

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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To Chou En-lai¹

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5 December 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

We have been following with great interest the account of your visits to Poona, Bombay and Bangalore. Today you must have reached Madras.² I am very anxious that you should not tire yourself too much. I am blaming myself for having made a programme for you which is rather heavy and takes up all your time. The desire of our people to have the privilege of meeting you or seeing you was so great that gave in several instances. I hope you will forgive us for this weakness that we showed in drawing up your programme.

I trust that you will have some rest in Madras which is a city known for its peaceful and soothing atmosphere. Please do not hesitate to indicate that your programme should be shortened or any item should be left out, if you so desire.

It is more important that you should not have to undergo too much fatigue than for you to see some extra place. The pressure of our people who want to meet you or see you is naturally great. But where necessary this has to be resisted.

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru Collection.

² The Chinese Premier arrived in New Delhi on 28 November. On 1 December 1956, he left for Pune to visit the National Defence Academy at Khadakvasla. On 7 December he travel from Chennai to Asansol and then to Kolkata. On 9 December he left for Myanmar.

You will, I am sure, have already formed an impression of the great friendship of our people for you and for your country.

I am writing to you specially and sending my letter with T.N. Kaul³ to Madras. The reason for my doing so is that I have received an urgent message⁴ from my colleague, VK. Krishna Menon, who is in New York. In this message he says that one Mrs Downey, the mother of one of the American prisoners in China, came to see him. She thanked him and our people for all that had been done about the prisoners and begged us again to do what we could to obtain the release of her son. Krishna Menon says that she behaved with dignity and understood all the difficulties. She made a special request that her appeal might be conveyed to you and to me.

In transmitting Mrs Downey's appeal to us, Krishna Menon has earnestly pleaded for the release of all the ten American prisoners in the next few days. He says that such action on the part of the Chinese Government will be widely appreciated and would help in clearing the atmosphere. He believes that any such step would be in the Chinese interest and calculated to help in lowering tensions. It would on no account be considered as any weakness on the part of the Chinese Government. The fact that ten Americans are kept in China under detention does not result in any marked pressure on the American Government but it does enable people to make a charge that they are kept in order to exercise that pressure. Krishna Menon has added that an announcement of the release of the prisoners might be made before I go to the United States.

I am taking the liberty of forwarding Krishna Menon's message to you. I trust that you will not misunderstand my doing so. We have no desire to interfere in China's internal affairs of which you are the best judge. But I do feel with Krishna Menon that an announcement of the release of the American prisoners

³ Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

⁴ Of 3 December 1956.

in China, at this moment of difficulty and crisis in the world, would prove helpful not only in the context of Chinese-American relations, but also in a wider context. I venture to suggest to you that this matter might engage your consideration.⁵ If it is possible for you to take the action suggested, it would make us very happy.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon⁶

I sent T.N. Kaul with a personal letter to Chou En-lai at Madras pleading for the release of the 10 American prisoners. You must have seen Chou's reply to questions at a press conference after he received my letter describing you as an optimist and a friend. Last night he talked to Kaul for about two hours tracing history of the whole case. He mentioned your assessment of May last year when you were in Peking⁷ that release of fifteen US airmen would lead to a Foreign Ministers' meeting. He said this had not happened and their own assessment was that Sino-US relations are not likely to improve during the next year or so in view of Eisenhower's declaration during election campaign that US Government would support Chiang Kai-shek.

⁵ Nehru cabled to Krishna Menon the same day stating: "I spoke about American prisoners to Chou En-lai when he was in Delhi. He replied at length blaming the Americans for various misdeeds and said nothing definite about [the] possible release of prisoners.

⁶ New Delhi, 7 December 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

⁷ Krishna Menon, in his reply to Nehru on 11 December, recalled that during his visit to Beijing from 11 to 21 May 1955 he had repeatedly requested Chou En-lai to release all US prisoners, but the Chinese Premier agreed to releasing only four. He believed that the Sino-American talks at Geneva would not progress, unless the prisoners' issue was resolved. "It is a mere irritant and it does not help the Chinese in any way," observed Menon.

2. Chou En-lai said that neither you nor Hammarskjold nor US Government had ventured to ask for the release of Downey and Facticeau who are not US airmen but pure and simple spies against whom the charges were serious and overwhelming. In any case Chou En-lai would like to have fresh assessment by you as to whether release of American prisoners at this stage is likely to lead to a meeting of the two Foreign Ministers even informally without any specific agenda. He would also like to know whether you have had any talks with US authorities which lead you to suppose that such a step might lead to improvement of Sino-American relations. It is possible a few prisoners excluding Downey and Facticeau may be released if your assessment is favourable.

3. I would however not like to create false hopes in Chinese minds and would therefore appreciate your cabling your definite views on the subject immediately.⁸

Chou En-lai has referred matter to his Government and will send written reply on 9th.

4. It would appear therefore that there is little chance of release of remaining American prisoners unless he gets some kind of the assurances that he requires.

If no assurances coming now he will wait for my talks with Eisenhower and return here. He asked why we were not pressing the US Government also for return of Chinese students and others.⁹

⁸ Krishna Menon said that he did not suggest taking up the issue of prisoners with the Americans "on the basis of a bargain of prisoners in return for agreement to negotiate." Menon assessed that the Chinese were holding on to the prisoners "as effective pressure on the US." He concluded that the psychological effect of a release would be considerable and would help Nehru in his talks with Eisenhower

⁹ Krishna Menon observed that India needed to do more regarding Chinese prisoners in the US. He noted that if Nehru mentioned this matter to Eisenhower, the latter would say "he

Talks with Chou En-lai-1¹⁰

Prime Minister opened the talks by giving a gist of his talks with President Eisenhower.¹¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I had talks with Eisenhower at his Gettysburg Farm for one day.¹² Only two of us were present. We discussed a variety of subjects. In the main, Eisenhower was interested in the Middle East situation and the question of how to handle it. There were three questions: (1) clearance of the Suez Canal; (2) future of the Canal; and (3) some kind of settlement in the Middle East which will include Israel. At first, Eisenhower thought that all these questions could be taken up together. I, however, said that we must take them separately.

To solve first and the second and when passions had calmed down, then take up the third question. Eisenhower mentioned that although US was in close contact with Britain and although US knew that Britain was excited over the Suez issue, the British action in Egypt was unexpected and he was very much surprised by the British action in Egypt. He was also angry with Israel, because Israel had attacked Egypt despite his warning to the contrary, and Eisenhower thought that he should take a strong attitude against Britain, France and Israel. Eisenhower said that his advisers had cautioned him against taking

does not want to retain one person here.:’ He felt it was up to India "to make the implementation more operative than hitherto."

¹⁰ Record of talks with Chou En-lai at Sutlej Sadan, Bhakra-Nangal, between 3 and 6 p.m. and partly on the train from Nangal to Delhi, between 10.30 and 11.30 p.m. and from 00.30 to 2.30 a.m., 31 December 1956 and 1 January 1957 Chou En-lai’s Visit to India (December /956- January 1957), File No.EI2 (109), NGO/56 and EI21132/NGO/59. MEA.

¹¹ See ante, pp. 539-543

¹² On 17-18 December 1956

strong action against Israel specially in view of the coming general elections¹³ in USA and the effect it will have on the Jew votes, but Eisenhower felt that he must express his feelings strongly even if it meant defeat in the elections.

Eisenhower further was worried about reports about large arms aid from the Soviet Union to Syria, and he felt that it might lead to trouble. I told him that we thought that these reports were very much exaggerated. Syria had bought arms, but the quantity was not apparently so large.¹⁴

As regards the Middle East question, Eisenhower wanted to proceed through the UN.

I gave him some background about Egypt and Nasser and told him that there has been so much propaganda made by the British against Nasser. I told him that I have great opinion about President Nasser. President Nasser faces many difficulties and these were increased by the Baghdad Pact which had split the Arab world. President Nasser, I told him, was a reasonable and peace-loving person, but his difficulties were very great. Action of certain Western Powers had upset the Arab world and American help extending into millions of dollars had not improved the economic situation, for it went only to the upper strata which was reactionary and unreliable and therefore unpopular, because it was thought that she was supporting unpopular regimes in this part of the world. Eisenhower agreed and said that they were in great difficulties as he realised that the help they gave was not properly utilised. He said he did not want the support of the reactionaries but they happened to be the functioning governments and how can he interfere in the internal affairs of any country. I also talked to him about the SEATO, NATO and Baghdad Pacts. I told him that whatever reasons they might have had eight or nine years ago, now these Pacts were out of place and out of time. Baghdad Pact was not only futile but provocative and it created tensions and trouble in the Middle East. SEATO

¹³ Presidential elections were held in the USA in November 1956.

¹⁴ Syria received military equipment valued at about 20,000,000 pounds

hardly functioned in South East Asia and did no good to any country but only irritated the people. I told him that time had now come to make new approaches; for these Pacts did militarily little good and politically came in the way of creating peaceful atmosphere in the world.

Eisenhower said that he had taken a strong line against Britain and France on the question of Egypt and they were now humiliated and had suffered financially also but they were still friends and he did not want them to collapse financially and, therefore, he was giving them considerable financial help. At the same time, Eisenhower said, that he was anxious to help Egypt economically and find some way out of the Middle East problem and to raise the living standards.

Eisenhower mentioned about his idea to use all avenues to help the people of these countries, but it is not quite clear to him. Eisenhower finally asked me to use whatever influence I had with Nasser to help solve these internal and external questions regarding Egypt.

Would Chou like to say something?

Chou En-lai: What possibility is there in the opinion of Your Excellency of settling the Egyptian dispute on the basis of six points passed by the United Nations¹⁵ some time ago?

Jawaharlal Nehru: There is good chance of settlement except for one point which says that the Canal should be isolated from politics. Nasser did not like it, though his Foreign Minister¹⁶ agreed to it. Nasser asked as to what this provision meant. But I feel that, with some variation, some acceptable solution

¹⁵ On 12 October 1956, UK, France and Egypt agreed on six principles as the basis for resolving the Suez Canal issue. The next day, a resolution based on them, was passed in the UN Security Council. See Selected Works (second series) Vol. 35, pp. 418-419 and p. 563.

¹⁶ Mahmoud Fawzi.

might be found. One difficulty is that Egypt says that Israeli ships would not be allowed to go, because Israel is at War with Egypt. This is not quite correct because the Conventions says that, even in war, it should be kept open. It is true that in the First and Second World Wars it was closed, but that was done by Britain and the fact remains that all ships should pass through the Canal and that Nasser has accepted the Convention¹⁷. Since it is matter of interpretation of the Convention, it may be sent to the Court at The Hague and the burden of decision would then lie on the International Court at The Hague. Nasser has indicated that even if the decision is against him, he would still accept it. Nasser is not prepared to say so himself because he is afraid that people of Egypt would not like accepting this interpretation if he did so on his own and, secondly, because he is afraid that it would give a handle to other Middle East countries to work against him. Apart from this, there seems to be no other difficulty. Nasser had also said previously that he would treat Britain and France in the same way as Israel, but he had later on modified it by saying that British and French ships may be allowed to pass since these two countries had not openly declared war against Egypt. For these subjects, I had sent Mr Krishna Menon to Cairo and he was to come here to see you also. I have, however, received a telegram yesterday saying that he could not come to Delhi and that he was proceeding to New York for the UN Session.⁹ As regards clearance of the Canal, Britain has probably the greatest experience in the salvage work and it had collected a big salvage fleet at Port Said, but Nasser would not allow them to do the work. Britain had said that they could send their ships under UN flag and their men in civilian uniforms with UN badges, but Nasser did not agree to this. Even so, some understanding seems to have been arrived at between Egypt and Hammarskjold, but I do not know the details. Even so, it is difficult to salvage

¹⁷ This refers to the Convention of Constantinople of 1888.

ships which were carrying concrete. It is, however, expected that in about 2 Yz months the Canal could be cleared.

Although Egypt has pushed Britain, France and Israel out and they appear to be strong, the position of Egypt and Nasser is not really so strong. If they have been able to push out Britain, France and Israel, it is not on account of Egypt but mainly on account of world opinion. Militarily, they were defeated by even Israel. Egypt could succeed only because a majority in the UN including the United States, supported them. Devoid of this support, Egypt is weak. So, it is in the interest of Egypt to settle the question quickly before people start realising Egypt's weakness and start feeling that Nasser is obstructive.

Chou En-lai: Guaranteeing of free international navigation is one of the principles, but it is different from international control as proposed by Western Powers. We wonder whether in the talks between Egypt and India any concrete content has been given to it.

JN: Nothing very concrete. Nasser has agreed privately to an International Advisory Council from the users who can be consulted and who can give advice.

So to that extent some measure of international cooperation would come in. There again is one more difficult question about Egypt's claim to compensation for several kinds of losses which she has suffered. There are military losses which are heavy. Then there is damage to Port Said and elsewhere and also losses to the Canal.

Nasser is taking the attitude that he would not talk to Britain and France on this, but one must talk. Even in war, people do talk. I feel that he will eventually talk, although it may not be feasible now. Recently, some suggestions have been made that a large group of powers may take up the subject. This proposal is in line with the Soviet proposal in the Security

Council. I told Eisenhower that, before any Committee discusses it, it is necessary to clear the Canal and that there should be informal contacts before a formal approach is made.

Eisenhower then discussed the situation in Hungary. He said that a large number of refugees is coming to the US and Canada. Already 1,50,000 refugees have come in this way, and there is more and more pressure of more people coming in. Eisenhower said that, while Britain and France have finally accepted the UN resolution and have withdrawn their armies, the Soviet Union has not done so and has not approved of Hammarskjold going to Hungary. This has created, he said, tremendous feeling in the US. Eisenhower said that he and his Government did not wish to push things too far there and would like to avoid war at any cost and that he wanted a peaceful settlement. Eisenhower added that it was obvious that no settlement was possible when large Soviet forces were in Hungary against the wishes of the Hungarian people. Eisenhower also spoke about the situation in Central Europe and particularly in Germany and said that the Soviet Union had not lived up to the agreements with the Central European countries and many East European countries were not satisfied and that the USSR was forcibly suppressing them. He felt that there was great instability and, if there would be instability, in East Germany also a grave situation will arise.

