

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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China

144. To Sundarlal: Fact Finding Commission to Ladakh¹

November 3, 1959

My dear Sundarlal,

Thank you for your letter of November 3rd.²

I do not think it is at all feasible for any meeting between Premier Chou En-lai and me to take place in the foreseeable future.

Your suggestion to have a judicial minded fact finding Commission on the incident at Ladakh is rather odd. Where two countries are in conflict, how is this Commission to be appointed and how is it to function?

Apparently, you have not realised what the position is there. The place of conflict is about three weeks' journey from Leh over very difficult and hard terrain at a height of 14,000 and 17,000 feet. The people in our check posts have to dig big trenches to stay there because of the extreme cold. It is very difficult to get any supplies there. Apart from this, how can any Commission go about contending passions?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

¹ Letter to the President, India-China Friendship Association & All India Peace Council. Pandit Sunder La! Papers, File No. 35, NMML. Also available in JN Collection

² See Appendix 7

145. To V.K. Krishna Menon: China Strategy-I³

Your telegram 247 November 3rd.⁴

2. I agree with you that it would be advisable to speak to a group meeting of Asian-African countries about the India-China border developments and present situation. This meeting, however, should be private and confined to members of that group. To leave out any members would not be right. Therefore, all members of group should be invited. As for people outside group, you can meet them individually or otherwise and talk to them on this subject.

3. I do not think you should say that the problem is more political than military. There are certainly military aspects to it and anyhow people here are constantly considering these other aspects. To say, therefore, that the military aspect-is not important would not be quite correct and would irritate people here. As I have already informed you, there is very strong feeling on this subject here among all groups and parties excepting Communist Party. Even Communist Party is finding it difficult to pull together as some elements, under leadership of Dange, have publicly disagreed with Communist Party's pro-Chinese attitude.⁵

4. I shall send you some further information and particulars about present situation separately, probably tomorrow.⁶

³ Telegram, 4 November 1959

⁴ See Appendix 8

⁵ Dange was accused of defying party discipline by endorsing the GO! stand on the McMahon Line. However, the Chinese attack on the Indian Police party convinced many CPI members of Dange's stand. See The Statesman, 25 October 1959

⁶ See item 148

5. Our reply to Chinese Note has just been given to their Ambassador here. It is a long and detailed reply.⁷ This will not be released to the Press for several days. We shall, however, indicate to you the lines of this reply.

6. Over week ago, Chinese offered to return our prisoners with them as well as dead bodies of our policemen. We immediately agreed to this proposal and made local arrangements accordingly. Our police party has been sitting there waiting to receive back these prisoners. But Chinese Government have taken no action whatever, inspite of reminders.

7. In view of developing situation and possible further dangers ahead, certain military dispositions have been made by us in different frontier areas and other preparations for future are being considered.

146. To Ram Subhag Singh: MEA and MOD Excellent⁸

November 4, 1959

My dear Ram Subhag,

Your letter of November 4th. We spent three hours in discussing these various matters this evening and so I will not deal with many points raised in your letter.

Our Ambassador in Peking⁹ is one of our ablest men in the Foreign Service. He is a scholar and has been a journalist of high standing-an Assistant Editor of The Hindu, Madras. The previous Ambassadors in Peking were also among our best. We have always chosen a good man for Peking. I think that the information they supplied us was probably much greater than what

⁷ See Appendix 9

⁸ Letter to Lok Sabha MP, Congress

⁹ G Parthasarathy

other Missions got. They have travelled various parts of China and had been to Sinkiang, but facilities for travelling in China and round-about are very limited and Government does not encourage Ambassadors to wander about. In particular, in Tibet, so far as I know, this is not approved by the Chinese Government. No one can travel there except with the help of the Chinese Government. No one could possibly go anywhere near the Chinese national highway. There is no mystery about this fact not having come to the notice of our Embassy or any other Embassy.

I do not think it is correct to say that we have been caught napping by the Chinese due to the complacency and unpreparedness of our Defence people. There are some basic facts of a situation which we cannot get over, however much we might want to do so.

You refer to the Kashmir operations. The base of these Kashmir operations was just under the Zoji-la. The whole question of Ladakh is the great distances from any feasible base.

As for your other suggestions, I think you might leave these to our Defence Advisers.

Yours sincerely,
[Jawaharlal Nehru]

147. To CPP: Explaining China Strategy¹⁰

Non-Alignment with Power Blocs India Must Adhere to Policy: Nehru
Explains Reasons Border Dispute with China Analysed
New Delhi,
Nov. 4.

¹⁰ Report from The Hindu, 5 November 1959

Prime Minister Nehru told members of the Congress Parliamentary Party that it would be harmful for India to change either her defence policy or her foreign policy of non-alignment. The 100 Members of Parliament, who felt concern over the developments on the Sino-Indian border, gathered in Delhi to hear from Mr. Nehru the steps the Government proposed to take to restore confidence among the people.

Mr. Nehru, after tracing the Sino-Indian friendship over the centuries, and the relations between the two countries since the attainment of Independence, declared that today China stood isolated in the world because of her aggressive and unreasonable activity. Mr. Nehru interpreted Mr. Khrushchev's statement on the Sino-Indian dispute as amounting to neutrality.

Mr. Nehru analysed the implications of the demand made in some quarters that India should secure outside assistance to meet China's threat. He said that, firstly, there could be no question of foreign troops guarding the Indian frontier outposts. This task of manning the outposts must be borne by the Indian people. India had enough manpower to defend her border. The only thing that India should get from outside was equipment. The real issue involved was one of India's confidence to produce the equipment or her ability to buy it, as she did at present. Secondly, if India were to enter into military alliances with another country, inevitably, the Soviet Union would support China and automatically it would become a global war. Mr. Nehru maintained that it would be wrong and harmful to abandon the policy of non-alignment which had established a name for India in the world.

REFERENCE TO CARIAPPA'S STATEMENT

In this context, Mr. Nehru regretted the statement issued by General Cariappa a couple of days ago.¹¹ He said that a public statement by a

¹¹ See item 13

former Commander in-Chief created embarrassment. It could have been more appropriate if the General had written to him explaining his approach to the problem. Mr. Nehru did not agree either with the General's view that, before it was too late, India should throw out the Chinese aggressors or that India should have a common defence arrangement with Pakistan. Mr. Nehru said that the defence of the border with China must be undertaken by India with her own resources. If India could meet the threat to her security, there was no need to enter into any military alliances or arrangements with any other country. If Pakistan could continue to be friendly, that would itself lessen India's burden.

Mr. Nehru explained that the task of maintenance of the frontier outposts was a complicated and difficult problem. In each outpost, it was not possible to maintain more than about forty to fifty people in normal circumstances. The difficulty of supplying these outposts was very considerable, if it was remembered that to supply one man it required additional six men. Mr. Nehru said it made no difference in what part of the frontier India stopped to face the aggressor and a few miles of uninhabited and mountainous areas would not make the slightest difference to the security of the rest of India.

Answering questions from the members, Mr. Nehru declared that his Government was determined to protect every inch of Indian territory. Several members got the impression that India might retake Longju if China did not vacate it. According to the General Secretary of the Party, members were generally satisfied that the interests of the country were safe in Mr. Nehru's hands.

The informal meeting was arranged by the Congress Parliamentary Party at the invitation of the Leader of the Party, Mr. Nehru. All the M.P.s who were already in Delhi for work connected with parliamentary committees

attended the meeting while some members came specially to hear Mr. Nehru on the border situation.

The M.P.s put questions to Mr. Nehru which expressed their grave concern over the Chinese activities on Indian territory. The questions also expressed the concern of the members for defending the Sino-Indian border at any cost.

Mr. Nehru is understood to have declared that the Government was fully alive to the border situation and would defend every inch of the McMahon Line and the Ladakh border.

He said that Government had entrusted the task to the military fully who were making necessary arrangements to defend the border.

While replying to questions, he is believed to have said that the Soviet Union was the only country which perhaps could influence the Chinese but expressed his misgivings whether China would listen to that country.

148. To V.K. Krishna Menon: China Strategy-II¹²

Continuation of my telegram of November 4th.¹³

Today I had my usual monthly press conference and for nearly an hour questions were asked about China border situation.¹⁴ Yesterday I held an informal meeting of all Congress MPs in Delhi, about 100, and discussed this question with them for three hours.¹⁵ There has been tremendous excitement and indignation all over the country, fanned by our newspapers, and I thought it desirable to explain to our colleagues various implications of certain proposals made. We have not been approached by any country

¹² Telegrain, 5 November 1959

¹³ See item 145

¹⁴ See item 13

¹⁵ See item 147

with request for mediation nor does this question arise. I expressed our appreciation of Soviet Government's attitude in regard to our border troubles.

2. There being vague talk about seeking help from other countries and even changing our policy of non-alignment, I spoke firmly on this subject saying that no question had arisen or will arise or can arise for changing our basic policies. Any such deviation from that basic policy would be morally harmful to us and even practically dangerous. It would also be a setback to world peace and efforts being made by great powers for disarmament and ending cold war.

3. Cariappa has been making very foolish statements about our settling all our problems with Pakistan immediately and of having a joint defence policy. I expressed my appreciation of the better relations with Pakistan in regard to border problems and some others. But much remained to be done. In any event, defence policy was intimately allied with foreign policy and could not be separated. Further while I appreciated President Ayub's friendly gestures, question of so-called joint defence had no practical meaning in circumstances.

4. We would and were taking effective measures for our defence. At the same time, our broad approach of peaceful settlements always remained according to our firm policy. We cannot have any negotiations on the basis laid down by the Chinese who claim as of right large areas of our territory and while they are in forcible possession of some of these areas, notably Longju, and are threatening further incursions.

5. You have with you our last White Paper¹⁶ and some subsequent correspondence with China. My letter to Chou En-lai of September 26th dealt in detail with Chinese claims.¹⁷ These claims are for 31,000 square

¹⁶ White Paper II

¹⁷ See SWJN/SS/52/pp. 216-231

miles of NEFA, 300 square miles in Bhutan, 100 square miles in UP etc. and 11,500 square miles in Ladakh (including 2,500 square miles in Pak occupied areas). We have had some minor disputes on UP frontier. In the main the dispute till recently has been about NEFA area. Now Ladakh has come prominently into the picture. There has been no mention of Ladakh in these controversies till recently, although in the old Chinese maps a part of this area has been included in China.

6. About these Chinese maps, as you know, we have been protesting for some years past. The answer always has been that the maps were old ones which had to be revised. When Chou En-lai spoke to me in Delhi, he gave me definitely to understand that he would agree to so-called McMahon line because of the accomplished fact and because of friendly relations between the countries concerned. Later he has gone back on this and for the first time made specific claim in his letter of September 8, 1959,¹⁸ to all these vast areas in NEFA and in Ladakh.

7. When our discussions took place for Sino-Indian Treaty in 1954 about Tibet, no claim was put forward to these areas although it was presumed that we were discussing all outstanding matters in regard to Tibet and India. Various mountain passes for trade and pilgrim routes were discussed. The clear presumption was that we had dealt with all outstanding matters and nothing remained and in the Treaty itself no reference was made to frontier claims or disputes.

8. In regard to recent incident in Ladakh, long account put out by Chinese Government is complete travesty of facts. We have received detailed first-hand account of October 20 and 21 from Second-in-Command of our police patrol party which returned to our base after Chinese attack. His account completely contradicts Chinese account in their note of October 25th and

¹⁸ See SWJN/SS/52/pp. 309-316

statement issued by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 26th¹⁹. We have no doubt that this Chinese account is completely wrong. In the statement they have stressed their claim to Ladakh area and asserted that they have been in occupation of that area for a number of years. This is not true. Our police reconnaissance parties have been visiting this area since 1954. It is obvious that the Chinese have come into this area in the course of the last year or so. They have challenged the right of India to send any patrol party in this area of Ladakh and asserted their right to do so in area south of McMahon Line. This is a position we cannot [possibly] accept and we have made this clear to them in our note handed yesterday.²⁰ In this note we have given full reasons in support of international boundary in Ladakh and NEFA and in regard to recent incident in Ladakh. We have once more asked them to remove their forces from our territory and expressed agreement to settle minor frontier disputes by peaceful methods.

9. Over a week ago, Chinese offered to return prisoners and dead bodies with them to us. We immediately accepted offer and sent an escort party for this purpose to a place within five miles of where Chinese are. They have been waiting there under physical difficulties for this last week but Chinese have taken no further step about return of prisoners etc.

10. There is no truth in press that Chinese have evacuated Longiu. Chinese actions belie their professed anxiety to settle the disputes with us peacefully. We have had to take military measures on the frontier areas, both in NEFA and Ladakh, to counter further expansive designs on the part of the Chinese. As you know, the terrain, especially in Ladakh, is a very difficult one for us. Chinese are better situated as they are near their roads and supply bases in Western Tibet.

¹⁹ See Appendix 3

²⁰ See Appendix 9

11. The attitude of Chinese officials in Tibet continues to be one of harassment to our Missions.

12. For your information only, Chou En-lai and others took up over-bearing and domineering attitude to Indonesian Foreign Minister²¹ who had recently visited them. This has much upset Indonesian Government who are indignant at this treatment.

149. To MEA: Meeting with Pan Tzu-li ²²

The Chinese Ambassador came to see me at 6.00 this evening. He said that he had not had the opportunity of meeting me for a long time. I replied that he had been away for a considerable time from India. He agreed and said that he had returned towards the end of September. He added something about good relations between our countries.

2. He then said that Premier Chou En-lai had written a letter to me the original of which had been handed to our Ambassador in Peking and would no doubt reach me later.²³ The Ambassador had been asked to hand me a copy of it, which he did. The copy is attached.

3. I told him that the message of Premier Chou En-lai would be given careful consideration and a reply would be sent later. I added that I was going to leave Delhi day after tomorrow and, for the next five days, I shall be mostly absent from Delhi except for very brief halts here.

4. I told him that I was surprised at the delay in the release of prisoners in Ladakh. It was about ten or eleven days now since we received a message from the Chinese Government offering to release those prisoners and hand

²¹ Dr. Subandrio

²² Note to N.R. Pillai and S. Dutt, 8 November 1959

²³ See item 150

over the dead bodies. The very next day, we replied saying that we accepted this proposal and were prepared to take charge of them. Our men had been waiting all this time for this, and nothing further had been done. The Ambassador said he did not know much about it, but he would immediately communicate with his Government by telegram.

150. To G. Parthasarathy: Letter from Chou En-lai²⁴

Chinese Ambassador here has just handed to me copy of Premier Chou Enlai's letter to me dated 7th November. He told me that original had been delivered to you and will no doubt be forwarded by you to US.²⁵

2. I told him that we would naturally give careful consideration to Chou En-lai's letter and then reply to it. I also told him that from day after tomorrow onwards I shall be mostly absent from Delhi for five days.

3. I enquired from him about the prisoners in Ladakh and said that the Chinese Government's offer to return them was made about eleven days ago. We accepted it the next day and yet nothing had happened while our people were waiting for them. He said he did not know much about this but that he would immediately send a telegram to enquire.

151. To Krishna Menon: Replying to Chou En-lai²⁶

Your telegram 252 of November 9th from New York.³⁶ Chou En-lai's letter to me dated 7th November has already appeared in the newspapers today and you must have seen it. We do not propose to send an answer to it

²⁴ Telegram, 8 November 1959

²⁵ See Appendix 11

²⁶ Telegram to Krishna Menon, 10 November 1959. 36. See Appendix 15

before 15th or 16th November as I shall be out of Delhi. Proposals made by Chou En-lai for withdrawal of armed forces may appear reasonable, but, in effect, are very disadvantageous to us and we cannot accept them. We propose to make counterproposals for avoidance of border clashes. We are now considering what form these should take.

2. I am leaving Delhi tomorrow morning, returning on 13th morning and leaving again same afternoon, finally returning on 15th afternoon.

3. It is not at all feasible for you to go to place of incident in Ladakh. Your going to Leh also will serve no purpose. All decisions are being taken in Delhi and you will have to acquaint yourself fully with the situation here and steps we are taking. Also you should be here when we consider our final reply to Chou En-lai. In any event, therefore, you cannot go before opening of Parliament.

