have added that it is quite impossible for me to proceed to Rangoon or any other place within the next few days.

In my reply I have expressed my entire agreement with him to the sentiments which he had expressed in the last paragraph of his letter, to the effect that the principal concern of our two countries should be "with the programme of long-term peaceful construction to lift ourselves from our present state of backwardness, and that we should not be parties to the increasing of tension between our two countries or in the world." India has welcomed the fact that there is some lowering of world tensions and that "the world situation is developing in a direction favourable to peace". It is

for this reason, even apart from the imperative need to improve the relations between our two countries, that in spite of recent events, I have continually stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of our problems.

Braj Raj Singh: Premier Chou En-lai has been publishing everything which he has been sending to our Prime Minister. May I know whether this letter which our Prime Minister has sent to Chou En-lai will be published here or whether a copy of it will be supplied to us?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I have given the substance of the letter. It may vary a little here and there. It will be released to the Press after two or three days so as to allow it to reach him.

C. K. Bhattacharya:²⁰ May I know whether Mr. Chou En-lai's letter was sent to the Press from the Chinese Embassy or from the Government of India?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The letter was issued in Peking to the Press and to the radio there. In fact the message that I received from our Ambassador in Peking containing Mr Chou En-lai's letters stated at the end of it that as soon as I received that letter, they would release it to the Press. They have released it to the Press.

Acharya Kripalani: Sir, as you know, I and some leaders of the Opposition Parties have given notice under Rule 193 of the Rules of Procedure that we are desirous of having discussion on the latest letter received from the Chinese Premier in reply to the Prime Minister's letter dated the 16th November, 1959.

²⁰ Congress

The reason for this is that the latest letter received from the Chinese Premier rejects in toto the proposals made by the Prime Minister in his letter of 16th November. Further the Chinese Premier asks for our withdrawal from a number of places all along the frontier and lays claim to places that are indisputably in India and agreed to as such by China in the treaty signed with us in 1954. From the reply, it appears that our territories in Ladakh have not been occupied by China but are being effectively colonised.

Parliament must have an opportunity to discuss the reply received and consider the situation arising out of it before it adjourns. In view of the urgency and the great importance of the matter sought to be discussed, we hope time will be found for discussion in the two days left. If this is not possible, I think we can prolong for a couple of days the sitting of the House and discuss this matter.

I am anxious to have this discussion because I find that they (the Chinese) have rejected the Prime Minister's proposals which were favourable to the Chinese and unfavourable to us and the other conditions laid down for a meeting, further, I say that we seem to have forgotten what we knew before—the importance of time. Time ripens a fruit but if not properly picked up, then time also rots the fruit. One good thing that we had learnt from Gandhiji was that he took action at the proper time. When the psychological time is past, then of course, it cannot be recovered. And even the Chinese Prime Minister has reminded us of what he calls an "eloquent proof". For many years while aggression was going on in the Ladakh, we did nothing and he calls that as "eloquent proof" of our having accepted the Chinese contention. So, I submit that all along we have made the mistake of not taking into consideration the factor of time and I believe the correspondence on the part of China is only to waste time. They yet claim the very same things that they have claimed in their maps. There is no

basis, I believe, for talks but time is being lost. Why is time lost? I humbly submit-because they (the Chinese) want that turmoil in the Himalayan regions should continue and they want to organise subversive movements on our Himalayan borders. Further, they want to frighten the people and the small kingdoms that are on the borders. Therefore, it becomes very necessary that we must in time decide what we propose to do because I feel that the tone of the letter and the contents of the letter are such that there seems to be no possibility of any negotiations. They (the Chinese) have not even left a basis for negotiations. They have even told us that what Karam Singh said is wrong and what they say is right. There is no point that we have raised which has been answered in the letter. So, I think it is very necessary that we do not allow time to be wasted by this fruitless correspondence. Therefore, I think a discussion upon the matter is very necessary and essential and I hope you will find time and the House will find time to discuss the matter before anything further is done.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, the House knows that I am always anxious, at any rate willing, to have discussions about any important matter arising in connection with foreign affairs, more especially a matter of this kind. We have discussed it on two occasions. But quite apart from the question of the House or you finding time for this discussion I really do not understand the argument of the hon. Member that time is passing and somehow the passage of time will be arrested by discussion. Time will nevertheless pass in spite of a discussion.

Acharya Kripalani: The House will give its opinion whether the time should be allowed to pass or not.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is exactly the point I was going to suggest. The hon. Member has said that it is not good to negotiate and that is a trick for time to pass on the part of the Chinese Government. Well, I do not know what the hon. Member has in mind. But so far as I am concerned and so far as this Government is concerned, we will negotiate and negotiate and negotiate to the bitter end. I absolutely reject the approach of stopping negotiations at any stage. That, I think, is not only a fundamentally wrong approach, but, if I may say so, with all respect to the hon. Member opposite, it is fundamentally anti-Gandhi an approach. That does not mean that any action which is necessitated should not be taken. That is an entirely different matter. But negotiations will go on so long as this Government functions, to the end.

Jadhav:²¹ Adopt the 1942 policy of Gandhiji.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That does not mean, as I said, any action that we intend should not be taken. If the hon. Member means a declaration of war, well, the hon. Member, if! may suggest to him, might consider the question a little more carefully as to what war involves and how we attain our object by a declaration of war.

Therefore, Sir, I am in your hands. I merely state what I think of a further discussion at this state, when we are obviously in the middle of this correspondence. The correspondence may not be to the liking of the hon. Member or to my liking, the letters that we receive, but that is the way how countries function short of war. There is no other way. The other way is war, and that way is to be avoided as far as one can avoid it. That has been our policy and that is the policy, at any rate, the declared policy of every civilised nation. For us to jump into something without exhausting all

²¹ PSP.

possibilities, something which will be disastrous not only for the countries jumping into it but for the whole world, is not a matter lightly to be undertaken, and we know this Government will not undertake it in that way.

But there are many other things which this country has to do in the way of preparation, in the way of strengthening our defences etc., and those things certainly should be expedited, undertaken to the best of our ability and as speedily as possible.

There is one thing more, that it is up to you and the House to decide whether they want a discussion, but I regret I shall not be here day after tomorrow as I have important engagements which I cannot forego; as the House is ending tomorrow I have made those engagements.²²

Acharya Kripalani: I did not want to interrupt the hon. Prime Minister, but every time to bring in the plea that this or that will lead to war and war is very disastrous, I think, is not very fair. I think that I know enough of Gandhiji, that he always negotiated, but the time came when he said that action must be taken. What action the Government takes is another question. Let them take any action but it should not be that time should be lost and in the meantime subversive activities should go on our borders and our friends should be intimidated in every way. That is all that I wanted to say.

Raja Mahendra Pratap: I strongly endorse the statement of our hon. Prime Minister.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, I am a little alarmed by the endorsement of the hon. Raja Saheb, but I would beg this House to consider one thing. There are, I

²² See items 111 and 169

would again repeat, only two ways in which nations deal with each other, diplomatic or war; there is no third way.

Acharya Kripalani: Is there an end to diplomacy ever?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is by war, nothing else than war.

Acharya Kripalani: There are many other things that can be done.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There is no other way. Diplomacy has many shares, many ways, but if it is diplomacy it is communication, it is talking till talking stops when there is war. Till there is actual, absolute declaration of war, there is diplomacy.

Acharya Kripalani: But if the other party wants to waste time, what is to be done?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know. Therefore, I should put it to the hon. Member to think a little clearly on the subject. Clear thought is necessary and clear thought leads to only one conclusion. There is no alternative to ceasing talking but war. It does not matter what it is. The hon. Member is thinking that time is being wasted. How, I do not know, time is wasted. It is not at all clear to me how it is being wasted; I think it is very profitably employed.

Acharya Kripalani: If there is a discussion you will be able to understand.

Jawaharlal Nehru: But I can't pit my wits against the hon. Member, but I think I would suggest to him to consider what he himself was saying and

what the consequences are. I do think that frequent discussions on the same thing will not help. There is no additional fact before us at the present moment. We have discussed it. We are committed, naturally, to take such steps as we can, as the country can, with such speed, as we can to strengthen our defences. The hon. Member referred to some infiltration or subversive activities in our borders. I do not know where subversive activities are taking place. (Interruption) I can't answer for any odd individual, but I think our newspapers sometimes rather exaggerate rumours which they get in Kalimpong Bazaar, in Kathmandu Bazaar or some other bazaar, and we need not accept everything that comes by way of rumour. We have to be vigilant and all that, but some things, I do submit, are not always desirable; to exaggerate them creates a wrong impression in the country.

There is the position, Sir. I am entirely in your hands and in the hands of the House in this matter. One thing I may add-I am sorry I forgot to say so we have asked our Ambassador in Peking to come to Delhi for consultation and he will be arriving here in about four days time.

Hem Barua: Sir, the information demanded from Shillong about airspace violation and all that is surely not a bazaar thing. The Press carries news about airspace violation and all that.

Jawaharlal Nehru: How to make it clear, I do not know, I thought I had made it clear. Every plane of ours that flies from there, the report goes that it is an enemy plane. How am I to repeat that they are looking up at a plane and are not able to recognise what kind of aircraft: it is? Our planes are flying all the time all over the place.

Acharya Kripalani: Then let us say that the airspace is free for everybody? Everyday violations are there.

Jawaharlal Nehru: No foreign plane is there, I repeat, I should like to have proof from anybody to counter my statement. We know it definitely. We get an account from the hon. Member opposite in his motion for adjournment we enquire and we find that our planes are flying and they are doing good work. How am I to explain this?

Acharya Kripalani: In answer to a question it has been said that planes have crossed.

Nath Pai:²³ Sir, I have one little point to make. The Prime Minister just now said that we cannot go on acting on Press reports which are bazaar reports. In fairness to the House and the Press we have got to say that on a previous occasion when some reports emanated from Kalimpong the Prime Minister angrily repudiated them but, unfortunately, to a point, regarding Tibet and Ladakh they proved right. Secondly, if the House is kept informed from time to time we shall depend not on what the Press tell us but on what he tells us, but we are very often informed too late.