Chou En-lai: As to the East European question, we discussed it last -time. I pointed out that the two questions (viz., Hungarian question and the Egyptian question) are different in character. In the last two years or so, the East European countries are trying to improve their internal conditions and their relations with the Soviet Union. This is permissible and necessary and they have already made some achievements in this task. Some imperfections are however bound to exist and the people are bound to express some discontent. It has happened in Poland, in Germany and in Hungary and similar situations

might also arise in future. If the question is limited only to internal question, then the question is easy to settle. We cannot say that socialist countries do everything well in making progress. Secondly, however, the Western Powers were carrying out subversive activities in East European countries. There were also landlords and capitalists who had lost and some of whom had fled and some of whom had stayed behind. If an opportunity presented itself, they would naturally start their activities and if it was supported by subversive activities of Western countries, the situation would be grave. Your Excellency also agreed that in Hungary also there were subversive activities designed to overthrow the socialist government and to throw her in the Western camp. The socialist countries concerned and majority of people in Hungary itself were however opposed to it. If there is a strong government, it can cope with such difficulties; but, in Hungary, the government was weak and could not control the situation and therefore asked the USSR to come in under the Warsaw Treaty and that is the only way out of it. Even if the subversive activities are put down, still the efforts to improve the internal situation have got to be made and they are being made and, as far as my information goes, situation in Hungary is improving. Our view is that the Soviet Army's going to Hungary cannot be compared with the British and French invasion in Egypt.

One thing which deserves attention is what Eisenhower told you about East Germany. East Germany is closely connected with West Germany and there are also people who do not like the system in West Germany. If they got foreign help and started activities, then troubles would start also. As a result of the Second World War, troops of three Powers have been stationed in West Germany while Soviet troops came in to East Germany. The Soviet Union had proposed withdrawal of troops but this has not been agreed to. If some trouble arose in East Germany, East Germany would also ask the Soviet Union for help to put it down, because East Germany's armies are weak. In West Germany, there are people dissatisfied with the system there and West Germany would

also use troops to suppress the people there in case of trouble and the Western Powers would also assist them in doing so.

There is a difference in systems and there is difference in objectives. In Poland, however, this kind of situation did not arise. There was not much subversive activity and they could themselves control the situation without foreign assistance. So, the conditions were better and there was quick improvement.

Jawaharlal Nehru: These questions, namely, the situation in Hungary and Poland, largely depend on factual appreciation. We have been receiving full and practically daily reports from our Ambassador and representative in Hungary and on the strength of these reports the situation seems to have been something like the following: While it is true that some external subversive elements were there, they formed only a small part of the trouble. It was mainly a national uprising of the workers, students and the youth. The object was not so much to change the internal regime as to get rid of foreign domination, namely, that of Soviet Union. The same thing happened in Poland too. But, as you have said, there the leaders were strong enough to control the situation. The question factually, therefore, is whether the large majority of people in Hungary want to assert their independence or not. That some subversive elements took advantage of the situation and raised slogans is not enough to ignore the actuality that a strong national uprising took place. In the riots that took place, 25,000 Hungarians are reported to be dead. That, in a city like Budapest, it required 1,000 tanks would show the extent of the uprising. Our information is that originally it was a strong national uprising, not directed against the USSR; but when the demonstrations took place and workers were shot, it became anti-Soviet. Even the Workers Councils wanted the socialist system but not foreign domination.

The question is whether this system has been imposed on them or not. If it is imposed, then it will mean that there is no national freedom. On October 30,

the Soviet Government made a policy statement announcing the withdrawal of its troops; but, after a few days, the Soviet troops went back with a large number of tanks. We had asked our Ambassador¹⁸ in Moscow to speak to the Soviet leaders of his impressions in Budapest. And although it has not been made public, he has done so. We have also seen that, for over a month after fighting had stopped in Budapest, workers did not go back to work and they stated that they will resume work on end of foreign domination and withdrawal of foreign troops. A great majority of Hungarians do not oppose socialism, but they want their own people to run the Government and the feelings are very strong on the point. A very large number of people have come out as refugees. How can this problem be solved? It is a continuing cancer. The minds of the people have not been won over till now. How will they be won? I agree that foreign troops should be withdrawn from Germany. When we discussed this matter, Eisenhower said that they will withdraw the American troops as soon as the West German Government wanted them to withdraw. Otherwise, they would withdraw them after the situation improved. You say that in Hungary the Soviet troops were asked to go there. But the Kadar Government was formed under very peculiar circumstances. The former Prime Minister was pushed out and then Kadar came into power.¹⁹ Kadar could not go out of his office building because of strong feelings against him. He is reported to be on the upper floor of the Government building, while the Soviet troops occupied the lower floor. He may be a good man; but, in the eyes of the people, it is not he who is governing but the Soviet Union which is governing.

I do not doubt that the majority of the Hungarian people do not want foreign authority. Is there any Way of finding out what the great majority of people

¹⁸ K.P.S. Menon

¹⁹ Imre Nagy was ousted on 4 November. The Soviet Union announced the same day the appointment of Janos Kadar as the Premier.

want? For over thousand years in the past, the Hungarians and the Poles have very strong nationalist feelings and a fear of either Germany or Russia.

Therefore, one can understand their aspirations. Even if they want to have socialistic system, they want to be free.

I told Eisenhower that, looking at it from the Russian point of view, the Soviet Union is afraid of hostile frontiers coming nearer to them and their security being endangered. Eisenhower said that he could understand it and that he could discuss ways of removing all fears. But the difficult problem to solve was that Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops against the wishes of the people and it went against every principle that the Americans stood for.

I feel that something has to be done and something can be done only after gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops which, I am sure, they will do. Otherwise, they will retain Hungary but will lose the people, which is bad.

The most unfortunate part of the Hungarian episode, it appears to me, is that it has harmed the cause of socialism in Europe and elsewhere and many of us who are friends of USSR are very much distressed and find it difficult to justify what has happened there. There is an unfortunate conflict between nationalism and socialism. Socialism has to be based on nationalism or otherwise it is weakened. Now, there are hundred and thousands of refugees from Hungary who have - become active propagandists against Russia. Even European countries have hundreds of them, and they are anxious that his matter should be settled. The main thing is to find a settlement acceptable to the large majority of Hungarian people. Otherwise, it is also going to have a bad influence on other East European countries. In Poland also, there is much sympathy for Hungary.

Chou En-lai: Yes, the situation in Hungary is very complicated. You have underestimated the trouble which took place between the 23rd October to the beginning of November. USSR did promise and in actuality also withdrew her

troops from Budapest. But precisely at this time anti-revolutionary elements gained control of Nagy's Government and asked the West for help and for abrogation of Warsaw Treaty. Nagy was going towards the West. This constituted a great danger because this could not guarantee that socialist system would be maintained in Hungary. We in the East do not so much feel the seriousness of the situation but other socialist countries in Europe felt very much concerned and disturbed over this threat. Even Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia felt very much concerned and Tito's report also bears this out. At this time, the Hungarian armies were completely disintegrated and reactionary elements had gained control of the situation. People's nationalism and desire to be free from foreign domination could be utilised for anti-revolutionary ends. History has proved it and Nagy had pushed the government on to the counter-revolutionary road. At this time, Kadar left Nagy, and those who left Nagy formed a government and asked USSR for help. Since it was the Soviet troops that suppressed anti-revolutionary activities and not the Hungarian People's Armies themselves, it was not naturally very powerful. But at that time there were only two ways out, namely, (1) that the Soviet troops leave Hungary and push it into Western camp. This would have meant large-scale massacre and in fact it did happen. Or, otherwise, (2) that USSR should send her troops and suppress counter-revolution. There was no third way.

Nagy also had to depend on the Soviet armies to put down the uprising. But because it depended on the Soviet armies, he felt weak and could not carry out his work. And in three days, many revolutionaries were massacred. Without Soviet support it is obvious that the socialistic system could not be maintained.

In Poland also, the government made certain mistakes, but the leaders there could handle the situation. In China, this kind of situation cannot take place. But even if it occurs, we are strong enough to control it. I am going to talk to

you about Tibet in a short while where also our inimical countries are trying to carry out subversive activities, but they will not be successful. Finally, the present government in Hungary is a temporary measure. There will still have to be organised a popular government; but unless subversive activities are put down, the country will go in an entirely different direction. Even among the workers, from the beginning there has been some dissatisfaction. Many of the workers' leaders are saying they want to maintain socialistic system, but it may be merely superficial expression and they are saying things on behalf of counter-revolutionaries. We must wait and see. We feel that the majority of people in Hungary want socialism. All the same, it is a difficult and complicated question. There were only two roads - either to allow Hungary to go West or to preserve socialistic system. I have been travelling all this time and had no time to study all the details, but after going to Peking, I will look into the details.

Jawaharlal Nehru: A great deal depends on knowledge and appraisal of facts. I agree that Nagy took a wrong line at the last moment and created difficulties. The whole trouble is not accidental but is the result of past mistakes, but it is someone else's fault and not Nagy's fault. Nagy proved incapable of dealing with the situation. But Subsequent events have not proved the ability of others to meet the situation.

Shooting down is not any solution. No one doubts Russia's might and naturally Hungarians cannot stand against It. But can socialism succeed by military force, without freedom? Is it compulsory socialism? These problems arise. The Hungarian uprising may have been suppressed, but the Hungarian people cannot be won over that way. The only way is through friendly cooperation.

Chou En-lai: Yes, to win over the people one must use persuasion and socialism will win, if only people accepted it. This is one thing. But to put down

internal or external forces of reaction which are originally oppressing people, it is necessary to have military strength. Counter-revolutionaries can also be a part of the people or sent from outside and hidden among the people.

When people are being oppressed by reactionary governments, they have to use arms as in the case of bourgeois democratic revolutions, as in the French Revolution and the American Revolution or in socialist revolutions as in the Soviet Union and China. After the success of the revolution, again military strength is necessary to defend socialism from foreign aggression and internal subversion. So, these are two different matters.

As regards the working class, there should always be persuasion and never imposition. But in Hungary armed forces were disintegrated by Nagy and he allowed haughty elements to gain control of the army. It was a special situation and under it a new government was formed and outside assistance was requested. But this was necessary under the circumstances.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Premier Chou has used the philosophy of force. Every Government uses force. Although we are opposed to force, we too use force although very small. But we do hope that we can reduce and even do away with our armies one day. In Hungary, Nagy Government acted wrongly. That is true. It could not control the situation. That also is true. But the situation arose out of past mistakes, which had angered the people. There was no economic betterment and then there was the foreign domination which went against all their traditions.

Chou En-lai: The question before us is an appraisal of the past and a way out for the future. Regarding the past, our view is that, if action had not been taken in Hungary, she would have fallen in the Western camp. As to the future, it depends on developments there. If the Hungarian Government gets stronger, the situation will improve. It is impossible and impermissible to

restore Nagy. So, we must try to support the present Government and improve the situation there.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I also discussed other matters with President Eisenhower. We discussed Pakistan and I told him that the now considerable arms supplied to Pakistan was causing us considerable apprehension. Eisenhower said that he never had the intention that Pakistan should use the arms aid against India; but in case Pakistan did so, he would not only stop the aid but would also take very strong measures.

As regards, Goa, President Eisenhower said that the Portuguese were a very difficult people to deal with. They lived in a different world.

My information is that the agreement²⁰ in Laos is not liked by the USA. It was after months of efforts that we brought the two sides together in Laos and it would be unfortunate if the agreement breaks down. Both President Eisenhower and Dulles said that they did not like that Pathet Lao representatives should be in the Government. But, after my talks with them, they said that they would not obstruct but would watch what happens and they have informed the Laos Government accordingly.

I spoke to the Canadian Government also about Laos and they were anxious that the agreement should go through. They told me that they would try to impress upon the US Government that the agreement should go through.

Chou En-lai: We told Prince Souvanna Phouma²¹ that they should settle their internal questions by themselves. We would like to see them peaceful and neutral like Cambodia. We told them that all our relations with Laos will be with the Laos Government and that we stick to this policy. In Cambodia, we

²⁰ On 28 December 1956, the Royal Government of Laos and the Pathet Lao regime in northern Laos signed an agreement establishing a government of national union.

²¹ Laotian Prime Minister

were told that Laos Government understood that we have only good intentions towards them. We are glad to know that through India's efforts an agreement has now been arrived at between the two parties in Laos and that Canada is supporting it and that US has promised not to obstruct it. What the Americans probably mean by "watching" is whether Chinese influence comes in Laos.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Eisenhower said that it was illogical not to recognise each other (i.e. China and America) but it was a result of certain circumstances. Even in war, countries deal with each other. And he implied that some time or other China and America would deal with each other; but, Eisenhower said, at present there is a strong feeling in US and that he shares it. Even if he had not shared it, he (Eisenhower) could not override popular feelings in this regard. Eisenhower said that America had suffered great losses in the Second World War and they had forgotten it, while they still remember the losses in the Korean war. Eisenhower further said that there was strong feeling in United States about the ten US prisoners in China and that it was not possible for him to take any steps until this question was settled. I told him what you had told me in details that there were forty-four or so prisoners in China out of whom all except ten have been released. Although so many prisoners have been released, still the US made no adequate response to this gesture of the Chinese Government and it was for the US Government to make some move. Eisenhower repeated that there was strong feeling in his country on the question.

I also mentioned to him about the Chinese nationals in America. Eisenhower said that any Chinese in America, whether in prison or outside, could go back. He (Eisenhower) had asked the Indian Ambassador²² to interview anyone in or outside the jail. But this was not done. What more could he do, he asked. He said perhaps one more statement could be made by the American Government

²² G.L. Mehta, India's Ambassador to the USA.

saying that all Chinese who wished to go can do so. Eisenhower added that America had no desire to retain any Chinese, who wanted to go back, in America, but if some did not want to go back what could he do.

As regards a Foreign Ministers' conference, I told Dulles about it. Dulles said that all this might happen when conditions were created. He said that there was strong feeling in the US specially about the prisoners in China. Therefore, he cannot meet the Chinese Prime Minister.

Eisenhower told me that he had heard that great changes and improvements had taken place in China and he thought that, if the US people knew about them, they might change their views. Both Eisenhower and Dulles said that their hands were tied down especially on the question of prisoners. If the prisoners were released, Eisenhower said, that he would allow journalists and other nationals to go to China and their reports from China might perhaps bring about a change in the view of the Americans and would normalise feelings. He said that if the prisoners were released, they would lift the ban upon journalists and other persons going to China and things might improve slowly.