4. I hope to meet you in Delhi on Friday, 13th forenoon.

152. To Subimal Dutt: Tibetan Refugee Camps²⁷

Please see the attached note which Mrs. Indira Gandhi²⁸ has sent me. So far as the Misamari Camp is concerned, I take it that you are taking

²⁷ Note, 13 November 1959, Dehra Dun. File No. 29(74) BST /59, MEA

²⁸ Indira Gandhi to Nehru, 12 November 1959. - "The following information has been conveyed to me:

1. At the end of September there were 8 Chinese in the Assamari Camp [probably Misamari]. They claimed to be anti-Communist and had come along with the Tibetans. Although they were supposed to be kept under strict guard and were given a separate hut to live, they were found to be mixing freely with the Tibetans, sometimes in suspicious circumstances. In August, a news item stated that Communist China had distributed some pamphlets among the Tibetan refugees. If this information was true, these Chinese might well have been the source. Two of these Chinese suddenly disappeared from the Camp. Later, they were arrested in Shillong. I do not know the present situation, but if there are

adequate security measures. Anyhow, these should be tightened. I do not like the idea of these statements being circulated. You might consider what steps we should take about the matter.

153. To G. B. Pant: Replying to Chou En-lai²⁹

November 15, 1959

My dear Pantji,

You have given a great deal of consideration to the draft reply to Chou En-lai.

I am now sending you a revised draft which we might consider this afternoon at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. I think that your suggestions have been embodied in this draft. Some other changes have been made. The reference to the Aksai Chin area has been deleted.

I did not particularly like the reference to the Aksai Chin in the previous draft. And yet, I am not quite sure in my mind if all reference to this area should be omitted, even though we might be prepared to take this matter

any Chinese, they should certainly be kept separate. The political loyalty of the Tibetan might also be ascertained unobtrusively.

2. Some of the Embassies, notably the American, are in direct touch with the Tibetan officials at Assamari. These Tibetan officials had been told that:

- (a) the American Government is meeting all their expenses in India;
- (b) that the Indian Government is being paid for everything and that it is the Americans actually and not the Indians who are looking after them; and
- (c) that the American Embassy should be informed of all complaints so that they may take the necessary action.

3. Would it be possible to issue some kind of a statement detailing what the Government is doing, how much is being spent etc.?" File No. 29(74) BST/59, MEA

²⁹ Letter

up later. To expect the Chinese to withdraw from the road in the Aksai Chin area is beyond the bounds of probability. This might this become a complete stumbling block at an initial stage.

Nevertheless, in the balance, I think we should omit references to the Aksai Chin area. I thought, however, to put my doubt before you.

Yours affectionately,

[Jawaharlal Nehru]

154. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China³⁰

New Delhi, November 16, 1959.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of November 7, for which I thank you. We have also received a report from our Ambassador, Shri Parthasarathy, on the talk which you had with him the same day.

2. In the note which was handed over to your Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, we have given full details, supported by factual data, of the international boundary in Ladakh. We also attached to the note a first-hand account of the incident at Chang Chenmo Valley on October 21 which resulted in the death or capture of a large number of Indian personnel. Earlier, in my letter of September 26 to you, we gave you full facts in support of our statement in regard to the Sino-Indian border along its

³⁰ Letter to the Prime Minister of the Peoples Republic of China. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, November 1959-March 1960. White Paper No. III (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.) [1959], pp. 47-51.

entire length. I have not had any reply yet to my letter of September 26 or any detailed reply to our subsequent note of November 4. I notice with regret that you have not taken any account of the facts as given by us in these two communications and have dismissed them with the remark that our note "disregards in many respects the basic facts of the question of the boundary between our two countries and the truth of the border clash". I am wholly unable to agree with this observation. We should certainly explore all avenues to reduce the "; present tension between our two countries, but our efforts will not succeed if we ignore facts.

3. I should like to repeat what I have said in a previous communication, that this entire frontier was a peaceful one for a long time and there was no conflict or trouble there. It is only recently that conflicts and difficulties have arisen in regard to the frontier. These difficulties have not arisen because of any action that we have taken. The cause of the recent troubles is action taken from your side of the frontier.

4. We are anxious that there should be a clear- understanding about this frontier and that such border disputes as there are between our two countries should be settled by peaceful methods. In the immediate present, we think it is important to avoid all border clashes so as to assure tranquility in the border regions and thereby create an atmosphere favourable for friendly settlement. We agree therefore, that the two Governments should come to an agreement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.

5. The Government of India have given close and careful consideration to your suggestions in this regard. But, before I proceed to discuss them, I must inform you of the resentment aroused in India by the delay which

took place in the release of the Indian personnel whom your forces had captured in the Chang Chenmo Valley on October 20 and 21 after inflicting casualties on our police patrol party. You will recall that on October 24 we received your offer to hand over to us the captured personnel and the dead bodies of those who were killed during the clash. On October 26 our Ambassador in Peking informed your Government of our concern about the prisoners and our anxiety to receive them back as well as the dead bodies. We wished to know the time and place at which the transfer was to take place. In order to avoid delay, we sent a forward party immediately to receive the prisoners and the dead bodies. This party waited at a place about five miles from the scene of the incident and, in spite of repeated reminders to your Government, no indication was given by your Government about the date and time of release until November 12. We are now relieved to know that the prisoners and the dead bodies were handed over to our forward party on November 14. In your talk with our Ambassador in Peking, you told him that the first-hand account of the incident which was attached to our note of November 4 was contradicted by the statements which the captured Indian personnel had made to you. We have since seen the official memorandum on the subject which your Vice-Minister handed to our Ambassador on November 14. We have not yet had any report from the released prisoners as to the course of events on October 20 and 21 and the circumstances in which they made their statements to their captors. It is clear from your letter that they have been subjected to repeated interrogation. Such interrogation of prisoners is deplorable.

6. In your letter, you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes.

Before I discuss this suggestion further I should like to state categorically that the Government of India had not posted any army personnel anywhere at or near the international border. Our border check-posts were manned by civil constabulary, equipped with light arms. The main purpose of these check-posts was to deal with traders or others going along the recognised routes and to prevent any undesirable or unauthorised check-posts were not intended for any aggressive purpose or for any persons crossing the border. This itself indicates that these border armed conflict. It was only after the recent unfortunate incidents that we asked our Army to take over responsibility for the protection of our border.

7. A proper understanding of the facts in regard to the Sino-Indian boundary is essential to the consideration of any proposal that ' is made for the avoidance of border clashes. The facts are that on our North-East frontier, the entire territory up to the border (which is referred to as the McMahon Line) has been for long years part of India. Our civil administration has been functioning there, and there are important civil divisional headquarters not far from the border. At no point, except at Longju, are Chinese forces in occupation of any area south of the Indian border. The boundary in this area passes over a terrain, the height of which varies from, 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea-level. In this extremely difficult terrain, almost all our border check--posts are situated on high hill features. We do not know where the Chinese posts are, but I understand that at no point along the length of this sector are posts on the two sides situated within sight of each other. In view of the difficult mountainous terrain, even where the distance between two posts is short on the map or as the crow flies, the actual journey from one place to another might take several days.

8. In view of these facts, we think that there should not be the slightest risk of any border clash if each Government instructs its outposts not to send out patrols. It is only when armed patrols go out in these difficult mountainous areas that there is likelihood of clashes taking place. We have, in fact, instructed our border outposts not to send out any forward patrols for the present. It would be extremely difficult in practice to establish a new line of outposts in the rear, whether they are to be ten or twenty kilometers from the international boundary. The risk of border clashes will be completely eliminated if our suggestion is accepted by your Government.

9. Longju stands on a different footing altogether. As we have repeatedly stated earlier, we disagree with your statement that it is on your side of the so-called McMahon Line. We have no doubt that it is on our side. But whether it is on your side or ours, the facts are that your armed forces attacked and ousted our personnel from Longju, inflicting casualties on them, and forcibly occupied our outpost. We cannot, therefore, agree to any arrangement, even as an interim measure, which would keep your forcible possession intact. The proper course which we have already suggested to you would be for you to withdraw from Longju. We on our part will not re-occupy it. This suggestion, if accepted, will immediately result in a lowering of tension.

10. At no point .on this border or elsewhere, have we taken over any post from you. In your talk with our Ambassador, you have stated that Khinzemane is north of the international boundary. I do not agree with this statement. As we have informed your ' Government previously, Khinzemane lies clearly south of this boundary and within our territory. It has throughout been in our possession.

11. I presume that your suggestion for a zone of withdrawal is intended also to apply to the Sino-Indian border in the middle areas that is where it touches our States of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab. In these sectors also, there is no ambiguity about our border and at no point do the Chinese authorities occupy any area below the boundary. This would apply to the border of Sikkim also. If, therefore, we observe the precaution which I have mentioned above, all risk of border clashes will be eliminated in this sector of the frontier also.

12. I shall now deal with the international frontier in the Ladakh area of our State of Jammu and Kashmir. In my letter to you of September 26 and in our note of November 4, we have described in detail the international boundary in this sector, supported by factual data. Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.

13. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them. The nature of this possession has inevitably been different from that of an inhabited area. This area is uninhabited, mountainous territory of an altitude varying from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea-level, with the mountain peaks going up much higher. Because of this, and because we did not expect any kind of aggression across our frontier, we did not think it necessary to establish check-posts right on the international boundary. But, as stated in my letter of September 26 and the

note of November 4, we exercised jurisdiction over this area by sending regular patrols up to the international boundary. Certain police check-posts were established some distance from the boundary to control the trade routes, etc. Since this statement is controverted by you, it is obvious that there is complete disagreement between the two Governments even about the facts of possession. An agreement about the observance of the status quo would, therefore, be meaningless as the facts concerning the status quo are themselves disputed. As we are at present discussing a short term interim measure to avoid border clashes, it is essential that we do not get involved in interminable discussions on the status quo at this stage.

14. I suggest, therefore, that in the Ladakh area, both our Governments should agree on the following as an interim measure. The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.

15. Mr. Prime Minister, I share Your Excellency's sentiments of friendship between our two countries. I have earnestly striven for this during the past ten years, but you will no doubt appreciate that mere expressions of friendship will not repair the breach that has already occurred. We have to

face the realities of a situation and the present situation is such that unless active efforts are made by the Governments of China and India, relations between our two countries are likely to grow worse. I am anxious that this should not happen as any such development will do incalculable harm not only to our two countries but also to the cause of world peace in general.

16. Your Excellency has been good enough to suggest that in order to discuss the boundary question and other outstanding issues between the two countries, the Prime Ministers of the two countries should hold talks in the immediate future. I welcome your suggestion and, as I have previously stated, I am always ready to meet and discuss with Your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore avenues of friendly settlement. It is our common desire that such a meeting should bear fruit. The nature of the discussion at our meeting should, therefore, be such that we do not lose ourselves in a forest of data. Our correspondence has shown that the issues involve a mass of historical data, maps, etc. It is necessary, therefore, that some preliminary steps are taken and the foundation for our discussions laid. Unless this is done, there is danger of the meeting not leading to a successful result, which we so much desire, and disappointing the hopes of millions of people in our two countries.

17. While, therefore, I am ready to meet you at a suitable time and place, I feel that we should concentrate our immediate efforts on reaching interim understanding, which will help in easing the present tension and will prevent the situation getting worse. Thereafter, the necessary preliminary steps might be taken and the time and place of meeting, convenient and suitable to Your Excellency and to me, could be fixed. I need not assure Your Excellency of my earnest desire, as it is the desire of my people, to restore friendship between India and China on a firm basis.

With my expression of high regard,
I am, Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

155. In the Lok Sabha: Withdrawal from Bara Hoti³¹

Vajpayee:³² My adjournment motion on the reported withdrawal of the Indian border police from Bara Hoti has not been admitted on the ground that the matter can be raised in the discussion on the 25th instant. I am prepared to wait, but I am afraid that the Chinese may not like to wait till the 25th. This House is entitled to know why the border police is being withdrawn from Bara Hoti and why Government has not made sufficient arrangements for our troops to stay there during the winter season.

Mr. Speaker: All that will be discussed.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): There has been for some time past an agreement with the Chinese Government in regard to Bara Hoti, that is, that Bara Hoti being a disputed area, no party should send any armed troops there. No armed troops have been sent there accordingly. Civil personnel have gone; this year, our civil personnel have gone there. They went there on the 27th of May this year, and they withdrew six weeks ago; there is no question of withdrawing them now. They withdrew on the 13th September, conditions becoming very difficult.

³¹ Motion for Adjournment, 17 November 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXXV, coIs 333-343

³² Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Jan Sangh

The Chinese sent as their representative, I suppose, of civil personnel, a Tibetan official, but no Chinese came this summer there at all so that we are functioning in terms of that agreement which said that no attempt will be made by either party to change the status of this Bara Hoti area unilaterally.

There are, of course, quite considerable difficulties about either the Chinese or the Indians remaining there during this period. It was the high Himalayas from this side, and in view of that, we may, and we shall naturally consider afresh whether we should erect any permanent structures there which are capable of withstanding climatic conditions. For the present, we have abided by the treaty or arrangement arrived at with the Chinese, and in so far as we know, they are abiding by it too.

Ram Subhag Singh:³³ I think during the last session of the Parliament, the Prime Minister had said that-so far as I can recollect-our patrol personnel were sitting in Bara Hoti. At that time, he did not have any idea that the Chinese military was also stationed there. But today's papers indicate that the Chinese are also there. I do not know whether when the statement was made at that time, it was also envisaged that the Chinese were there. I want to know under what circumstances they came.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I have not understood the hon. Member's question. What does he mean by 'last time'? When?

Ram Subhag Singh: During the last session of the Lok Sabha.

Jawaharlal Nehru: What was said then?

³³ Congress

Asoka Mehta:³⁴ May I invite the Prime Minister's attention to his letter to the Prime Minister of China dated the 22nd March? There, he has said: "I learn that a material change in the situation has since been effected by the despatch of Chinese civil and military detachments, equipped with arms, to camp in the area, after our own civil party had withdrawn at the beginning of last winter. If the reports that we have received about an armed Chinese party camping and erecting permanent structures in Hoti during winter are correct, it would seem that unilateral action, not in accordance with custom, was being taken in assertion of your claim to the disputed area."

Asoka Mehta: Page 57 of the White Paper.

We would like to know what has happened to this. This was the position which our Prime Minister had raised with the Prime Minister of China.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Which page does the hon. Member refer to?

Ram Subhag Singh: Here, the reply was given that no Chinese were there.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I believe the hon. Member is referring to White Paper No. 1.

Asoka Mehta: I am referring to page 57 of White Paper No.1

Ram Subhag Singh: At that time, the Prime Minister had said that our police were sitting there in Bara Hoti.

Jawaharlal Nehru: This relates, I take it-I am sorry I cannot read the whole thing in a minute-to the previous year, that is, the 1958 summer. That is

³⁴ PSP

true. In 1958, there were long talks between representatives of the Chinese Government and the Government of India in Delhi about this Bara Hoti area. They lasted for many weeks. The result of the talks was that they did not lead to any settlement; they were postponed, but this was agreed that there should be no unilateral change made there through armed possession and no armed forces should be sent by either party, but only civil personnel.

As a matter of fact, the hon. Member will find somewhere in White Paper No. II, a protest by China on the 7th September last, that is, 1959, protesting against our personnel being at Bara Hoti. We pointed out that they were civil personnel, in reply. I do not think there is any contradiction in what I have said.

Asoka Mehta: Our difficulty is this that the Chinese forces advance at some places, and then in the name of status quo, they want to continue there. This has been happening at a number of places, as we know across our frontier. What is the position at Bara Hoti? Did they entrench themselves there last year, and if they have entrenched, have they moved out of that?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Bara Hoti is a place which has been in some kind of a dispute for a long time past, even before the Chinese came into the picture. It is a very small area, which is used for pasturage purposes during a few months in the year; otherwise it is almost unapproachable. In this place, the Chinese used to send a kind of a police party or a small party, and the UP Government also sent their police party. For two or three years running, both these parties sat there simultaneously facing each other in that little bit of an area, and it was then that it was decided that Armed Forces should not be sent there and that this should be settled by negotiation and not by unilateral action.