Regarding the remarks, how does a discussion stop passage of time, I must say that a discussion does not stop the passage of time, time keeps on marching, but if we have a discussion definitely the Government knows the mood of the country and, far more important, China also is informed how this country is feeling about it. It is for this reason, Sir that we plead that we be given an opportunity of discussing this.

It is unfair to suggest every time that we demand that we be firm we are asking for war. Nobody wants war. It has been made innumerable times clear that in your pursuit of peace we are with you. It is unfair to stand

²³ PSP

behind, that is what we want to suggest. Nobody wants you to go to war. There is a charge against us that there are war-mongers in this country. Who wants war? (Interruption) We are not in war so far as Peking is concerned. (Laughter) You do not know where to laugh. Sir, this is a very unfair thing and you should not allow that. Acharya Kripalani is the last person in the world to demand that. We are standing by him. He never meant that the country should go to war, but that China should not be allowed to proceed further. Only a week ago the Prime Minister told us that there was no road. I had asked the question whether the road was constructed without our knowledge and why we were prevented from noticing, it. He told us that there was no such thing as a road, it was only a question of removing a stone or building a culvert. Mr. Chou En-lai now says that 3,000 people were working for a period of two years. It is this thing that worries us, this passage of time. Therefore, he should make a reply in that context and not indicate that others are wanting to start a war.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I did not say at any moment that we should not believe anything that appears in the press. I said that occasionally Kalimpong Bazaar rumours appear there. Take this particular fact which has its humorous side that we get a number of adjournment motions day after day, and I go on saying that, after due enquiry, we find not a single aircraft coming from outside (Interruption). Please let me proceed I am not referring to some other previous things. I am talking of the last few days. The fact is that our aircraft are functioning there very adequately and very efficiently. Nobody, no layman can possibly find out, when an aircraft is flying at about 20,000 or 30,000 ft, what its markings are and what its country of origin is. They cannot. About that particular area, during these days, I can say with the greatest certainty and definiteness that no foreign aircraft is coming, because we have been in the air all the time doing work

that has been allotted to our people. I do not say that every statement in the press is wrong. That would be ridiculous for me to say.

163. In the Rajya Sabha: India-China Relations²⁴

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): I am grateful to you, Sir, for giving me this opportunity of making a statement. Three days ago, on the 18th December, I received through our Ambassador in Peking, Premier Chou En-lai's reply to my letter of the 16th November.²⁵ This letter has already appeared in the Press and so I need not give any details about its contents.

I read this letter with regret. It does not accept the reasonable and practical proposals which I had made to Premier Chou En-lai in order to secure an immediate lessening of tension along the Sino-Indian border and to create the necessary atmosphere for a peaceful settlement of the border problem. It is merely a reiteration of claims to extensive areas in our territory which by history, by custom or by agreement have long been integral parts of India. It does not contain any reply to the detailed letter which I had sent to him on September 26²⁶ and the Note of November 4 in which some salient facts bearing on the situation had been mentioned. Premier Chou En-lai has stated in his letter that he would send a reply to this previous letter and Note of mine in the near future.

I have today sent a reply to Premier Chou En-lai²⁷ referring to the above facts and stating that I am sorry to find that he had based his claim on

²⁴ Statement, 21 December 1959. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. XXVII, cols 3227-3232

²⁵ See Appendix 12. For Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai of 16 November 1959, see SWJN/SS/54/pp. 492-498

²⁶ See SWJN/SS/52/pp. 216-231

²⁷ See item 161

recent intrusions by Chinese personnel into parts of Indian territory. It is, in fact, these intrusions which had brought about the present situation and created apprehensions. I have further stated that I cannot accept the allegation that Indian forces had occupied any part of Chinese territory, or committed aggression at Kongka Pass or at Longju, where our established checkpoint was attacked by Chinese troops.

Premier Chou En-lai in his letter has spoken of the "friendly manner" in which Indian personnel who were captured in the Chenmo Valley were treated. I have referred him again to the statement of Karam Singh about the treatment that he and his colleagues received while they were prisoners in the custody of the Chinese border forces. This statement clearly indicates the deplorable treatment to which the Indian prisoners were subjected.

Premier Chou En-lai had suggested that he and I should meet on December 26 so as to reach an agreement on the principles which are presumably to guide the officials on both sides in the discussion of details. I have repeated, what I have said previously, that I am always ready to meet and discuss with him the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. I have, however, pointed out that I do not see how we can reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts. I would prefer to wait for his promised reply to my letter of September 26 and our note of November 4 before we discuss what should be the next step. I have added that it is quite impossible for me to proceed to Rangoon or any other place within the next few days.

In my reply I have expressed my entire agreement with him to the sentiments which he had expressed in the last paragraph of his letter, to the effect that the principal concern of our two countries should be "with the programme of long-term peaceful construction to lift ourselves from our present state of backwardness, and that we should not be parties to the

increasing of tension between our two countries or in the world." India has welcomed the fact that there is some lowering of world tensions and that "the world situation is developing in a direction favourable to peace". It is for this reason, even apart from the imperative need to improve the relations between our two countries, that in spite of recent events, I have continually stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of our problems. I might add that some days ago we asked our Ambassador in Peking to come here for consultations and that we expect him to be here in three or four days' time. Thank you.

V.K. Dhage: With your permission, Sir, may I say that the situation now seems to be rather very serious? Would the Prime Minister consider the feasibility of having a discussion on this situation now before we disperse? As I said previously, it is possible for us even to sit late at night. Let us have a discussion on this matter so that we may be able to assess the situation properly and know the mind of the Government.

D.P. Singh:²⁸ I think a new situation has arisen, in view of the reply which we have received from Mr. Chou En-lai. So, I would also associate myself with his suggestion that there should be a discussion of the situation which has arisen

Jawaharlal Nehru: In this matter I am in your hands, in the hands of the House. This question was raised in the other House and I told them that it was for the House to decide or for the Speaker. I personally did not see the necessity for a discussion at this stage although normally I welcome discussions, because this is a stage where no new development has taken place, except of course the reiteration of certain positions, points of view.

²⁸ PSP

But I have no objection to a discussion All that I would say is that so far as I am concerned, I am leaving Delhi day after tomorrow morning. We have only today and tomorrow. Tomorrow afternoon in the other House they have decided to have a discussion for two hours. That is the position, Sir.
Mr. Chairman: On the same subject?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, Sir.

V.K. Dhage: We can take up the discussion either before that or even after that. I have no objection. I do not think that on our side anyone will have objection to sit even late. I think a discussion on this matter should be held in the House.

Ganga Sharan Sinha: Is it a fact that this letter from the Chinese Premier was released by the Chinese Embassy to the Press?

Jawaharlal Nehru: When I received Mr. Chou En-lai's letter-he had it delivered to our Ambassador in Peking, who telegraphed to us-in that letter there was a mention by Mr. Chou En-lai that after I had received this letter he would release it to the Press and it was, therefore, released by him at Peking.

Seeta Parmanand:²⁹ Would it be possible to have a joint sitting tomorrow after six?

Seeta Parmanand: Was it released before he received it or after?

Jawaharlal Nehru: After. I have made that clear.

²⁹ Congress

Mr. Chairman: He said so. After he received it. What is it, Shrimati Seeta Parmanand?

Seeta Parmanand: Mr. Chairman, we may have a joint sitting of both Houses so that time could be saved.

Mr. Chairman: Joint sessions are provided only in case of conflict between the two Houses. I do not think there is any conflict.

Ganga Sharan Sinha: Is it the normal procedure that when the Prime Minister or a Government writes a letter to the other Government, that is released by the Embassy of that Government or the other Prime Minister who receives the letter? What is the normal procedure?

Jawaharlal Nehru: That has been done by us too. We did that in the case of our letter.

Jaswant Singh:³⁰ Is the consent of the other party generally not taken in this matter, and may I know whether one party can release it without the consent of the other party? Just I want to know the general procedure, the diplomatic procedure.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Normally such letters are not published at all. Diplomatic correspondence cannot be carried on if letters are constantly being published. But recently chiefly because of the debates in this House and the other House and the desire of the Houses to know all that has happened we published all this correspondence in the White Papers and that is a

³⁰ Independent

continuation of that. Naturally we had to follow it up. We could not have debates here, proper debates, without information being given as to the latest development. Therefore, we have been publishing and they have been publishing and we cannot complain of their action in this matter. But all that we try to do is not to publish them before they are received by the other party.

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Prime Minister, may I ask whether it would be possible for you to have a discussion here between eleven and one O' clock, suppose we started at ten tomorrow for the Question Hour?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, Sir, if that is your will.

Mr. Chairman: So, we meet tomorrow at ten. Then Question Hour will be over at eleven. Between eleven and one O' clock we will have discussion on this question.

V.K. Dhage: Thank you.

164. To Han Suyin: "A Many-Splendoured Thing"³¹

December 21, 1959

Dear Han Suyin,

I have received two letters from you during the past few days—one addressed to "Your Excellency", the other to "Panditji". That anyhow is an improvement.

I sent you a brief note on November 30. I presume you receive it, although you do not mention it in either of your letters.

³¹ Letter to Han Suyin, Chinese-Belgian writer

In your "Excellency" letter, you refer to many things but, about one matter, I should like to clear any misapprehension that you might have. Your coming here to see me did not in the slightest annoy or irritate me. In fact, it did me good and helped me to understand some aspects of this China-India problem. I shall not discuss this matter in this letter because I find this kind of discussion does not help much. You say that recent events have led to the iron entering the souls of the Chinese and that their pride has been struck at, time and again. Unfortunately the same reaction is taking place in India and so we try to balance ourselves in between these strong emotional reactions, apart from the facts.

Did I upbraid you three years ago about your book "A Many-Splendoured Thing"? I do not remember what I said then, but obviously, if I ventured to criticize anything in it, it must have been because I thought it worthwhile talking to you more intimately than I might have done to others.