Chou En-lai: We will talk about the Sino-American relations tomorrow. I would first like to speak about the Tibet question. India is clear about the situation in Tibet. Tibet is a vast territory with only one million population. They are of the same nationality, viz. Tibetan. Throughout history, Tibet has formed a part of China; but, unlike Sinkiang which is also a national minority area, it was never made into a province of China. The religion of the people is Lamaistic. In dealing with Tibet, we take a very careful attitude. In the past, religion and politics were combined into one, that there was the same religious and political leader. But in actuality, political power was vested in the government (Kashag) under the Lama, since a new Lama was always an infant (less than one year old) and could not look into political matters till he came of age. Therefore, for

more than ten years, political power rested in the hands of the government. Besides, the temples also wielded powers. There are three large ones in Lhasa and there are living Buddhas there who have power. Therefore, those who have power are the living Buddhas and the persons in government.

Tibet is divided into three parts: Inner Tibet; Outer Tibet; and Chamdo area. In the past, Chamdo was sometime made a part of Sikang. Sometime, it was not a part of Sikang. Now, all these three parts are made into one autonomous region. In this area, there has been formed a preparatory committee²³ with Dalai Lama as Head and Panchen Lama as Deputy Head.

Next year, the autonomous area will be formed. These three parts still have some distance (differences) among them, because the reactionary government in the past have created discord among them. We have always advised unity. Our policy has always been to give them an autonomous government under the Central Government, enjoying a large measure of autonomous rights. The Central Government consults it on all related matters and local matters are handled by themselves. We fully respect their religion; everyone lives in religion there and every family has to give one or two of its members to the temple. At present, we do not talk of democratic reforms to them; but when other parts of China become economically better and if Tibetans feel the need and agree to it, then we can introduce them. At present, there is a semi feudal and semi-slave system in Tibet with compulsory service to government and temples. China can help them in improving their living conditions, but then there is the difficulty of communications. Therefore, it will have to be done slowly.

The two Lamas (Dalai and Panchen) are young and able. They have their own views on subjects. Since their tour of various places in China, they want to improve conditions in Tibet. We, however, advised them not to go too fast but

²³ This was the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART). It was inaugurated on 22 April 1956 in Lhasa.

to take all the government and Lamas with them first. There are bound to be people who are dissatisfied and people who are afraid that their religion would be affected. It is natural because they do not understand the policy of the Central Government. We take an attitude of waiting and seeing. But there is also a minority under foreign influence which does not like Tibet to be under the Central Government and wants to have an independent Tibet. Their activities are mainly carried out from Kalimpong and these include some Tibetans who have returned from the USA. In the past, some trouble was started in Tibet once or twice, but Dalai Lama pacified it. Towards them, we take a mild attitude. We disbanded their organisation, but made no arrests. We let Dalai Lama persuade and educate them. This was the situation in the past. There is, however, a group in Lhasa which has kept constant contact with Kalimpong and has never stopped its activities. When Dalai Lama went to Peking for People's Conference²⁴ (and when Your Excellency met him there²⁵) these people started rumours that Dalai Lama was not going to return and this caused disturbances. Only when Dalai Lama went back the rumours stopped. This time, when India invited Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama²⁶ the Chinese Government knew that some trouble would start in Tibet after they left Lhasa. But, on the other hand, the Chinese Government considered the friendly relations existing with India and they also knew that Dalai Lama would be well received in India and the visit would help religious contacts. Dalai Lama decided to come and also to bring more people with him. Then we also advised Panchen Lama to accept the invitation; because if only Dalai Lama came, it

²⁴ The first session of the First National People's Congress met in Beijing from 15 to 28 September 1954. The Dalai Lama was one of the participants. He returned to Lhasa on 29 June 1955, after a year's stay in China.

²⁵ . Nehru visited China from 19 October to 30 October 1954. See Selected Works (Second Series), Vol. 27, p. 78 where Nehru mentions his meeting with the Dalai Lama.

²⁶ To participate in the 2,500th Buddha Jayanti celebrations, held in India from 26 to 30 November 1956.

would show disunity between the two Lamas. We also knew that when they came to India they would meet many Tibetans who had never returned to Tibet after liberation. There are thousands of Tibetans near Kalimpong. And although Dalai Lama did not go to Kalimpong, these Tibetans did not give up hope and the US agents have encouraged such and other subversive activities. Dalai Lama's brother,²⁷ who has recently returned from the US told Dalai Lama that the United States would support independence movement in Tibet or failing that would welcome him in the United States.

Now the Kalimpong Tibetans want Dalai Lama to go to Kalimpong in order to preach to them. And it is difficult for him to decide. If he does not go, then it would not be good from the religious point of view. But if he goes, there is bound to be some trouble. At the same time, some of the officers accompanying the Dalai Lama this time have also been influenced in their Indian visit. The influence comes from two sources; (I) Kalimpong Tibetans, including Dalai Lama's brother. Among these officers, there are some backward elements who fear reform and are easily susceptible to propaganda. (2) Local officers in India: some of these local officers are quite unfriendly to China. In welcome speeches to the two Lamas, they called Tibet a separate country and made no mention of China at all. For example, the Mayor of Bombay²⁸ and the Mayor of Madras or some nearby town referred to Tibet as a separate country without mentioning China. In the case of the latter Mayor, he was going to say it but the Chinese Embassy officials came to know about it and protested and therefore that part of the speech was dropped. Calling Tibet a different country gives an impression that Tibet could be independent. Dalai Lama is really faced with a problem. The Chinese Government had advised Dalai not to go to Kalimpong; but if he does not go to Kalimpong, it would show that Dalai has some prejudice against the Tibetans in Kalimpong.

²⁷ Thubten Jigme Norbu.

²⁸ Salebhoy Abdul Kader.

But if he goes to Kalimpong, all sorts of embarrassing questions would arise. If Panchen goes, it would be much more awkward, because Panchen comes from Outer Tibet (Hou Tsang) and there is historically some animosity between the Inner Tibetans and Outer Tibetans. But if Panchen does not go, then also again it would give ground to spread rumours that something is wrong between them or that the Chinese Government is not allowing him to go there.

Actually, in one of the big temples in India, something unpleasant between the two Lamas also occurred. Therefore, the matter is very complicated and the chief cause is the instigation of USA. Taiwan has also a hand in it because another of his brother²⁹ (married to a Chinese) has come from Japan.

At the same time, since Dalai left Lhasa, those bent on trouble are preparing for an incident in Lhasa. These people have some armed forces. Some three temples in Lhasa have also armed forces and they want to create an incident with the People's Liberation Army there. If it happened, then there would be bloodshed. This plot was, however, discovered and then an open meeting was called where the representatives of the Central Government declared that they should not try to create an incident; but if they did so, People's Liberation Army would definitely take measures to put it down. People's Liberation Army on its part, would not take any provocative steps. The local government and the People's Liberation Army representatives have formed a committee to handle this matter. So, for the time being, the matter is over; but, as long as Dalai Lama is away, something might happen. The Kalimpong people are thinking of keeping Dalai as long as possible so that his absence could be taken advantage of. This is chiefly instigated by the USA and Taiwan. Since Dalai Lama is in India, if anything happens it will be unfortunate. We will, of course, take measures to put down any incident in Tibet, but still it is not good if something happens.

²⁹ Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama.

Newspaper reports say that Dalai Lama might stay in India. He can if he wants to as long as he abides by Indian Government's regulations. Whether he wants to go to Kalimpong, he is going to decide tomorrow. He has to consult his Government. This is the whole situation. If anything should happen in Tibet or in Kalimpong, of course the Chinese Government would be directly concerned. Since Dalai Lama is in India, I thought I should also inform Your Excellency about this. The situation is a complicated one.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Your Excellency has said a good deal. You said that I know a lot about Tibet but I don't know. Something of what you told me is news to me. I know nothing about Dalai Lama's going to Kalimpong. I am hearing it for the first time. It is a matter primarily for Your Excellency and Dalai Lama to decide. It would be embarrassing for us to say anything either way.

About Kalimpong, I am surprised to learn that there are tens of thousands of Tibetans there. I know that there was a large number but not to this extent. There are many kinds of Tibetans and the people are akin to Tibetans. I have heard also for a long time that Kalimpong has a nest of spies and the spies are probably more than the population. In the past, we have turned out some of the people from Kalimpong, including Americans. I have not met any of Dalai Lama's brothers. I have met one eight or nine years ago. And the second time I have met him was when Your Excellency introduced me to him recently. I do not know that his brothers were in Delhi. The Government of India's policy has been not to allow anti-Chinese propaganda to be carried out here.

I am thankful to Your Excellency for the background material given to me. But I do not quite understand what you meant when you said that Tibet in the past had not become a province of China.

Chou En-lai: That Tibet is part of China is a fact, but it has never an administrative province of China but kept an autonomous character. Therefore,

when we started negotiations for peaceful liberation of Tibet, we from the first recognised the autonomous character of the region. When I said that India knew more about Tibet, I meant about the past history. For example, I knew nothing about McMahon Line until recently when we came to study the border problem after liberation of China.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Historical knowledge is not important but is useful as background information. History is gone. My impression was that whatever it may be in theory, for all practical purposes Tibet has all along been autonomous. But at the same time, whatever government there might have been in China, Tibet has always been claimed by the Chinese Government. The British tried to create some trouble on account of their fear of Czarist Russia but this is past history. We recognise that China has, in law and in fact, suzerainty over Tibet even though it may not have been exercised sometime. As your Excellency has said, Tibet has behaved in an autonomous way and was cut off from other countries.

The criterion of an independent state is that the state should have independent foreign relations and Tibet had no foreign relations except with England.

The McMahon Line was put forward in the 1913 Conference between the Chinese, the Tibetans and the British.³⁰ That Conference decided not only the McMahon Line but also two other points. The Chinese Government raised objection only to the other two points. Surely, the Chinese Government always knew about it (i.e. the McMahon Line).

As regards Dalai Lama, we do not want any incident to take place about Dalai Lama in Kalimpong or while he is in India. We will do as Your Excellency and Dalai Lama decide. What kind of incident does Your Excellency fear might happen? If you can give some specific idea about the trouble, we can prevent it.

³⁰ This was the Simla Conference held between October 1913 and April 1914.

Chou En-lai: The situation is really very complicated and it is difficult for me to say as to what specifically might happen. Dalai Lama is also concerned about this matter and he also said that the situation is complicated. There are two possibilities: (1) We have already raised this matter seriously with the Dalai Lama. Now Dalai Lama will naturally go back and talk to his officials and maybe perhaps nothing would happen except some small quarrels or verbal exchanges and he returns to Lhasa safely. Alternatively, (2) a possibility is that attempts might be made at Kalimpong to detain Dalai Lama. In fact, that is exactly the slogan raised there: "Won't let Dalai Lama go back".

Panchen Lama does not want to go to Kalimpong. If he goes, he might be treated discourteously or some other trouble might be created. These are some of the possibilities.

If such incidents happen, Indian Government has power to intervene and check them, because such incidents partake of the nature of anti-Chinese activities or activities designed to create an independent Tibet or espionage Or encouragement to subversive activities. We are mentioning these possibilities to your Government in advance so that, if anything happens, the Government of India could take preventive measures.

As regards the Tibetan question, even during the Ching dynasty, Tibet was indeed part of China and, at the end of the 19th century, when China was defeated in war with France and other countries, all Western powers wanted to divide China; but they could not agree among themselves and so agreed to have separate spheres of influence. This was especially true after the Boxer Uprising. That is why Tibet was always kept as a part of China, not only in law but in fact, with a view to keep balance between powers.

The relations of Sikkim and Bhutan with China differ from those between Tibet and China, because Sikkim and Bhutan were never under China and even the Imperial power did not recognise Bhutan and Sikkim as being under them. But

in the case of Tibet, it was a different case. The Ching Emperor appointed Governors to Tibet and troops were also stationed in Lhasa. The British wanted to go into Tibet under the pretext that Russia wanted to get into Sikang. Russia also made the same pretext, namely, that Britain was trying to get into Tibet, to get into Sikang. Exactly because of this rivalry and balance of power, Sikang and Tibet were never taken actually. But there are many still who are not acquainted with these facts. Even the Pakistan Prime Minister recently³¹ told me that he always thought Tibet to be independent. Even the Simla Conference admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

McMahon Line -What I meant was that people like me never knew about it till recently. The then Chinese Government, namely, the warlords in Peking and the KMT naturally knew about it. Perhaps U Nu might have told Your Excellency that we studied this question and although this Line was never recognised by us, still apparently there was a secret pact between Britain and Tibet and it was announced at the time of the Simla Conference. And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far. In the last agreement which we signed about Tibet³², the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line; but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside. I believe immediately after India's independence, the Tibetan Government had also written to the Government of India about this matter. But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it. This question also is connected with Sino-Burmese border and the question will be decided after Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa. So, although the question is still undecided and it is unfair to us, still we feel that there is no better way than to recognise this Line.

³¹ H.S. Suhrawardy was in Beijing on a state visit from 18 to 29 October 1956

³² .Refers to the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China. It was signed in Beijing on 29 April 1954.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The border is a high mountain border and sparsely populated. Apart from the major question, there are also small questions about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points. Of course, this has nothing to do with the McMahon Line.

Chou En-lai: Yes, the question can be solved and we think it should be settled early.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I would like to mention one thing in connection with what you said about some Mayors trying to make out Tibet as an independent country. Reference by a Mayor has no significance. He does not know much politically and probably very little about China and Tibet. They would generally only know about the great religious significance of Tibet to Indians and that is all that they must be stressing.

Our policy has been to deal with the Chinese Government about Tibet and the treaty on Tibet was also signed with the Chinese Government. We are naturally interested in what happens in Tibet as one of our near neighbours but we don't want to interfere. Our main interest is from the point of view of the pilgrims not only Buddhist pilgrims but Hindu pilgrims too for whom Kailash and Manasarovar are sacred places and abodes of God. A Dalai Lama is always a mythical figure and a great deal of mystery is attached to him in the mind of an Indian. So, when Dalai Lama came, the people were naturally greatly attracted to him. But the only significance is that the people would be interested from a religious point of view. Your Excellency has said that Tibet is backward and cut off. But it cannot remain long that way. They are a deeply religious people and they are naturally afraid that their religion and customs would be upset. I myself personally think that changes are inevitable in Tibet,

but I would like Tibetans to feel that they themselves have brought about the changes. As Your Excellency has said, Tibet is a part of China but with full autonomous powers. Then I don't understand why there should be any trouble in Tibet at all.