When we made that protest, it was that some of their police party had come earlier and sat there.

Tyagi:³⁵ After the protest, did they withdraw?

Jawaharlal Nehru: In 1958, they withdrew and they did not send any party in 1959, that is, this year.

Goray:³⁶ What is the present position?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The present position is that there is nobody, no armed personnel, Chinese or Indian, anywhere near that place.

Vajpayee: Why has Bara Hoti been treated in an isolated manner? When the Chinese have not vacated their aggression on other territories, why should we refrain from sending our men to the place which belongs to us from time immemorial?

Tyagi: Should we leave it to them until the whole thing is decided? (Interruptions).

Vajpayee: What is the guarantee that they will not do in this place what they did in Ladakh?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am sorry I am not personally acquainted, as the hon. Member appears to be with 'time immemorial'. But I deal with historical periods. As regards this particular place, it is a minor dispute with the old

³⁵ Mahavir Tyagi, Congress

³⁶ . N.G Goray, PSP

Government of Tibet. About this little area, it has been going on. We think our case is a good one and, therefore, we hold by it. But it has been a disputed area and long before the other incursions of the Chinese took place, this matter was being argued.

Ranga:³⁷ The Prime Minister referred to 'long before'. Since when? After the People's Government came or before that?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Before that, it was carried on with the Tibetan Government. I mean there were no conflicts, but there were complaints by us to them and by them to us. They used to send their tax-collector who used to collect grazing fees and other fees. This has happened in several parts of the border for the last half a century---certainly before the change in Government in China, even in the brief period in 1947-48-49. Then we had to deal with these problems in two or three places in the border, small problems relatively. There they were.

So it was a continuation of that. As I said, this was an isolated thing and we treated this-and there were two other places-as matters in dispute which had to be settled by negotiation. It had nothing to do with the major events that happened since then. In continuation of that, last year a Chinese representative came to India to discuss this matter. He did discuss it for a long time. It is true that the discussion did not lead to a successful conclusion. It was postponed further. There the matter stood. But it was decided, and agreed to, that neither party should send armed personnel to that little area, and that has been adhered to. In fact, as I said, we thought that the year before they had sent some armed personnel. We protested against it. Later they took them away. This year they have not sent

³⁷ N.G Ranga, Congress

anybody. We sent civil personnel there which in the ordinary course has come away when conditions became too bad for it.

Braj Raj Singh: We were given to understand that all the border, extending to 2500 miles, was being put under the control of the military. Now we learn that Bara Hoti is being accepted. May I know whether any other important place is also being accepted? As a matter of fact, the Army was being put in charge only for the reason that there were some special circumstances-because there were Chinese incursions. Prior to that, there was no Army control of the whole of the border. Why has this unilateral action been taken in respect of Bara Hoti?

Surendranath Dwivedy:³⁸ Why has the Defence Minister left his seat and why is he standing near the wall?

Jawaharlal Nehru: One question at a time. The military are in charge of the entire border, but the actual people there are still the police under the military. They function under the military. For instance, in the Assam border or the NEFA border, it is the Assam Rifles who are in charge, but they are under the direction of the military. In the Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab borders, there are the police under the direction of the military. That is, the military direct them, change them; they' can send their own people or keep the police, as they choose. The direction and command is that of the military, but the police are there in all these places. In some places, in Ladakh, the military actually are there at the check-posts.

Shri Asoka Mehta rose...

³⁸ PSP

Mr. Speaker: Can we not have a discussion on this later?

Asoka Mehta: The trouble is that the facts are not being placed before us in a clear fashion.

Mr. Speaker: Are we going to have a discussion on this now? We have already spent about 15-20 minutes on this.

Nath Pai:³⁹ The matter is very important.

Mr. Speaker: I have no objection. All that I said when I withheld consent to the adjournment motion was that we would have a discussion of this matter. We have set apart the 25th November for this purpose. The hon. Member was referring to a White Paper which the hon. Prime Minister placed before this House. The hon. Prime Minister has given the answer. If the hon. Member now wants further elucidation, why should he not wait till the 25th?

Nath Pai: Many events are taking place which we are not controlling.

Asoka Mehta: It is only regarding a little spot about which we want fuller information.

Mr. Speaker: That is exactly what the Prime Minister said. It is after all one little spot. We are not going to discuss this matter just now.

Asoka Mehta: We are not discussing; it; we are trying to ascertain facts.

³⁹ Bapu Nath Pai, PSP

The Prime Minister asked me to look up the Note of 7th September, which was given to the Counsellor of India by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, and the reply that was given by us on the 13th September. In their Note of 7th September, the Government of China say:

"It must be pointed out that the above-mentioned actions of the Indian official personnel are obviously deliberate attempts to change the status quo of the Wuje area and constitute an infringement of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity..."

Over and over again, this has been their insistence, that we are infringing their territorial integrity. Now, we have said: "That is not so.

You are wrong". But they have nowhere accepted it. They have said that the status quo is to be maintained. Status quo would mean that this has been our territory, according to us, whatever be the claims they may have. Have they accepted that position? To every protest that we send, there is no reply. Every time we have protested, the Chinese Government have ignored our protest. Whenever they have protested, we have tried to make amends; we have tried to rectify our position. We want to know where precisely the Government of China stand on this position.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know what is the confusion in regard to this particular matter. It is quite clear. It does not matter what they have said in a particular document.

Asoka Mehta: It matters very much.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I beg the hon. Member's pardon. The facts are there. Just as they claim, we have continued to stick to our claim and we shall hold to that throughout. It is an identical position in this particular matter-I am not talking about others-and there is no difference. We think our claim

is a very good one and we intend to hold by it. Nevertheless, we have decided long ago-many years ago-as I said repeatedly, that this is being treated as a matter in dispute I am referring to the Bara Hoti area-which should be settled by consultation. We decided about two years ago that neither party should send armed forces there. We have held by it and apart from one or two doubtful incidents in the past two years, they have held by it. There the matter stands.

Tyagi: I wish to make a suggestion. In respect of the border area disputes, questions of a nature which seek to elicit information about the location and deployment of the armed forces may, by convention, be not asked of the Minister. If they are asked at all, I think it is in the interest of the security of the border that the Prime Minister should not reply to such questions in a manner...

Several Hon. Members: No, no.

Tyagi: The deployment of the armed forces is a matter which should be kept secret.

Nath Pai: What secrecy?

Jawaharlal Nehru: What the hon. Member, Shri Tyagi, said is, in spite of the protest of Opposition Members, the obvious rule followed in every country.

Braj Raj Singh: Nobody is asking for it.

Vajpayee: Nobody has asked for secrets to be disclosed.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not saying that the hon. Member asked. I am saying that what Shri Tyagi said is the obvious rule followed everywhere, especially in a moment of crisis.

Vajpayee: We never asked for any information that will not be in the public interest to give. There is no need for making a suggestion like that.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member need not think that he is being attacked in any way. Nobody is attacking the hon. Member Shri Tyagi made a suggestion that we might be treading delicate ground if repeatedly questions are asked about these matters. So far as these matters are concerned, we have put the army authorities completely in charge and we abide by their advice, as our specialist-advisers, in this matter.

156. To B. C. Roy: Outrage at CPI Support for China⁴⁰

November 24, 1959

My dear Bidhan,

A day or two ago I read of the communist demonstration in Calcutta about our troubles with China on our border.⁴¹ I was astounded to read the account of the papers and to find that your Bengal communists had the temerity to take out a demonstration practically in support of the Chinese

⁴⁰ Letter

⁴¹ The Hindusthan Standard reported on 27 November 1959 the statement of the West Bengal Secretariat of the CPI: "The said Calcutta demonstration was taken out to voice the peoples' desire for a peaceful settlement of the India-China border dispute and for a meeting with the Prime Ministers of these two great countries. The slogans shouted in the rally and demonstrations were the most patriotic, as they focussed the importance of a peaceful settlement instead of creating a war hysteria inside the country."

case. I do not know what you think about all this, but if this kind of thing is going to continue, I think that some strict action will be necessitated.

I cannot make out why the local authorities give them so many facilities for their meetings. Somebody told me that they have reserved the various parks weeks ahead, if not longer.

Anyhow, I am writing to you what most of us feel here. I have no doubt that you share our feelings. I should like to know what you may have in mind about this matter.

Yours affectionately,
[Jawaharlal Nehru]

157. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Relations⁴²

U.C. Patnaik:⁴³ Then, we have got to look into the question as to our defence. We read in the papers today that our Defence Forces have taken over the NEFA area or are going to take it over. Although it was decided several weeks ago that our Defence Forces should take over the overall defence of the NEFA area, yet till now, only plans are being prepared by an officer deputed by the Army Headquarters, by the Army Commander of the Eastern Command and by the Governor of Assam. We are told that they are planning for the Defence Forces taking over, and then the Defence Forces would take over. I do not know what is true, but that is what appeared in the newspaper report.

Forces took over this some months back. They are planning for future work, future operations. They have been controlling this completely, since, I forget, July or August or September.

⁴² 25 November 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXXV, cols 1792-1793

⁴³ Independent

U.C. Patnaik: That is the newspaper report which has appeared this morning.

Jawaharlal Nehru: These anonymous reports need not always be correct.

U.C. Patnaik: The report which appeared this morning says that although the Defence Forces were said to have taken over the NEFA area, at present three gentlemen have been authorized to formulate plans as to how that is to be implemented. I may be wrong, because Government do not take us into confidence.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I assure the hon. Member what I say is correct. I speak with authority, because I know. The Defence Forces took over this, as far as I remember, about three months ago. The Army Headquarters requested the Assam Rifles to remain where they were, and they changed them about; they are under control. The Assam Rifles were considered by our Army Headquarters as peculiarly suited for that terrain. They said that they would keep them. I do not want to disclose where they are kept, but they have got them too round about. Now, they are conferring with each other. I do not know how the hon. Member has arrived at the conclusion that something was decided six months ago but that three people are meeting now only. The three people and four people will be meeting all the time, today, tomorrow and the day after.

158. In the Lok Sabha: White Paper on India and China⁴⁴

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Sir,
I beg to move:

"That the White Paper II on India-China relations laid on the Table of the House on November 16, 1959 and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China laid on the Table of the House on November 20, 1959, be taken into consideration."

Mr. Speaker, Sir, in September last, about 2 ½ months ago this House debated this question of Sino-Indian relations, more especially in regard to our border' and the developments which have taken place there. We went into, at that time, some past history and the House was concerned about the various developments. Since then, other events have taken place and other developments also and I have placed on the Table of the House various papers, correspondence, etc. which had occurred since our last debate.

The House knows the background of all that has happened and I do not propose to go into that except perhaps to fill in some details here and there because it is important that this House and Parliament should have every aspect of the question before it. A great responsibility rests on us in Government but that responsibility can only be discharged if the House itself shoulders it in a very large measure, as representing the country. Therefore, it is my intention to keep the House informed of every development in this situation and take counsel with Members as to what policy we should adopt.

For the present, we have specially to deal with certain recent developments, the proposals made by Premier Chou En-Iai and my reply to

⁴⁴ Motion on India-China Relations, 25 November 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second series Vol. XXXV, cols 1680-1708

Premier Chou Enlai containing certain other and alternative proposals, and the House will no doubt consider them and express its views in regard to them. But behind those proposals lie certain basic approaches and basic principles; because we cannot act merely in a 'haphazard or spasmodic way reacting to events that happen. Naturally we have to react to them but that reaction has to be conditioned and controlled by the basic policies that we pursue and the objectives that we have. If we forget it or if we have no anchorage in basic policies and objectives, then our reactions sometimes may take us in the wrong direction or lead us in a direction not of our choice. Therefore, I think it is important that these basic policies should be kept in mind.

Naturally, even basic policies have to be implemented in the light of conditions that arise; and in this changing world and changing situations we cannot ignore what happens, but we have to measure what happens and respond to it in the light of any basic policy that we might have. Therefore, I should like this House to consider in all earnestness those basic policies which have governed us and which, I hope and trust, will govern us in the near future.

If there is a vital difference in regard to those basic policies, then of course, the steps we may think of taking may be different and may vary. It is necessary that that should be done more particularly now and not merely taken for granted. We have accepted certain basic policies in the past and the Government, under the directions of this Parliament, has functioned in accordance with those basic policies. In the old days, perhaps, as I said, they were taken for granted and not put to the test of experience and danger. They are being put to the test now and it is necessary, therefore, that we should not merely take them for granted but accept them or reject them as this House chooses. There should be no half way house about our thinking when matters of such importance are at issue.

We are faced with grave problems. I do not mean to say that there is some immediate danger of any magnitude, but the gravity of the problems lies certainly in the present but even more so in the future, and any step that we might take will therefore be pregnant with future possibilities. It is a problem obviously of a much greater, much wider significance than what might be called party problem..It transcends all party issues; it comprises the whole country and, if I may say so, to some extent, it comprises the issues beyond our country, that is, the issues of war and peace in the world.

Now, it is a tremendous responsibility for any individual or group like our Government to have to shoulder and face these questions and decide wisely and firmly about that policy and about the steps we should take. No individual and, if I may say so, no Government even is good enough by itself to shoulder this grave responsibility, because the consequences that flow from it do not flow to the Government only; they flow to the country and to some extent to the world. Therefore, I would beg this House to shoulder that responsibility and tell us what we should do about it. If we can do it, carry out its directions, well and good for us. If we cannot, then, let others carry those directions out. But let the directions be clear. We cannot deal with these matters in a halfhearted way, in a destructive way, in a party way, because, as I said, the issues before us are grave and vital, and every step that we may take, by that, we sow certain seeds for the future which may bear good fruit or ill fruit.

It is in this mood and with this feeling of a certain humility before these grave issues which affect the future of our country that I approach this hon. House and seek its indulgence if I say what I feel about these matters frankly because frankness is desirable.

Now, I shall discuss in the course of my speech the particular matters which are before us, but as I have referred to the basic issues, I shall begin by

saying something about them. We have stood for a policy of peace, for a policy of friendship with all nations even though we differ from them, for a policy of non-alignment with power blocs and avoidance of military pacts and the like. It is not for us to judge what others do about it.

Circumstances may be different or difficult for them. The other countries have to judge about their policies and their alliances as they think best. Certainly I do not feel myself competent to criticise them or to offer them advice, but certainly I feel that so far as our country is concerned, it is we who should judge, and we have followed this policy.

Now, recently a cry has arisen in this country from some sources, some people, criticising and condemning that policy of non-alignment, that policy which has been sometimes referred to as one of Panchsheel or five principles and the like. It has been said that that has collapsed because of what has happened vis-a-vis China. Some people have even allowed themselves the pleasure of being humorous about it. It was not particularly happy being satirical or humorous on issues of this character.

As I said, this policy has been our consistent policy for the last ten years and indeed, even before; when the words Panchsheel came into use they just described the policy that we were pursuing. Some years ago, other great countries in the world also spoke rather lightly and casually about our policy, imagining or thinking that it was a policy of weakness, of sitting on the fence and the like.

But as the years have gone by, wisdom has come to other countries, not to all, but to many and the biggest of them, and today it is one of the bright features of the developments that take place before us that basically, that very policy has not only been appreciated in so far as India is concerned but is colouring and conditioning the activities of great nations. Let us not forget that, it is an important fact. That policy was against cold war and the like, because cold war necessarily leads in the direction of hot war and

people came to realise that war of that type in the present age was a disaster, which could not be even imagined and therefore, steps must be taken to avoid it. Fear, apprehension and suspicions came in the way, but ultimately an effort is being made, which has met with some success already and which holds promise of greater success in the future, that we must put an end to this cold war and we must come to some kind of settlement, which removes these fears and suspicions.

There are innumerable hurdles and difficulties in the way, but I think we would be justified in a measure of optimism when the greatest nations of the world today, greatest nations not only in peace but in war, are thinking on these lines and are trying to come together, and I should like this House, even though we are entangled in our own problems and difficulties, to send its good wishes to the efforts of the great leaders of these nations who are working for peace.