Thank you for your good wishes. May the New Year prove better for all of us than the one through which we have passed.

Yours sincerely,
[Jawaharlal Nehru]

165. To the Consultative Committee on External Affairs: New Map and Goa³²

Sino-Indian Border
Congress M.P.s Discussions
Authoritative Map to be Published

New Delhi,
December 21.

³² From The Hindu, 22 December 1959

Prime Minister Nehru informed the members of the Consultative Committee on External Affairs of Parliament that the Government of India would shortly publish an authoritative map showing the Sino-Indian border.

Mr. Nehru said that India's position in respect of the border on NEFA side and on Ladakh side was unassailable being supported by maps, documents and treaties apart from tradition and custom. He assured members that in no case would India yield to the unjust and unreasonable claims of the Chinese on Indian territory as seen in the latest reply received from Premier Chou En-lai.

He criticised the Chinese Premier for trying to link up the Ladakh border issue with the McMahon Line and said that these two things were separate. While India was in favour of negotiations he would certainly take all steps to safeguard her from further incursions.

It is gathered that Mr. Nehru also made a reference to the Chinese edition of his book "Discovery of India" carrying a map showing the Sino-Indian border and said that it was only a rough artist-drawn map which was done long after the McMahon Line was drawn and the Simla Conference. In this connection, he said the Government would continue to ban the import of unauthorised maps into India. The authoritative map would show the border clearly and would leave no room for doubt. A map showing places which the Chinese claim as theirs may also be published.

The meeting which lasted for an hour discussed mainly the Sino-Indian border issue in the light of the letter received from Mr. Chou En-lai and Prime Minister's reply to that.

When a member asked whether a Summit Conference was likely to be held in Delhi, Mr. Nehru pointed out that the British Premier had suggested that a series of meetings might be necessary as a preliminary to holding the Summit Conference.

The Prime Minister is said to have indicated to the committee that the Government of India was in touch with friendly countries like Burma and Indonesia in regard to China's present attitude towards Asian countries, adds the PTI. China's border problem with Burma still remained and despite assurances, the Chinese version of the Sino-Burmese border claimed large chunks of Burmese territory. Burma was rather concerned about this development and General Ne Win and he had had a talk during the latter's visit to Delhi while on his way to Rangoon from Cairo. The recent trouble over Chinese nationals in Indonesia provided an indication of the Chinese attitude.

Reference was also made about Nepal and the Prime Minister was asked about the extent of anti-Indian feelings in Nepal. Mr. Nehru is reported to have deplored this attitude of the Communist Party in Nepal. By and large the people and the Government of Nepal, he is reported to have said, were friendly with India. By way of illustration Mr. Nehru referred to a procession organised by the Communists and other groups in Nepal as a protest against Prime Minister's declaration on Nepal. The procession consisted of only 200 people and they cheered the Indian Ambassador at Kathmandu when he passed by it.

GOA DISCUSSED IN TALKS WITH IKE

Prime Minister is understood to have told the committee that during his talks with Mr. Eisenhower, a casual mention of Goa was also made. It was in connection with his review of the Portuguese rule in Goa. The reference to Goa is reported to have arisen when the committee was discussing the citizenship rights of Goans who are in India. Mr. Nehru is said to have pointed out the difficulties relating to the grant of Indian citizenship so long as they remained Portuguese citizens. Unless they renounced Portuguese citizenship and acquired Indian citizenship in the same manner as other

foreigners act, the rules in this regard could not be altered. The Government of India did not wish to alter the rules at any rate till the case before The Hague Court was decided.

166. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Relations³³

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, I do not exactly remember the date of our last debate in this House.

Dr. Ram Subhag Singh: 25th, 26th and 27th.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I think it was in November, towards the end of November. A little before that, I had sent a letter to Premier Chou En-lai which the House knows. In that letter we had made certain proposals and we had a full and instructive debate in this House. The House had that letter before it and the whole situation, and the House was pleased to give its support, and if I may say with respect, its enthusiastic support, to the action we had taken in that matter.

Since then we have had a reply from Premier Chou En-lai, and I have sent a brief reply to him, to his letter. In effect, the new points for consideration are Premier Chou En-lai's letter and my reply. On the whole, however, the debate has proceeded more or less on the same lines as previously, though references have, no doubt, been made to Premier Chou En-lai's letter.

Hon. Member Acharya Kripalani complained or remarked that I was allergic to suggestions being made to me or criticism being made. I hope I am not, and that I am always very willing to listen to any suggestions or criticisms. Naturally, when a criticism means a reversal of policy, which I believe in,

³³ 22 December 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXXVII, cols 6709-6727

then, I find it somewhat difficult to accept, unless I am prepared to accept the reversal of that policy; it is not a question of minor changes or anything, but a basic reversal of the policy, and, therein, naturally, I have some difficulty.

Now I have listened, as I should, with very considerable attention to the various speeches made, and made rather long notes about what has been said. I shall not say much in regard to the many things said, because much of that was said, though no doubt justified from some point of view, was not particularly helpful in understanding the situation or what should be done. One can understand that, but they are not helpful by themselves in finding any particular way out of the difficulty.

May I say that I entirely agree with Shri Jaipal Singh when he said that this matter should not be treated as a party issue? Of course not, it is not a party issue. Many things have been said by hon. Members opposite with which I am in hearty agreement; some things have been said by Members sitting with me on this side, with which I am in hearty disagreement, so that it is not a party issue at all; it is a national issue, and indeed, it is something more even than a national issue, because it impinges on all kinds of international issues, but certainly, so far as we are concerned, it is a national issue.

Now, let us be clear about certain basic factors, so that they need not be thought to be in doubt. We are committed, from every point of view, to defend our country, to preserve its integrity, to preserve its honour and self-respect. That is not a matter for argument, I thought. Opinions may differ as to how to do it. That is a different matter. But the basic thing is clear, and in doing that, in the ultimate analysis, almost any price has to be paid. One cannot proceed on the basis of barter, haggling and the tactics of the market-place, where a nation's honour and self-respect are concerned. That is clear. But when you come to the next step about what one should do, much has been argued about negotiation or war or something in

between. I said the other day that if you really stop negotiations, the alternative is something which is either war or leading up to war, or, of course, it may be just sitting tight and doing nothing, which seems to me a very feeble way of meeting the situation.

Shri Jaipal Singh referred to what he considered the many intermediate or middle stages, such as, he said, South Africa or Portugal. Well, I would hardly have thought those instances helped this argument. In spite of all that has happened in South Africa, every year, we have put forward the proposal to negotiate with them in the United Nations, and it has been passed there by a considerable majority. It is South Africa that has refused to negotiate, the word may not be right, anyhow, to talk about these matters, which have created so much trouble there.

In regard to Portugal, we have always been willing to talk to Portugal; naturally, the talk has to be about the basic matters, not about some superficial matters. So, those examples are not very helpful.

Then, Acharya Kripalani mentioned economic sanctions. Another hon. Member talked about a punitive police action. Now, with all respect to them, I do not see how economic sanctions have the slightest effect on anybody in the present situation. We have very very little trade with China. We had some trade with Tibet which has dwindled chiefly because of Chinese activities on the other side. We may consider further as to whether we should continue it or stop it or take another step in the economic sphere. That is a matter for consideration. One may do that, but it has no real effect on the situation. It is obvious.

As for the idea of a police action, I am rather surprised that the hon. Member who, he himself has reminded us, has been a gallant soldier, should put forward this idea of a police action. What exactly it means in this context is not clear to me. You can have a police action against some very very weak adversary where the police-the whole meaning is that the police

can function there and get results. Whether the police is represented by some little army or not, essentially it is a police action against a small adversary. We do not take police action against a larger force of police, if you like to call it, or whatever it is. It is a misnomer. Let us not confuse ourselves.

Then I found in the speeches of many Members a desire to make it clear that they do not want war, but they suggested various other things. I have mentioned some. Acharya Kripalani asked: 'Why do you always talk about a world war? It may be a local war.' Yes, it may be, of course. But anyone studying the question in the context of wars today-possibly of wars-knows very well that local wars do not take place, are not likely to take place, between two great countries without developing into big wars and the big wars without developing possibly-not certainly-into a world war. I am merely trying to clarify these matters so that we may indulge in clear thinking. Merely in our resentment saying, as a hon. Member just said a little before me, that we must do this here, we must take Tibet or Tibet must be this-all that may be a pleasant thought, but it has no relation to reality.

Here are two countries, both strong in their respective ways, both huge, both-I say-incapable of being defeated by the other. It is quite absurd to imagine for anyone in China or elsewhere that China, however powerful she may be, is going to ultimately defeat India in case of war, I do not accept that, and I think China knows that too. It is equally absurd to imagine that India is going to defeat China in a great war.

Braj Raj Singh: We never wanted it.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Of course. Then why talk about it?

Braj Raj Singh: Nobody is talking about it.

Jawaharlal Nehru: If you do not want it, why talk about it? If you say 'We do not talk about that thing', then I would say: Do not talk things that lead up to it. One has to be logical about this. We admit it. It is quite clear. First of all, for some things a country pays-it does not count the cost. If its honour, self respect and freedom are involved, no cost is too great. It is better to perish in the attempt than to submit or surrender. That is the basis of our thinking-and I hope of this House and our people.

Having said that, it does not mean that we should give up thinking in regard to the steps that we take in order to justify whatever our position may be. If we have to think of problems of war we have very much to think of what the views of experts may be, I do not mean to say that experts are only people wearing the military uniform. Civilians like Acharya Kripalani may become experts in military matters; for aught I know he may be able to give an opinion about what should be done. (Interruption)

Normally, when one talks about war or even police action one does so after logically thinking as to what those steps should be one after the other.