Chou En-lai: Basically, I am in agreement with your views but there are certain specific matters which may be clarified. We have always held the view that purely religious contacts should not be limited or restricted by State boundary. Thus in Asia, there are many Buddhist countries and they should have more contacts with each other. We have established relations in religious matters even with Thailand. Chairman Mao also said that there should be increasing contacts between Chinese Buddhists and Buddhists from other countries and that we should remove restrictions. This would also increase the confidence of Buddhists in Tibet that we respect their religion. So we also approved of Dalai and Panchen Lamas visit to India. But purely religious contacts is a difficult matter. Some try to exploit it for political ends, as in the West some call themselves Buddhists and try to instigate movement for the independence of Tibet.

Your Excellency said that Tibetans should feel that the reforms are brought about by themselves. It is correct, but this does not mean that there would be no trouble because there are some who are open to foreign influence and there are some who lack understanding. They feel that since China is a socialist country, religion may be restricted; but actually it is not so. We respect religion. On the other hand, the Ching dynasty used religion to decrease the populations of Tibet and Mongolia, while we want to increase population in Tibet without putting any restrictions. Furthermore, among the Tibetans there are many who are not so progressive. Those who are progressive want quick reforms, but this makes the non-progressive ones suspicious of the progressive elements and they feel that the latter are being

influenced' by the Hans. For example, in Szechuan province the progressive Tibetans wanted early reforms and there was resistance. The backward elements started agitation and one armed lamasery surrounded the People's Liberation Army troops and this People's Liberation Army detachment had to be fed by means of air-dropped food and thus finally they were able to beat back the attack. Some of these Tibetans later ran away to Lhasa. So, even if we agree that Tibetans themselves should carry out reforms, such problems and difficulties do arise. If it is a question of internal dissatisfaction alone, we would like to adopt a policy of waiting. But if there is foreign influence in it, then it becomes troublesome. Therefore, we maintain that religious contacts should be developed in Asian countries, but at the same time we should stop subversive activities. Espionage activities are carried out in the open in Kalimpong and we feel that the Government of India should intervene because these activities will interfere with religious contacts and exchange.

Jawaharlal Nehru: If any fact about espionage comes to our notice, of course we will take steps. But if it is only a vague suspicion and no proof, then it is difficult to take action

Chou En-lai: It is quite true. What we sought by informing the Government of India before hand was to help the Government of India to deal with the situation in case something happens.

As regards Dalai Lama's going to Kalimpong, I should be able to let you know something by tomorrow morning after I have seen Dalai Lama.

Talks with Chou En-lai-II³³

Chou En-lai : This morning I had talks with both Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama and I have also told them about our yesterday's conversation. They told me that yesterday they held a meeting. Dalai Lama still finds it difficult to decide. The people with him also know the complicated situation; but there are over 10,000 people waiting for him at Kalimpong and if he does not go, it may not also look nice. Therefore, his party also find it difficult to make up their mind. Dalai Lama wanted me to have a talk with his officials this afternoon and then perhaps something could be decided. Panchen Lama will not be going to Kalimpong. Firstly, it may be embarrassing for him and it may not also be safe because the Tibetans there are mostly from Lhasa and they are hostile. So it is more important for Dalai Lama himself to decide. It won't be good for us to tell him. So, I can tell Your Excellency the final decision later. The Dalai Lama's retinue always make him waver. If, however, they agree to go directly to Lhasa, then a trial flight to Lhasa will first have to be carried out. IN: Yes, if they agree to go straight; still they will have to go separately for ceremonial purposes. They can go to Lhasa from Calcutta. Perhaps the Tibetans from Kalimpong could come and see him at Bagdogra on the way. Chou En-lai: I also wanted to tell Your Excellency something about my visit to Burma and Pakistan.

I first went to Burma.³⁴ In Burma, the situation is, generally speaking, good. Leaders of the Burmese Government also went with us to Mohnyin, and the Kachin leaders were also there. As regards the border question, the Burmese Government leaders told me that the final decision could be arrived at only in February when the Burmese Parliament opens. Through this visit we have

³³ Record of talks with Chou En-Lai at New Delhi, 2.30 p.m. to 5.00 p.m., 1 January 1957.

Chou En-lai's Visit to India (December 1956- January 1957). File Nos. F 12 (109), NGO/56 and EI2/132/NGO/59, MEA

³⁴ From 10 to 19 December 1956

been able to understand the Burmese Government leaders and I think we can get along better.

In Pakistan³⁵ I found proof that the people of Pakistan want peace and friendship. But immediately the Kashmir issue was raised, they asked many questions. As Your Excellency told me, I told them that if the UN Resolution which was adopted eight years ago is to be carried out, then Pakistan should withdraw her forces and then India would also withdraw her forces to certain limit and then plebiscite could be held. I have also told them that throughout the last eight years Pakistan had not carried out this. Pakistan's reply was that they would carry this out but there must be simultaneous withdrawal of troops. If this is difficult, then Pakistan is ready to withdraw first, but UN troops should be asked to enter the part vacated by Pakistan troops. This is the view of some of the Pakistani leaders, but others do not necessarily share it. There is no definite solution thought of, to the problem. They also gave me lot of material on Kashmir. I told them that I will study it later. I told them that the Chinese attitude was to advise amity and direct talks with India. I only advised them to be peaceful and to have direct talks with India and nothing more. I listened however to a lot of people who came and told me many things. But basically they were the same as I was told in Peking by the Pakistan Prime Minister.

Sino-American Relations-President Eisenhower mentioned to you about the feelings of the American people. He has said that they have forgotten their losses in the Second World War but they still remember their losses in Korea and have strong feelings about them. We can quite understand it, because in Korea Americans did not win. They did not gain victory. Therefore, it is difficult for them to forget and the feelings are constantly aroused in the people by the China lobby; but Eisenhower has taken no steps to lessen this kind of feeling.

³⁵ Chou En-Lai visited Pakistan from 20 to 30 December 1956.

China also has very strong feelings. Though we succeeded in defending our security and maintaining the 38th Parallel, still we had to make great sacrifices in Korea. But, in the process, Taiwan was occupied by the Americans and they are also interfering with our liberating the shore islands.

In Korea, although at the front we destroyed a large number of Rhee's³⁶ troops, still in the negotiations we made a great concession on the question of PsOW. Despite the fact that the United States and Rhee did many provocative things, including detention of PsOW, we tolerated it all. The NNRC's report on this was never even presented to the United Nations. All these hurt the Chinese feelings and yet we tolerated it and did not connect them while dealing with the cases of the American prisoners in China, nor did we feed the Chinese people on this and arouse their feelings in the matter. What the US wants is to make China make concessions from the beginning to the end, and this is difficult for us to accept. Eisenhower himself said that the present state of relations is illogical, unreasonable. And this proves that the relations are unreasonable. It takes both sides for having a rapprochement. America wants China to make concessions and then only they would allow journalists and other nationals to come to China. This is an unreasonable situation. This cannot last long. A solution this way is unlikely. It goes against the feeling of the Chinese. There are many Chinese nationals in the United States who want to come but are not allowed to come back. If more can return, then the situation can change. There is no need to say more about it. You represent us on the question of Chinese nationals in the United States and we will send you some more material about it.

While in the United States, you put forward very just views and we are thankful to you; but we feel that as far as improvement of relations with America are concerned, time is still not ripe. We clearly know that there is not much possibility of the United States creating more tension in the I Far East. I

³⁶ Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea, 1948-60

don't say that there is no possibility at all. For example, they might try to do some subversive activity in Tibet. And if we get hold of any evidence of US espionage activities in Kalimpong, we will inform the Indian Government in order that you might be able to take action. Of course, these activities should not prevent improvement of Sino-American relations; for in fact, if relations are improved, then the United States will have to be more careful in their dealings with us and they will have many inhibitions before they do a thing. So we would like to wait and see.

The Geneva talks are still on. If America is genuinely interested in rapprochement, then they can agree on at least one or two points. In the Geneva talks, it was never stipulated that China should release all prisoners, but America may not implement the Agreement at all; nor was it decided that it is only after agreement on the first agenda that the second item should be discussed. We have fully carried out the terms of Agreement. Those of the American nationals wishing to return have all gone away and a majority in the jail has been released but, on the other hand, a large number of Chinese nationals in America want to come back but cannot come back. Improvement of relations can be done from different angles and that will increase the possibility of release of the remaining Americans. There will be more chances of testing the intentions of the Americans.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I have told all this to Eisenhower. There is great divergence of views between the two sides. I doubt whether either can persuade each other and it is hard to suggest any definite steps.

Your Excellency said that in China too there is great feeling as in the United States. It is true that in the US there is a China lobby but I may mention what Eisenhower told me. He said: "These people (Senator Knowland³⁷ and the rest)

³⁷ William Fife Knowland (b.1908); American publisher and Senator; editor, Oakland Tribune, member, California Assembly, 1933-35, and California Senate, 1935-39; member, Republican National Committee, 1938; Chairman, Republican Executive Committee, 1941-42; served in

take an extreme attitude. I do not care what they do, but they create strong feelings in the American people and I cannot go against it". Now the question is whether matters should be allowed to drift or something should be done. My impression is that the United States is not likely to do anything unless the prisoners are released. About the Chinese nationals, they said that they have openly allowed them to go. They have also allowed the Indian Ambassador to meet them in prison or outside; but if they would not go, what can they do about it? The question again is whether anything is to be done or nothing is to be done. These ten prisoners are hardly a part of a major issue, but the Americans feel that they have become a symbol of humiliating the United States and the Chinese not wanting any change. As I said, it is not for me to suggest any major policy change by the Chinese Government, but I am anxious that something is done to solve the deadlock and get things moving. These prisoners are young men in their twenties and they cannot be considered guilty of anything important. It does not make much difference if they are in prison or not but their being kept in prison makes a difference. On the prisoners question, there is great sympathy with the United States in other countries and the release will help soften the atmosphere. Apart from the question of right and wrong, it is clear to me that, because of the question of prisoners, the United States is not likely to make any move; but I feel that in the short run and in the long run the Chinese would stand to gain by showing generosity to the prisoners and releasing them. The release would not be a sign of weakness on the part of China; but, on the other hand, the deadlock would be somewhat relaxed. To what extent it would be relaxed I do not know except for what Eisenhower and Dulles told me, viz., the Americans would be

the US Army, 1942-45; appointed US Senator, 1945; elected full term, 1946; re-elected 1952; majority leader, 1953-54; minority leader, 1955-58; member, US delegation to the UN session of the UN General Assembly.

allowed to go to China. It would be a pity if major developments are held up for this rather small matter.

Chou En-lai: Here, a question of reciprocity by both sides is involved. In the Geneva talks, we reached one agreement and we carried out and even exceeded from what was expected of us; but what the United States is doing is to give empty promises. They say 'who wants to go may go', but actually laws and regulations prevent a person from going away. On the question of release of nationals, we must have some more guarantee. It is proved that agreement itself is no guarantee. Because we released three-fourths of the prisoners in our hands and in return there was no guarantee from the American side and there was no response. Therefore, the remaining prisoners in China would serve as a guarantee for the return of our nationals from America. Your Excellency said that the United States cannot do anything beyond a public announcement. But these are empty words. In fact, they can do much. If American nationals can return to America, Chinese nationals should also be able to return to China and we require some kind of guarantee. We will study how it can be done and let you know later.

As to what you said about the prisoners being young, probably you were thinking of the airmen; but all the airmen are released. Among the ten prisoners now remaining, only two are military people and were caught from a plane which was shot down and while they were trying to get in touch with the ground personnel. The United States has denied that they are army men. The remaining eight are American nationals and some of them are old and some quite grown up. If we talk about these eight, then we must talk about Chinese residents in the US who are in jail. If these eight are to be released, then both should be released. Even if the prisoners are released, no one can say how far the situation will improve because the US policy changes and wavers and Eisenhower cannot completely decide it. Therefore, we will take a step and see what happens. Since nothing can be done, then reciprocal treatment may be

given on both sides giving freedom to nationals from both countries to return home. The Chinese do not regard the question of their nationals in America a small matter because they form a large number. Whatever propaganda the United States may make we cannot help it because United States has large news agencies in the world to spread such news while we have no such facilities. So, the issue of prisoners is quite important. The United States talk of its public opinion. But while thousands of Chinese prisoners were detained by the United States, it evoked no comments. So we must see what kind of public opinion it is. As regards Sino- American relations, on the question of release of prisoners we feel there should be reciprocal treatment. After going back from here, we will study what specific proposals could be put forward taking into account the views that you have expressed.

Jawaharlal Nehru: What are the specific laws and regulations preventing Chinese nationals from leaving the United States that you just mentioned?

Chou En-lai: I have already mentioned about them to Mr Kaul. One is a provision by Immigration authorities for obtaining entry permits to Taiwan before they can leave, but these Chinese have families on the mainland and this would virtually make them Taiwanese. (2) Besides, they create difficulties also for the Chinese if they want to leave. There are many Chinese in America on contract and they are not allowed to leave before the expiry of their contract.

(3) Chinese nationals have to report constantly to Immigration authorities and there are moreover many other peculiar regulations.

JN: Are these regulations meant specially for the Chinese?

Chou En-lai: We do not know whether they apply to others or not, but what we have learnt is from the notices sent to the Chinese nationals in America.

JN: I was repeatedly told in America that the Chinese can go back any minute they want and that nothing will come in the way of any person leaving America, provided he wants to go back. In fact, the Americans said that they do not want to retain any Chinese. As regards the permit system, I understood that it has not prevented any man from returning to the mainland. It was introduced, I understand, mainly because the Americans do not recognise China proper. As regards the US prisoners in China, I was told that one of them is fresh from the college and he is not an army man at all because he was physically weak to be admitted to the army. He was working only on the clerical side and understands only English.