During the last few years, we find the world has been on the brink of danger most of the time, because cold war is the brink of danger. On two or three occasions, it came very near toppling over the brink. There were talks of brinkmanship too as a policy. But the world as a whole has moved away somewhat from that dangerous edge of a precipice, but it is a strange turn of fate or circumstance that we in India, who stood for this policy of peace and worked for it with all our might, should suddenly be drawn into this dangerous situation which we face today. I am not for the moment saying whose fault it is. If hon. Members or any Member wants to say that we are partly at fault, it may be, although I firmly believe that right policy is right and rightness should not be judged by the wrongness of other people's actions and that right conduct inevitably has right results. If you like, you may call me an idealist, but I have been conditioned to believe in that throughout my life and I am not going to change at the age of seventy years. It is true that some hon. Members may smile at this and may think it

a sign, perhaps, of senility in me. Whatever it may be, the fact is that by a strange turn of fortune's wheel, fate or circumstance, we, who stood for peace, are faced by the possibility even of war.

I do not think war will come. I am merely talking about possibilities. I do not think that the world or any country is foolish enough to jump over the precipice into war. But I say that these possibilities come into our minds and that is certainly strange. Those people who may imagine that this is due to our policy of Panchsheel or non-alignment seem to me to think in a somewhat distorted and upside down way. I really do not understand that, I would say that any other policy will have brought infinitely greater dangers and brought them sooner and brought them when we would not have had the prestige we undoubtedly possess in the world today because of our policies and the wide friendship that we possess in the world today.

Some hon. Members sometimes talk of our not having any friends.

Apparently their idea of friendship is some kind of iron chain that binds in a military alliance. That is their idea of friendship. It is feeble; that iron chain breaks often enough. It is not a chain of friendship, but a chain of compulsion of events. We do not want such chains to bind us. But we have the friendship of great nations and small nations with whom we do not agree in many matters and yet we are friendly.

When people talk lightly, casually and scornfully of Panchsheel, I should like them to tell which of those five principles they disapprove of, which of them they think is bad and which of them they think should not be acted upon. I should like them to tell me that, because nobody has yet told me that. I say those five principles are right principles, inevitable principles, for right-thinking people, right-thinking individual, or right-thinking world. If you move away from them, you move into a world of conflict and a world of conflict today is a world of doom. Therefore, I should like that to be considered. Let it not be said merely that this is silly. That is not good

enough. We are dealing with various matters in a serious way and it is just not good enough—not that I mind it—for some kind of party advantage to be taken, because the country faces a grievous situation.

I have mentioned all this because I want this basic issue to be considered by this House in this debate and for a firm and clear opinion to be given on that issue, which will govern the activities of this Government. Naturally we have to act according to the directions of Parliament, which means according to the wishes of our country and countrymen, who are represented in Parliament. On this matter there should be no quibbling, no doubt. A straightforward direction must be given that this is the basic policy that the country must follow. In a matter of this kind, I repeat again, whatever one's internal difficulties might be, whatever the internal controversies might be, which influence the action of parties, normally a country does not function in a party way when such problems are raised and the Parliament of that country decides something.

So, we have this curious situation that when in the western world, which means a large part of the world, there is a sort of improvement in their relations, although there are doubts, still, but nevertheless there is a basic, definite, deliberate and earnest desire to improve them we have to face this situation. In a sense the danger zone shifts from other countries to our own borders.

I should like to add a little to the information I gave previously filling some gaps as to how this border situation arose. There is nothing new in what I am going to say. Nevertheless, I think hon. Members should know it. The Government of India recognized the Central People's Government of China in December, 1949. Eight months later, the latter, i.e. the Chinese Government expressed their gratification over the Government of India's desire "to stabilise the Chinese-Indian border" and the Government of India replied that "the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should

remain inviolate". Then, sometime later, in an informal conversation with the Indian Ambassador, on the 27th September, 1951, Premier Chou En-lai expressed his anxiety to safeguard in every way Indian interests in Tibet on which matter "there was no territorial dispute or controversy between India and China." He added: "The question of stabilisation of the Tibetan frontier was a matter of common interest to India, Nepal and China and could best be done by discussions between the three countries." I am quoting still: "Since the Chinese army entered Lhasa" (i.e. in 1951) "in pursuance of the Sino-Indian agreement of 1951 to take up frontier posts, it was necessary to settle the matter as early as possible."

Now, this was in September 1951. On October 4th, 1951, the Indian Ambassador in Peking⁴⁵, under instructions from the Government of India, informed the Chinese Premier, that the Government of India would welcome negotiations on the subjects mentioned by Premier Chou En-lai. This was previous to the agreement, which came later, about Tibet. In February 1952 the Indian Ambassador gave a statement of the existing Indian rights in Tibet and reiterated India's willingness to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement. Premier Chou En-lai replied that there was "no difficulty in safeguarding the economic and cultural interests of India in Tibet". He did not refer to the frontier question in his reply; nor did the Indian Ambassador raise this question specifically then. It was our belief that since our frontier was clear, there was no question of raising this issue by us.

When discussions took place for the Sino-India agreement on Tibet, seven subjects were dealt with-our mission at Lhasa, trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung, a trade agency at Gartok, the right to carry on trade other than trademarks, postal and telegraphic installations, military escorts to Gyantse and the right of pilgrimage. These were indicated to the Chinese

⁴⁵ K.M. Pannikar

Government as subjects for negotiation and ultimately an agreement was arrived at in regard to these matters. Our clear impression was that we had settled all matters relating to Tibet and India and that no frontier issue remained except some minor ones. The question of the frontier did not arise at all at any other time, except later in relation to some maps published in China to which we took exception. The reply of the Chinese Government to us was that those were old maps and their revision would be taken up later when they had leisure to do so. This objection was raised by us several times and the reply also was the same every time.

In March last, that is, this year, there was the Tibet revolution.⁴⁶ In fact, there had been uprising in the eastern part of Tibet for several years previously. In March this revolt took place in Lhasa and spread. This resulted in large numbers of refugees coming to India and the Chinese forces pursuing them, or trying to cut them off, and they also reached our eastern frontier, that is, what is called the McMahon line. Later they spread out to some other frontiers on the west. The story of subsequent events is clearly stated in the correspondence in the White Paper.

It was for the first time on the 8th September 1959, that is, about 2 ½ months ago, that Premier Chou En-lai, in a letter addressed to me, claimed the areas in India which had been included in the Chinese maps. Up till now there had only been this reference to maps and their telling us that they would be revised, in what manner of course, they did not say. But, for the first time, in this letter in September last, Premier Chou En-lai made the claim on the basis of those maps, though he did certainly express his willingness to discuss the boundary disputes with us, presumably such disputes being of a minor character.

Now, in this brief account, I have left out Aksai Chin developments. I shall now say something about them. In September 1957 we learnt of an

⁴⁶ See SWJN/SS/47/pp. 455-459

announcement by the Chinese Government that a road had been made from Yencheng to Gartok in Tibet and that this would be open to traffic in October. As there were two alternative routes from Sinkiang to Western Tibet, we enquired from our Embassy as to where this road was. They could not send any precise information, but they sent us a copy of the announcement which had been published in the People's Daily of Peking which also contained a sketch on a very rough and small scale. In view of this uncertainty about the exact alignment, it was decided that before we send the protest to the Chinese authorities, we should have more reliable information about the alignment of the road. Two reconnaissance parties were sent to the areas in the summer of 1958, an army party towards the north and a police party towards southern extremity of this road. It took some time for the police party to return as the journey was a long and arduous one. The army party did not return, and it was suspected by us that they might have been arrested by the Chinese authorities. In fact, they had been arrested and they were released somewhat later. From the police party we learnt that there was a part of this road in Indian territory. This was a year ago, round about the end of September of last year when we knew with some definiteness that there was this road which had crossed our territory in Aksai Chin. On 18th October, 1958 a little more than a year ago, we sent a formal protest note to the Chinese Government regarding this road and repeating that the road passed through Indian territory and asking for an early reply. No reply was received then or later to this note of ours. On the 14th December, 1958, I wrote a long letter to Premier Chou En-lai about the incorrect delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary in Chinese maps and the circulation of those maps.⁴⁷ There was no specific mention in this letter of Aksai Chin as this matter had been referred to in the earlier letter. Premier Chou En-lai replied to this letter on the 23rd

⁴⁷ See SWJN/SS/45/pp. 702-706

January 1959. These letters are given in the White Paper. I then sent another letter on the 22nd of March 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai.⁴⁸ This letter dealt in detail with the boundary in all sectors, including Ladakh. This brings us to March of this year when we were trying diplomatically, through correspondence with the Chinese Government, for a settlement over this issue.

It has been stated-and the charge may be justified-that we failed in informing Parliament of this. As the House will appreciate, the matter came precisely to our knowledge in October, that is, a year ago. And we took immediate steps to enquire from the Chinese Government and we were corresponding with them for the next three or four months.

We felt, rightly or wrongly, that we should clear this up with them and then place the matter before the House. Now, in about the middle of March something else happened. The Tibetan Rebellion took place and a large number of other issues, border issues and other issues arose, with which we have dealt in all this correspondence. That is in so far as this Aksai Chin matter or road is concerned. Another complaint has been made that we were not swift or quick enough to inform the country or this House-the House was not sitting-about the recent incident in Ladakh. That, I think, is based on a complete misapprehension. The incident took place on the 21st October. We gave the information to the Press etc. on the 23rd October, that is, two days later. We heard of it for the first time on the 22nd October evening or late afternoon.⁴⁹ It so happened that I was in Calcutta then. So was our Foreign Secretary. We heard or we were told that a brief message had come, that there had been this conflict and that some of our persons had died. Further particulars did not come by then. We got it there. We returned early next morning. We got some other messages and we gave

⁴⁸ See SWJN/SS/47/pp. 451-454

⁴⁹ See SWJN/SS/53/pp. 491 and 492-493.

the matter about midday, maybe in the afternoon, of that day to the Press. There was absolutely no delay there.

People complained as to how did the Chinese send a protest note to us a little before, a few hours before. The reason is fairly obvious, namely, that our party had to return from the scene of accident or incident to its own base and then send the message while the Chinese got the message from their outpost or check-post, or whatever it was, there. So this involved a few hours' delay, nothing great. The message came to us via Srinagar. So there was absolutely no delay in that.

In dealing with these matters, I do not know how far the hon. Members have felt this, but it is important that we should realise an inherent difficulty in dealings between India and China. Maybe, to some extent that difficulty arises in dealings between any two countries, more particularly when they are rather unlike each other. All of us are apt to think or look at the world or look at any problem, naturally, from our point of view. The other person looks at it from his. Even geography becomes different, whether you are at the North Pole or at the Equator looking at the world. But that, to some extent, has to be faced. But in regard to China, I feel that we have to deal with, what might be called, a one track mind, very much so. We all have to some extent one-track minds, of course, although I believe that we in India perhaps suffer from it a little less than other countries not all of us anyhow. I was not excluding the Opposition from my remarks, although sometimes I begin to doubt whether they do not have one-track minds. However, it seemed to me in discussing these matters that one comes up against this wall of a one-track mind apart from other things. What is more, I am not saying this as criticism but as some kind of appraisal, right or wrong-this is all a national trait which has existed for considerable time past because China was a great, advanced and powerful country at various stages of history. It spread-and, of course, it spread by

the normal imperialist method-by war and conquest and built up a great empire repeatedly.

Anyhow, from fairly early in history they had a sensation of greatness of the Middle Kingdom as they called themselves, all the fringes belonging to lesser developed countries and human beings who paid tribute to them. It seemed natural to them that other countries should pay tribute to them. Then I think I forget the exact date, but long ago--about 150 years ago or thereabout when the British came, they sent an Ambassador or an envoy with some gifts to them. The reply of the then Chinese Emperor makes interesting reading. He addresses them. He thanks them for their loyalty and subservience to him and he appreciates their gifts as from some country of which, in a sense, they were suzerain powers almost. Their thinking was that the rest of the world occupies a lower grade. Whenever any gifts were sent-even in Tibetan history you come across cases where these gifts were sent-they always treated that as if it became a sign of their sovereignty and suzerainty. That was 200 or 300 years ago.

Now that has made it difficult for us to understand the working of their minds, and, what is more to the point, for them to understand the working of our minds. It has been very difficult for me to explain to them that in this country our structure of Government is, what we consider, democratic, there are civil liberties and that civil liberties include the civil liberty or the right to misbehave, the right even to say highly objectionable things-that is part of civil liberty-that there are parties here which function in their own way, rightly or wrongly, and that Government here cannot control them and cannot inhibit these activities unless they go beyond the pale of the law. They (the Chinese Government) cannot understand it.

Now take an incident that happened some months back-an incident when Chairman Mao Tse-tung's picture was set up and insulted and some tomatoes were thrown for about half a minute or for a minute when the

police intervened.⁵⁰ Now this incident created a depth of anger in China, which it is difficult for the people to understand because Chairman Mao was symbol to them. The picture did not count. The symbols are more to them than even to us although we believe more in symbols. It was a symbol to them of everything and that anybody should insult Chairman Mao's picture made them livid with rage.

Now I want the House to realise what effect some things that we say or do unthinkingly or casually have. Therefore, I have been venturing to say that in these matters we should weigh the words we use, the language we use as well as the actions we take. I am not talking of China only now but of any country. It is a wrong and dangerous thing to deal with individuals there. What I mean to say is that to condemn individuals and Government, more especially to condemn heads of governments, heads of States, because they are symbols, is bad because you create an unnecessary passion on the other side, which comes in the way of calm consideration of any matter, just as, you can well imagine the strength of feeling in India if in some country insults were hurled at our revered President. We would resent it, because he is the symbol of the dignity of our State. Therefore, we should avoid this. But this basic fact remains. I only mention this to help us to understand the situation. It does not solve it, of course.

We now face a situation which is partly a political situation, but partly also a military one; not military in the sense of war coming, but military in the sense that we have to take military steps to meet it and be prepared for all contingencies; in that sense it is a military situation. Now, obviously, this House will not expect me to tell it what arrangements, military and defence arrangements, we are making. That kind of thing is not publicized. But I can tell this House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle and with

⁵⁰ See SWJN/SS/48/pp. 502,510-511 & 595-598

the background of far greater industrial production in the country to help them than today. I am not boasting about them or comparing them to other countries, but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our security.

It is easy to say, but does the House realize that we have 9,000 miles of frontier? It is a pretty big link-not the frontier with China; that is 2,600 miles, a little over 2,600 miles-but all the various frontiers that we have running to 9,000 miles. Some people seem to imagine that our forces should stand at guard along all our frontiers, nine thousand miles.

Nath Pai: Not all; nobody says that. Only where they are threatened.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Quite so, quite so; I accept the amendment. So they rush to guard that place; then the other party goes to some other place; then we rush to that place; our time is spent in rushing to all manner of places at the bidding and command of others! Any person with the least acquaintance with military matters, of war and other things, would not make such a suggestion, I can assure this House. It has no meaning, running about like this, dispersing your forces over wide areas and getting entangled here and there and reducing your capacity to hit out wherever you want to. The main thing is to hit out when you want to, not to stand in a row like in the streets of Delhi when some procession goes by.

Nath Pai: The best thing is not to guard anywhere so that we can concentrate!

Jawaharlal Nehru: This is a matter in which I cannot express an opinion, because I do not consider myself an expert in it. I have to take the advice of the experts who advise me or our Government; naturally, discussing it

with them, naturally, putting one's own view-point, but in the final analysis accepting their advice as to how to use the resources at our disposal?

Obviously, the resources are not infinite, are not just that you can draw upon them; there is a certain limitation upon those resources; and we have to use them to the best advantage.

But, apart from these border conflicts, the real strength of an army or defence forces, it is well known, is the industrial background of the country. If you think in terms of war, it is the industrial background that counts. In the last Great War, the Second World War, was won by a certain group of nations, of course many factors counted, but it was the enormous industrial productive capacity that counted most. If some powers today, like the United States or the Soviet Union, are very great powers, super powers, it is because of the industrial and scientific progress that they have made. It is obvious; their scientific and industrial progress have made them such tremendous powers. We have a greater population than either of them. Population does not make it, or merely giving a rifle to every individual. It may help in some matters.