What is more important and what every General has to think is this. A General has to forget himself for a while and think that he is the enemy's General and what he will do. Then he should devise his policy. That is the way to think. One cannot imagine any General who has any experience at all imagining that he has a clear field and the other fellow is a fool and he will run away before him. That does not happen in war or in any circumstances like this. Everyone thinks about these matters in the strictest practical way. In addition to that he may think in an idealistic way. I hope we think in both ways, idealistic and practical. But if you give up one of them it will be unfortunate. But if you give up both idealism and practicality then where are we? There is no anchorage to hold on to.

As I said, apart from strong expressions of opinion etc., broadly speaking, I believe that there is a very large unanimity of opinion in this House on this issue. It may be expressed differently with greater emphasis or less emphasis. There is a large unanimity of opinion about this matter, even though some people may differ here and there about the steps to be taken, the timing of it.

Much has been said about timing. Acharya Kripalani is apprehensive that time may run against us and the Chinese authorities may consolidate their position in these areas. In fact he used the word 'colonise them'. I do not know what the Chinese mayor may not do. But as Raja Mahendra Pratap managed to say before he sat down-and he speaks with experience having, I believe, wandered about some of these territories-it is not a particularly easy matter to colonise, or, if I may say so with all respect to Dr. Ram Subhag Singh-to industrialise these territories.

Ram Subhag Singh: But they have three ton trucks in the Kongka Pass.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is not colonising. I do not know what modern science may not do in future. I cannot say. I am merely referring to the present, that for the last 2,000 or 3,000 years nobody has succeeded in that in Ladakh. I am talking about Ladakh for the moment because there are different areas. At the present moment, in all this wide area, I think, possibly one or two tiny villages or a few huts are there. Otherwise, there is no inhabitant.

In summer some shepherds came to graze their sheep and they walk away in winter. We are now-I need not remind hon. Members-in winter. It is exceedingly difficult except for some daring explorers or that type of persons to function with ease in those territories. Nobody lives there. I do not deny the possibility of, with great effort, creating conditions for people

to live there. They live there not by producing anything there because the territory is not that way-for thousands of years it has been like that. If it is going to be changed by scientific effort, that will take a very considerable time. It does not change suddenly like this.

Hem Barua: This oft repeated statement of uninhabited areas where only shepherds go to graze their sheep has given encouragement to the Chinese... (interruptions) It has been repeated often.

Rajendra Singh: It only substantiates the charge against you.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I was talking about the colonisation of these territories. I am merely pointing this out as Raja Mahendra Pratap wanted to do. This may be done-I do not know-with the resources of people but it is not a practical proposition. I am talking about the time element. The hon. Member has rightly pointed out that a road has been built. Mr. Chou En-lai has in his letter referred to this road being built with 3,000 civilian personnel and all that from 1955-57. That is perfectly true. The House knows that-the road that was built. I am not talking about the subsequent developments. Mr. Chou En-lai's statement presumably refers to this road through Aksai Chin area; that is perfectly true. In that corner of Ladakh that road was built and for two years or so, we knew nothing about it. It is perfectly true; it may be our fault. We knew nothing about it. Whatever has happened in Ladakh, so far as we know, apart from the Aksai Chin area, the wide area that they have transgressed has been done mostly in the last summer-this last summer-as part of the continuation of their efforts to suppress the Tibetan revolt. I cannot say of any corner but broadly, this, I think, is true. I am merely stating the facts and not trying to answer any

argument. So we come back to this. Again, Dr. Ram Subhag Singh made it clear that he did not want a ship-building yard in these areas.

Ram Subhag Singh:³⁴ That is true. But that can be done in this age of science when Moscow has been joined to the five seas and Alaska and Siberia have been equally well developed.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Quite so. I happen to have been to Siberia and know some little things about it. I do not know what in this age of atomic energy can be done or what might not be done. But take the NEFA area. I think that we have done a rather good piece of work in the NEFA area, an area in which the British failed to do anything at all for decades and decades. They just failed completely. We have done a good piece of work not only in spreading our administration there but in communications, in schools, hospitals, agriculture etc. among the people who are very difficult to handle. That was done and that no doubt will continue.

We want those areas to develop and naturally we expect them to develop in the real industrial sense. It is far better to develop industries where they can easily develop than across mountains and other places where it is a much harder task but those areas should develop in that sense and may be, where we find good minerals, etc. they will certainly have to be developed and exploited.

But the main thing is this. If you do not go back to the past which we had discussed so often, what is to be done in the present?

Now, I repeat that whether we talk about negotiation or whatever else we may talk about. It is clear, and I thought there would be no doubt in any hon. Member's mind, that any kind of further step that the Chinese may

³⁴ Congress

take will obviously be resisted wherever it may be—that is obvious—to the best of our ability.

Rajendra Singh: What about the places that are still in the hands of the Chinese?

Mr. Speaker: Order, order.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Because Shri Vajpayee put me a straight question I am giving him this answer that, as a matter of fact, that has been our policy—whether it was fully and properly implemented or not is a different matter. That policy has not changed. And, as a matter of fact, in NEF A, of course, apart from that very tiny enclave of about three or four miles, Longju, it is because of our strength there and our determination to resist that we have prevented their entry into NEFA except, as I said, in Longju. In all these areas, whether it is the border, Uttar Pradesh or Himachal Pradesh or Punjab we have prevented their entry and we will prevent it.

Now the real question is that difficulties have arisen in regard to this fairly large area in eastern Ladakh which, as I said, apart from the Aksai Chin area, they have entered mostly during the last summer. It may be said, rightly that we should have been in a position to prevent that. It is a difficult task, but it may be that if we had directed all our attention to it previously it might have been done. I do not wish to argue that point. Anyhow, here is this present position and this present position can be resolved basically in two ways: one is by an attempt at negotiation yielding some kind of fruitful results, a peaceful settlement, and the other is by compulsion and coercion which may be less than war or war itself. Any attempt at compulsion or coercion is really—in these circumstances economic sanctions do not count—if not war, call it police action if you like,

that is, the use of armed people. Now, when hon. Members refer to this, no doubt they have to bear in mind that there are armed people on the other side too; it is not a one way traffic. Therefore, if one has to take that, principles apart, one has to do so in favourable circumstances when one thinks that it is likely to yield substantial results. One does not do this merely in a huff or because one is angry. That may lead to something the opposite of what one desires.

Therefore, while one tries to settle it always by negotiation, one at the same time, strengthens oneself to deal with any situation that might arise or has arisen. These are normal platitudes-the House will forgive me for repeating them, but I want a little clear thinking. On this issue, we follow both these policies. We tried to negotiate because that is not only right but inevitable and I would submit that no country in the wide world would not negotiate, does not matter how much they are opposed to each other. If they are dead opposed to each other, even then they talk. We have had in recent months, or may be in the last year, very serious incidents between powerful countries like the Soviet Union and the United States of America-shooting down bombers, aircraft, etc. Well, they have talked about it. They have not declared war. They have talked about it; settled it and sometimes not settled it; it is still there unsettled. Sometimes they have given compensation, or whatever it is. But countries, whatever the situation may be, always negotiate. It is inevitable in international affairs. Otherwise, there will be a complete law of the jungle. You may say that one party is functioning as if it was the law of the jungle. It may be. It is deplorable and one should naturally do what one can to stop that. But one negotiates even then. Negotiation always carries weight if there is strength behind it. A weak country or a weak person cannot negotiate at all. Therefore, strength is an essential factor. The building up of strength, the addition to your strength, the addition to your strength, is obvious. It has to be done.

Then, hon. Members might ask, "What will you do if your negotiation does not yield results?" I cannot, and it would not be right for me now, to lay down what one does; but, as I said, in any event, we have to build up strength to meet such contingencies at a suitable moment. For us to say, as some hon. Members hinted at, that "Do not talk to them; do not negotiate", is a thing which, I would venture to say, will not be understood by any country in the wide world.

The hon. Member, Acharya Kripalani, seems to think that this is the fault of our publicity. Countries gather information, and their foreign offices, even if we are at fault, do keep themselves informed about these matters. They are interested in a matter of this kind. It has excited world-wide interest naturally because of the possibilities in it; because of the potentialities of big scale trouble in it. Every country has watched it, studied it; we have helped them to study it and all that. If those countries do not immediately accept, let us say, Acharya Kripalani's view-point on it, it is not necessarily true that we are at fault. It may be that Acharya Kripalani's viewpoint may be at fault. It may be.

Acharya Kripalani: If you are satisfied with your publicity, I have no objection.

Jawaharlal Nehru: No, no. It is not a question of my being satisfied. One seems to imagine that if we shout loudly enough about what we feel the other party or other country will agree to it! Publicity goes a very small way in these matters. It really consists, as far as possible, in placing the material. In judging of any matter outside India-many matters come up-do we decide, because somebody's publicity hits us on the head, in his favour? We judge these things from our own sources and our own information as to what has happened in Europe or South America or Africa or Asia or South-

East Asia. The countries have their ambassadors, ministers, agents of publicity, and what not, to get information. They judge from them. We may fail completely in some small matter; this may happen if there is a riot somewhere here; but in big matters concerning two countries, other countries are deeply interested and are very well informed. They have to be. They cannot afford to be not fully informed about matters like this between two great countries like India and China. They may be right or wrong. That is a different matter. But they attempt to keep themselves "informed and we attempt to keep ourselves informed too. I have no doubt the other country also keeps them informed. There it is.

To imagine that what we think is inevitably a hundred per cent right is not necessarily correct. Sometimes we may be a little wrong too. We are human beings subject to error, just like others are. I think it comes in the way of clear thinking. If we decide and if we have come to the conclusion, that we are a hundred per cent, in the right, no further thinking is required. Only some kind of strong action is necessary. Action, or rather the capacity for action, is always necessary, because without that, words do not count. But that action must think of the consequences and every action that is indulged in surely is indulged in with a view to achieve results. To indulge in action not to achieve results obviously has no good result itself. So, these factors have to be considered.

Nath Pai: May I ask, is it not that we are 100 per cent right? This is casting an aspersion and weakening our case when he indicates that there is one degree of doubt regarding our basic rights. He has made the statement that we are not 100 per cent right.