Chou En-lai: Your Excellency is probably referring to the case of the two American prisoners who were involved in espionage. It is indeed a case of espionage. They are convicted and the case is made public and their Chinese agents have also confessed. If necessary, we can disclose the details of the case to the entire world. It will create a huge uproar, but it would not harm us. Even Hammarskjold did not touch this case. He only touched on the case of other nationals. If these two are to be released, then the question is to be taken up along with the other eight and on the basis of reciprocity. If the oral promise of the United States is indeed true, then we can put forward a formula.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Americans are not terribly worried about these people. In fact, there are every day hundreds of people dying in the States and it is not so much a question of human feelings. In a way, the China lobby is happy that these prisoners are there, because then they can exploit their imprisonment.

Chou En-lai: Even if the prisoners are released, they can find another pretext. Probably a formula has to be found on the basis of reciprocal treatment and giving some guarantee to us. Only this way can we explain our action to the Chinese people. We feel that probably Sino-American question will remain as it is for a long time. For, as soon as one question is over, another crops up.

(At this stage the talks were concluded and then the two Prime Ministers talked about Premier Chou's third visit to India. Premier Chou said that he would be coming to India on the 24th and will leave for Nepal on the 25th. Premier Chou said that it was a pity that he would be missing the Indian Republic Day only by a day. PM said that the Chinese Prime Minister was welcome to India any time. Premier Chou said that now that he was not going to Nepal, the two Lamas had also dropped the idea of going to Nepal. Before going to Nepal, Premier Chou said, he would like to discuss the question of relations between China, India and Nepal with Premier Nehru and would like to ask if Premier Nehru would like to make any suggestions to the Chinese Prime Minister regarding his visit to Nepal. Premier Chou added that he would like to talk about this matter when he comes to India next time. Premier Chou said that he was shortly meeting the two Lamas and that he wanted to have a talk with the two brothers of Dalai Lama. Premier Chou added that he wanted to tell Dalai Lama's elder brother that he could have his different views, but it was unnecessary for him to carry on his activities).

Talks with Chou En-lai-III ³⁸

³⁸ Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA, R.K. Nehru, India's Ambassador in Beijing and Apa Pant, political Officer in Sikkim, 1 January 1957. Jawaharlal Nehru Collection.

On our journey to Nangal and back, in Nangal and today in New Delhi, I had long conversations with Premier Chou En-lai. During his previous visit to Delhi, I also had long talks with him.³⁹ The present talks were in continuation of those talks.

2. Apart from a number of minor matters, I discussed especially with him:

- (i) The crisis in Egypt and the Middle East
- (ii) The Hungarian situation
- (iii) Tibet
- (iv) Sino-American relations

3. Our talks were through interpreters, the Chinese interpreter⁴⁰ and Shri Paranjpe.⁴¹ No one else was present except today when Marshal Ho Lung⁴² was a silent witness of them. Paranjpe has taken fairly copious notes and it would be desirable to get a copy of these notes for record in our Ministry. I do not want these records to be circulated even in the Ministry and only the persons actually concerned should see them. They should, therefore, be kept under Top Secret cover.

4. I made also fairly long notes of my talks with him about Tibet and Sino-American relations. I shall attach these to this note. Below I am giving a summary of some of these talks.

Tibet

³⁹ Chou En-Lai was in New Delhi from 28 to 30 November 1956. He had a series of private discussions with Nehru during this visit.

⁴⁰ Pu Shou-Chang.

⁴¹ V. V. Paranjpe.

⁴² Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council of China.

5. Premier Chou En-lai said that Tibet was a vast territory with only a small population, about one million. It has always been a part of China, but never a province of China as Sinkiang. I asked him to explain this and he made it clear that Tibet had always been, though a part of China, a separate and autonomous part, presumably having a special status which was much more than that of a province and that it had a well-defined nationality, namely, the Tibetan. Politics and religion were interconnected and the Kashag,⁴³ a kind of Cabinet, held political power. The new Dalai Lama was always an infant and seldom lived of good age. Therefore, it was the Kashag that really was the chief authority in Tibet.

6. Other seats of power were the big temples with their living Buddhas. There were three large temples in Lhasa.

7. Tibet was divided into three parts: (1) Outer Tibet; (2) Inner Tibet and (3) Changdo [Chamdo] area. The Changdo area had been sometimes part of Sikang Province and sometimes part of Tibet proper. Now all the three had been joined into one.

8. A Preparatory Committee with Dalai Lama as its head and the Panchen Lama as Vice-Chairman had been established and next year Tibet would become an autonomous region.

9. There had been often previously discord between the three parts. The policy of the Chinese Government now was to have an autonomous region with considerable rights, under the leadership of the Central Government which would consult Tibet in all matters relating to Tibet. So far as local matters in

⁴³ The Dalai Lama's Council of Ministers consisted of four officials, three aristocratic and one monastic.

Tibet were concerned, they would be decided mainly by Tibetans themselves. Their religion would be fully respected. It was not proposed even to talk of democratic reform in Tibet at present. At some future time, when other parts of China were more developed and the Tibetans agreed, a beginning might be made with democratic reforms in Tibet. .

10. At present the living standards in Tibet were very low and there was a lack of transportation facilities.

11. Both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were very young and very able. They had their own views. Since their tour in China, they wanted to go ahead in Tibet with reforms. The Chinese Government had advised them, however, not to go ahead too fast. They should carry their advisers and others with them. In spite of this advice, some people in Tibet were afraid that their religion would be affected. They did not understand the policy of the Central Government which was to wait and see.

12. Some people under the influence of foreign governments did not want Tibet to be under the Central Government of China and talked about the independence of Tibet. Their activities for independence were mainly carried on from Kalimpong. Some of these people had returned from the USA. In the recent past, there had been some trouble in Tibet, but the Dalai Lama had pacified these people and the Chinese Government had adopted a mild attitude. They disbanded the organisation claiming independence, but did not arrest anyone. They left it to the Dalai Lama to persuade these people.

13. There was a group of people in Lhasa who had kept constant contact with the group in Kalimpong and had never stopped their activities. When the Dalai Lama went to Peking, this group spread the rumour that the Dalai Lama would

not return to Lhasa. Only when the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa was this story ended. This year, when India and Nepal invited the Dalai Lama, the Chinese Government knew that if the Dalai Lama went out of Tibet, there would be some trouble in Tibet. Still, because of religious reasons as well as the friendly relations with India and Nepal, the Chinese Government left it to the Dalai Lama to decide. After the Dalai Lama had decided to visit India and Nepal, with a large number of companions, the Chinese Government advised the Panchen Lama also to accept.

14. There were tens of thousands of Tibetans round about Kalimpong and US agents were all the time inciting them. The Dalai Lama's brother recently returned from the US. He told the Dalai Lama that the US would give support to the independence movement and welcome the Dalai Lama to the US.

15. As the Lamas did not go to Kalimpong, the Tibetans there were disappointed, but they had not given up hope and were now insisting on his going there nominally to preach. If the Dalai Lama did not go to Kalimpong, this would not be good from the religious point of view. If, on the other hand, he went there, there was bound to be trouble.

16. Among the officials accompanying the Dalai Lama to India, some had been influenced in India by two sources: (1) Tibetans in India including the Dalai Lama's brother in Kalimpong, and (2) local officials in India, some of whom had been unfriendly in their speeches of welcome, calling Tibet a separate country and not mentioning China. The Mayor of Bombay was mentioned in this connection and there was another case elsewhere. (I pointed out that all these people were concerned with the religious ties between India and Tibet and were not referring to any political aspect.)

17. Premier Chou En-lai went on to say that this encouraged the Dalai Lama's officials and the Dalai Lama was faced with the difficult problem of going or not going to Kalimpong. The Chinese Government advised them not to go there. It was even more difficult for the Panchen Lama to go to Kalimpong as the Tibetans there were mostly from the Lhasa region which had been opposed, historically, to the Panchen Lamas in the past. If the Panchen Lama did not go to Kalimpong, this would give rise to misunderstanding about Chinese Government preventing him.

18. Premier Chou referred to some unpleasant incident in some temple in India which had embarrassed the Lamas.

19. One brother of the Dalai Lama who had just returned from Japan and had contacts with Taiwan was also creating trouble.

20. Since the Dalai Lama left Lhasa, those who were out for trouble were preparing for some incident of armed conflict with the Chinese forces. If this happened there would be bloodshed. This plot was discovered in time and an open meeting was held in Lhasa. Representatives of the Central Government announced that no one should try to have such an incident. If any armed attack took place, it would be put down. The Chinese forces, however, would not take any provocative steps. A joint committee of Chinese and Tibetans was formed to deal with this situation. So long as the Dalai Lama was away from Tibet, there was always the danger of some such kind of conflict taking place. But the Kalimpong Tibetans wanted to keep the Dalai Lama in India for as long as possible. Their activities were chiefly instigated by the US and Taiwan. If any untoward incident occurred in Tibet while the Dalai Lama was away, this would result in unfortunate consequences.

21. Premier Chou continued: The Government of India had stated that Tibetans might stay in India provided they did not agitate against China and obeyed the laws of India. If anything happened in Tibet or Kalimpong, the Chinese Government would be directly involved.

22. At our second meeting, we continued the talk on Tibet and I wanted further clarification about Tibet's position in China in the past and in the present. Premier Chou repeated that Tibet was always a part of China, but it was never made an administrative part of China and had always been autonomous. Hence the present Government in China recognised this fact. He referred to past history and the activities of British Imperialism in Tibet. In this connection he said that the present leaders of China had not even heard of the McMahon Line till after the Revolution.

23. I asked Premier Chou as to what his fears were about an incident in Kalimpong. So far as the Government of India was concerned, we wanted no trouble there or anywhere else in India and we could certainly prevent any disorder.

24. Premier Chou replied that he had a talk with the Dalai Lama who had agreed that the situation in Kalimpong was complicated and something might happen there if he went there. The Dalai Lama was conferring about this matter with his officials. It was possible that nothing serious might happen now. But there was another possibility that the Tibetans in Kalimpong might demand independence for Tibet. They might also try to keep the Dalai Lama in Kalimpong and prevent him from going back. Also, the Panchen Lama did not want to go there as he might be treated with discourtesy. The Indian Government could of course deal with any disorder. Premier Chou was

informing them so that they could be prepared to deal with any contingency that might arise.

25. Premier Chou then went back to past history and said that even during the Ching dynasty Tibet was part of China. At the end of the 19th century, when China suffered defeat at the hands of Western Powers, the latter wanted to divide up China, but could not agree among themselves. Hence only separate spheres of influence were established. Tibet was always considered by these Powers as part of China.

26. The relations of Sikkim and Bhutan with China were different from Tibet's relations with China. Sikkim and Bhutan were never under China and even the imperialist powers never considered them as such, as they did in regard to Tibet. The Ching dynasty appointed Governors and stationed troops in Tibet.

27: Premier Chou said that in his talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the latter had said that he had always thought Tibet to be independent. Premier Chou then told him the facts.

28. Premier Chou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan Government about it yet. They proposed to do so.

29. In 1954, when India and China were discussing their Treaty, the Tibetan Government wanted the Central Government of China to raise the question of the Indian frontier with them. They were told by the Chinese Government that this question should be postponed.

30. Premier Chou said that about 1948, soon after the Indian independence, the Tibetan Government wrote to the Indian Government on this subject of the frontier.

31. Premier Chou added that the Central Government tried to convince the Tibetan Government to recognise the McMahon Line as an accomplished fact in India and Burma.

32. I pointed out that, apart from the McMahon Line, there were certain very minor border problems between India and Tibet. These should be settled soon to put an end to these petty controversies and so that everybody should know that there was no dispute left about the frontier. The settlement should be based on established practice and custom as well as the watershed if there was any such thing there. In these small border problems very small pieces of uninhabited territory in the mountains were involved. They had no importance and the border should be a geographical one as far as possible. Premier Chou agreed that these should be settled soon on this basis.

33. I pointed out that Tibet had been important for India because of a religious bond which applied both to Buddhists and Hindus. It was from this point of view that references were often made to Tibet. The Dalai Lama was considered some kind of a mythical figure and was greatly respected and attracted crowds. Tibet had been backward and cut off. It was deeply religious. There

was fear there of religion and customs being interfered with. If an assurance was given that Tibet would have full internal autonomy, then there was no reason why there should be any trouble. Tibet would undoubtedly change as it could no longer remain isolated. If these changes came on Tibet's own initiative, then they would be wholesome and stable. If there was any sense of imposition, then there would be trouble.

34. Premier Chou said that he was basically in agreement with what I had said. But he wanted to clarify certain matters. The Central Government of China had always been of the view that religious contacts should not be limited by boundaries of states. For this reason they favoured the present visit of the two Lamas to India. Chairman Mao had said that Chinese Buddhists should have greater contacts with Buddhists elsewhere and the Chinese Government was now seeking ways to facilitate these contacts and remove any restrictions which came in the way. This would increase the confidence of the Tibetans also. But there were some people who wanted to exploit this for other purposes. Thus some Buddhists in Western countries had other objectives. The Chinese Government did not wish to encourage such persons to go to Tibet.

35. Premier Chou said that it was right that reforms in Tibet should be carried out by Tibetans themselves. But, even so, there might be some trouble in Tibet because of foreign influence.

36. Tibet's religion had caused decrease of population. The Ching dynasty aimed at this through religion. The present Government of China wanted to encourage religion without any obstruction. Some people in Tibet were more progressive, but others would suspect them of being influenced by the Han people.

37. Premier Chou referred to some Lamas in temples, probably in the east, having taken to arms and surrounded a detachment of the People's Liberation Army.⁴⁴

For a number of days the detachment had no contacts with outside. Finally the Chinese Government had to send supplies by parachute so that resistance could be carried on.

38. Thus, although it was agreed that internal problems should be dealt with by the Tibetans themselves, in practice difficulties arose. Foreign influence came in and created trouble. But for this, the Chinese Government would leave the matters wholly to be settled internally.

39. Premier Chou said that if espionage activities took place in Kalimpong or any other place in India, he hoped that the Indian Government would take action. I replied that if we had proof we would certainly take action, but we could not act unless we had proof and on merely vague rumours.

40. In my talk today with Premier Chou En-lai, he mentioned that he had talks with the two Lamas and told them about my conversation with him. The Dalai Lama was still perplexed about going to Kalimpong. The Panchen Lama had no intention of going there as he felt he would be embarrassed there and also there was some risk to his person.

41. I mentioned that it might be desirable for the two Lamas to go back to Tibet by air. Premier Chou liked this idea and said that there should be a trial flight before the travel by air. He was going to talk again to the Dalai Lama

⁴⁴ Perhaps Chou En-lai was referring to the revolt in the Changtreng Sampheling monastery, one of the largest monasteries in Kham.

about this question of going to Kalimpong and let me know more definitely tonight.

42. I discussed the programme of the two Lamas in India-their going to the place near Mandi and later to Nalanda and then to Chittaranjan, etc. He agreed.

The Nepal visit has been given up. I said that I agreed that it would be better for the Nepal trip to be taken up on some later occasion. I have also indicated that in all the circumstances it would perhaps be better for the two Lamas not to go to Kalimpong during this visit. They might go there on some other occasion. If they fly to Lhasa, their planes would stop at Bagdogra and an opportunity might be given to people to gather there and worship them or take their blessings. This should not be inconvenient for people in Kalimpong which is not far from Bagdogra.

43. In regard to my conversations with Premier Chou En-lai on other subjects, I shall write a separate note. These, I repeat, must be treated as Top Secret. Copies should be given to our Ambassador in Peking, Shri Apa Pant and one copy for the Ministry which SG should see and then pass on to Foreign Secretary.

Talks with Chou En-lai-IV⁴⁵

The talks on this occasion began with Premier Chou En-lai asking me about my visit to Washington and my talks with President Eisenhower. I told him that I

⁴⁵ Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA, R.K.Nehru, India's Ambassador in Beijing, and Apa Pant, political officer in Sikkim, 1 January 1957. Jawaharlal Nehru Collection.

had had long talks with the President covering a variety of subjects. Among these subjects were the Middle East, Hungary, Pakistan and Kashmir, Goa, Indo China and especially Laos, and Sino-American relations, apart from a broad consideration of the world problems. I did not say much about these talks relating to Pakistan and Kashmir, and Goa.

2. About Indo-China, I referred to the recent agreement in Laos between the Royal Laotian Government and Pathet Lao and said that the US Government were not very pleased with this agreement. However, I had explained this to them and pointed out how it would be very harmful for this agreement to break down right at the beginning. I think I produced some effect on their minds. They said they would not come in the way and would wait and see what happened.

3. The first subject I dealt with was the situation in Egypt and the Middle East. I explained this at some length to Premier Chou, who asked me certain questions for elucidation. There was no particular discussion on this subject.

4. We then moved on to Hungary. On this subject, there was a long discussion which I need not repeat here. Premier Chou practically repeated the Soviet argument and stood by it. His main contention was that, whatever the previous faults and errors committed, a crisis arose when Nagy asked for the help of Western Powers. The Hungarian Army had disintegrated and there was chaos. The choice, therefore, lay in Soviet intervention or allowing Hungary to become an ally of the Western Powers. In these circumstances, the Soviet had to intervene, and they were right in doing so. I argued with Premier Chou at considerable length and pointed out that, however Nagy might have erred, the situation created in Hungary was deplorable and, in effect, it was the Soviet Government that was dominating the scene there, and Kadar was helpless and

counted for little. This had produced a strong reaction in many countries of Asia and Europe against the Soviet. It was clear that the great majority of the Hungarian people were opposed to Soviet domination and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We discussed this question at great length without apparently producing any effect on each other. We left it at that.

5. Sino-American relations were also discussed at length. I enclose a note I took on that occasion.

6. I pleaded hard for the release of ten American prisoners and made it clear that there could be no progress in bettering these relations unless these people were released. Premier Chou repeated his old arguments and would not budge an inch. He said that the only approach could be reciprocal. He would think about this matter again and let me have further suggestions about such a reciprocal approach.

7. There our talks more or less ended. I asked Premier Chou if there was any other subject which he wished to mention. He said no. Then I asked him if he intended visiting Nepal later. He said yes, and he wanted to talk to me about Nepal. If I wanted to talk about that subject now, he was prepared to do so. I said I had nothing special to say in regard to Nepal.

8. He then told me that he would be going to Afghanistan from Moscow and then to Nepal, passing India on the way.⁴⁶ Probably, he would reach India on the 24th January and leave for Nepal on the 25th. He said he would be sorry to miss our National Day on the 26th January. I told him that he would be welcome on any day, and we would be glad if he was here on our National

⁴⁶ Chou En-Lai was in Moscow between 17-19 January 1957. He was in Kabul between 19-23 January 1957.

Day. So far as I was concerned, I would be in Delhi from January 22nd to the 30th.

9. Later in the evening, I met the Dalai Lama. He told me that he had not yet decided about the visit to Kalimpong. He felt that it would be difficult to miss it.

I suggested to him to fly back to Lhasa from India. He did not like the idea much and said that he had promised to visit some monasteries in Tibet on the way to Lhasa. Therefore, it was better for him to go by road.

10. I told the Dalai Lama that his brother at Kalimpong often spoke very foolishly and it seemed to me that he was rather unbalanced. I told him that as he had already agreed by a Treaty⁴⁷ to Tibet being part of China but autonomous, it was not easy for him to break this agreement. Indeed, any attempt to do so would result in a major conflict and much misery to Tibet. In an armed conflict, Tibet could not possibly defeat China. I also pointed out that we had a treaty with China in regard to Tibet. Our position all along had been that sovereignty rested with China but Tibet should be autonomous. Therefore, the best course for the Dalai Lama to adopt was to accept this sovereignty but insist on full autonomy in regard to internal affairs. He would be on strong ground on this, and he could build up the Tibetan people under his leadership.

11. I told the Dalai Lama also that I had been surprised to learn that some people had advised him to remain in India and not return to Tibet. That would be the height of folly and it would harm him as well as Tibet. This was not the way to serve the cause of Tibet. He must be in his own country and give a lead to his people. He listened carefully to what I said and did not say much himself. I am likely to meet him again a week or so later.

⁴⁷ The 17-point agreement signed on 23 May 1951.

12. On my way to the airport to see Premier Chou off, he told me that no decision had been arrived at 3-bout the Kalimpong visit of the Dalai Lama. Premier Chou had met the Kashag or Cabinet of the Dalai Lama and spoken to them about it. He had also met the Dalai Lama's two brothers and spoken to them frankly, telling them that they could hold any views they liked but they must not create trouble in Kalimpong or elsewhere.

13. Apparently, the Dalai Lama will indicate his final decision about the Kalimpong visit to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi later.

14. I think it is desirable, whether the Dalai Lama goes to Kalimpong or not, for someone on our behalf to make it clear privately to the brothers of the Dalai Lama that we do not approve of any agitation or trouble in any part of India in regard to Tibet. We sympathise with the people of Tibet and are prepared to help them in any legitimate way. But we cannot tolerate any mischief in Indian territory. In the event of the Dalai Lama going to Kalimpong, some special steps should be taken for the prevention of any trouble there.

To S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike⁴⁸

New Delhi,
January 21, 1957

My dear Bandaranaike,⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru Collection.

⁴⁹ Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, 1956-59.

As you know, Premier Chou En-lai has visited India twice in the course of the last few weeks and I have had fairly long talks with him about various matters. He will be coming here just for half a day and a night on the 24th January and will go from here to Nepal. From there, I understand, he will proceed to Ceylon via Calcutta. I have not received his exact programme yet and even the Chinese Embassy here do not know much about it. But it does appear that he will be going to Ceylon and you may have some indication of when he is likely to reach there. Probably we shall have fuller particulars in the course of two or three days.

2. As you are likely to have talks with Chou En-lai when he goes to Colombo, you might be interested in some brief account of my talks with him. These talks covered a great deal of ground and we discussed many subjects. Among these subjects were:

- (i) Egypt and the Middle East
- (ii) Hungary
- (iii) Sino-American relations
- (iv) Indo-China
- (v) Our relations with Pakistan and Kashmir question
- (vi) Goa, and
- (vii) Tibet

3. On the occasion of his second visit, he was particularly interested in the talks I had had with President Eisenhower when I went to Washington. I gave him a brief account of them, more particularly in regard to Sino-American relations.

4. I need not write to you about our talks in regard to Indo-China, Pakistan, Kashmir, Goa and Tibet. As regards the Middle East, there was, at the time,

not much in the nature of a discussion. I told him of my appraisal of the situation. We did discuss, however, at considerable length the Hungarian situation and Sino-American relations.

5. I am afraid we disagreed about Hungary and what had happened there.

6. As regards Sino-American relations, everything has got stuck up because of the non-release of ten American prisoners in China. It has seemed to me for some time past that China gained nothing by keeping these ten prisoners in detention and could well afford to release them. I have been pressing this on Chou En-lai for some time. He has, however, reacted strongly and said that they had already released more than thirty Americans and there had been no response from the American side. He saw no reason to carry on in this unilateral way and there must be reciprocity. The American answer is that every Chinese person in the United States can return to China if he so wishes. They cannot force him to leave the United States against his will. I shall not here enter into any detailed account of this complicated subject. I think there is some justification for what the Chinese Government says, but it is not enough for them to take up this non possumus attitude in this matter. Eisenhower told me emphatically that he would take no step at all vis-a-vis China, so long as these ten prisoners were not released.

Feeling in the United States was too strong on this subject. If they were released, he would take one step and that is, allow Americans, including American journalists to go to China. Their reports might well help to mould American opinion and make it less anti-Chinese. I informed Chou En-lai of this, but he stuck to his point. At last he said that he would try to evolve some suitable formula based on reciprocity and would tell me about it later. Perhaps when he comes next, he might say something about this matter.

7. About Egypt and the Middle East, he naturally took up a strong line against the UK and France. I largely agreed. About the USA also he felt that it was secretly backing England and France. I did not wholly agree about this, at any rate, in so far as the initial stages were concerned. The US had taken a strong line against England and France after the ultimatum and invasion of Egypt. It had also expressed itself strongly against the Israeli invasion of Egypt. It was true, however, that subsequently the US had taken up some kind of a middle attitude. '

8. After this had come the Eisenhower speech laying down what is called the Eisenhower doctrine about the Middle East. When I talked to Chou En-lai last, very little of this had come out and so we did not discuss it.

9. I might mention here that in our opinion this Eisenhower doctrine about the vacuum in the Middle East and the threat to the Soviet Union contained in it are not at all to our liking. I have indicated as much privately to President Eisenhower.

10. Coming to Hungary, Chou En-lai supported the Soviet thesis completely. I could not agree with him, although I admitted that some of the Western Powers had certainly intervened in Hungary and instigated the people there to rebel. But essentially the Hungarian rising was a national movement widely backed by the workers, students and others. I could understand that the Soviet was placed in a difficult position, more especially as just at that time, the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt took place. Nevertheless I could not reconcile myself to the forcible imposition of Soviet policy in Hungary with the help of a thousand tanks, etc. Budapest is a city in ruins today and, according to our information, at least 25,000 Hungarians were killed. Apart from our

representative in Budapest who has remained there throughout all these troubles, we sent our Ambassador in Moscow there as also our Minister in Prague. We have had very full reports from them and they have made very distressing reading. I have had little doubt the Kadar Government was only carrying on because of Soviet troops. It had very little backing in Hungary itself. It may be of course that the rising having been suppressed, the Kadar Government can function more or less on its own with less help from the Soviet. But to call it an independent national Government is hardly correct.

11. Anyhow, the Russian action in Hungary seemed to me to be opposed to the Five Principles about which we talk so much. Also from the longer point of view, this action could not possibly solve the Hungarian problem. The Hungarians might feel defeated, but they would remain sullen and discontented. What impressed me more than the fighting in Hungary was the passive resistance of the workers there which continued for a long time in spite of the terrible time they had passed through.

12. Chou En-lai did not agree with me in this analysis at all and was of opinion that Hungary was faced with a critical situation. If the Russians had not acted as they did, Hungary would have fallen into the lap of the Western Powers and this the Soviet could not tolerate. There was something in this, but I did not wholly agree. I think with a somewhat wiser policy Hungary could have remained a friend of Russia, although more independent like Poland. In any event these aggressive methods would hardly gain friendship in the future.

13. It seems to me that the Hungarian tragedy has brought out an essential weakness in the policy pursued by the Soviet Union in the East European countries. The same type of reaction has taken place in Poland and in other countries. In Poland, fortunately, some kind of an agreement was arrived at.

14. In all these East European countries, there are two major fears - fear of an armed Germany and fear of the Soviet Union. I have no doubt that there is increasing dislike of Soviet domination there and no amount of coercive tactics will change this dislike into love and affection. Some other policy has to be followed to make them friends and reliable allies. But evidently the Soviet Union got very frightened at these developments and decided to come down on them with a heavy hand. The Chinese Government have lined up with them completely and supported them.

15. What is particularly unfortunate is that the new trends towards liberalisation and democratisation in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Communist countries have been checked and to some extent reversed. The anti-Stalin movement now has given place to moderate praise of Stalin. I do not suppose that these powerful new trends can be stopped. But meanwhile all this adds fuel to the fire of cold war. On the American side also, the cold war is being encouraged.

16. These recent developments indicate certain inherent contradictions in the communist regimes. They also indicate that it is no easy matter to impose communism on another country. Communism may grow out of internal conditions as in Russia or China, but it cannot be imposed. Even eleven years of propaganda, education and indoctrination in Hungary did not win over the Hungarian people. Nationalism and the desire for national freedom was stronger than an imposed communism. As a matter of fact, I think that the Hungarian people do not at all want to go back to the capitalist system. They want socialism, but they want freedom also.

17. For the present, however, we are again in the thick of the cold war and countries like ours, Ceylon and India, have to face the inevitable difficulties of unaligned countries. We get the worst of both worlds.

I hope these odd jottings will give you some idea of my talks with Chou En-lai. I hope you are keeping well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

Talks with Chou En-lai-V⁵⁰

First Session⁵¹;

At the outset, Premier Chou En-lai mentioned that after his visit to Nepal he would be reaching Calcutta on the 29th January and would like to visit Santiniketan as he had received a cabled invitation from Professor Tan Yun Shan.

PM replied that it would be an excellent idea. He suggested that it might be convenient for the Chinese Premier who would be reaching Calcutta about noon on the 29th to leave for Santiniketan the same afternoon, spend the night and the next morning there and come away on the afternoon of the 30th.

PM said that he presumed that the Chinese Premier was aware of the latest programme of Their Holinesses Dalai and Panchen Lamas. PM mentioned that Dalai Lama was at the time at Kalimpong and after attending the Republic Day celebrations at Darjeeling on the 26th, would return there and then proceed to Tibet via Gangtok. We had taken precautions that there should be no trouble or incident in Kalimpong.

⁵⁰ Summary of talks with Chou En-Lai held at New Delhi on 24 January J 957. Jawaharlal Nehru Collection.

⁵¹ The talks began at 4.00 p.m. at Teen Murti House in New Delhi.

Chinese Premier mentioned that before Dalai Lama left Delhi, a Tibetan called Shagapa⁵² presented a document to the Dalai Lama, but Shagapa had been spoken to firmly and warned that there must be no trouble at Kalimpong. The Chinese Premier recalled that this Shagapa had left Tibet long ago and was now staying at Kalimpong.

PM handed over to Chinese Premier a note from Mr Bartlett, US Charge d' Affaires at Delhi, on Chinese nationals in USA and US prisoners in China, adding that this document appeared to be a sequel to PM's recent talks on the subject in Washington.

PM also handed over a letter from Ella Maillart,⁵³ a Swiss lady who was coming to India in March and wished to visit Tibet. This lady had, some years ago, made a journey through Sinkiang, Kashgar, etc., in company with the well-known writer, Peter Fleming.⁵⁴

The Chinese Premier received these documents without any comment.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Your Excellency has visited many places recently and will perhaps like to talk on Your Excellency's impressions.

Chou En-lai: I would like to talk about the situation in Europe, but before that, I would like to acquaint Your Excellency with the details of our talks with the

⁵² Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa (b. 1907); Tibetan government official; entered government service, 1930; subsequently, headed finance department; spokesman, Tibetan National Assembly; headed, Tibetan Trade delegation, 1948; moved to India, 1951; appointed personal representative of the Dalai Lama, 1959.

⁵³ Ella Kini Maillart (1903-1997); Swiss explorer, skier and Olympic sailor whose six-month journey into Soviet Turkestan is described in *Turkestan Solo* (1934). Her expedition across the Gobi desert with Peter Fleming is described in *Forbidden Journey* (1937).

⁵⁴ Robert Peter Fleming (1907-1971); British journalist and travel writer; remembered for his journeys up to the Amazon and across the Gobi desert, recounted in *Brazilian Adventures* (1933) and *News from Tartary* (1941).

Prime Minister of Nepal. I have already informed Ambassador Nehru about these talks, but would like to mention them to Your Excellency also.

The first question raised was regarding exchange of Ambassadors between China and Nepal. The question was should the Chinese Ambassador be in Kathmandu or concurrently accredited from Delhi. We (Chinese) insisted that the Ambassador should be in Delhi as this might deprive US of the excuse for insisting on having their Ambassador in Kathmandu.

The Prime Minister of Nepal pointed out that as Nepal was already in the UN, it would like to have diplomatic relations with other important countries in the UN. As it might be difficult for Nepal to have a concurrent accreditation at Washington, it may ultimately be difficult for her to refuse to accept a US Ambassador in Kathmandu.

We (Chinese) said that in any event, China would not like to be the first to have an Ambassador in Kathmandu. In case US takes the first step in sending an Ambassador to Kathmandu, China may then reconsider the matter in the altered circumstances.

The Chinese Premier stated that this question may come up again during his ensuing visit to Nepal when he proposed to reiterate that in any case China would not like to be the first in having an Ambassador at Kathmandu. PM agreed with this approach.

Chou En-lai: The second question was that of exchange of Consul Generals. I We (Chinese) have already agreed that Nepal can have a Consul General at Lhasa and Trade Agents elsewhere in Tibet. Though under the agreement, China has a reciprocal right to have a Consul General at Kathmandu, she does not at present see any necessity to send a Consul General there but may do so later if she feels necessary.

The third question was that of economic and financial aid to Nepal from China. China agreed to Nepal's request but made it clear that the amount of aid must be less than those given by India and US.

This aid will have no strings attached to it. Its purpose was not that Nepal should refuse aid from US, but that US should be obliged to refrain from attaching any strings to their aid. In other words, the purpose was to assist Nepal in maintaining her independence.

Fourthly, Nepal also wanted technical assistance from China. She wanted machinery and experts for starting new industries and installing factories. We (Chinese) pointed out that China could provide technical aid only in light industries but in these India was more advanced. In any case, while China was willing to provide machinery and technical equipment for industries in Nepal, we (China) advised Nepal to approach India for technical experts as such experts from India were likely to be more acquainted with local conditions in Nepal. China has, therefore, decided not to send any experts.

The Government of Nepal had not yet furnished a list of machinery and technical equipment that they required from China - but this would probably be confined to light industries. In any event, China would keep India informed about Nepalese requirements as soon as they were received from the Government of Nepal.

As regards China's general relations with Nepal, the view of the Chinese Premier was that they should be built on:

- (a) The Five Principles; and
- (b) On the basis of friendship between India and Nepal.

In other words, the Sino-Nepalese relations should be based on friendship between these three countries. Both our countries, India and China, wished to improve and strengthen their friendship with Nepal and neither wants anything from Nepal. My ensuing visit to Nepal will also be in the same spirit and I would keep India fully informed of developments.

I would, however, like to have Your Excellency's views on the subject.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Nepal and India have very close contacts geographically, culturally and linguistically. Nepal can be roughly divided into three regions. The first is the Terai consisting of the forests and plains at the foothills of the Himalayas. In this region the people were 100 per cent like Indians.

Then there is the middle valley inhabited by the Newars. Finally, there were the mountain people consisting mainly of Gurkhas. The politics of Nepal was dominated by the people of the Kathmandu valley.

Is Your Excellency aware of the recent history of Nepal?

Chou En-lai: No.

Jawaharlal Nehru: About hundred years ago, the Prime Ministers of Nepal revolted against the King and for the last 100 years the Prime Ministers' clan, the Ranas, have been the rulers of Nepal. The King virtually became a prisoner in his palace without any powers, though he was left in enjoyment of his personal property and wealth. The Prime Ministers' clan-the Ranas-intermarried with Indians.

Until about seven years ago, the Prime Ministers were autocratic rulers with practically no restrictions on their powers. They used the revenues of the State as their privy purse. The history of their rule has been stormy. There were several assassinations and three or four ex-Prime Ministers were exiled to India. Even now they are in India. They brought so much money with them that they are still living on it.

The British Government in India got on very well with the Ranas and completely ignored the King. Nepal had no foreign relations with any country except UK. She had only an Agent - not a fully accredited Ambassador-in

Delhi. It was only five or six years ago that Nepal appointed her Ambassador in London concurrently to Washington.⁵⁵

The British, as they did not consider Nepal independent, sent no Ambassador to Nepal, but only a Resident, viz., a dignitary with the same powers and functions as the British Representatives in "native States" of India. The Resident was all powerful in Nepal. The chief interest of the British was to use Nepal as a recruiting ground for their army. The Gurkhas, when properly trained, make very good soldiers, though without the proper training, as in the Nepalese Army, they are no good.

When we became independent, we and the British had a Tripartite Agreement with Nepal under which we were authorised to recruit twelve Gurkha battalions in Nepal and the British eight. Under this agreement the Gurkhas so recruited by the British were also permitted transport and transit through India if they were in civilian dress.

Recently, there has been some opposition in Nepal to the recruitment of these Gurkhas as soldiers for countries other than Nepal. The Government of Nepal, however, finds the arrangement economically advantageous.

The British also had some Gurkha Recruiting Depots on Indian soil which we have asked them to remove.

No truly national Government could grow in Nepal under the Ranas and under British tutelage, firstly because Nepal was politically backward and secondly because leaders of nationalist and democratic movements were ruthlessly suppressed and heavily punished. The present Prime Minister, Tanka Prasad, was himself in prison for twelve years and was actually in chains.

A nationalist movement, however, grew up among Nepalese young men in India who participated in our national movement.

⁵⁵ An agreement on commerce and friendship between Nepal and the United States was signed at Kathmandu on 27 April] 1947, and the Nepalese Ambassador in London was accredited as Minister to the US and US Ambassador in New Delhi as Minister to Nepal.

The King of Nepal had more liberal views than the Rana Prime Ministers. He was, therefore, more popular, was widely respected and almost regarded as a divinity.

About five or six years ago, there was some internal trouble in Nepal. As a result one day the King with his entire family actually took refuge in the Indian Embassy.⁵⁶ Only one grandson was left behind. The Ranas officially deposed the King and proclaimed the two-year old grandson⁵⁷ as the new King. Though UK was inclined to recognise the new King we refused to do so. The Royal family then came over to India and the revolt in favour of the King spread in Nepal. The UK sent an observer⁵⁸ to report on the situation. This agent reported that the situation was fluid and advised the British Government to wait and see how the situation develops before recognising the new King. As a result of the revolt the entire Government began to disintegrate and the Rana Prime Minister⁵⁹ could not control the situation. The Ranas who had lost much of their power and authority then approached us. There were talks in Delhi. As the popular movement was not strong and as the King was the only stable and cementing factor, the result of the talks was that the King was reinstated in power. The Rana Prime Minister continued as PM for some months and was then replaced by a popular Prime Minister with a promise of elections in a year or two. Since then there have been several changes of Prime Ministers, but the political situation still remains unsettled.

⁵⁶ On 6 November 1950, King Tribhuvan, his two queens and three sons and some other members of his family sought refuge in the Indian Embassy. See Selected Works (second series), Vol. 15, Part II, pp. 356-357.

⁵⁷ On 7 November 1950, Prince Gyanendra, the second son of Crown Prince Mahendra, was installed as the King of Nepal. The Government of India was officially informed of the installation of the boy King on 10 November 1950. See Selected Works (second series), Vol. 15, Part II, pp. 357.

⁵⁸ Maberly Esler Denning.

⁵⁹ Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur.

About six years ago, we had a treaty with Nepal recognising Nepalese independence and regulating Indo-Nepalese trade, etc. We also exchanged letters to the effect that Nepal would consult us in foreign affairs and defence and would coordinate their foreign policy with our own.⁶⁰

The last King died about two years ago. The new King Mahendra appointed the present Prime Minister a few months ago.⁶¹ At present the Prime Minister holds office entirely at the King's pleasure and without any big popular organisation backing him. No elections have been held yet, though they have been promised in October 1957. The present Prime Minister's party is one of the smallest in Nepal. The biggest political party there is the Nepali Congress which is now in opposition.

For the last few years, we have been helping Nepal technically, administratively and educationally. There is a development plan in which we are helping. While some good work has already been done, progress has not been satisfactory, due largely to the weak administration in Nepal. The Nepalese Army was useless. At their request, we sent a military mission of only about 200 persons two or three years ago, which has been training the Nepalese Army.

Until recently Nepal was completely isolated. It had no roads and no airports. People were actually carried in baskets and even motor cars were carried for miles on the shoulders of hundreds of persons. We have, however, built a highway which is nearing completion.

Economically, there is great inequality of wealth in Nepal between the Ranas on the one hand and the people on the other.

⁶⁰ On 31 July 1950. See Selected Works (second series), Vol. 16, Part I, p. 485

⁶¹ Tanka Prasad Acharya, leader of the Praja Parishad Party, was the Prime Minister of Nepal from January 1956 to July 1957.

The Americans, though they have no Embassy in Kathmandu, have many technical experts working there, on road projects, etc. They also have a library.

The British and the UN are also helping in some development schemes.

Chou En-lai: I would like to know the present position of K.I. Singh⁶² in Nepal.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Singh who is liked by the King has now formed a party which is fairly popular. I met him three or four months ago. On the whole he impressed me as a fairly intelligent and honest man.

Chou En-lai ; I thank Your Excellency for this background information on Nepal. I should, however, like to have a similar picture about Ceylon-a country which I shall be visiting for the first time.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Ceylon and Pakistan got independence at about the same time as India. Ceylon has no history of national struggle. Therefore for some years, even after independence, the change was only at the top. Kotelawala, the previous Prime Minister, was himself a very wealthy man and a rich landlord.

Bandaranaike-a typical Oxford University product-won the election partly because the previous ministry was unpopular and partly because of the Buddhist support. He is a good man and is an old friend of mine. He has, however, got himself tied up with a language controversy. Tamils in Ceylon are agitating against him.

We, on our part, are concerned not only about the old Tamils settled in Ceylon but also the new generation of Indian workers who really built up the tea and rubber plantations in Ceylon. Ceylon wishes to drive out most of these Indians. The matter is under discussion with us.

⁶² A rebel leader who took part in the 1950 uprising and later sought asylum in China. He returned to Nepal in 1955 after receiving a royal pardon, and founded the Samyukta Prajatantra Party.

The Singhalese are in many ways very close to us. Even the old Singhalese trace their descent from India. Their standards of living are however somewhat higher than that of average Indians due largely to their rich, tropical resources like tea, rubber, copra, etc. If Indians are driven away, I think the tea industry would collapse.

Chou En-lai: Was Ceylon ever a part of India ?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Not quite a part of India, though for some periods in their history, kings from Southern India have ruled in Ceylon.

Ceylon, like Burma, has been experiencing a strong Buddhist revival. The scriptural language-Pali-which is understood in Ceylon is very much like Sanskrit.

Chou En-lai: I thank Your Excellency for all this information.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I would like to ask Your Excellency whether the cash aid to Nepal that Your Excellency talked about will be in foreign exchange.

Chou En-lai: Yes. It will partly be in foreign exchange.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Will any part be given in Nepalese or Indian currency?

Chou En-lai: Entirely in Indian currency. When I said foreign exchange, I meant Indian currency.

I would now like to talk to Your Excellency about my visit to European countries. I stayed in Budapest for only one day⁶³ but met Hungarian leaders in Moscow also.⁶⁴ I found the situation much better than I had expected. The law and order situation in particular was much better than I had thought. I would say that the situation was now stable. It is true that the Soviet armed forces are still stationed in a few places. One sees signs of destruction in only one or two streets of Budapest. I had lunch as well as meetings with Hungarian leaders in the Assembly hall. Travelling from the airport to the city, I saw smoke from every factory chimney. Shops in Budapest were open till

⁶³ On 16-17 January 1957.

⁶⁴ Chou En-Lai met Janos Kadar on 10 January 1957 in Moscow.

late hours. Automobiles were plying on the streets. According to the Hungarian leaders, the wheels of industry were working again. The same was true of agriculture. Farmers' cooperative had been formed by the administration. President Dobi⁶⁵ told me that Nagy became reactionary and even appealed for help from Western Powers. Many genuine revolutionaries, including the Secretary of the Party who was in sympathy with Kadar, had been killed. On the 31st October reactionaries were released from jail. They beat the Secretary of the Party and grievously injured him. Before the Secretary died on the 1st of November, he sent a message warning Kadar. Nagy completely went over to the side of reactionaries—that is why Kadar broke with him. I attended a meeting of active workers of the party at which Kadar himself was present. I got the impression that the workers and peasants supported the present Government and the situation was becoming stable. I therefore feel that the views expressed by me in my previous talks that the Kadar Government should be supported is the correct view. I have received a cable from Yugoslavia today according to which Tito is likely to support Kadar Government. So will Poland. The only way to consolidate and improve the present situation was to support the Kadar Government. I do not think they will allow past mistakes to recur. Of course, difficulties still remain such as the stoppage of work in factories and the fall in production, but that is all the more reason why we should support the Kadar Government.

Last time Your Excellency told me that some 150,000 refugees had left Hungary. I found this correct. Some are in Yugoslavia with whom the Government of Hungary is negotiating in order to persuade the refugees to return. Nothing can, however, be done about those refugees who went over to

⁶⁵ Istvan Dobi (1898-1968); Hungarian politician; served as a labour battalion guard during the Second World War; elected to the National Assembly after the war; minister of agriculture, 1945-46; leader, Smallholders Party, February 1947; minister without portfolio, May 1947; Prime Minister. 1948-52; President, 1952-67; joined the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, 1959.

western countries. Some of these refugees are now realising that the standard of living of workers in Hungary is actually better than those of workers in Western countries. Some refugees who went to Belgium found that Belgian factories did not even have canteens for workers. I found the standard of living of Hungarians even better than those of Poles.

In Poland, I visited Warsaw⁶⁶ and four other places. The new leadership there has close contacts with the masses. This has been confirmed by the recent elections. The new leadership impressed me. They have close ties with the Government and the party. They are, however, keen on socialism and wish to remain in the socialist camp. They are facing two difficulties:

(1) Unfavourable balance of payments: In order to restore this balance they even have to export coal. The production of coal in Poland is highest in the world but because of the necessity to export, they themselves have to use less coal. The per capita consumption of coal is only two and a half tons per year. The consumption of meat is forty-six kilos per month. Even those quantities are inconceivable in Eastern countries. Of course, there have been mistakes in the adjustments of planning. Poland would at present welcome investment from Western countries.

(2) Difficulties arising out of mistakes of past leadership: Education which has been too doctrinaire does not encourage independent thinking on the part of the individual. As a result, democracy has not been able to fulfill itself. The present Government is now giving attention to these matters. I think, however, that the counter-revolutionaries will not be able to use Polish socialism to stir up trouble. Both Poland and Hungary are correcting past mistakes, but not in the way that the West would like them to. There is little possibility of their taking a neutral stand which is equivalent to going over to the Western camp. Although there has been some recent confusion, future

⁶⁶ 17. From II to 16 January 1957.

development is likely to be healthy. Other socialist countries will also learn from the difficulties of Hungary and Poland.

Second Session⁶⁷

Cho En-lai: I would now talk to Your Excellency about Afghanistan. We have exchanged Ambassadors with Afghanistan. Though in ancient times China and Afghanistan had cultural contacts, there have been no contacts recently. The country is mountainous. This has enabled the people to resist foreign aggression.

Agriculture and Irrigation: They, however, have economic difficulties. Agriculture is backward. The main problem is to increase agricultural production. The Royal Government is now paying attention to irrigation. We saw two dams-one near Kabul and also a smaller one near Kandahar. The dam at Kabul has a potential of 240,000 kW It has been constructed by German engineers. The Government is going to have a bigger dam constructed by Russians.

Considering that they have no railways, their achievements in the field of development are quite considerable.

The principal products are hides and skins, cotton, wool, fruits and copper. Their exports are mainly to India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Japan, etc. They must however have economic relations with more countries.

The foreign policy of the Royal Government is neutral. They do not like military blocs and are guided by the Bandung spirit. They have two Baghdad Pact countries on their border, viz., Iran and Pakistan. They also have boundary disputes with Pakistan which are a legacy left by the British Government. Every year a number of Pakhtoons go to Peshawar in Pakistan for jobs. Their

⁶⁷ This session was held at Rashtrapati Bhawan and began at 10.00 p.m.

relations with India are good. If they have assistance from friendly countries without interference in internal affairs, they can develop their country.

Jawaharlal Nehru: About 700 years ago at the time of Chengiz Khan, Afghanistan was a rich country with cities of more than a million inhabitants each, like Herat, etc. These places are now only villages.

Chou En-lai: What you say is confirmed by the historical records that we have, like the travel notes of Fa Hien and Huen Tsang who, when they came to India, also passed through Afghanistan. The Greek, Chinese and Indian civilisations met in Afghanistan.

JN: There was a great Buddhist university and school of medicine at Taxila near Peshawar.

Chou En-lai: One of the reasons for the present backwardness seems to be that some of their people have a nomadic history. If people remain nomads, agricultural production obviously cannot increase. In this connection, may I ask Your Excellency whether the desert in Western India was originally there?

JN: No. It has gradually grown due to sand drifts and imprudent cutting down of trees which reduced rainfall. Now we are planting trees.

The Bhakra-Nangal project which Your Excellency has seen will also enable reclamation of part of the land.

Chou En-lai: Your Excellency must have seen the joint statement issued after my visit to USSR. This dealt with the international situation in general outline. In our view, there are three types of countries: (a) Socialist, (b) Capitalist Imperialist, and (c) Nationalist Independent. Relations between (a) and (b) are antagonistic, but are capable of improvement.

Today, except for a handful, the overwhelming majority of people in any country do not want war. Socialist countries certainly do not, as they are engaged in internal reconstruction. Even imperialist countries do not want war. Britain and France do not and even in US, very few do. Thus, we feel that war is not inevitable and can be prevented. Here, the Nationalist 'Independent

countries can play an important role in trying to bring about a rapprochement between the antagonistic groups by relaxing tensions.

Improvement in the relationship between Socialist and Capitalist countries will also benefit the Nationalist-Independent countries themselves.

The question is how to bring this about. In our joint statement it was pointed out that firstly, Socialist countries must improve relations among themselves and present to the world a united front. In the past, relationships between Socialist countries amongst themselves have not always been satisfactory. In this connection, I would draw Your Excellency's attention to the Russian statement of October 30⁶⁸ and the Chinese statement of November 1.⁶⁹

Imperialist countries thought they could take advantage of differences among Socialist countries. But such attempts are doomed to failure as will be clear from recent events in Hungary. Whatever the expectations of imperialist countries may have been, the result of the troubles in Hungary has only been to strengthen the unity among Socialist countries.

Both Socialist and the Nationalist Independent countries base their relationships on the Five Principles. They are, however, determined to repel aggression.

Our second point is that one of the best ways of improving relationship between Socialist and Capitalist countries is to press forward with disarmament. But US is actually enhancing its military budget - not only in terms of dollars, but in terms of the number of actual men under arms. Disarmament, however, will benefit the Imperialist countries themselves.

⁶⁸ The USSR statement issued on 31 October stated: "The Government of the Soviet Union emphatically condemns the acts of aggression against Egypt by the governments of Britain, France and Israel and added that "this line of action is incompatible with the principles and purposes of the UN.

⁶⁹ The Chinese statement supported the Russian declaration condemning British, French and Israeli armed aggression against Egypt.

We also feel that it is possible to abolish the antagonistic military blocs and replace them by collective peace. The present period of truce can be used for internal reconstruction. We must, therefore, lose no time in pressing for disarmament.

Thirdly, as regards the Nationalist-Independent countries it is our view that their independence must be respected and in relationships with them the Ten Principles of Bandung must be observed. By extending economic assistance their political status can also be raised.

The Imperialist countries cannot repose any confidence in the Nationalist Independent countries. In the Middle East, for example, the British and the French tried to hang on to their old privileges. When they committed aggression, it is true US opposed them. But since then US itself is trying to usurp their privileges in this area. Your Excellency has pointed out very aptly that if we are to believe that there is now a power vacuum in the Middle East countries, then these countries could not have been really independent. If there is a vacuum the countries themselves must fill it.

So far as China is concerned, we respect the independence of these countries, as our actions since the Bandung Conference fully prove. We do not try to pressurise them under any bloc. Our friendship with them does not exclude their friendship with others. We have no objection to their receiving aid from others provided no strings are attached. We fully recognise that they need aid to develop. But US aid is different. It is not limited to economic aid. Its object in the Middle East is precisely to take the place of Britain and France. US wishes to impose Eisenhower doctrine on these countries. US wants to make use of the Baghdad Pact and to enlarge its scope.

The recent Five-Power Declaration from Cairo clearly underlines the antagonism of these countries to the Eisenhower doctrine.

We feel the best course is to abolish military blocs. The next best is to make the blocs less effective. On the other hand, the purpose of the Eisenhower doctrine is to strengthen such blocs.

Eisenhower's statement that Communism wants to enter the Middle East is entirely contrary to facts. We certainly sympathise with these countries because we are against colonialism. Eisenhower, however, wishes to retain the privileges of the West in this region.

Up to a point, the West also wishes to relax tensions but at the same time it wishes to retain its privileges-an aim which by itself creates fresh tensions. Thus Western policy is wavering and full of contradictions. It confuses and misleads some of the Governments in this region.

As regards China, regardless of whether US recognises us or agrees to our admission to the UN, we shall continue our efforts to relax tensions. Only if a handful of Western adventurers risk a shooting war, shall we take recourse to arms to resist.

JN Your Excellency has referred to many important aspects of the international situation, for which I thank you. These questions are by no means simple. I shall only mention one or two things.

I agree that the majority of countries and peoples do not want war. I, however, doubt whether even a handful wants war, although they may feel that wars-at least local wars-are inevitable.

It is true that the tendency towards relaxation of tensions has been arrested and we are back again at the cold war phase. The problem is how to work back to relaxation of tensions. It seems to me that merely to point out the faults and errors of the other party will only increase tension.

I feel that the problem of disarmament is an integral part of the relaxation of tensions. The compulsion of events-I mean the development of nuclear weapons has already induced a reconsideration of war as a policy. Even when

we differ with a country, a peaceful approach helps in producing a better atmosphere and achieving a relaxation of tensions.

Once we rule out war, the only alternative is peaceful co-existence. There is no middle way. This involves a certain tolerance of those who differ from us. In other words, it means non-interference. We, therefore come back to the Five or Ten Principles.

Your Excellency was talking about refugees from Hungary. We have received certain figures of refugees coming out through Austria issued by the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration. Up to the end of last week the total number was 1,68,056. Of this number, 1,00,253 were sent to twenty five other countries leaving 67,803 in Austria itself.

I am more interested in the future of Hungary than in what has happened in the past. I do hope that, as stated by Your Excellency, things will settle down. Kadar Government is anyhow the only government. We therefore recognise it and deal with it.

I also agree with Your Excellency when you say that the present situation in Hungary-both economic and political-is the result of (1) past mistakes; and (2) subversive activities. I have no doubt that there were subversive activities. But such subversive activities could be effective only if conditions were favourable for them to flourish. If such were the conditions after ten or fifteen years of socialism, I feel that something has gone wrong. I hope, therefore that, in future, the socialist movement in any country will be more in line with the national aspirations of that country. Otherwise, internal conflicts are bound to continue.

Chou En-lai: There is much in common between our views on this question. I feel however that subversive activities can be very widespread and may go even so far as to affect the top leadership of a country as in Hungary -- so that there is no remedy left to meet the situation but to call in Soviet troops.

As regards the past mistakes, the new leadership is trying to rectify these mistakes. It is true that socialism must be linked with the national situation in a country and with, actualities. In the past, socialism has sometimes been divorced from realities. For example, too great an emphasis has been laid on industry to the detriment of agriculture. But, now, industries which have been started cannot be stopped for the sake of developing agriculture.

Another type of mistake in the past has been political persecution of some leaders. Kadar himself, for example, has been persecuted.

The US Government does not say outright that it refuses to recognise the Kadar Government, but the US Ambassador continues to refrain from presenting his credentials. Again the Americans continue to give protection to Cardinal Mindszenty,⁷⁰ a person whom even the Pope does not like.

In Hungary, in the past, on the one hand there has not been enough democracy -on the other there has not been enough of firm dictatorial action. The old leadership failed to give the correct lead. We have now made our suggestions and are trying to unite all political parties while at the same time eliminating classes.

In fact, the recent incidents in Hungary is a lesson to all Socialist countries. The bourgeois revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries had their setbacks and did not stabilise for a hundred years. It is no wonder, therefore, that Socialist revolutions which are much younger-should also have their setbacks. We consider the improvement of relations as between the Socialist countries themselves to be a very important point.

⁷⁰ Jozsef Mindszenty (1892-1975); Roman catholic clergyman; Primate of Hungary; 1945 and Cardinal, 1946; became internationally known in 1948 when he was charged with treason by the communist government; granted asylum in the US legation at Budapest, 1956-71; moved to Rome.

Jawaharlal Nehru: In the history of the last one hundred years or so, we see many national revolts in Poland and Hungary. These countries are almost romantically nationalistic.

Chou En-lai: Last time also Your Excellency reminded me of this point about nationalism. I agree that in these countries national feeling is very strong. I also agree that socialism should take account of this fact instead of running away from it. Socialism, which we consider to be a better system, should be able to take cognisance of this and not permit reactionaries to make capital of this factor.

JN: agree that Socialism is a better system. Socialism, however, has to join hands with the feeling and aspiration for national freedom. If in the public mind there is a conflict between the two, then both will suffer.

Chou En-lai: Quite true. If Socialism cannot join hands with nationalism, none can be working well and there must be something wrong.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I must not keep Your Excellency up after midnight.

I would only like to mention that subsequent to my meeting Your Excellency earlier, in the evening, I learnt from Lady Mountbatten that Ella Maillart is already in Delhi.