And, therefore, the whole question of defence has to be considered in all these various aspects, and among them the basic aspect is the growth of industry, industrialisation; and, industrialisation not meaning merely some kind of defence industries-that is important, of course-but you have to create a background to industrialisation all over the place, and more particularly in matters relating to industry; but you cannot separate these things.

In the past we have discussed our defence estimates here, and this House has seldom wanted them to be lowered much. Sometimes some criticism has come. At the same time we have resisted-I want to be quite frank with you-we have resisted the normal tendency of our defence apparatus to spend more and more. In every country there is that tendency. We have

resisted it. Last year we reduced our estimate, not because we wanted our defence to be weak, but because we knew that the strength of defence is the development, the Five Year Plan, and this and that. That is the real strength of the defence. It is true that when we are certainly faced with a dangerous position, well, you have to make the best of it with whatever you have. But if you are always making the best of it at the moment, that means that you are never preparing for the morrow with greater strength. Coming to these letters, Premier Chou En-lai's letter to me and my reply to him they are both before the House and hon. Members must have read both of them. It is not my purpose to go into details, and I should not. But I do feel that the approach that we have made in our letter to Premier Chou En-lai is a fair and a reasonable one. It is-an honourable one. It is an honourable one certainly for our country, and I would repeat that it is an honourable one for China too. Because, unless you are bent on war 'and you merely want drum-beating all the time and strong language, well, that is a different matter. I regret to say that I do not agree with that, and I think it is a wrong policy and a dangerous policy. War is a dangerous policy. But if war is thrust upon one, one has to defend it. If war is thrust upon us, we shall fight, and fight with all our strength. That is a different matter. But I shall avoid war, try to prevent it with every means in our power, because it is a bad thing, it is a dangerous thing. Shri Masani smiles,⁵¹ because he evidently thinks differently; he likes war, or he may think that some of his friends from other countries will come and help if there is war here. If that is the view of any person that we should become just a weak nation, shouting loudly and expecting others to come to our defence, I hope India will never degrade herself in this way.

⁵¹ M.R. Masani, Independent

M.R. Masani: Will the Prime Minister not jump to conclusions on no basis at all? Hon. Members have every right to smile at a foolish argument.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am a reader sometimes-not always-of M.R. Masani's speeches. I came to that conclusion from the broad outlook that he possesses.

You have to be logical. Either you have to have a bellicose, warlike mentality, a sort of what is normally associated, let us say, with Hitler or Nazism. Then you definitely work for war. Of course, Hitler had the strength to do so although he was defeated ultimately. I find here people exhibiting a strange situation; not having the strength and yet talking like Hitlers. It was a most amazing phenomenon. It was bad enough for Hitler who had the strength to do so. Without strength, for a person to talk like Hitler seems quite extraordinary. However, my point was, if you do not aim at war, you have to face a dangerous situation from what you do.

Naturally, inevitably, you take every step to protect your country, because, war does not come or come because of your wishes. Only you may help or prevent the process. It is the other party that may bring it about in spite of you.

Therefore, you have to keep that in mind and therefore you have to prepare for it to the best of your ability. That is admitted. If it comes, you have to fight to the best of your ability. Nevertheless, you have to work for avoiding it if you are working for avoiding it, the preliminary steps that you take should also keep that in view. Because, if you talk in too loud a voice about these matters, if you go on denouncing everybody, if you create an atmosphere which must inevitably lead to warlike thinking, exciting people in your own country and irritating beyond measure people in the other country, whether you want or not, you are taking that country step by step to that position. That is inevitable.

I do not myself see why the strength of a country should be associated with the beating of drums. I have heard of this being done in the old days. Nowadays, strength is represented not by drum-beating or slogans, but by whatever it is, your army, your industrial apparatus or morale-all these things. Build them up certainly and stand firmly before any intruder. I can understand that. But, keep the facts of life in view. Do not ignore life as it is, the world as it is, everything as it is.

I can recognise one thing. There are some things which no nation can tolerate. Any attack on its honour, on its integrity, on the integrity of its territory, no nation tolerates, and it takes risks, grave risks even, to protect all that. Because, you cannot barter these things, your self-respect and honour. One has to stand for them, whatever the consequences. That is all right. But, in standing for them, if one takes some action which puts the same dilemma before the other country and the other country thinks that its honour is being attacked and its self-respect brought down, you shut all the doors to any kind of approach or talk. I should like the House to appreciate this distinction. Firmness and building up of strength is obviously necessary and right and inevitable when we have to face a crisis of this kind. But, firmness and building up of strength does not mean doing so in a manner which may worsen a situation and which may shut all possible doors to a peaceful settlement. I think, whatever the circumstances, whatever the conditions that might arise, always there should be an attempt at a peaceful settlement, provided always again that we are not going to barter our honour, our self-respect, our territory. That proviso always remains. Otherwise, we are talking childishly-I hope you will forgive me for using this word-in this world, talking without understanding the consequences of our words or what action we are apparently suggesting. It becomes then something, the defence of the country being put on the level of, let us say, a demonstration in Delhi city. Defence of a country is

something different: not a speech in the Ramlila ground or drum-beating somewhere or slogans somewhere. It is far too serious a matter to be treated in this casual way.

So, I have endeavoured in my reply to Premier Chou En-Iai, in all my letters that I have sent to him, to state our case with as much clarity as I could command, but always with politeness, always with a view that I might help in solving this problem however difficult it might be. If it is beyond solution, we face that. But, we shall always go on trying to solve it. Some people come to me and say, "Why don't you eject everybody from Indian territory?" Occasions may arise in war when one tries to do so. But, one does not do so except in war if it is war, then, of course, one tries it. In peace, one tries other means. Otherwise, it is war. People seem to think that we need not go to war, but we may have some kind of petty campaigns here and there. I do confess that this is beyond my understanding.

Nath Pai: But, if the other fellow does not go about peacefully?

An Hon. Member: It is all peace so far.

Raja Mahendra Pratap:⁵² On a point of order, Sir, if you had said only of world federation, world government, world army and world court, there would have been no talks about these things.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There are one or two matters that I should like to mention specially. One is the treatment of people of Kashmiri or, more particularly, Ladakhi origin in Tibet by the Chinese authorities. This has been very harsh and unreasonable. Our trade representatives in Gyantse

⁵² Independent

and Yatung, etc. also have had any amount of pin-pricks and difficulties from day to day. It is interesting to contrast this with the Chinese claim to the Indonesian Government for the treatment of people of Chinese origin in Indonesia, because there is a very great difference between that and the treatment they are giving to these people of Kashmiri or Ladakhi origin. Also we have been much disturbed by the treatment received by these prisoners taken by the Chinese in the Ladakh incident. According to the accounts that we have received, it is bad treatment. Some of these people have got frostbitten toes and all that, chiefly because of that. Also, it appears from these reports, and indeed from the whole account given to us even by the Chinese Government that these people were subjected to repeated and constant interrogation. Now, there are rules and conventions about these matters. Of course, there are no special rules relating to people captured in this way. The rules and conventions apply to prisoners of war. We are not at war with China, but I take it that it is in our favour. My colleague, the Defence Minister, tells me that they apply in civil commotion also. My point was...

Asoka Mehta: But have the Chinese signed that convention, because, according to us, they do not observe them?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I was telling the House that the conventions and rules of war lay down certain ways of treating prisoners. They lay down specifically that prisoners should only be asked their names, parentage, association or the unit to which they belong, some specific details about themselves, not about any other question. They should not be interrogated in this way. I merely wish to bring this to the notice of the House. I do not know, but I suppose they have not signed that convention very probably, but these people were treated badly.

Now, there is one thing. I was talking about one-track mind and the like, and I was not understanding the Chinese attitude and they are not understanding ours. But it often happens. But there is one aspect of the question which I wish the Chinese Government and indeed other countries might try to understand. Any border trouble, any border dispute raises passions in any country. It is so everywhere. But there is a peculiar feature of this particular matter to us, because it deals with the Himalayas. Now, the Himalayas are high mountains, of course, but they are something much more to us, and more intimately tied up with India's history, tradition, faith, religion, beliefs, literature, and culture, than, to my knowledge, any other mountain anywhere, whatever the other mountains may be. The Himalayas are something much more than mountains to us; they are part of ourselves. And I want the other people to realise how intimately this question affects our innermost being, quite apart even from a pure question of border.

Now, I do not wish to deal further with it, but I see that some amendments are proposed to be moved. I should hope that after listening to me, hon. Members who want to move amendments might see the path of wisdom and not move them, (interruptions) because apart from other odd amendments, there is one coming from a motley group with motley ideas...

Asoka Mehta: Not as far as national defence is concerned. There is nothing motley in it.

Jawaharlal Nehru: In national defence, Asoka Mehta does not obviously stand on a separate footing outside India, as if nobody else wants national defence. It is a most amazing attitude to take up for any Member, that they stand for national defence and others do not. I hope Asoka Mehta.....

M.R. Masani: It is not your monopoly either.

Jawaharlal Nehru: ...will learn better about national defence (Interruptions).

Asoka Mehta: We may differ in internal problems, not in this.

Jawaharlal Nehru: If Asoka Mehta will interrupt me, I shall answer his interruption.

I say that these amendments of that motley group, socialist, anti-socialist, Jan Sangh, this, that and the other coming together, all for national self-defence.... (Interruptions)

Vajpayee: What is wrong about it? There is nothing wrong about it.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There is nothing wrong, there is absolutely nothing wrong except that I say that the amendment has not a single constructive proposal. They just want to take party advantage of a national situation. (Interruptions)

Some Hon. Members: We have not done so.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I repeat that it is an amazing thing to me that this kind of exploitation by all the odd and sundry groups in this House meeting together..... (Interruptions)

Nath Pai: It is most unfair on his part to accuse us of exploiting a national situation, when all that we say is that we stand behind him in the defence of the country. This is most unfair of him.

Mahanty:⁵³ Sir, I rise to a point of order....

Goray: We can say that they are exploiting the situation.

Some Hon. Members: No, you are exploiting the situation. (Interruptions)

Jawaharlal Nehru: But that is exactly what they have been saying all the time.

Nath Pai: Is it fair to smother all criticism by saying that we are exploiting a national situation?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not. I welcome criticism. (Interruptions). I do not give in.

Mahanty: I rise to a point of order. My point of order is this.

Acharya Kripalani:⁵⁴ The Prime Minister has himself said that in this matter we should be united. Therefore, he should not get angry if certain parties are united.

Nath Pai: I do not want to interrupt the Prime Minister, but let him be gallant enough and give in, because he has accused us. Let him be gallant and give in. We do not want to accuse him. You gave us the right. This is not China where the right of disagreement and criticism does not exist; that is a country with one-track mind. This is a free country, and we shall disagree and criticise. That does not mean exploiting the situation.

⁵³ Surendra Mahanty, Ganatantra Parishad

⁵⁴ J.B. Kripalani, PSP

Jawaharlal Nehru: I entirely agree with what Acharya Kripalani has said....

Mahanty: On a point of order. My point of order is this, namely whether before an amendment is moved, when it is not the property of the House as yet, it is open to the Leader of the House.

Some Hon. Members: Yes, yes.

Mahanty: I am not going to be shouted down like this. Let not hon. Members shout me down. This is not a Congress Party meeting. This is the Parliament. (Interruptions) I have risen to a point of order, and you will give me the protection. Let it be remembered that this is not a Congress Party meeting. This is Parliament, where I have the inherent right to rise to a point of order. Let those gentlemen who want to shout me down hold their patience. My point of order is this. Before an amendment is moved, it does not become the property of the House. Is it open to the Leader of the House to pass comments on it, to talk on it, and to attribute motives that we are trying to do something which is not in our minds? I take strong exception to this fact, and I want that you should give us a ruling on the matter whether it is open to the Leader of the House to comment on an amendment before it has been moved.

An Hon. Member: He should withdraw these remarks. (Interruptions)

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. I have heard the point of order. (Interruptions) I am afraid the hon. Member is going away from the point of order to point of disorder. Once he has raised the point of order, he must keep quiet, and he must allow me to give a ruling on the point of order instead of trying to interrupt me. I have heard the point of order. There is nothing new that is

being done in this House. We have circulated in the Order Paper all the amendments that have been tabled; it is not as if they have been moved now. But it is not as if any Member who moves a resolution or a motion to which a number of amendments have been tabled, ought not to refer to them and answer them in advance but wait until all those amendments are moved and then take a last chance only at the end. That is not the practice in the House. In some cases, a number of amendments are also accepted. Even in the original speech, while moving the motion, the mover says that he finds those amendments reasonable and he is going to accept them. Possibly, if the amendments are accepted, those exceptions may not be taken. If the amendments are accepted, Mahanty himself would not raise this point. If the Prime Minister had said that he would accept the amendment, then, possibly, he would not raise this point. (Interruptions).
Order, order.

There cannot be one rule if the amendment is accepted and another rule if the amendment is criticised. Therefore, it is open to the hon.

Mover to refer to these amendments and say in advance that he does not accept these amendments, and that these amendments are not in our best interests and so on. The hon. Member will have his turn to reply, and then the hon. Minister will have another opportunity to reply to whatever is moved on the floor of the House.

Jawaharlal Nehru: May I continue?

Vajpayee: There is one more point of order. Is it open to the Prime Minister to attribute motives to the Members?

Mr. Speaker: No, there is no point of order.

Vajpayee: He has attributed motives to the Members.

Mr. Speaker: He has not attributed motives. He says that it is not in the best interests of the country.

Nath Pai: It was most unlike of him.

Mr. Speaker: Absolutely not. The hon. Member will have an opportunity later on. Now, the hon. Prime Minister.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am very sorry that any words of mine should have hurt any hon. Members. I really did not intend doing that. But what I was venturing to point out was-and I entirely agree with what Acharya Kripalani has said-that these matters should not be discussed in anger or excitement. But when we deal with these matters, I think whatever I said-I am prepared to say, I should not have said-I was perfectly entitled to say; there was nothing wrong about it, because I was laying stress, if I may say so, on a constructive approach to this problem and not a merely destructive approach. We are facing grave issues, grave issues not for today only but for the tomorrows to come. And obviously, when we talk of defence and all that, the greatest defence is a united country. It is patent, and I am sure we have that united country.

But there is one matter I should like to refer to, while I am talking about unity. The other day there was a public demonstration in Calcutta which amazed me, and ashamed me.⁵⁵ What am I to say to people who reject in effect the soil from which they spring, the nationality which they possess and which gives them protection? What am I to say to them?

(Interruptions)

⁵⁵ See item 156

Renu Chakravartty:⁵⁶ If the Prime Minister is referring to the *Indian Express* version, I would respectfully tell him that it is an absolute untruth that has appeared there. He should see what has appeared in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, not a pro-Communist newspaper. I was there myself and I can tell you that the slogans raised were not the slogans that are given there.

Ila Palchoudhuri:⁵⁷ I was there. I heard the slogans.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not wish to pursue this matter. I hope at no time I have [sic] tried to suppress criticism. But there are certain limits in a national crisis, and-I am not for the moment referring to any particular person or group; I am laying down a principle when any person or group behaves in a national crisis anti-nationally, anti-patriotically, then the time comes to deal with that individual or group. I hope this will not happen. I am laying down a proposition.

I am grateful to you and to this House for listening to me with such goodwill all this time. I would again repeat that a tremendous responsibility rests on this House at the present moment, because it is this House which shall give the lead to the country, and the responsibility is not limited to some step that we might take today but to see the perspective of the future and how we are to deal with it, because, as I said, a step today may have good consequences or bad consequences.

Therefore, I hope that this House will consider this matter and discuss it, keeping this perspective in view and remembering the grave issues that are involved and remembering also what this country has stood for not only in the recent past but even in the distant past.

⁵⁶ Communist Party

⁵⁷ Congress

159. To Subimal Dutt: Reply⁵⁸

With reference to the attached telegram, you might send an answer to this effect:

"Your telegram 531 November 24.

When Philip Potter told Prime Minister about this statement by Sadiq, Kashmir Opposition Party leader, Prime Minister said that he did not agree with Sadiq's statement. In Ladakh the population was chiefly Buddhist and they were particularly against what had happened in Tibet and would, therefore, intensely dislike any Chinese aggression in Ladakh. The Muslims there are also likely to be against such an invasion.

As for Kashmir Muslims, some might perhaps side with Pakistan, but, generally speaking, he thought Sadiq's statement quite wrong."

160. To I. P. Parekh: Mao and China⁵⁹

Please reply to this letter from Shri I.P. Parekh. Tell him that I have no recollection of the particular conversation with Mao Tse-tung. My general recollection is that his attitude was friendly, but as if he was an elderly uncle talking to a younger person and giving good advice.⁶⁰

2. As for my being aware of the Chinese challenge, in a sense, every thinking person, whether in Europe or in Asia, realised that a vast country like China would be a formidable power once it is industrialised. Also that there was a tendency in Chinese history to expand.

3. The slogan 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' was not started by me. This is an ordinary phrase used in Delhi or elsewhere whenever any high personality

⁵⁸ Note, 25 November 1959

⁵⁹ Note to Kesho Ram, 25 November 1959

⁶⁰ See SWJN/SS/27/pp. 6-11 & 32-40

comes from abroad. There was no reason for me to try to stop it. It is always good to try to be friendly with everybody.

4. You might mark your letter confidential as I do not want this to go to the press.

161. To Subimal Dutt: Residential Permits for Foreigners⁶¹

I agree. I suppose these residential permits will be for some fixed period. If so what period? Presumably this will not apply to Commonwealth nationals.⁶²

162. In the Lok Sabha: India-China Relations⁶³

Mr. Speaker: The House will now take up further consideration of the motion re: India-China Relations. The original motion along with the amendments is before the House. The hon. Prime Minister.

⁶¹ Note, 26 November 1959. File No. 6/176/59-F.I., MHA

⁶² S. Dutt to Nehru, 26 November 1959-"Under our present rules, foreigners, who have been resident in this country without interruption since the 12th August, 1943, have not to take out residential permits. Advantage has been taken of this by a large number of Chinese in Calcutta and we are not certain that these persons have even registered themselves as foreigners. It is now proposed to amend the Foreigners' Order 1948 in order to make it obligatory on all foreigners to take out residential permits. The foreigners who will be largely affected are the Chinese, Afghans and Iranians. In China, Iran and Afghanistan, no foreigner can stay without a residential permit. There is no particular reason why nationals of these countries should be entitled to any special exemption in India. The proposal is submitted for PM's approval." Ministry of Home Affairs, File No. 6/176/59-EI

⁶³ 27 November 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, VoL XXXV, cols 2185-2213

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, I must express my gratitude to you and to hon. Members of the House for this debate which has been taking place for the last two days. May I, right in the beginning, say that I am sorry that some words I used on the last occasion when I moved this motion had slightly upset some hon. Members opposite. I talked about a motley crowd with motley ideas or some such thing. I did not mean any disrespect to anybody. What I meant was that people who are of entirely different opinions and groups had gathered together in a resolution, which was not a disrespectful thing to say.

Yesterday, Asoka Mehta referred to a friend of his, M.R. Masani, and said that M.R. Masani's economic ideas would be pushed into the dustbin of history. I would not have ventured to say that although I entirely agree with that statement. Therefore, it surprised me that some remark that I made without any intention of hurting any hon. Member was resented. Anyhow it was not my intention. I am sorry.

In the course of this debate many things have been said, and many criticisms have been made, and yet, the major fact stands out, namely, on the big issues before us there is practically unanimity in this House. I was a little surprised when Acharya Kripalani accused us of treating this matter lightly and casually as a small issue. I can assure him that whatever other mistakes we might have made, we have never considered this question as a small question. In fact, perhaps we might have attached a little more importance to it than even Acharya Kripalani, because we had to give earnest thought to all the consequences, to where it was leading us and to what might happen not today but in the months and years to come. In fact, if I may say so, there came for me one of these peak events of history when a plunge has to be taken in some direction which may have powerful

and far-reaching effects not only on our country but on Asia and even the world.

It was no small matter that we considered. I can assure him that it was not casually that we considered it. We considered it, keeping all these far-reaching aspects in view, keeping in view all these processes of development in India, our five year plans and everything. All this picture came before me and before my colleagues when we discussed it. So, let us be clear about it, namely, that we are dealing today not with a small or a casual matter but a matter of the utmost significance to the present and the future of India and Asia. That is the approach.

Another thing that struck me very agreeably and pleasantly was the almost unanimous affirmation of what is called the policy of non-alignment. I think perhaps some Members who have affirmed it might have done it maybe with some inhibitions or limitations in their mind. That is possible, even with some different view point. But the fact is that barring perhaps one or two hon. Members-I forget the names--everyone in this House belonging to every party said that there was no other policy open to us but that of non-alignment.

Even those who perhaps cast some doubt on it seemed to me to be labouring under some misapprehension. When they talked about Panchsheel or the five principles, they seemed to imagine that that involved our forgetting the recent developments or ignoring them and finding it impossible to cooperate with the Chinese Government in many ways and generally to carry on in the old way. But the two points are quite different, the policy of non-alignment and of having friendly relations is, I believe, basically a right policy under all circumstances, whatever happens. That is true.

But the policy remaining like that, if two countries fallout, let us say two countries, in the extreme extent, go to war, obviously that policy does not

apply to them. It is absurd to say it does. If peace is broken, we deal with the situation in so far as we can. The policy remains good all the same, and it applies to the rest of the world, and later to that part of the world too, because war is a bad thing-anyhow it is not a permanent phenomenon. If people think that what has been happening on our borders and elsewhere has made no great difference that, of course is not correct. It has made a tremendous difference not only to Government and to our present relations with China, but to what might happen in the future too-that is quite obvious-the widespread and deep-seated reaction in our country. There is no doubt about that. From almost, you might say, a little child in a primary school to a grown up man there has been this powerful reaction.

I have ventured sometimes to ask people to be calm about it. That is true. But, I might tell you that I was proud of that reaction. I did not wish that reaction to go in the wrong direction, because, I was afraid that we might fritter the vitality and energy that we may have into unnecessary and even undesirable activities, thinking that we are doing something. The issue was so grave in my mind, so big. Here we are sitting on the edge of history and all kinds of things are going to happen in the future. Are we going to think that we are solving these problems by organising students' demonstrations, or coming in front of Parliament House and waving flags? That way, it does not help. That is minimising the issue. If we are straight about it and if we really feel like that, we shall have to change the millions of people in this country. It is not a question of some additional armies. These are minor things. If this unfortunate thing occurs, we have to face this and we shall become a nation of armies, every man; let there be no mistake about it. But it is not by petty things, that we shall do it. Every single activity, every single thing that we do-planning, etc. would have to be conditioned by one major fact, because that will be a struggle for life and death; not as hon. Members say-forgive my mentioning it- "go and occupy that land; force

them out". I am surprised at the casual way such things are thought over and mentioned.

Therefore, may I point out to Acharyaji that we have not casually considered this question, and it is because of its importance and vital effect on the future for all of us in this country, that we have given this matter so much attention? If two of the big countries of Asia, biggest countries, giant countries of Asia, are involved in conflict, it will shake Asia and shake the world. It is not a little border issue that we are troubled about. We are troubled about the border issue, of course; that is a different matter. But the issues surrounding it, round about it, are so huge, vague, deep-seated and far-reaching, intertwined even, that one has to think about them with all the clarity and strength at one's command, and not be swept away by passion into action which may harm us instead of doing us good. All these are considerations, and we have, in our little wisdom, however limited it may be, tried to consider these aspects. And we shall continue them. They are too big for any Prime Minister or Government to deal with. We are small men facing great events and great decisions; and we can do very little without the support, the fullest support, of this Parliament, and of the people. That support, I believe, is there and will come.

When I appealed to this House two days ago about united effort etc. I meant it in a very much deeper sense. I did not mind all the speeches made here or there, although sometimes those speeches influence public opinion. They indicate to the outside world that we are not united, that we are quarrelling and that we are weak, which is a bad effect to create on our people or on the outside world. They are misled by it, because the reality is that on a subject like this India is bound to be united and nobody can break that unity when the danger comes. But there is this to be said. If this House thinks-you will forgive me for being quite frank-that the manner our Government carries on this particular work is not satisfactory, then, of

course, it is open to this House to choose more competent men in whom it has faith, in whom the country has faith. That I can understand, for in a crisis there can be no, shall I say, personal considerations by way of courtesy when we face these matters. But if, in your wisdom or in the balance, you feel this House feels, that this Government has got to face this challenge, or this Prime Minister has to face it, then hold to him and help him, and do not come in his way. I did not mean at all that there should be no criticism.

Criticism, of course, there should be. But there are criticisms and criticisms. In a moment of crisis one should not do anything to encourage the opponent or the enemy. One should remain on one's toes, I admit; our people and this House, certainly, should remain on their toes and be wide awake to correct mistakes, to point out mistakes. I do not want any Government, least of all the Government of which I have the honour to be the head, to be treated as if we are all wise. We are not all wise; of course not. We are rather common mortals facing great events. Sometimes, of course, the mere association of great events makes a person greater than he is, as many of us grew greater in the old days when we associated ourselves with the struggle for India's independence. Small men and women that we were, we became bigger in stature because we were associated with those great events.

Now also there is a challenge of these great events and if it is your will and pleasure that I should serve in this capacity in which I have been placed, I am not going to shirk it, and I am going to serve with all my strength and such competence as I have. But, if you make me the instrument of your will for this purpose, do not blunt that instrument; keep it sharp for the work that it is intended to do.

So, we really have to consider this issue in all its ramifications, to which reference has been made in this debate, and many other ramifications. But,

in the final analysis, you have to consider it in this much deeper sense of the biggest challenge that they could have—a challenge which may make history for good or bad. Let us not boast. The issues are too grave for boasting. Let us not talk about how we will go and kick them out. China is no small country, nor is India. They are both big countries, ancient countries, and in perhaps somewhat different ways, strong countries. It is absurd, I think, for the Government of China to imagine that they can sit on India or crush India. It is equally absurd for anyone in India to think that we can sit on China or crush China.

Nath Pai: We have never asked for it.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not accusing anybody, I am making a statement as to what we have to face. If the worse comes to the worst and a conflict arises between two mighty countries, it does not much matter if one country has got a few more guns, or a greater army; it may matter in a military sense, but basically when these two giant countries come into conflict in a life and death struggle, no one gives in. No one gives in when he is being crushed. Certainly India does not give in. Something may happen here and there on the borders, we take it. We deal with it as we think best always keeping in view this distant prospect of what might happen and how we should deal with it. It is therefore an issue of the biggest magnitude. We should not, I submit, however big the issue, lead ourselves to cultivate or to encourage what is being sometimes referred to here as a war psychosis, because let us realise in all consciousness that such a conflict such a war between India and China will be bad, terribly bad, a tragedy of the deepest kind—a tragedy for us, a tragedy for China too and a tragedy for Asia and the world. Therefore, let us not think lightly of it. Let us not take steps which automatically push us in that direction.

That is one side of the picture. The other side is that when this challenge comes, when this danger comes we cannot be complacent. We have to be wide awake and prepared and do all we can to face it if it comes. These are the two sides of the picture and we have to steer a course avoiding extremes.

I am not going to discuss many of the suggestions and proposals made about developing the border and all that. Of course, it is true. But may I say that some of the suggestions made rather surprised me. Dr. Ram Subhag Singh said that we should industrialise NEFA, the Ladakh area and—where else?

The Deputy Minister of External Affairs (Lakshmi Menon): Himachal Pradesh.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There were three places.

Sardar Hukum Singh:⁶⁴ Spiti and Lahaul.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Spiti and Lahaul.

It is a noble ambition of Dr. Ram Subhag Singh. But before we do that we have to think of the little country of India also. We have to deal with and industrialise it. We might concentrate on industrialising India first before we go across the Himalayas for that purpose. It shows the enthusiasm of our hon. colleagues here in this Parliament, but it also shows that in their enthusiasm they sometimes overshoot the mark and that is not helpful. Then again, we have been charged. "Why did you walk out of Bara Hoti? Why did you do this? You made a statement in September last and in November you tell us that you walked out of there."⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Congress

Well, I venture to explain the matter. First of all, we have always walked out of Bara Hoti during winter because, broadly speaking I do not say it is impossible to live there; it is unlivable and uninhabitable in winter. Of course, it is a conceivable possibility that if necessity arose and when there is vast urgency one can do anything. One can go to the North Pole or to the South Pole. That is a different matter. But we have retired and China has retired from there because the place is unlivable. So far as we are concerned, it is, roughly, approachable for five months in the year, that is, the approach routes to Bara Hoti, on China side too, are in other months difficult-the high passes which lead to Bara Hoti are blocked. A person may live there, certainly, with difficulty, but he just cannot travel to and fro in the rest of India for seven months in the year. As I said, one can always do everything if danger threatens and necessity arises. But the idea of living there or putting our people there, cut off from the rest of India for seven months more or less, unless there is urgent necessity, did not seem to me obvious at all or something that was demanded by the honour or interests or the defence of India.

Then again, we had arrived at an arrangement with the Chinese Government some two or three years ago--three years ago, maybe--particularly about this matter that they would not put any armed personnel there and we would not do so. Of course, you will say, "Why did you come to such an arrangement?" Well, I am sorry that I disagree. When there are any disputes-I am not talking about these big scale border troubles and almost a mountainous invasion and all that; that is a different matter-but when there are disputes as there are plenty of disputes between two countries, they have always to be discussed and arrangements are arrived at. All that is a common factor everywhere where such disputes arise. So, we agreed with them that neither they nor we will send armed personnel

⁶⁵ See item 155

there. We have both kept by that in the last two or three years. In summer we go. We did not agree about our withdrawal or not-there is no agreement-but it was by force of circumstances. They withdrew. We withdrew. So, we have been sending our civil personnel there not that the civil personnel do any civil administration there, but they sit there and they will sit there, of course.

So, I submit that attaching too much importance to these matters and becoming touchy about them rather 'distorts the picture in our minds. We seem to think that we are going to decide these major matters by, let us say, what they did in the old days. Two persons would fight if a moustache was a little longer or shorter or a little higher or lower. That kind of thing does not apply to these grave national problems.

Some hon. Members talked about common defence with Pakistan. Now I do not wish to discuss that matter, but I would remind the House of the statement that appeared only two days ago-I think day before yesterday-that President Ayub Khan made when he was asked about this letter that I have sent to Premier Chou En-lai. He said that Pakistan will not recognise this because she had a claim to Ladakh, that is, because Pakistan had a claim to Ladakh, he said that I had no business to make proposals to Premier Chou En-lai and that he does not recognise my letter. I am not discussing this. But I am just pointing out the inherent difficulties of this question of common defence. But people do not realise fully what difficulties it involves.

Then, about war-limited war; leave out big war we have had in recent years at least two important but limited wars. One was in Korea and the other was in Indo-China and great and powerful nations were involved in it. After lasting years, those wars ended in some kind of a partial settlement or some kind of a truce: some kind of a settlement, not a complete one perhaps. The troubles have continued, tension has continued. But even

there, there was a war in which great nations were involved and ultimately by force of circumstances they came to some settlements which were not very satisfactory to either of them, big nations as they were. I am pointing out, that we have to look at this question not lightly, not vaingloriously, not boastfully, but still firmly and determinedly. It does not mean that we have to shout at the top of our voices in order to be heard. It is action and determination that counts and not a very loud and repeated assertion as to how we feel, although that has to be done when necessity arises.

There is another thing. There has been a misapprehension evidently and people say that we are creating a no-man's land in Ladakh-it is true-and that we are thereby acknowledging China's claim to the frontier there. First of all, we are not acknowledging it in the slightest degree. It is patent, secondly, in effect, we are asking them to do what, I believe, was the desire of every Member of this House, that is, to walk out of the territory of India, that we consider India's territory. It is true that we are doing it in a polite way, in a courteous way, in an honourable way for both the countries, because that is the only way to do it. Of course, otherwise, you aim not at getting them to do something, but at a deadlock and war. Either we come to the decision that all this is nonsense as some people do say, you must not negotiate, you must not talk with them until they do this or that. I believe that in this matter, as in some other matters, the Chinese Government has been in error, has behaved badly; it has not behaved fairly to us, has committed, what I might say, a breach of faith on us-not a breach of faith of my particular word or document, but broadly speaking breach of faith. I believe all that.