Jawaharlal Nehru: That depends on, right in regard to what?

Nath Pai: Our rights in Ladakh, regarding the border.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I think we are in the right, very much so. We have a strong case.

Nath Pai: Is it not 100 per cent, right?

Jawaharlal Nehru: He should not ask me these questions, which it is not proper for me to deal with in these circumstances. I am prepared to discuss this matter with the hon. Member, because these matters are complicated matters. As I have told you, we have been discussing in regard to two or three areas in dispute with the old Tibetan Government. This has been going on; old standing disputes have gone on.

There are various factors to be considered. I believe our case is a very strong one; I have no doubt about it, but I can assure you that the Chinese believe that their case is a strong one. They say so, whatever they believe.

Rajendra Singh: They are wrong.

Vajpayee: Why should the Prime Minister say that the Chinese say so? Let the Chinese say what they want.

Rajendra Singh: The Prime Minister is in doubt about our case. That is why he is saying like this.

Tyagi: The Prime Minister knows what he talks.

Raghunath Singh: That shows his vigilance.

Jawaharlal Nehru: When you discuss the border of any country, wherever it may be, which has historical backgrounds, all kinds of past incidents are brought up, which are discussed. I think the Chinese case is a very weak one. They go back, which is very wrong, I think, to past periods of history. That is a different matter. But whatever it is, if you have to deal with it, you have to answer it. My point is I cannot deal with them by saying, "All that you say does not require an answer". We are right, but that is not the way. We may be right 100 per cent, or 99 per cent, but I have to answer their case, as I insist that they should answer mine, otherwise, there can be no dealings at all. Otherwise, you decide in an armed way or coercive way- they or we-and whichever has the longer lathi possibly produces a greater effect. The whole thing cannot be dealt with in this easygoing way, as if it does not require any argument. It does require argument to convince them, to convince the other countries and all that.

Acharya Kripalani himself referred to some foreign countries. They are no fools-those people; they are friends; yet, they have argued this matter in a variety of ways.

There is so much said about the McMahon line and we have strongly stressed our case. I have not a shadow of doubt in my mind that not only the McMahon line is right from our point of view, but I would go further and say that before the McMahon line was made, the McMahon line itself was the laying down of something that existed before it; that is, a justification of the traditional border there. It is not the McMahon line that created the border. It is only after a conflict it was laid down. That is so. Take Ladakh. The history of Ladakh, the present history of Ladakh goes back to 1842 when after war between the ruler of Ladakh, Maharajah Gulab Singh, and the ruler of Tibet, both being feudatories of others-the ruler of Tibet being the feudatory of the Emperor of China and the ruler of Ladakh being the feudatory of the ruler of Punjab at that time-the war between them ended

ultimately in the victory of Gulab Singh's forces, and that resulted in a treaty, acknowledging that Ladakh was part of Kashmir State territory. Later this area, this boundary, was not demarcated on the ground, but laid down in maps by some English surveyors.

Now I can understand some dispute being raised about some country here and there. Of course, it is not marked, and its territory is not inhabited. There is no administration, no payment of tax, no proofs-the only proof is travellers' accounts the normal thing that has been understood by people who pass that way and maps; these are the two or three ways of proving these things. So that, the question may arise about minor points here and there, but the major point is the basic boundary of Ladakh which was laid down 112 years ago, not today. It is not marked there; it is marked in maps.

Now, some maps differ. There is no doubt about it. Maps differ, travellers' accounts differ and travellers' books differ, and all these matters can be argued about. One cannot say that we will not talk about these matters. But the basic thing is not about those border troubles, but this rather massive infiltration into Ladakh which has chiefly taken place, to the best of my knowledge, during the last summer, apart from the Aksai Chin area. The argument-if it is raised-that "we are here and we have taken possession of this territory; therefore, it is ours" of course, is an utterly wrong argument. The sovereignty of a country does not change because somebody comes and sits in a corner of it. It is obvious it cannot. No country has an army spread out all along its borders to protect it from people coming in. Anybody can come in, but the sovereignty of that country remains over that territory, even though some people may sit on a little part of it.

Therefore, if I may say so the basic point today is not, I submit, that we should not negotiate; let us consider that, because one has always to

negotiate, and to say that negotiations will not bear fruit, if I may say so, has no relevance in this matter. Even if it did not bear fruit, even then you will have to negotiate, because that is a way of procedure. The moment you refuse to do so, you are wrong before the world, and the world will think you are afraid of negotiation; you are afraid of that. They will not accept your word for it-you are afraid of talking to the other parties; that is the impression created.

But the negotiation has some value only if it is backed by strength.

Raja Mahendra Pratap: On a point of order. As an elderly man, I say: let us also negotiate amongst ourselves. It is 6.30 and let us adjourn.

Jawaharlal Nehru: In the final analysis, it comes to this that we must build up our strength and, as I have said previously-I think on the last occasion-this is not a matter which we can dispose off by a discussion. It may take a few months or a year or more.

Whatever the issue of this is, the issue, of this matter may come or may not come in a few months or so, I do not know, but what I am saying is that the situation that has arisen on our borders is of such historical significance from a long-term point of view. India and China, these two great countries, for the first time face each other on a long border which is a live border, and even if we are friends, even then, we have a live and dangerous border; if we are not friends, then it is worse. Therefore, this tremendous historical development is taking place in Asia affecting not only India and China, but all the countries of Asia, necessitating, quite apart from other developments, the building up of our strength. Then we can consider using it whenever it is necessary.

Building up of our strength means certainly defence forces and the defence apparatus, but remember that defence means today industrial strength. It

is industry that gives real strength. So, while we keep our Army etc., as strong as we can make it and as well-equipped as possible, the real basis, the real strength, will come from rapid industrialisation.

We come back really not only to industrialization; it means better agriculture, better industry, in order to meet these crises, because it is only then that countries become strong. That is how other countries are strong today. The so-called Great Powers or the middling Powers are strong because they have become a modernized State, because they take advantage of the modern methods which increase their production, give them strength, all kinds of things. Therefore, the basic thing is that we become a modern State, not remain in a backward condition economically and socially.

These are the basic things that we have to face, and this is a challenge to the country, not a challenge in the present of course which we have to meet, but much more so a challenge for the future, because ultimately unless proper balances are created in Asia, all our wishes may not lead us to what we want to have.

Therefore, I would beg this House to look at this matter from this wider point of view as well as from the immediate danger point of view, and to consider it not a party matter, but a national issue of far-reaching consequences.

Braj Raj Singh: Acharya Kripalani has to reply.

Mr. Speaker: The discussion has been allowed under rules 193 and 195. It is specifically noted in rule 195 that there is no motion and no voting shall be taken, and there is no right of reply. I am sorry.

167. In the Rajya Sabha: India-China Relations³⁵

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Chairman, I have always welcomed discussions on foreign affairs in this House and profited by them. On this occasion I was somewhat reluctant for a discussion, though I bowed to the wishes of the House and your wishes, Sir, because I felt that having regard to the present situation, nothing new, so far as discussion is concerned, had really emerged and it would be rather an odd course of events or precedent to establish that whenever I send a letter there is to be a discussion and whenever I receive a letter there is to be a discussion. As a matter of fact, such letters are normally not published. But owing to the peculiar circumstances of the case here, we have decided, and I think rightly, to place all correspondence that takes place before Parliament and the public. And yet it is obvious that diplomatic correspondence can hardly go very far, if this took place and if it is continually discussed in public. Some new method of diplomacy will have to be evolved. That was my difficulty, not of keeping back any facts from this House or the country, because when we place all our cards on the table and all our letters, then there is nothing hidden, and if we are to proceed through diplomatic means, they have to be somewhat different from the procedure often adopted in a debate. The facts may be the same, the course of events may be the same. As Mr. Dahyabhai Patel³⁶ said, and no doubt, others have said or realised, the issues before us are of the highest moment and importance and require not only great effort of the mind, but if I may say so, other efforts too. It is a situation which, as was pointed out in the last debate here, is a new situation in India's history of two thousand years. It is not some mere border incident that has happened, although border incidents have happened. It is not something which can be brushed

³⁵ Motion, 22 December 1959. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. XXVII, cols 3460-3471

³⁶ MJP

away by a little strong language as our friend from Ladakh just used. It is a conflict between two of the biggest nations of Asia coming up face to face on a long border after thousands of years of history. Therefore, we have always to keep in mind where we are and what we can do and what we will have to do. At the same time, keeping in mind all this does not mean that we should approach this question with an apprehension of not being able to do much or with weakness. I do not believe in that. But weakness or strength comes from many things and in many ways. It is not merely a question of strong resolutions that we may pass. There is the military test of weakness or strength. There is the industrial test of weakness or strength, and there is the test of the morale of the people, the discipline of the people. All these are tests and we are going to be tested in every way. And whatever may be the outcome in the next few weeks or few months or whatever the period might be of these border troubles, this testing will continue for years to come, I should like this House to realise this. Now, I do not understand when hon. Members ask: "How long are we going to put up with this kind of thing?" What exactly does this kind of thing mean? I do not understand it, I say, as long as the circumstances require it. It may be a week, a year, ten years or a hundred years, because you cannot change all these factors that go to make world changes. I use the words "hundred years" in a metaphorical sense. It may happen. But the point is the whole outlook has to be fitted in into the enormous changes that are taking place in the world.

Here are two mighty nations of the Western world-the United States of America and the Soviet Union-opposed to each other in many ways, fearful of each other, arming against each other and yet holding their hands realising the consequences of not holding their hands realising the consequences that once they let loose the dogs of war, nobody can stop them. In strength or military might, neither India nor China can come up

anywhere near those tremendously powerful nations but we are big nations, strong nations, determined nations and each nation is having its own strong sense of self-respect and honour. If we honour, as we do, our own self-respect and are going to stand by it whatever happens, let us remember that China is not a small or a mean country. It has also a strong idea of its self-respect and honour and let us not throw words which without doing us any good do a lot of harm by attacking the self-respect of a country. This is quite apart from what they may have done or we may do. Of course, we have to talk warily as we have to act warily but with strength. Here this position has arisen due, undoubtedly, to certain activities, advances, and I think, aggression by the Chinese authorities in Ladakh chiefly and a little bit in NEFA. Now, there is a history behind it which can be traced to some extent from the White Paper that had been circulated, the correspondence, etc., and we can try to understand and find out what has happened more or less and what might take place but again, I would say, behind all this are bigger and more historical changes that are taking place in the face of history. Two revolutions come into contact, the Chinese revolution and the Indian revolution. They are of different types but nevertheless revolutions which have changed the face of these countries and which go on changing them, maybe in somewhat different ways and it is a major fact of history not only of India and China but of Asia and the world that these two revolutions come across each other on a wide field. That is the problem before us which cannot be dealt with by merely getting angry or petulant about it. Let us be angry by all means but let us think as to how we can deal with this matter. We cannot, of course lay down every step because each step has to be conditioned by events, each step has to be conditioned by new circumstances, but broadly speaking one can lay down and one can prepare for it so far as one can, because whatever step we may take can only be successful in so far as it is backed

by strength and a people's will and determination to shoulder the burdens of that step. Each step involves burdens and each step involves grave difficulties for the country. When there is a conflict between two countries big or small, there are, broadly speaking, two ways of dealing with it. The normal way which every country follows till something else happens is the diplomatic way, by diplomacy of correspondence, diplomacy of personal meetings and discussion. The moment any country renounces the diplomatic way, there is no other way except war. There may be perhaps a middle way of nothing happening, just sitting at home and being angered with each other, but the moment you say that you will not have the diplomatic way, it means that you close the door of meetings, of talking and of correspondence. There it is and then the other forces come into play. It may be a way or it may be, for the moment, not doing anything if you like, but a situation which drifts towards war. I should like to know what other third way there is. That is one point to be realised when people talk about: "How long are we to wait?" I say, you will have to wait as long as you have to wait. I cannot measure that time and I cannot limit it. Do we deal with a situation like this, or does China deal with a situation like this by issuing an ultimatum to India "Do this" or "Do that"? Is India going to deal with a situation like this by issuing an ultimatum to China? Think of the meaning of these words and the consequences that lie behind those words. It means shutting the door with no other way open except the way of war. Now, all of us want to avoid war, I presume all of us, maybe not some but let us realise that this imagining that one can have a little scrap here and a little scrap there and then just adjust with the other party is rather infantile thing. Two great nations do not have little scraps and then frighten each other by scraps. Scraps grow. In fact, the chief difficulty at the present moment which the House faces and the country is angered at is, as everyone knows, because scraps have occurred. It is not our fault, maybe,

but it does not matter; the point is it is the scraps that rouse passions and if there are a few more scraps, the period of small scraps will end and the period of big scraps will end and other things will come in. One thing leads to another. One has to look into this not only from the context of our border and of two mighty countries coming into conflict, but its consequences elsewhere, what will happen. I am being perfectly frank with this House which normally a person in my position should not be, but I think that we should be frank with each other and not lose ourselves in fine phrases. Any kind of warlike development between India and China will be an indefinite war because we will never give in and they will never give in. Realise that. It is not like what the hon. Member from Kashmir said, "Go and teach them a lesson. They will then behave". It is amazing, and this kind of approach, I am sorry to use the word, is rather infantile. It means that throughout our life we will be warring and warring because India will not give in. Are we going to allow China to conquer India, or will they allow themselves to be conquered? All these facts come up. Have you thought of them? Of course, if they try to push into India, naturally we have to fight and fight regardless of the time taken; it may be a few years or a hundred years. That is a different matter and we have to fight because there is no choice left. From our side or from their side, in bringing this decision about one thinks not once but many times before doing it. When there is no escape from it, well there is no escape from it. Therefore, one tries naturally the way of peaceful settlement. We have been talking about these things not only in our case but in the case of every quarrel in the wide world. We have talked about this in regard to big international issues and we still go on talking about it. Was that meant for others only, this talk that we indulged in, and was not to be applied to our own case when it came? That would be a strange commentary on what we say and what we do when faced with a difficult situation. Therefore, it is inevitable that we

should call it what you like-negotiate, deal with this question diplomatically, deal with it by correspondence, by meeting when necessary, because in such a matter it is far more important to get results if results are obtainable than to allow some kind of false prestige to come in and refuse to talk. That is not becoming when major issues are at stake involving the future destiny of a country, of hundreds of millions of people, and I should say quite frankly that in this letter which we have been discussing-the letter of Premier Chou En-lai-there is, so far as facts are concerned, no giving in. It is a reiteration, repetition and reaffirmation of their claims and yet there is one thing in it which I welcome, whatever the reason for it may be, and that is, as I see it, certainly a strong desire to meet and discuss. There is that and I welcome it, although I must say I do not understand how Premier Chou En-lai expected me within four or five days or a week to be able to meet him in a third country. It seems rather odd to me but the fact remains that there is that and whatever the reason behind that may be-some people may say there is a special motive behind that; it does not matter. Maybe, but the point is that throughout that letter this point is brought out-so far as I am concerned, whenever the time comes, whenever it is suitable, I shall avail myself of that opportunity because the issues are too serious for any other course to be adopted. That is the broad approach to this question.

We have sent a reply to Premier Chou En-lai which has not been published but in fact I had given the substance to this House yesterday, because I wanted it to reach Premier Chou En-lai before it is published. It will be published in a day or two, perhaps two or three days.

Now, I think in the last two or three letters that we have sent we have stated our case, I won't say in all its details but broadly they have been stated and this House should realise that merely repetition or strong repetition of certain phrases does not make a case when you are dealing

with international matters, just as the Chinese Government should realise that their mere repetition of strong phrases does not make a case for them. A case is something different whether it is looked at from constitutional, legal, historical, geographical or other points of view, usage etc. We have broadly stated our case; it is a good case and I think the facts and the history behind it and all that are very much in our favour. But it has to be dealt with in that level. If I or the Chinese Government merely deal with it at a level of hurling strong speeches at each other or ultimatums, well, then there is no discretion. Then we enter into a field of conflict which from a merely verbal conflict may go on to physical conflict and from a small physical conflict to a big physical conflict and so on and so forth. All these step-by-step consequences come.

So I have ventured to place these various considerations before the House. I am grateful to the House for their kind expressions of confidence in the policy we are pursuing and their assurance to support this policy to the hilt. Of course without that faith and confidence and assurance, I could do little; nobody could do anything. In such a grave matter we require the full direction and confidence of Parliament and of the people and we have to tread the straight and narrow path of building up strength as soon as and as rapidly as we can in all ways, always also restraining ourselves from doing the wrong thing which will bring about wrong and evil results which may become irretrievable. It is now a difficult position for anyone or for any country just as the world in the last few years has lived-not under a balance of strength or balance of power but it has lived under a balance of terror. That has been the state of the world. These great 'mighty countries, mightier than any country the world has ever seen, have lived in a state of terror of each other-the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb and all that-and in spite of their anger and passion and disgust of each other, yet they have restrained themselves because they knew the consequences of not

restraining themselves. And here now we see this great attempt being made by two of the most powerful nations in the world somehow or other to find a way out of life under this terror, a way of peace which will not come quickly. It will take time. It is not a question of a meeting, call it summit meeting or whatever you like. Even now they envisage a succession of summit meetings, but it is by far the most hopeful sign the world has seen in the last ten years, this meeting of people who have been rivals and who have been opponents trying and coming together to find a way out and that way out is not merely something that will apply to them or something that will apply only to Europe. Obviously in the circumstances as they exist, it will apply to the wide world directly in some places, indirectly to others if tension goes down. Now, even in an extreme case like that, the House will see how countries have functioned even when they are full of passion and anger and strength and all that; yet they have restrained themselves realising the consequences. Are we not to show even that much restraint here and not think of the consequences of this or that action and to become impatient and say, we cannot wait? Well, if we cannot wait, what do we do? I do not know what anyone has in mind when he says, 'I cannot wait; something must be done'. And I should like that aspect to be developed as to what should be done. Mere anger I can understand and I should like that anger to be translated into strength-giving elements in the country. That I can understand. Of course we have to build up strength-that is the basis of it-in every way; as I said not only in the military way but even more so in the industrial way, and this strength has to do far more than the sword or the small gun. It is the industrial machine behind it that counts and above all it is the strength of the morale of the nation which counts, a nation which will not surrender to evil, surrender to invasion, surrender to any threat and stand up with head high whatever happens. That is the thing we build up meanwhile always trying to find a way out of the deadlock, to find

a find a solution consonant with the integrity and self-respect of the country-because anything which goes against self-respect should be ruled out of course-at the same time remembering not to say or do things which make it difficult for the door to remain open which put the other side-not a weak side but a powerful side-concerned also angry and thinking,-wrongly you may think but rightly according to their thinking that they are being insulted and all that. It is a very dangerous thing when the iron enters the soul of a nation. In war time it enters it and then they go ahead simply motivated by hatred and anger and a desire to destroy. It is a dangerous thing and till it works itself out in terrible destruction; well, the war proceeds somebody is defeated or nobody is defeated-whatever may happen.

Now, I should like some difference, some distinction, to be made in India between what I would call a grim determination to preserve our freedom, our integrity, our honour and self-respect because there can be-I entirely agree with one hon. Member-no bargaining about these things, it is true, and at the same time avoiding that iron entering into our souls and our saying something or doing something which makes the iron enter into the other party's soul. Then a situation is created out of which there is no way out, except dreadful conflict, indefinite conflict, uncertain conflict, spreading possibly to other countries, spreading possibly all over the world. These are serious possibilities which may come about by some action of ours or China's or somebody else's. We feel wronged by China. I feel that the way they have acted has been wrong and unfair to us. I am not for the moment going-it is up to the House and hon. Members-into the question of how far we have been at fault, our Government here in the past. But we cannot go on repeatedly discussing the past. We have to discuss the present and the future. And in the future the only two courses open to us are to strengthen ourselves in all these ways that I have mentioned and at the same time to

try our best by friendly approaches, dignified and friendly approaches, to find a way by settlement.