But, do you treat a Government or do you expect to be treated in a way to be ordered about? Then, you are in the wrong. No country likes being ordered about. A great country to be ordered about is not either the way of diplomacy or dealing between two countries. Therefore, to say as some

hon. Members have said, I am sorry to criticise them, that they must do this or that, in fact, if you analyse what they say, they must surrender and then we go graciously to talk to them-that is not obviously a feasible proposition. It may please us. We will be very happy if that happens. But, that kind of thing does not happen even with small countries, much less with a great country-deliberately asking the other country to do something which it considers humiliating. There are very very few countries which tolerate that, even small countries, rights or wrongs apart. Therefore, either you aim at a complete deadlock with no way out except war or you aim at finding some doors and windows which might help in removing that deadlock, lessening it and creating an atmosphere where one can possibly get over it and settle the question to our advantage. It is a difficult matter. I cannot say now whether this can be done or not. But, one thing I know absolutely and definitely: to accept the deadlock for ever or to suggest something which confirms that deadlock and leaves no doors open except war, is a bad step, dangerous step, an utterly wrong step, from any point of view.

That does not mean, of course, that we should weaken or we should-the word is often used-go in for appeasement. I do not quite understand what meaning people attach to it. It is a bad word with bad associations. That is true. But, those Members who used it, seemed to think that the alternative to any policy of negotiation or any policy of trying to find some way out was appeasement. That means that they believe in no other course but war. Let us realise it. Because, they may not have used the word war, but the steps they suggested, if taken, inevitably lead to that. We must realise the second, third step. Therefore, I do submit that not only in this case, but always, we should be prepared to negotiate. We should be prepared to meet as we have met even when feelings were rather tense, representatives and leaders of Pakistan. I am prepared to meet them. I am

not going to allow my sense of any personal prestige to come in the way of meeting any person anywhere if I think that the cause of my country is served thereby or the cause of peace is served thereby.

It is true that, much as one might desire a meeting, that meeting itself, unless it is held under proper circumstances or a proper atmosphere, with some kind of background and preparation, may lead to nothing. It may fail; it may do harm. It is a different matter. It is a matter of judgment. It is true that any such meeting which has the faintest resemblance to carrying out the behests of another party is absolutely wrong.

I have said, in this particular matter, and the House will remember, Mr. Chou En-Iai suggested an early meeting. I have said, "I should be glad to meet you." It seems to me that the meeting could only take place firstly when these proposals that we have sent have been accepted, there is some basis for meeting, tension becomes less or some other preparation made for it. I do not wish to delay anything. I am not trying to escape the very idea of meeting. I want it; I welcome it as early as possible. But: as I have stated, there must be some preparation, some ground for it. It is a complicated issue. Leaving out the broad question of how the Chinese have behaved in this matter, which, I think, is very bad, even if you come to the narrow issue of the borders here and there, it is a fairly complicated issue, full of history, tradition, this and that and maps.

The Chinese Government has recently published a kind of an Atlas-Atlas is not perhaps the right word-a collection of maps, plenty of them. I think about two or three are their own maps. The others are maps taken from other countries, all maps, British maps, American maps, French maps, wherever they could get hold of, which they thought to some extent helped their case. Sometimes they help them a little, sometimes more.

Encyclopedia Britannica, some traveller's maps, all that kind of thing. They have done it. We have plenty of maps, very good maps. I have no doubt

that our case is a very strong one, broadly speaking. What I mean is two countries, where there is a dispute, cannot refuse to talk. That is not a legitimate way in the modern world or at any time to deal with. If you are strong, you can, of course, push aside your adversary, talk or no talk, get away. It is a bad habit even then.

In the present case, things have happened which have come as a shock to us. I have no objection to talks about Bara Hoti or one or two other places. These are limited cases of border. Where there is a dispute, let us discuss it. How many hon. Members here, who have warmly protested against our coming out of Bara Hoti, know even the facts about Bara Hoti? But, it is resentment, a justified resentment because they feel that with the Chinese pushing themselves here and there, we must not put up. I can understand that emotional reaction to it. But very few of us here can discuss the question of Bara Hoti, what the facts is this way or that way, or any other question. So, I had no objection to discussing Bara Hoti or one or two other matters which I might mention. We have inherited the dispute not since the Chinese came but from before that.

But the question becomes an entirely different one as it is today; whether it is the so-called McMahon line or whether it is in Ladakh, it becomes different.

Something has happened there which is not a minor border dispute, a minor transgression where there may be doubt about it or not.

Whatever the Chinese Government might feel in their minds, as I said the other day they have a one-track mind more so than other countries. We all have one-track minds to some extent when our national interests are concerned, but I think more than other nations the Chinese Government has that one-track mind, and that has been encouraged or developed or conditioned even more by the semi-isolation in which this revolutionary

China has grown up in the last ten years with no contacts with others except a limited circle of nations.

I say this is on a different footing. Here we are for the last ten years talking to them, dealing with them, discussing the Tibetan Treaty with them, and so far as we are concerned, openly and repeatedly declaring what our frontier was the maps are there-declaring in Parliament and elsewhere, so that there was no doubt as to where we were.

I am for the moment assuming that the Chinese believed in their own case, and believed in their own frontier. Anyhow, they perfectly knew our stand, while the way they put it to us was: yes, this matter, these maps require revision or reconsideration-something like that-which certainly did not close this argument, but broadly the impression created was that they had some minor rectifications to suggest, no more.

In spite of all this, they suddenly, or gradually if you like, creep up and take possession of these various areas and territories. I am not going into the whole history which the House knows. It does seem to me a definite breach of faith with a country which tried to be friendly to them. I think we have rightly tried to be friendly to them not only because of the past, but more so because of the present and the future, because I do not like, my mind rather does not like, the prospect of the future where these two giant nations of Asia are constantly at each other's throats. It is a bad future for us, and for them, if I may say so, and for Asia certainly.

Therefore, keeping all this in view, we followed a certain policy. There was no question of appeasement. Certainly it was a policy which objected to and disliked the other policy, what might be called anti-policies. We do not believe in anti-policies, broadly speaking, and we think anti-policies are necessarily based on hatred, which is the typical cold war approach to any problem. If you have an enemy you have to fight, go and fight that enemy, down him if you can, but this kind of cold war attitude is, I think, more

pernicious than any straight out war. It perverts a nation and an individual who indulges in it. It is far better, as Gandhiji said, if you have a sword in your heart, to take it out and use it, not nurse it in your heart.

So, there was no misunderstanding on our part about what China was as some people imagine. Perhaps we had given more thought to it than most hon. Members here.

Even before the revolution, we developed, we tried to develop, friendly relations with the previous China, the Chiang Kai-shek China, not that we approved of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, it was for China to decide who should rule. But because we attached importance to China as a great country, our neighbour country, the biggest country in Asia, we tried to be friendly with them, and we were friendly with them; it was not a long period, of course, since we became independent, because two or three years later came the success of this revolution there.

Well, when the revolution came, we discussed this matter, thought of it, with our Ambassador there and others concerned. It was perfectly clear that this revolution was not some kind of a palace revolution. It was what might be called a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings. It was a stable revolution with strength behind it and popularity behind it at that time, whatever might have happened later-there is no doubt about it. It produced a perfectly stable Government, strongly entrenched and popular. That has nothing to do with our liking it or disliking it that is a different matter. And naturally, we came to the decision that this Government should be recognised, and within two or three months we recognised it.

I might repeat here a phrase which has stuck in my mind. Soon after the Chinese Revolution-I forget, maybe a year after, maybe a little more, but about that-a very eminent statesman belonging to the Western Countries who did not like the Chinese Revolution said in the course of a talk with

some people: "We made a great mistake when the Russian revolution took place, the Soviet revolution; that is, for years we behaved to them, tried to crush them, tried to, you might almost say, put an end to the revolution. We did not succeed in doing so, but we did succeed in embittering everybody and creating these terrible conflicts between us ("us" means those people, Western countries) and Russia." He said: "Let us not repeat that mistake in regard to the Chinese revolution." This was a person who did not like the Chinese revolution. He is an eminent statesman of the Western countries, but he was a wise man.

Now, it is pretty obvious, it was then and it is now, that you cannot deal with these revolutions because you dislike them, cursing them up and down, bell, book and candle; they do not cease to be. These are elementary things that happen in a country. You have to deal with them. If you like, you can fight them, but you cannot ignore them. That is why we have always been convinced that it is utterly wrong and harmful and dangerous for the world for China not to go into the United Nations. It is not in keeping with the facts of the situation, with the facts of life, it comes in the way. And so, this is what we have been saying in the last ten years and now gradually, even those who have opposed this, have to admit that it would have been better to recognise China progressively they admit it. And indeed, China ought to have been there long ago but for certain complications that arise in regard to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, it is true. Take even the last meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. When this question of China being seated there was brought up by some countries, including India, people were surprised. They said: "Oh, India goes on doing this in spite of what has happened in Tibet, in spite of what has happened on India's borders. How blind they are!" Well, it is not for me to say who is blind and who is not, but normally, we have found in the last ten years that what we have said, and what action we have proposed has

been accepted by the other countries year after year, after much damage had been done, of course, because of their not accenting that advice; they have come round. And you will find that even in the last voting in the United Nations over this Chinese question more people voted for it; more people who had opposed it became neutral or abstained. Those who had abstained, voted for it this time, that is, in spite of all these factors which had irritated, the countries and irritated us against China, yet, the facts of the situation made people vote more for that in this last session, because there are statesmen there, there are people who think of the future and of the present; they cannot ignore these facts. They had to vote. I have no doubt that if China had been...

Acharya Kripalani: Is it because the Chinese are disappointed that the world is opposed to them, that they attack their friends?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am afraid, with all respect I say so, that Acharya Kripalani's mind is astray at the present moment. It has nothing to do with what I am saying or with my line of argument. Perhaps, I shall be able to clarify the deep recesses in his mind presently.

Now, I am pointing out that you are dealing with enormous elemental phenomena in the world, with these big revolutions and others. You have to understand them and fight them, if you like, but understand them; you cannot fight without understanding.

Now, I shall come to another aspect of this question which might perhaps lead Acharya Kripalani to have a slightly better understating of the working of our minds. Ever since the Chinese revolution, we naturally had to think of this major fact of this revolution and what this new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution, apart from the changeover, was going to be a very big factor in Asia and in the world too, and in regard to us. We

realised, we knew this much history, that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history, that has been the case. And we saw, or we felt that the two factors taken together, the great push towards industrialisation of that country, plus the amazing pace of its population increase, would create a most dangerous situation; it was obvious; it did not require much cleverness to think of that; every intelligent person in the world more or less thought on those lines.

The population problem itself, a vast population and the pace of growth, greater than almost any in the wide world, creates an explosive situation; it bursts at the seams, but a big population may be weak, of course, unless it is industrialised. And it is this industrialisation process that came in powerfully, that gave a push. And I said, the combination of that too, was likely to create, we saw eight, nine or ten years ago that it was likely to create, a very novel and a very dangerous situation, not so much for India, but for India also-that taken also with the fact of China's somewhat inherent tendency to be expansive, when she is strong. So, nobody was blind to this fact. We realised it. We have discussed it here, in other countries repeatedly, because everybody knew it. And gradually, as the years have gone by, this fact has become more and more apparent and obvious. So, if any person thinks that we followed our policy in regard to China, without realising these obvious consequences, he is mistaken. If he thinks that we followed it because of fear of China, he is doubly mistaken. It is not for me to say how weak or strong or fearful we are, but I think it may be said that at no time during these last ten years have we functioned under the urge of fear; not previous to these ten or twelve years, but since we formed a government, we have been conditioned not to function under fear. And something of that lesson and experience has still conditioned us and helped us. There was no question of fear of China. Certainly, there was an appraisal of a situation, of the consequences-that is a different matter-

and further action taken, which helps to prevent a dangerous development of these steps, of course; every country has to take that.

So, I am putting this to the House as the background of our thinking, because people seem to imagine that either we live in a world of our own without thinking of what is happening elsewhere, without realising it, or that we are shrinking in fear. They are mistaken in both ways.

Another point that I might mention is these great revolutions like the Soviet Revolution or the Chinese Revolution, and at the same time, in a sense even a greater revolution, that is, the scientific and technological revolution that is taking place; all these have been round us in our generation. We have seen them, technological and scientific. It is only in the last few years that we are really making good. Previously, we had no chance. And we are doing pretty well in it, and I have no doubt that considering the material we have, we shall do well, given an opportunity.

Now, all revolutions, whether it is the French Revolution or the Russian or any other, rather tend to function abnormally, obviously; a revolution itself is a departure from normal behaviour, normal development. They become abnormal; they become upheavals; they do not pretend to having drawing-room manners; in fact, they go against drawing-room manners and break things; they are destructive, although also these big revolutions have obviously something constructive in them, something which appeals to people, something which rouses their enthusiasm, obviously. And you see, therefore, these tremendous ferments and upsets and crude things and cruel things happening gradually, the revolution subsides, keeping many of the gains of the revolution, but becoming more and more normal, whether it is the French Revolution or any other. Of course, it depends on other facts, how soon it becomes normal. If conditions, external conditions, prevent it, like wars and tumults, it takes a long time; it is bound to, because people cannot live up to that pitch or excitement of a revolution.

Now, we see that normalising process very much at work. So in the Soviet Union, I do not mean to say that that means they are going back on their economic theories, although, without going back, they change them; as wise and pragmatic people, they change them somewhat from time to time, the basis remaining more or less the same.

Now, China is very very far from normality, and that is our misfortune, and the world's misfortune-that is, strength, considerable strength, coming in an abnormal state of mind. This is a dangerous thing. There it is. One has to face it, combat it, if you like. I am merely analysing the situation.

That is why you find a marked difference between the broad approach of the Soviet Union to world problems and the Chinese approach. I do not think there is any country in the world-of course, all countries are anxious for peace I do not think there is any country which is more anxious for peace than the Soviet Union. And I think that is the general view of people, even of their opponents. But I doubt if there is any country in the world, if I may put the other thing, which cares less for peace than China today. See the vast difference between the two.

One may talk of other things. Shri M.R. Masani may talk still of International Communism and others may talk of international capitalism. There may perhaps be a grain of truth in what they say. But basically and fundamentally, these cries of these ideas are completely out of date and have no relation to today's world. However, it is not for me to argue it. I am merely stating a fact. The world is changing and I can conceive the two great colossuses today, the Soviet Union and the United States, coming very near to each other, as they are slightly coming, essentially, these ideas of Capitalism and Communism are, as I said, out of date. You may quote scripture. I think Shri M.R. Masani quoted what Chairman Mao said and somebody else quoted Marx. Well, it is interesting to know what Chairman Mao said in the middle of a civil war, many things are said at

such times. It may be that Chairman Mao will say the same today. I cannot say. But the fact remains that all these cries become out of date. They are out of date today in this world when you have reached the moon and other things happen. The fact of the matter is that the two countries at the present moment in a sense the most advanced technologically, scientifically and all that, are America and the Soviet Union. They both worship technology and the machine. They both think that they will get more and more out of it and perhaps they both forget that there are some other deeper aspects of human life which cannot be ultimately ignored. So this talk about international capitalism and International Communism, repeating an old slogan, merely prevents us from thinking straight and understanding the changing world.

The hon. Member, Shri Vajpayee, expressed surprise and resentment at the letter I had written to Premier Chou En-lai which was sent on the 16th November, just on the day this House reassembled. Could I not have delayed that letter for two days and got the sanction of the House? I am surprised at this suggestion; as if diplomatic correspondence of any type, even of a trivial type and much more so of an important type, is going to be considered by Parliament before every letter is sent. It is impossible for us to carry on in that way. It cannot simply be done. I am sorry to say so. You have to trust to some extent those people whom you appoint to do this job. If they do badly, take them out, of course. But you have to trust them. There is no other way. You cannot have these letters, communications and dispatches all the time put before the House.

That was the reason also why a number of these things were not placed before the House previously. I am accused of keeping things from the House. I did not deliberately do so. But I do not wish that before a thing was completed the correspondence-I should put my letter and create perhaps a furore before I got a reply. One thing in which this argument or

criticism may be applied was about the news regarding the Aksai Chin Road. Now, as I said, we wanted to confirm it. We sent our men there. It was only in October last year-about a year ago-that we had news that it was there and they had seen it. It was in our territory. Immediately, we wrote to Premier Chou En-lai. We could of course have immediately announced the fact. But the possible result in such cases is that there is no room for talk left. Each side becomes rigid-I do not say they are flexible now. That is not my point, but I am talking of the general practice. Each side becomes rigid; publicity is given; national feeling is roused and the other country reacts to it. Then any talk, any flexible approach becomes impossible-I may have made a mistake, but I am merely explaining how one cannot all the time announce or publish these facts in Parliament, the Press and the rest. But the broad principle, of course, is there that it is essential for Parliament to be kept in touch with events and there should be no secrecy; there might be delays etc. in order to achieve a certain object. Reference was made in some speeches to our Defence Minister, I am rather sorry this was done, because large questions of policy become entangled in this way round personalities. I do not challenge the right or any hon. Member to say what he feels like about a Minister or about the Government. It is not a question of challenging that right. Nevertheless, even a right can be exercised rightly or wrongly or at the wrong time or producing wrong results. There are ways of doing it. It is rather embarrassing to talk about personalities anyhow, but it so happens that probably in so far as this House is concerned, I have known the Defence Minister longer than any other person. Shri M.R. Masani shakes his head; may be perhaps he knows him better than I do. Anyhow, I have known him for a long time and worked closely with him for many long years before independence came, and I presume that I know him as well as I know anybody else. I know his faults as well as his virtues and abilities. I have

disagreed with him on many occasions. I am likely to disagree with him in future. But I know that apart from his outstanding ability, he is a man of the deepest patriotism and national feeling, and because of that, all the ability he has would have been insufficient if I had not believed in his patriotism and his love of country.

Then I saw his work in the Defence Ministry. The Defence Ministry in the last two or three years has, in some respects, made very great progress; it has revolutionised the scientific part of it, the production part of it, these two main parts which are of the greatest importance in this crisis—the scientific background and the productive apparatus—giving, if I may say so, far greater status to our leading soldiers and others, because previously they were rather relative. It weighed down by other departments and so many other things. You may refer to minor matters. But I may say that I speak from certain experience and I was very sorry that some months ago, this controversy came before the House in connection with an offer of resignation from our Army Chief of Staff.⁶⁶ I was sorry because of what I felt about the Defence Minister and about the Army Chief of Staff. I had considerable admiration for his ability, for his experience and when this kind of a thing happens when people of worth have some kind of temperamental conflict, it is sad. It is not a question of keeping one man in a job or another person, not. Fortunately, that matter was got over and things have gone on smoothly. We are all working together satisfactorily and I would say that this matter in any sense should not be revived because whatever step one might take, it is harmful, especially in these circumstances.

I should like to say one thing. It is exceedingly difficult to talk about oneself or to judge oneself. Now, Acharya Kripalani especially accused me and said that I was intolerant and that perhaps I was not charitable enough to

⁶⁶ See SWJN/SS/52/pp. 100-111 and SWJN/SS/53/pp. 386-387

other's opinions. As I said, it is difficult for me to judge but I have not been able to understand why this excellent virtue of tolerance should be limited to me only.

Acharya Kripalani: May I object? Because you are in authority, because of your position as the Head of the Government and also in the affections of the people, you must be tolerant about other's opinions. I made it very clear-more than once.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I accept that. But the point is that all of us represent something. We are not here merely finding a kushi job. It may be kushi for some. We are here representing some views. The hon. Members here represent the views of their Party or their individual views. All of us are here for that. We stand for those views. I can be attacked for two reasons by anybody: either for the wrongness of the views or for incompetence or for corruption or something like that. These are the various ways in which a person is dealt with. If it is a question of corruption, etc. it is a question of fact. So, more or less, is the question of incompetence. Now, there may be conflict of views. If some views are pronounced which I think to be patently wrong and injurious to the country, am I to remain silent and remain tolerant of this injurious doctrine? Obviously, it is up to me, if I have any views of my own, to put them before the country and to fight the heretical views, if I may say so, of the others and the wrong views. Now for a moment I have to plead for myself and to show how amazingly patient and tolerant I am...

Acharya Kripalani: To the foreigners.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Hardly two or three days pass by, certainly not a week, when various articles do not appear in a southern paper from a very eminent person, mainly concerned with attacking me personally and my policies. I remain quiet and tolerant and patient. I do not go about arguing. But it reminds me of a rather well-known couplet. It is in French; in La Fontaine's Children's Fables. Cet animal est tres mechant. Quand on l'attaque, il se defend. It means: "This animal is very vicious for, when attacked, it defends itself!". Am I not even to defend my views when they are attacked? Surely, that would be unfair not only to me but to the public before whom I stand for some principles.

Let us of course be tolerant and we must be tolerant. We have also to express our respective views with such ability and force as we command always, I hope, keeping, within the limits of the broader tolerance of each other.

May I just say this to repeat what we have said previously that any aggression on Bhutan or Nepal would be considered by us as aggression on India. I know very well what all this involves-what I am saying. It is a very grave responsibility. But realising all this and thinking it out, we said so long ago and now I want to repeat it because not only of wider considerations but also because of considerations of India's security. If you ask, what will be done if this happens or that happens-obviously I cannot say.

Now, the other day, referring to the ill-treatment of some of our prisoners by the Chinese, I mentioned the Geneva Convention. I think Shri Asoka Mehta said something about that and asked whether China had signed it.⁸¹ I have looked that matter up. It is the Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, August, 12, 1949. The Convention applies to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of

war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention was also applicable to cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. No physical or mental torture nor any other form of coercion is to be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. It applies to this. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any other unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Apart from the present Chinese Government accepting it, Premier Chou En-lai actually made a statement to this effect-I am not quite sure where but I think-in Geneva recognising the Geneva Convention.

I am very grateful to this House for the courtesy it has shown me. I would again repeat that it is up to us to realise the gravity of the situation fully, because it is not only an army matter, defence matter, and all that, but it goes much further than that. It affects all of us; it affects our production; it affects all our planning; it affects the workers in the factory and the employers; it affects men in every field. All these demands and other things that are made will have to be conditioned by this new position. Strikes, hartals, lock-outs and all that will have to be viewed from this point of view, students, who I am glad to say, have shown so much vitality over this issue, will have to realise that that has to be shown in other ways also which would really help us. So, it applies to all our life.

So far as we are concerned, I cannot function and my Government cannot function in a big way-it can function normally-when these difficulties face us if we do not have the fullest cooperation from Parliament and the people. I appeal, therefore, for that cooperation and I promise them that we shall keep them in touch with what happens to the best of our ability. I cannot promise that every letter I send shall suddenly or certainly be placed before

them, but it is impossible for us really to function with any kind of secrecy when such grave issues are at stake.

There are a number of amendments. I would, if I may, suggest to the House that the amendment of Shri Kasliwal⁶⁷ which of course is in my favour might be adopted.

163. In the Lok Sabha: Incident at Chinese and American Consulates in Bombay⁶⁸

Mr. Speaker: I have received notice of another adjournment motion from Braj Raj Singh. It is about the "Grave anxiety being expressed all over the country consequent upon the activities of the Chinese and American Consulate in Bombay as a result of which one Chinese and another American national were mishandled on 26th and 27th November, 1959 at Bombay. The incident may draw us nearer the cold war."

A calling attention notice on the same subject was received by me on the 28th November from Vajpayee and others and it has been referred to the hon. Prime Minister. There is no case for an adjournment motion here if the Chinese Embassy looks up an American and the American Embassy has offered a counter suggestion except that it is causing some anxiety in the House and in the newspapers. In any case, I am not going to allow it. Let us know our limitations and the jurisdiction of this House. But to allay any unrest that may have arisen with respect to the working of the Embassies here I would like to know the situation from the hon. Prime Minister.

⁶⁷ N.C. Kasliwal, Congress

⁶⁸ 30 November 1959. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXXVI, co1s 2428-34

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Jawaharlal Nehru): Sir, I can well understand the desire of the House to know about this. It is a very extraordinary occurrence that has taken place during the last two or three days in Bombay. It is an unusual type of thing. I cannot even now give any correct or official account because I do not know it. A good deal has appeared in the daily Press and I can only repeat part of that and can add to it here and there.

On the afternoon of the 27th November the U.S. Ambassador⁶⁹ saw the Foreign Secretary and informed him that Chang Chien Yuh, Bombay representative of the Chinese Import Export Corporation had requested political asylum at the U.S. Consulate General in Bombay at 11:30 hours, the previous day, that is, November 26th. The Embassy had informed the State Department and asked for their instructions. In the meantime the Embassy wanted to inform the Government of India. The Foreign Secretary took note of the information but said that Government would have to look into the matter and would reserve their comments. But in the evening the Minister-Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy reported to the Foreign Secretary that the Chinese who had sought asylum had gone back to the Chinese Consulate General in Bombay and that an American national was being detained in the Chinese Consular premises. He added that owing to some difficulties of telephonic communication he could not give the latest information.

On November 28th, the U.S. Embassy lodged a formal complaint about the kidnapping and detention of the American national in the Chinese Consulate General. On the 27th afternoon, that is, the same day, as we received the first information from the U.S. Ambassador, on the 27th afternoon, the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Delhi saw the Director of the Eastern Division in the Ministry of External Affairs to complain about the

⁶⁹ Ellsworth Bunker

demonstration in front of the Chinese Embassy premises. He also mentioned that a member of the Consulate-General of China in Bombay Chang Chien Yuh had been kidnapped by an American the previous day. On the 27th morning Chang and the American were passing in a taxi by the Chinese Consulate-General when Chang asked the taxi driver to stop and managed to get down. The American tried to drag him back. A scuffle ensued in the course of which the American was taken into the Consulate premises. The Consulate-General also informed the local police station at 1.30 p.m. The American was taken away by the Bombay police. Further details of the incident were received from the American Embassy yesterday. The Embassy also sent the Ministry a full statement which they had issued on this incident. According to these reports Chang Chien Yuh had voluntarily sought asylum at the U.S. Consulate-General in Bombay on November 26th. He was kept at a cottage belonging to the Consulate General on the seaside where he spent the night. On the 27th morning he was found walking away with a portion of the tape on which his statement had been recorded. He was, therefore, followed by Mr. Armstrong, the Security Guard of the U.S. Consulate-General. Chang is reported to have told Armstrong that he was going back to the American Consulate-General to get something which he had left there. They both went in a taxi. As the taxi was about to enter the American Consulate-General Chang objected. He therefore went on and stood a few yards from the gate of the Chinese Consulate-General. Chang then shouted to some people in the Consulate General. Armstrong was then pushed into the Consulate premises. He was kept bound with a rope there and the Bombay police got him released at 1.50 p.m. Armstrong sustained some superficial injuries. The allegations are serious and are now being investigated by the Bombay police authorities. Kidnapping and detention of a foreign national is clearly outside the functions of a Consulate-General and the complaints will have to be

fully investigated. Meantime Government had advised the Consulate General that the persons involved in this incident should not leave India until investigation has been completed, without the concurrence of the Government of India.

These are the facts. It will be noticed that the statements made on behalf of the two Consulates-General contradict each other in many important particulars. And, unless fuller investigation is made it is difficult to say which is more correct. In this matter the two principal persons concerned are obviously the Chinese gentleman, Chang Chien Yuh and the American Armstrong. Thus far neither of these two have met the police or been examined although a brief statement was made by Chang Chien Yuh in the early stages.

There are, of course, other important witnesses, one of them being the taxi driver who took them. He has, I believe, made a statement to the Bombay police. So this is a matter which requires further investigation.

This morning the Chinese Ambassador called at our Foreign Office and saw the Foreign Secretary. He formally complained that Chang Chien Yuh had been kidnapped by the personnel of the U.S. Consulate-General, at 11 a.m. on November 26th and was detained by them until 7 a.m. on November 27th.

According to the Chinese Ambassador, on the 27th morning when Chang Chien Yuh was trying to run back into the Chinese Consulate-General he was chased with a knife by the personnel of the U.S. Consulate-General in Bombay. The Chinese Consulate-General stopped the American and protected Chang Chien Yuh. He also informed the Bombay Police by telephone.

All this sounds more like some piece of fiction than reality. So, this is quite extraordinary that such a thing should happen. Such facts as are known to

us have been placed before the House. Of course, we shall inform the House of any further developments when they occur.

Of course, there is a police aspect and an international aspect or diplomatic aspect of it. Obviously, the police aspect comes into the picture if either of the parties puts in a complaint to the police for an enquiry. Thus far neither party has done so except that they have come to our Foreign Office and made complaints-both the American Embassy and the Chinese Embassy here. The privileges of Consulate General are more limited than those of embassies, though a wide latitude is shown to them normally in regard to these privileges.

These are the facts, Sir, so far as we know at present; whenever further information comes I shall place it before the House.

Braj Raj Singh: May I know whether the U.S. Embassy here sought the reactions of the Government of India about the grant of a visa-it has been given in the Press that they wanted to consult the Consulate General in Bombay to a Chinese national in view of the strained relationship which exists today between China and India?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I have just informed the House that on the afternoon of the 27th the U.S. Ambassador saw the Foreign Secretary and informed him of the previous incidents-the other incidents had not occurred by then-and the Foreign Secretary took note of it. He said that he had come to inform our Government as he had to inform the State Department and the Foreign Secretary told him that the Government would look into the matter, it was a complicated matter and so on and he reserved his comments.

Vajpayee: Sir, recently an armed guard has been posted at the Chinese trade agency in Kalimpong. May I know if there is any proposal...

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. That does not arise out of this.

Vajpayee: It does arise. Sir, may I make a submission? If there would have been an armed guard at the Chinese Consulate in Bombay...

Mr. Speaker: Order, order; hon. Member may kindly resume his seat. He has tabled another adjournment motion, but I have disallowed it. If the hon. Minister wants to make a statement on that I have no objection.

Vajpayee: May I put another question?

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. I am not going to allow any question about Kalimpong on this question about Bombay.

Vajpayee: I want to ask a question about Bombay. Is it a fact?

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. I have heard him. He wants to put a question on Kalimpong and connect it with Bombay.

Vajpayee: Both are interconnected. If there would have been an armed guard, there would have been no such incident.

Mr. Speaker: Order, order; the hon. Member must control himself. In view of the statement of the hon. Prime Minister I do not think there is any need to give my consent to this motion.

Yajnik:⁷⁰ May I know whether the Government of India would ask the Government of Bombay to submit a detailed report on the subject within a short time?

Jawaharlal Nehru: We represent the Bombay Government here; of course, whatever I say is based on the reports supplied to us by the Bombay Government. How else do I get them?

Mr. Speaker: So far as Kalimpong is concerned, this is not at all a matter for adjournment motion. Also, it is a matter of law and order. If an armed guard has been posted in front of...

Vajpayee: Sir, I am not pressing for my adjournment motion; I have accepted your judgment on that.

Jawaharlal Nehru: May I just say, Sir, to remove any doubts that may be there, that the placing of an armed guard in Kalimpong has, of course, nothing to do with this. It has little to do even with the charges that have been made, of Chinese propaganda etc. It is placed there almost entirely to protect the Chinese Consul in Kalimpong because there is a good deal of feeling and therefore it has been placed in order to avoid incidents.

Vajpayee: May I say that this feeling is widespread. May I know why only the Trade Agency in Kalimpong has been singled out for posting of an armed guard? Why not post armed guards at other agencies also?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member knows that Kalimpong has often been mentioned here in connection with all kinds of special activities and all that.

⁷⁰ Indulal Yajnik, MJP

Also, really, our own trade agents in Gyantse and Yatung, for the same purpose, have the so-called protection as armed guards have been placed around them by the Chinese authority there.