Now, sometimes Mr. Dahyabhai Patel, sometimes others talk about the "Bhai-bhai" approach. I really do not understand what this criticism means. I hope that our approach to every country will be a "Bhai-bhai" approach. I am very glad that in regard to China it was a "Bhai-bhai" approach. What does it mean? I fear the significance of the words is not realised. It is a very common thing in India, a friendly way of approach. Each country has its own way of approach. It is not a bad approach. There is nothing derogatory about it. And this "Bhai-bhai" has been used for almost every country from which people have come here. We may have used it more for some countries, because they took it more, and for some less, and it is quite a right approach. That does not mean, of course, that our eyes are closed, that we surrender anything that we value. That, of course, is wrong. More especially while Governments deal with each other, the people's approach towards another people should always be friendly and they should not consider the people of the other country enemies, even though we are in conflict with the Government. Surely even in the days of our national struggle, the lesson we learnt was to fight against imperialism, British imperialism, and not against the British. I am merely mentioning this in passing, because I am anxious that the resentment that there is in India and which has been caused rightfully and justly should be directed into right channels of strength to build up, because it is a matter of our survival, not of phrase and of not being able to wait or not wait. It is a matter of India's survival. That is the question we have to face. It is a big question. It is not a border issue. Of course, there is the border issue. We shall deal with it to the best of our ability, but behind that border issue stretches out this future which might be and ought to be a good future for us and which might also be a dreadful future by countries fighting for survival. So, it is in

this context that I would beg of this House to consider these matters and deal with them and even advise us.

Now, I am not dealing with Premier Chou En-lai's letter. But there is one particular matter which I should like to correct. First of all, may I point out- I think it was Diwan Chaman Lall who said something about it-that the Chinese have agreed to withdraw from Longiu. Yes, but they have made conditions.

There are conditions attached to that. You withdraw from somewhere else. So, it is not simply a case of agreeing to withdraw. You withdraw from places in the U.P. borders Himachal Pradesh and several other things. It is not such a simple thing. Now, they have caught us in a small matter in regard to a name. They have pulled us up. They have caught us in an error. In Ladakh, in the papers you might have seen, there is this question of a place called Pulingsumdo. Now, we have got mixed up. It was an error in one of our letters between two places-Pulingsumdo and Pulamsumda.³⁷ And they have caught us in that mistake in this last letter. No doubt you did not know anything about it and hon. Members could not judge. They have said with great force that this place you have mentioned is in our territory. Well,

³⁷ Nehru wrote to Chou En-lai on 26 September 1959 as follows: "Premier Chou En-lai states that there have been historical disputes regarding many places in the sector of the boundary between Ladakh and Nepal, and gives as an example the area of Sang and Tsungsha, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet. In fact this is the only area in regard to which the Chinese authorities have raised a dispute. Sang is J adhang village, Tsungsha is Nilang village and Tsaparang Dzong is the district headquarters in this part of Tibet. The Chinese Premier accuses India of having invaded and occupied Puling-Sumdo that is Pulam Sumda, a village in the Nilang-Jadhang area." See para F in "A Note on the Border Disputes," Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, September-November 1959 and a Note on the Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India. White Paper No. II (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.) [1959], pp. 48-49

it is undoubtedly. It was a misprint or error. It is a place twenty miles away. This Pulamsumda is in our territory. So, that is true.

May I express my gratitude, again, to the hon. Members for the confidence they have reposed in the policy we are pursuing. Thank you, Sir.

168. To MEA: Inviting Chinese Professors to Santiniketan³⁸

I had a talk with the Vice-Chancellor today.³⁹ He agreed with me that we had better go slow about inviting Professors from China for Viswa-Bharati.

2. Later I had a fairly long talk with Professor Tan Yun Shan, who has recently come back from China. He gave me a letter which I enclose. This deals with his conversations with Premier Chou En-lai and others.

3. He told me that Premier Chou En-lai had tried to explain to him the Chinese viewpoints in regard to the border etc. In particular, he had said that when he (the Premier) had spoken about the status quo on the border, he had meant the McMahon Line. Further, when Premier Chou En-lai had talked about the Dalai Lama being under duress in India, he had not meant that the Government of India was keeping him under duress. What he had meant was that his own colleagues from Tibet, who acted as advisers, were doing so.

4. Professor Tan then spoke to me about Cheena Bhavana at Santiniketan. He was anxious to raise standards here upto the PhD for the teaching of Chinese. For this purpose, it was necessary to get high class Visiting Professors from China. He said that he would like three Professors: (1) for

³⁸ Note to N.R. Pillai and S. Dutt, 23 December 1959, Santiniketan

³⁹ This note was in response to Subimal Dutt's query on 18 December 1959 to Nehru on the proposed invitation by K.C. Chaudhuri, former Vice Chancellor of Visva-Bharati, to two Visiting Professors from Peking University. Dutt had discussed the matter with Parthasarathy and awaited further instructions from Nehru.

Chinese Literature, ancient and modern; (2) Sino-Indian studies and (3) Buddhist studies, especially dealing with Chinese Mahayana.

5. Professor Tan mentioned two professors, both of Peking University now, whom he had in mind. One was Dr. Chou-ta Fu (I am not sure of the spelling of the name). This gentleman spent some time at Santiniketan long ago. He then went to Bombay and took his doctorate there, probably in Sanskrit. He is now Professor of Sanskrit at the Peking University and is a member of their Academia Sinica.

6. The other professor was Wu Shiao Ling (again spelling uncertain). He also spent some time at Santiniketan. He is now Professor of Chinese in the University of Peking.

7. For the third, no name was mentioned, but the China Buddhist Association had promised to help in sending a Professor of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism.

8. Professor Tan told me that he had mentioned all this to Premier Chou En-lai, who was favourably inclined to his proposals, but did not commit himself. He said he would think about them.

9. I told Professor Tan that I liked his ideas on the subject of expansion of Chinese studies, but, in view of the present tensions, we had better postpone consideration of this matter for a while.

10. I have spoken to the Vice-Chancellor on the above lines and he has agreed.

11. Professor Tan had heard that there was some controversy about a map of India appearing in the Chinese translation of my Autobiography. So he gave me a copy of this translation, which I am sending you.

169. In Allahabad: Public Meeting⁴⁰

Situation on Border

People must be Vigilant

Nehru's Call

Allahabad,
December 25.

Prime Minister Nehru said here today that the people of India would have to be vigilant even after a settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Mr. Nehru, who was addressing a mammoth public meeting this evening, made a passing reference to the border dispute between India and China and said that it was a big and dangerous issue which would continue to confront them for long.

The Prime Minister added: "During the past thousand years there had been no danger from our north-eastern border. It was a dead border and nobody bothered about it. But now a new situation has been created, and two great countries are facing each other on that border. I hope there will be a settlement in which the sovereignty and integrity of India will not be affected. But we have to be vigilant even after the settlement."

Mr. Nehru said that some people had been criticising him for not sending the military to the border to chase out the aggressors. "We are not afraid, and there is no question of fear. But it is the question of farsightedness, force and strength", he added.

The Prime Minister said that one person had written to him that he was prepared to send 10,000 students to the border. Another had sent him a letter signed in blood. But if he asked those 10,000 students to do drill for two hours daily or build a hostel of a college, all their enthusiasm would cool down. They probably did not know that those who were sent to the border ought to be physically strong. Generally very few people passed a

⁴⁰ Report of speech from The Hindu, 27 December 1959

physical test. "Our men on the border must be strong enough to scale over the high mountains", he added.

Mr. Nehru said that they could not prepare themselves for defending the border by processions and hunger strikes. People of other countries would laugh at them.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S VISIT

Mr. Nehru referred to the recent visit of President Eisenhower, and said that he was given a great ovation in all the countries he visited because people of the world regarded him as 'a messenger of peace'. The whole world knew that there were only two countries-America and Russia-which could establish world peace. After a long period those two countries had thought of coming closer to each other. If they succeeded in their mission the whole face of the world would change. India would certainly help in that process. It would then be easy for the world to progress and develop.

But, Mr. Nehru said, no country could progress without hard labour and firm determination. India was at present facing that problem. The people would have to consider and discuss the problem. They would have to face the dangers, whether they were external or internal, he added.

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

The Prime Minister earlier called upon the people to launch an all-out drive against poverty and to lay a firm foundation of heavy industries in India.

Mr. Nehru said that unless agriculture and industry were fully developed, freedom would be endangered.

He said that they had to fight the demon of poverty on a war footing and they must remember that no nation could progress and prosper without heavy industries. The establishment of heavy industries was very essential for the country's prosperity and defence. They could not go to America and

beg for arms to defend their country. They had to manufacture them in their own country. They should remember that the country's freedom would be jeopardized if people depended on others for help, and did not stand on their own legs.

Mr. Nehru said that a country's strength was not its military power but the progress made by it in the field of science and technology. He said that for establishing industries and manufacturing machines a country required iron and steel. India was setting up several steel plants and had to prepare her own young men to run those plants. She could not ask America or Russia to send their men for running these plants.

Mr. Nehru said that America and England became prosperous and rich because they manufactured machines for increasing production on the land and in factories. India too had to come in line with the advanced countries.

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Forty years ago, there was a revolution in Russia but even during those days Russia was much ahead of India. Nevertheless it took Russia forty years to develop and progress. Whether a country was capitalist or socialist, both progressed on scientific and technological lines.

They wanted to establish factories and manufacture machines in India. They wanted to make furnaces for steel plants and other machinery for running those plants. At present, except for Japan and China, India was marching ahead of other Asian countries in science and technology. They had laid a sound foundation for the teaching of science and engineering and they were at such a point that if they accelerated their pace of development, they would "take off." Then India would be able to stand on her own legs without anybody's help or support. They were in mid-stream and if they did not hasten to cross the river, they would be doomed.

Mr. Nehru said that while people in other countries were taking a keen interest in India's march to progress and prosperity, considerable sections of Indian youth had not yet understood what was happening in the country. Mr. Nehru said that the world was changing fast and it was essential that they should keep pace with it. While so many changes were taking place in the world, the cultivator of India had not changed. The Indian cultivator was using the same type of plough which was used 2000 years ago. There was no difficulty in changing the plough. The cultivators must use improved implements of agriculture, good fertilizers and good quality seeds to increase their production. They had to demonstrate to the Indian farmer all these things and make him understand their utility.

Mr. Nehru said he wanted that there should be no illiterate person in India but to give education to 40 crores of people was a major problem. At present these crores of children were in primary education stage and one crore in high schools and colleges. This total of four crores was only one-tenth of the population. Even yet the figure was not a small one because there were countries where even the total population was not four crores. He added that by the end of the Second Five Year Plan the number of school-going children would be about six and a half crores. He wished the time would come soon when about ten crores of people would be receiving education. This could not be done immediately. Education, he said, was not merely to obtain a degree or diploma. The real thing was to judge how much capacity a man had developed to share a particular responsibility. If they wanted to develop their country, there should be a right type of education. At the bottom it should be basic education which should be compulsory for every child.

Mr. Nehru said that basic education should be for everybody. After fourteen or fifteen years of age, there should be a selection and only a student, who had shown some intelligence and ability, should be allowed to go to a

University for higher education. Others should go to polytechnique institutions and other training centres. It was possible that there might be hidden talents in villages which did not get any opportunity for higher education.

It was unfortunate that universities had become the forum of party politics and "a fighting ground" instead of being centres of learning and teaching. Some blamed professors and some blamed the students. Whoever might be at fault the universities had become fighting places. Somebody resorted to hunger strikes and some organised processions. If world problems were to be solved by hunger strikes and processions, the world would be doomed. If such things were to continue, it would be better that the universities remained closed.

170. To Subimal Dutt: Han Suyin's letter to The Times (London)⁴¹

You will remember the letter that Han Suyin wrote to the London Times.⁴² I wrote to the AICC Office here about it. I enclose the reply of the General Secretary of the AICC. He has sent me the actual resolution passed in December 1904 by the Indian National Congress at Bombay about "Tibetan Affairs and Forward Policy".⁴³ This resolution was obviously passed in connection with the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa. This has nothing to do with our present controversies. The main purpose of the resolution appears to be to protest against India's money being spent on the expedition.

⁴¹ Note, 30 December 1959

⁴² On 16 December 1959. See Appendices 2 (a-c) for this and related letters

⁴³ See Appendix 2 (d)

I am also sending you a number .of the Economic Review which presumably Han Suyin saw. You can see the passage at page 63 of this Review.

(c) Tibet

71. In the Rajya Sabha: Abstention at the UN Tibet Debate⁴⁴

M.P. Bhargava:⁴⁵ Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

- (a) whether any instructions were sent by Government to the Indian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly regarding the attitude to be adopted by India on the question of the inclusion of discussion on Tibet in the United Nations agenda; and
- (b) what are the reasons for which India did not take part in the voting on the question?

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru):

- (a) Yes.
- (b) The instructions sent to the Delegation were in accordance with the statements made by the Prime Minister in Parliament and elsewhere on several occasions. The Government of India had considered this matter fully, even before it was brought up in the United Nations, and were of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by a discussion of this issue in the UN in existing circumstances. When this matter came up for discussion in the UN on the question of inscription, India did not participate in the voting. When the resolution sponsored by Malaya and Ireland was discussed, the Delegation staid.

⁴⁴ Oral Answers, 1 December 1959. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. XXVI, cols 885-886

⁴⁵ Independent

M.P. Bhargava: May I know whether it is a fact that according to the United Nations procedure any country can abstain from voting and explain its reasons for doing so before or after the vote?

Jawaharlal Nehru: May be so, Sir. I do not know.

172. To MEA: Mobilizing Afro-Asian Opinion on Tibet⁴⁶

Dr. Samar Guha, who is a Lecturer and is also a member of the P.S.P., was sent by Shri Jayaprakash Narayan to South-East Asian countries in connection with the proposed Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet. At the instance of Shri Jayaprakash Narayan, he came to see me this afternoon. He gave me a copy of his report on his impressions which apparently he has presented to his party here. I am sending you this copy. His talk with me was more or less a summary of his report.

Apart from this, he mentioned some other matters to me. One was that our Embassies abroad in these countries might give greater publicity to our border issues and India's view-point. There was a great deal of interest in them, but our Embassies were not utilising this opportunity to publicize our case. His own visit in connection with Tibet was a successful one except for Cambodia and Singapore. The real success of the visit was not due to the interest in the Tibetan question, but much more so to the great interest and anxiety in connection with the Himalayan border troubles. There was a general resentment at the aggressive attitude of China, coupled with a little fear.

U Ba Swe⁴⁷ of Burma was particularly interested in our border troubles. In this connection, Dr. Guha mentioned that U Ba Swe told him that the army

⁴⁶ Note to N.R. Pillai, S. Dutt and M.J. Desai, 2 December 1959

was entirely opposed to U Nu⁴⁸ and his party. If by any chance U Nu won the coming elections, the army would probably take some action against U Nu's party.

Hongkong, he said, was an ideal place for intelligence set-up to find out what was happening in China. But apparently we had no such set-up there. In his letter to me attached, Dr. Guha refers to the monument of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in Singapore. He said that the Indians in Singapore wanted our Government to take some initiative in this matter. I told him that this was a matter between the Indians in Singapore and the Singapore Government. If they agreed, we would not object, but we did not think it desirable to take any initiative ourselves.

Further, he said that there were two houses in Singapore---one was where Netaji lived and the other was used as headquarters of the Provisional Government of the I.N.A. He has given pictures of these which I attach. The Indians in Singapore were anxious that our Government should acquire these houses and use them for any suitable purpose.

173. To Subimal Dutt: Alleged Corruption at Missamar⁴⁹

Some little time ago, Shri [sic] Freda Bedi met me, and discussed the condition of the Tibetan camps etc. She asked me if I had seen her reports. I told her that I had seen some reports but I was not sure if I had seen all of them. Thereupon she sent me some of her later reports which I have read through.

⁴⁷ Former Prime Minister of Burma, 1956-57

⁴⁸ Former Premier and President of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League

⁴⁹ Note, 3 December 1959

2. These reports struck me as good and a number of suggestions appear suitable. Some perhaps were not feasible.
3. Two matters attracted my attention most. One was the absolute necessity of social workers being attached to these camps. The normal official machine is not adequate for this purpose, however good it might be. The lack of even such ordinary things as soap and the inadequacy of clothing etc. should not occur if a person can get out of official routines. But more than the lack of things is the social approach.
4. What concerned me most out of her reports was a complaint of corruption at Missamari. She says that "I am convinced that there is very bad corruption among the lower clerical staff in Missamari". Heavy bribery is referred to. She suggested in her note on corruption that an immediate secret investigation should take place in this matter.
5. Have any steps been taken to have such an investigation. I think it is important that we should deal with such charges of corruption and removal of officials who may be found guilty of it. It is not enough for the local police to be asked to do it.
6. There is also a reference in the note to costly drugs being purchased by money supplied by the Government of Assam even though large USA drug stocks were available. This kind of thing is either extreme carelessness or corruption.
7. I am anxious that full careful steps should be taken to find out these charges of corruption.

174. In the Lok Sabha: Bhotiya Traders⁵⁰

P.C. Borooah:⁵¹ Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

⁵⁰ Written Answers, 15 December 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXXVII, col. 5116

- (a) whether it is a fact that the Secretary of the Indo-Tibetan Border Legislators' Association has sent a memorandum to Government detailing the difficulties of the 40,000 Bhotiyas who used to trade in Tibet formerly; and
- (b) if so, action taken thereon?

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru):

(a) and (b). A copy of the Memorandum, which is addressed to the U.P. Government, has recently been received by the Government of India.⁵² As is well-known, the Government of India has been giving substantial assistance for the development of the border areas. They have recently addressed the U.P. Government to consider measures to alleviate economic distress which may be caused amongst the border people as a result of the dislocation of the trade with Tibet.

175. To Jayaprakash Narayan: Asia-Africa Conference on Tibe⁵³

December 31, 1959

My dear Jayaprakash,

Ever since you met me a few days ago, I have been thinking about your proposed Asia-Africa Conference in regard to Tibet. As the matter seemed to me important enough, I have consulted some of my colleagues also informally. I think it will be right for me to let you know how we feel about this, to avoid misapprehension in that respect.

⁵¹ Congress

⁵² . Submitted by Pratap Singh, Secretary, Indo-Tibetan Border Legislators' Association

⁵³ Letter. Copied to S. Dutt

We feel that such a conference can do little, if any, good and it can and is indeed likely to do a good deal of harm. Even the cause of the Tibetan people will not benefit in any way and obviously our difficulties of the border situation will be enhanced. These difficulties are serious enough, as you know, even as it is. The holding of such a conference in Delhi in the course of a month or two will lead the Chinese authorities and people again to laying stress on what they have been saying, that is, that this Tibetan trouble has been organized from India with the assistance or acquiescence of the Government of India. The fact that it was a real revolt of the Tibetan people will be covered up to some extent in this way and all the attention will be directed to India as the prime mover.

So far as the Tibetan people are concerned, whatever our sympathy may be, and that is great, the fact is that no country anywhere in the world is going to help them in their plight. Activities outside in favour of the Tibetan people may perhaps be justified from some moral point of view but, actually, they bring greater burdens on those people, which cannot be relieved in any way by others.

Because of this, we have felt that such a conference, more especially in Delhi, is unfortunate. If it is held here, then obviously the Government cannot directly or indirectly associate itself with it.

I hope you will understand our difficulties and our position.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru