

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Series 2

References on Tibet

Volume 26

Measures to Control Floods¹

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6- I suggest, therefore, that we should move in this matter:

1. In regard to Nepal, we should point out to them the disastrous consequences of these floods both to Nepal and to India and the necessity of having the fullest data about these rivers and then evolving schemes, which will no doubt be joint schemes so far as Nepal territory is concerned. We have thought too much on the lines of big and very expensive dams and hydro-electric works, etc. But there are other ways also of dealing with this question. In any event, our approach will have to be many-sided. Therefore, steps have to be taken for the survey of these rivers and surrounding terrains by competent engineers.
2. Bhutan: The same applies to Bhutan except that our ignorance about Bhutan is complete. We should point out to the Government of Bhutan in forcible language that this is a dangerous situation for us and, no doubt, for Bhutan also. The distance between the Bhutan territory and the plains of North Bengal and Assam is very little, that is to say, between the Brahmaputra and the mountains in Bhutan is a short distance. A river coming down in spate from Bhutan suddenly overwhelms us and covers the whole area with water. It is essential, therefore, that some steps should be taken to survey the upper reaches of these rivers that

¹ Note to the Secretary General, MEA, Foreign Secretary and Cabinet Secretary, 18 September 1954, JN Collection. Also available in File No. 17(320)54-PMS. A copy of this note was sent to Gulzarilal Nanda.

come down from Bhutan to India, Otherwise, there 'will be continuing disasters. We suggest, therefore, that these upper reaches of these rivers should be surveyed and we are prepared to organise this survey in cooperation with the Bhutan Government.

3. Tibet: We might address the Chinese Government about these recent floods. They themselves suffered from terrible floods this year and know the disastrous consequences. They are themselves taking far-reaching steps to control their floods, which have brought them some relief. We have the same problem though, perhaps, in a somewhat different context. Some of our floods In Assam have been due to rivers coming down from Tibet. Indeed, the Brahmaputra itself comes down from Tibet. But the real trouble has been due to some of the tributaries of the Brahmaputra, notably the Dihang or Siang and the Dibang or Sikang. We will be grateful if information about the upper reaches of these rivers is collected by the Chinese Government and some arrangement is made to warn us of any likely flood. We suggest a measure of cooperation in dealing with these rivers which pass through their territory and ours.
4. The NEF Agency comes into the picture because these rivers from Tibet through NEF Agency, notably the Dihang and Dibang. I suppose we have little information about this area In regard to the rivers. We must look into this matter also.

The Temples of New India²

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Again a thought came to my mind on seeing the Sutlej. Where has it come from? What course has it traversed to reach here? And then we make friend, with her and try to reap profit with our labour. Do you know where the Sutlej springs from? It rises near Mount Kailash in the vicinity of Manasarovar Lake

² Speech while inaugurating the Bhakra-Nangal canal system at Nangal, the forenoon of 8 July 1954. File No. 17(59)48-PMS. Original in Hindi and English.

which is famous all over the world, especially in India. Many other big rivers rise nearby. The Indus river also rises near that place. Brahmaputra also flows from that place in a different direction and reaches India and Pakistan after traversing thousands of miles. Other rivers rise from places nearby and flow from Tibet towards China. So the Sutlej traverses hundreds of miles through the Himalayas to reach here and we have tried to control her in a friendly way. You must have seen two big diversion channels. At present the whole river has been channelled through one channel. After the rains the river will be diverted completely in the two channels so that the dam might be built there. These and other thoughts came to my mind there. I look far, not only towards Bhakra-Nangal, but towards our country, India, whose children wt are. Where is she going? Where have we to lead her? Which way have we to walk and which mighty tasks have we to undertake? Some of these will bi completed in our lifetime. Some others will be taken up and completed by those who will come after us, because the work of a nation or a country -- never completed. It goes on and no one can arrest its progress -- he progress of a living nation. We have to press forward. The question is which way we have to take how should we proceed, what principles, what things, what objectives have we to keep before us. All these big questions crop up. This is not an occasion to tell you about them but we have to remember them always and no forget them. When we undertake a big work we have to do so with a large heart with a large mind. Small minds cannot undertake big works. Small-minded nations do not do big works. When we see big works our stature also grows with them. Our minds open out a little.

To Lord Mountbatten³

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New Delhi

³ JN Collection. Extracts

September 18, 1954

My Dear Dickie,⁴

I received a few days ago your letter of the 5th September with which you sent me a letter of the Princess George of Greece.⁵

The question of extending the visa of Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark has come up before us repeatedly. The present position is that his visa has been extended to the end of June 1955. So far as I know, no obstructions were placed in the way of his work, but I am enquiring about this. It is quite possible that the police might have created some difficulties.

Kalimpong, where Prince Peter now lives, has become, during the last three or four years, an amazing nest of spies. This is so because it is near the Tibet border and has been, and is to some extent even now, an Indian Tibetan market Tibetan refugees have come there. Because of its nearness to Tibet and the constant flow of traffic through it to Tibet and from Tibet, this place has attracted Intelligence agents, professional as well as private, from all kinds of countries There are White Russians and Red Russians, Communist Chinese and Nationalist Chinese, Americans in large numbers and probably half the countries of Europe are also represented there in this unsavoury way. It is a common joke in Kalimpong that there are more spies there than other folk. All kinds of stories emanate from Kalimpong about Tibet. Most of these stories have little or no foundation and are based on hearsay. They are, however, given considerable publicity by newspapermen, Indian and foreign.

Occasionally attempts are made there for the hatching of petty conspiracies in connection with Tibet.

Americans are greatly interested in Tibet and what happens there. As a part of their global strategy, they consider Tibet as an important area and they perhaps think that it might be possible to encourage those elements in Tibet which are opposed to Chinese dominance there....

I have mentioned all this to you to indicate the background in Kalimpong. Our

⁴ Mounbatten of Burma, first Earl (1900-1979); Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, 1952-54, also see Selected Works (first series). Vol. 13, p. 276.

⁵ Great-great niece of Napoleon Bonaparte and mother of Prince Peter.

Intelligence reports have constantly mentioned Prince Peter's name as a person who has very undesirable connections in these matters. One or two petty incidents have also happened, which, by themselves are not important, but have added to the general impression about Prince Peter's activities there, in consequence of all this, the West Bengal Government. which directly deals with Kalimpong, as well as our Home Ministry, have not looked with favour on the continued stay of Prince Peter and his wife in Kalimpong. They have repeatedly pressed for his visa not to be extended. Doctor Katiu, our Home Minister, however, has taken a more lenient view and it was at his instance that the visa was extended to June 1955.

The position thus is that we have nothing definite against Prince Peter, but he has managed to create a good deal of suspicion about his activities.

Personally. I always read our Intelligence reports very critically and I am not prepared to accept them as they are, I have had a good deal of experience of the police and of Intelligence from the other side to be easily taken in by the reports we get. But I must confess that Kalimpong troubles me very much and I do not like all kinds of people settling down there and adding to the confusion.

I have written to you quite frankly about this in order to give you the entire picture. We are further enquiring into this matter and I am writing to Dr B.C. Roy.

As I have said above, there is no ban on his activities. But I have little doubt that, ban or no ban, the suspicion of the police probably comes in the way of some of his activities.

Yours sincerely
Jawaharlal Nehru

Preventing the War⁶

⁶ Record of interview with William H. Attwood, Correspondent of Look, New Delhi, 31 August 1954. JN ollection. Extracts. The interview was published in Look, 2 November 1954.

Q: Is communism a major problem in India?

JN: I wouldn't call it a major problem. Of course, we have a hard core of dedicated party workers, but most people who call themselves Communists are just against the Government for one reason or another. A few trade unions are Communist controlled but on the whole their strength is declining. They have barely thirty seats out of 500 in Parliament and this participation in the business of Government has toned down their activities in the country. The Communists could only be a threat in India if we relaxed our efforts and did not work to improve social and economic conditions. And we are not relaxing....

Q: One thing that bothers Americans about India is that you are so ready to suspect us of ulterior motives. You seem to be more concerned about Western colonialism than about Soviet imperialism. For example, American arms shipments to Pakistan caused much more alarm in India than the building of Communist airfields in neighbouring Tibet. Why is that?

JN: Yes, you are right to some extent. Asians are inclined to be suspicious of American policy.

But you mentioned the airfields in Tibet. Now, they don't frighten us at all. Practically speaking, I cannot conceive of an attack on India across the Himalayas from Tibet. Those airfields are being built because there are hardly any other communications in the country. We do the same in the more inaccessible parts of India. I realise that communism is expansionist but they only go where they can go easily. Steps must be taken to prevent their creeping in elsewhere, but Tibet is not a problem.

Restraints and Firmness⁷

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...Now, there is another matter. Several honourable Members have referred to Tibet-'the melancholy chapter of Tibet': I really do not understand such a reaction. I have given the most earnest thought to this matter. What did any honourable Member of this House expect us to do in regard to Tibet at any time? Did we fail or did we do a wrong thing? I am not going into that matter now but I would beg any honourable Member who has doubts about this question to just consider and try to find out what the background, the early history and the late history of Tibet and India and China have been, what the history of the British in Tibet has been and what the relationship of Tibet with China or India has been. Where did we come into the picture unless we wanted to assume an aggressive role of interfering with other countries? Many things happen in the world which we do not like and which we would wish were rather different but we do not go like Don Quixote with a lance in hand against everything that we dislike; we put up with these things because we would, without making any difference, merely get into trouble. We have to see all these things in some larger context of policy.

Big things have happened in the world ever since the last War. And among the big things has been the rise of a united China. Forget for a moment the broad policies it pursues-Communist or near-Communist or whatever it may be. The fact is-and it is a major fact of the middle of the 20th century-that China has become a Great Power-united, strong and great power I do not mention that in the sense that because China is a Great Power, India must be afraid of China or submit to China or follow the same policy in deference to China-not in the least.... Now, China has come into the picture with enormous potential

⁷ Reply to a debate on the international situation and the policy of the Government of India. Lok Sabha, 30 September 1954. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. VII Pt II, 1954. cols 3872-3901. Extracts

strength not so much actual strength, that is, developed strength, because remember this, even now China is far less industrially developed than even India is. Let us not forget it-these facts. Much is being done in China which is praiseworthy and we can learn from them and we hope to lean' from them but let us look at things in some perspective. India is more industrially developed than China-India has got far more, let us say, communications, transport and so on which are also essential for development of China. China no doubt, will go ahead fast; I am not comparing or criticising but what I said was that this enormous country of China which is a Great Power and which is powerful today, is potentially still more powerful. This is a country which inevitably becomes a Great Power. Leaving these three big countries, United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, for the moment leaving them aside, look at the world. There are great countries, very advanced countries, highly cultured countries and all that. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong-wars and the like-the obvious fourth country in the world is India.

To Ali Sastroamidjojo⁸

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The fact of some countries remaining non-aligned and neutral is obviously important, as is shown even by the Geneva Conference. Such countries can play a definite role in favour of peace. If there are no such countries left then there is no one to play that role.

You refer to recent rumours about Indonesia trying to form a non-aggression pact with India, Burma and the People's Republic of China. I have heard these rumours myself and I note what you say about the American reaction to

⁸ JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to the Prime Minister of Myanmar.

them⁹. I think any such pact between a number of countries in South-East Asia would tend to appear as a kind of ganging up. At the present moment, with the conflict in Indo-China, it would not be possible even to consider such a proposal. But a time may come when this subject might be approached in a different way that is, a bilateral way, two countries dealing with each other. You will remember our Agreement with China in regard to Tibet.¹⁰ That is not a non-aggression pact but, in the Preamble, it is stated that our two countries base their relations on non-aggression and non-interference with each other and the recognition of each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is a good example. It may be that two other countries, without actually entering into a non-aggression pact, could state their relations to have that basis, But I think even this is slightly premature at present. We must see the outcome of the Indo-China affair before we can think of any other step.

Chou En-Iai is, of course, stoutly opposed to any supervision by the United Nations as such, on the ground that the UN have been belligerents in Korea and that China is not recognised by them. There is force in that argument. I am afraid that, in the unfortunate case of a break at Geneva, events will move rather fast. Because of the realisation of this, Casey was very anxious that there should be no such break at Geneva and that they should carry on as long as they can. The difficulty is the changing military situation in Indo-China. That is so favourable to Vietminh that it is becoming almost out of the question for any effective intervention even by the US.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

⁹ Sastromidjojo wrote that the reaction to these rumours from Washington was that such a pact could not but be interpreted as a pact against the 'free world' because the Asian 'neutralist' countries would step right into the Communist camp.

¹⁰ The Agreement was signed in Beijing on 29 April 1954.

Chou En-Lai's Visit

Message to Chou En-Lai ¹¹

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I am very happy to learn from your Ambassador¹² in Delhi that you have accepted the invitation to visit India which Mr. Krishna Menon conveyed to you on my behalf.¹³ Your Excellency and your party will be welcomed here and I am looking forward particularly to meeting you and of having the opportunity to exchange views. We are glad that your Excellency will be traveling by the Air India International. We are instructing our Consul General¹⁴ at Geneva to place himself at your disposal for any help in regard to travelling or other arrangements that you might require.

May I congratulate you and express my deep appreciation of your efforts to terminate hostilities all over Indo-China? I earnestly hope that the direct negotiations now in progress will soon achieve this result and will thus lead to the next step of a peaceful settlement of the difficult problem which you have had to face at the Geneva Conference. I am grateful to your Excellency for the consideration you showed to our representative, Shri Krishna Menon.¹⁵

¹¹ New Delhi, 21 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Chou En Lai was at this time representing China at the Conference on Indo-China in Geneva.

¹² Yuan Chung.hsien.

¹³ Krishna Menon informed Nehru on 21 June, "I not only conveyed your invitation to Chou En-Lai, but mentioned it more than once and we talked it over. I believe I helped him to get over what he might have been regarding as prestige difficulties, etc.

¹⁴ Samarendranath Sen.

¹⁵ Krishna Menon, in his telegram of 21 June to Nehru, wrote about Chou En-la is a fine and I believe a great and able man; I do not believe that the Chinese have expansionist ideas. He spoke to me about Malaya in this connection. I think he is also somewhat happy that the British and they have got closer and that we broke down some barriers. I found little difficulty in getting near him. He as never evasive with me even on difficult matters after the second day. He is extremely shrewd and observant, very Chinese but modern."

Conversation with Chou En-lai (I)¹⁶

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Jawaharlal Nehru: We have many things to talk about. Where would your Excellency like to start?

Chou En-lai: Wherever Your Excellency wishes to start.

JN: Your Excellency has just come from Geneva and might like to talk about Indo-China.

Chou En-lai: The Geneva Conference has been meeting for eight weeks and the Foreign Ministers have left, but the Conference is continuing. The Korean question was simple-we did not reach any agreement...

JN: That is, so far as the Korean question is concerned, the Geneva Conference is closed?

Chou En-lai: That is true....

JN: I thought Mr Eden said it was not over. There was always the possibility of its being started afresh.

Chou En-lai: Originally the delegation of China made a proposal not to close the discussion and the Belgian Foreign Minister¹⁷ agreed. That day, Eden was the Chairman, and, if there had been no opposition from the USA, there was a general desire to continue the discussion....

¹⁶ Record of five sessions of conversation between Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai held in New Delhi from 25 to 27 June 1954, is printed in this section. The minute of the Conversation were maintained by T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs. This item contains record of the first session, 3.30 pm to 6.15 pm 25 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts. Chou En-lai visited India from 25 to 28 June 1954.

JN: Of course, it is always open to start discussion. Otherwise, the Conference is closed.

Chou En-lai: Yes, that is so.

JN: What about Indo-China?

Chou En-lai: On the Indo-China question we reached two agreements: One was on Vietnam after three weeks of discussion. This was an agreement in principle on a military armistice. The question is now under concrete discussion between the two High Commands. The second was also on a military armistice on Laos and Cambodia. This has also been referred to the Military Commands....

JN: These military talks have been going on for some weeks. Have they thus far achieved any result?

Chou En-lai: On the idea of having two large regrouping areas, the views in principle held by the senior representatives of the French Command and of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam¹⁸ Command are quite close, They both agreed that they should not have a number of small regrouping areas because that would be inconvenient and would also result in an unstable armistice. Of course the representative of the Bao Dai¹⁹ Government did not participate in the negotiations between the senior representatives of the two sides though they participated in the staff talks..., Therefore, I think Bao Dai's representatives may have some other views.

¹⁷ Paul Henri Spaak.

¹⁸ The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Set up under Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi in 1945 was in control of the northern half of Vietnam. This government was recognized since 1950 by China and the Soviet bloc governments.

¹⁹ Bao Dai, a former emperor of Annam was the chief of State of Vietnam which France

JN: This means that there is going to be a temporary partition, only temporary. Am I correct?

Chou En-lai: Yes. That is the significance of it. Mendes-France has also told me²⁰ that a line can be drawn east to west. In connection with this question, the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed that the northern part should be integrated and complete so that it would also include the Red River Delta... The French military representative was also inclined to discuss this question. The unstable position of the French Government caused a suspension of almost three weeks up to now, and so far no reply has been given to the proposal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam...

JN: If there is going to be an east-west line, then both sides will form an integrated area on each side of the line-two solid blocks as it were. Is that not so?

Chou En-lai: Yes. That would be our view.... But the United States is not in favour of this idea. They have expressed their opposition outside but not inside the Conference.

JN: That is, they are not in favour of a temporary partition?

Chou En-lai: As for the attitude of the USA in the Conference on the Indo-China question, it is something like this..., They neither accepted nor objected to any proposals made in the Conference but merely made reservations....So, if we say that the United States is against a determination of areas, we cannot say at the same time they are in favour of the unification of the country. Their policy is to obstruct any settlement in the Conference. They are against an agreement. of course the United States would be in favour of surrender by Ho

recognized as an Associated State within the French Union.

²⁰ Chou En-lai had a meeting with Mendes-France in Berne on 23 June 1954 prior to his departure from Switzerland for New Delhi.

Chi Minh. But that would not be honourable peace for both sides.

JN: Were Bao Dai's representatives in favour of an armistice?

Chou En-lai: The representative of the Bao Dai Government was in favour of an agreement.... However, in discussions the delegates of the Bao Dai Government have put emphasis on the unification of the country under the UN and that the UN should guarantee that Bao Dai will continue as Emperor. But, of course, such a proposal can never be acceptable.

JN: Does Bao Dai intend to govern his Empire from Cannes?²¹... The present question is of drawing a ceasefire line east to west temporarily dividing that country?

Chou En-lai: Yes. That is exactly the question being discussed between the military representatives of both sides.

JN: But in the meanwhile warfare and military operations are going on. How does one determine a fluid situation?

Chou En-lai: ... If both sides agree on the readjustment of regrouping zones and on Laos and Cambodia, we have an armistice and after that, the transfer of troops.... But if there is an armistice now without determining the line, conflicts may arise.

JN: That is so. Once the principle of an armistice is agreed, then all that remains is to draw the line. But once the principle has been agreed to, would it not be possible to tone down the military operations? Otherwise each side will try to have a new line-apart from the desirability of stopping killing.

Chou En-lai: Yes,... I think what you have said about toning down military operations is a very good idea.

²¹ Chou En-lai laughed loudly at Nehru's remark.

JN: If an armistice is agreed to in principle, it helps in creating a climate for an armistice, that is, people staying where they are, subject to some minor changes in the armistice agreement.

Chou En-lai: We hope that both sides will avoid large military operations when they are discussing armistice,... The military operations should not, however, affect the determination of the areas. There may have to be some adjustments. For example, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has many areas in the South from which they may have to withdraw. Gains and losses should not affect determination of areas....

JN: Regarding Laos and Cambodia also, these military talks were going on. I saw a statement by your Excellency in a paper at Geneva that all outside troops should be withdrawn. Is that so?

Chou En-lai: It is true.

JN: I understand that one point which Your Excellency stressed was that Laos and Cambodia should not provide military bases for attack on Vietnam or China.²²⁷

Chou En-lai: Especially American military bases. The Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia have personally said to me that if these two countries have peaceful unification, they would not allow United States to build military bases.

JN: What do you mean by unification?

Chou En-lai: They think that elections should be held under their respective Governments. They think that through these elections, the people will support

²² After many weeks of deadlock at Geneva, Chou En-lai told Eden on 16 June that he thought he could persuade the Vietnam to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia, and that China would recognize their royal governments, provided there were no American bases in the territories. See Anthony Eden, *Memoirs: Full Circle* (London. 1960). p. 129.

royalist Governments there. If this is the people's will, we shall abide by it. The Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia ... told me that they would not allow US to build military bases. Mendes-France also said the same. He told me and Mr Eden that they would like to see Laos and Cambodia to become like other South-East Asian countries, e.g., India, Burma and Indonesia.

JN: That means that Laos and Cambodia should be independent and live their own lives without any interference from outside countries. Am I right?

Chou En-lai: Yes.

JN: In other words, the two countries would feel assured if they were independent neutral countries without being interfered with by other countries.

Chou En-lai: Yes. The States participating in the Geneva Conference and other States should recognize Laos and Cambodia as independent countries and make a declaration that they would not allow interference with them. At the same time, Laos and Cambodia should declare that they will not allow any foreign country to build bases there.

As regards these two countries, we should make a distinction between external and internal problems. Militarily all foreign forces should be withdrawn. On the other side measures should be taken to unify the native forces. For example, in Cambodia, these native forces should be unified and in Laos the resistance forces should...become part of the Government forces...,

JN: Your Excellency said that at a suitable moment elections should be held in Laos and Cambodia so that Governments representative of the people can be formed. How can unification and military forces affect the Governments? I can understand Governments being formed as a result of elections and then these Governments taking steps to unify the country and military forces. It is an internal problem and can be dealt with by the present Governments or by Governments formed after the elections. These internal developments can take place if external pressures are removed.

Chou En-lai: In Laos and Cambodia there are resistance movements. These have resulted in the colonial war. So, if the war is going to be stopped, not only outside forces should be withdrawn but even internal forces should be controlled. The internal problems should also be settled. In Cambodia the resistance forces are small and the internal problems can be solved early.... In Laos there is a resistance Government. We should persuade both States to make contacts. The royal government should be recognised to have the leading position...

JN: These resistance movements are a result of colonial Governments. If colonial forces are removed then the resistance forces can settle things peacefully with the existing Governments, that is, a settlement should be arrived at peacefully and not by war.

Chou En-lai: Yes. This policy is correct, as you have stated it. The Royal Government in Laos should be in the leading position and take in the resistance forces. In this way a peaceful settlement can be arrived at. Unlike the situation in Vietnam, where there are two opposing Governments.

JN: The positions are different. If there is trouble and conflict in Laos and Cambodia that is a disturbing factor in other countries of South-East Asia.... A peaceful settlement of Laos and Cambodia would produce a climate of peace for larger areas.

Chou En-lai: Yes, Your Excellency has said that these two countries should have neutral status. That is exactly what I said. They should become States of the South-East Asian type. Then they would enable the peaceful forces in South-East Asia to strengthen. It would strengthen peace and avoid internal conflict and external pressure.

JN: Your Excellency considers these two countries as those of South-East Asia, which you consider to be neutral and peaceful and you would like Laos and Cambodia to become part of South-East Asia-neutral and peaceful.

Chou En-lai: Yes, that is true.

JN: I am sure that will have a wider influence for peace in South-East Asia and in other countries also, particularly in Burma and Indonesia, the two chief countries in South-East Asia.

Chou En-lai: On this question of peace in South-East Asia and peace in Asia. I would like to exchange views and to hear whatever views Your Excellency holds.

JN: I hope Your Excellency will be meeting U Nu in Rangoon. I met him about two months back.²³ He is a very frank and forthright person. He is a good man. I like him very much. Throughout these past seven years, U Nu and his Government were very sympathetic to Ho Chi Minh. In fact in the early stages they sent him some arms, not much, as a friendly gesture. I found two months ago that their attitude had slightly changed chiefly because, shall I say so, of fear of war coming near them. If they can be assured of this area being neutralized and chances of peace increasing, I am sure it will have a powerful effect on them.

Chou En-lai: I have also heard the views of Prime Minister U Nu, which were conveyed to me by Mr V.K. Krishna Menon under Your Excellency's instructions²⁴ and for which I wish to thank you.

I think some of the questions may have resulted from misunderstandings. The view-points on some other questions have not yet been brought closer. That is why there is lack of understanding. I hope that if I can meet His Excellency U Nu, these questions can be clarified.²⁵

²³ Nehru met U Nu at the Colombo Conference of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Indonesia held from 28 April to 2 May.

²⁴ The views of U Nu were probably conveyed to Chou En-lai in Geneva in May 1954 after the Colombo Conference. See also *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.25. p. 478.

²⁵ Nehru sent a message to U Nu on 25 June: "Premier Chou En-lai...leaving 28th morning for

Our policy towards South-East Asia is one of peaceful existence. This is our policy towards India, Burma, Indonesia and even towards Pakistan and Ceylon, and now, towards Laos and Cambodia, we have the same policy.... The Foreign Minister of Laos told me that Laos is situated in the middle of so many countries.... I told him therefore that the best policy for Laos was to have neutral status and all countries round about her should respect the independence of Laos and make it a bridge for peace. As for Cambodia, it is more to the South and there is much more reason for it to be neutral.

JN: I entirely agree that if as between these countries of South-East Asia and us we can lay down principles like respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, as we have laid down between our two countries,²⁶ this would create a large area of peace. I referred some time ago to the creation of an area for peace,²⁷ that is, neutral countries which have no foreign bases in them and accept the principles of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, etc.,- it would help peace.

Chou En-lai: This is also the policy of the Government of China. Therefore, on this point we have complete agreement. If on this point Your Excellency thinks that we should do something further, we shall only be too pleased to do so.

JN. Regarding Pakistan also we want to follow the policy of peaceful coexistence. We do not wish to take any territory of Pakistan or have any conflict with them. We have unfortunately some issues pending with them like Kashmir, canal waters, refugee property, etc. Our policy is that we are not

Canton via Rangoon. He has expressed a wish to meet you and have talk with you.... Would strongly urge your inviting Chou En-lai to spend afternoon, and night in Rangoon. I consider your having a full talk with him important."

²⁶ These principles which became famous as Panchsheel, were stated in the preamble to the agreement on trade and cultural intercourse between "the Tibet region of China" and India reached between India and China on 29 April 1954.

²⁷ Nehru said this in a statement in Lok Sabha on 24 April 1954. See *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.25. pp.439-444.

against the existence of Pakistan and we want it to continue as an independent State. Unfortunately Pakistan's policy is allied with that of the USA. It is a strange mixture of fear and aggression. At present there are many American influences there. Therefore, for Pakistan to be a neutral country is rather difficult. Nevertheless, our policy is that Pakistan should continue as all independent country and any outstanding issues between us should be settled peacefully.

Chou En-lai: We understand very well this policy. We have persuaded many times the Ambassador of Pakistan in Peking²⁸ to be friendly and peaceful with India and not rely on the help of USA. Pakistan has said several times that they want to be a strong nation. We have no objection to that.

JN: Nor have we.

Chou En-lai: But relying on USA is a different matter.

JN: The difficulty with Pakistan is that they have always relied on others- sometimes the British and sometimes the Americans. If they dealt with us direct, we would have settled various problems. But this reliance on others makes things difficult.

Chou En-lai. Yes. That is the crux of the matter.

JN: When India was partitioned and Pakistan came into existence, that was a terrible blow. So far as the people of India and Pakistan are concerned, they have the same language, same habits and customs. Today there are thousands of families, half in India and half in Pakistan, e.g., a father is in India and the son is in Pakistan; one brother is in India and the other in Pakistan. It is an unnatural division. For instance, there are two brothers, one is a general in the Indian Army and another in the Pakistan Army. Also two brothers - one serving in the Indian Foreign Service and one in the Pakistan Foreign Service.

²⁸ Major General Agha Muhammad Riaza.

Chou En-Iai: Yes. It is a man-made artificial division.

JN: As Your Excellency knows, there was a powerful movement against British rule for 25 to 30 years. The people who are now running Pakistan were the people who were opposing the movement and helping the British. So the British were helping them to get Pakistan in order to create an area under British control. In Pakistan the persons who came into power came in with British help. They have no roots in the people. Two recent facts are interesting (1) After Independence, about ten thousand British Officers left India. Many of them went to Pakistan and became high officers there. They were very bitter against India because we had kicked them out. They have caused more trouble between India and Pakistan than the Pakistanis themselves. (2) About three months ago, there were elections in East Pakistan. They were unique. Out of three hundred and nine seats, three hundred were won by the Opposition and only nine by Government, in spite of Government pressure.²⁹ That shows popular feeling was against the Government. They have now suppressed these popular forces and there is martial law. I said that British influence in Pakistan had set them against us. Now it is not British influence but American influence, because American money is flowing there.

Chou En-lai: Yes. This reliance on outside forces has been most disadvantageous between these two brother States.... They could have been friendly and cordial. but' outside interference has made things worse. However, people still want to have unity with India. East Pakistan elections have shown this.

²⁹ The elections held between 8 and 11 March resulted in an overwhelming victory for the United Front, an alliance of the Opposition parties which secured 223 of the 237 seats reserved for Muslims and 10 of the 72 seats for the minorities. The United Front's programme envisaged recognition of Bengali along with Urdu as an official language, rejection of the draft Constitution, dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and its replacement by a directly elected body, and complete autonomy for East Pakistan in all matters except defence, foreign affairs and currency.

JN: I have no doubt that many people in Pakistan want unity, but we have deliberately not said anything. Politically Pakistan is backward. Their rulers all belong to the feudal class. Their chief propaganda is that India is going to attack them. If we say anything, they exploit it and fan hostility. That is why we do not say anything.

One result of the situation in Indo-China has been that East Pakistan has become a little more important in their eyes because if there is war in South-East Asia, East Pakistan is more important-otherwise they did not attach importance to East Pakistan. Their propaganda is chiefly by American sources, that East Pakistan is going Communist. There are many people who want to abolish landlordism, etc., but they are not Communists. The Americans bring in the charge of communism and the Pakistan rulers use it to bring in martial law. I mentioned all this about Pakistan to Your Excellency just to clear our position. I am afraid Pakistan will follow American direction so long as the present Government lasts. Any proposal regarding peace we make with the present Government of Pakistan does not come about. Even at the Colombo Conference Pakistan gave a lot of trouble.³⁰

Now, to come back to South-East Asia, Pakistan considers itself not a South-East Asian country but a West Asian country. Pakistan wants to have alliances with West Asian countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, etc. They are not friendly with Afghanistan. We should consider the real South-East Asian countries from the point of view of bringing about this neutral area of peace.

Chou En-Iai: What about Ceylon?

JN: About Ceylon, there is not much to say. It is a small island. They have not

³⁰ On 28 April 1954, the opening day of the Colombo Conference. Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, assailed the Indian position in respect of Kashmir and sought to block discussions on Indo-China and world peace by insisting on the Kashmir question being settled first. The Prime Ministers eventually decided that the subject could not form part of the Conference agenda. Pakistan, also strenuously opposed India's suggestion for a call for "non-intervention" in Indo-China or banning of military aid from outside as she seemed to be concerned about not offending the US and also about not compromising her own stand on Kashmir and acceptance of US military aid.

had much to do with international affairs. Her independence was fin accident which followed India's struggle for independence. There is no background of anti-colonial struggle in Ceylon. It has a rich soil which produces a lot without much effort. The present Government is conservative and needlessly afraid of India because it thinks that India is a big country on top of them. But we have no such designs. The people of Ceylon are the same as Indians and very friendly to us. Ceylon does not count much internationally. But it 5 a little apprehensive. The real countries in South-East Asia, apart from India, are Burma and Indonesia. I might however mention that in spite of our troubles with Pakistan, our personal relations with Pakistan are quite good.

Chou En-lai: I mentioned Ceylon because the new Government there has not been very friendly to China. As regards our trade with Ceylon, we have been most considerate to them... Their representatives came to China thrice But they have not accepted our representatives, although we said we would talk only about trade. Our regard for Ceylon has beer greater because she is a small country. However, the major States in South-East Asia are standing on the side of peace.

I agree with Your Excellency that these are India, Burma and Indonesia Now we shall try to include in this Laos and Cambodia. As for Ceylon we can make some efforts and enlarge this area of peace.

JN: Yes. Of course. We should make efforts even in the case of Pakistan Ceylon is concerned really with only two or three things, e.g., price of rubber, rice, etc.,..

Conversation with Chou En-lai (II)³¹

³¹ Second session, New Delhi, 10 pm to midnight, 25 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extract.

Jawaharlal Nehru: We were discussing of how we can make South-East Asia an area of peace.... Of course if peace can be achieved in Indo-China that would be a step forward. What else can be done?

Chou En-tai: I have talked about the question of Indo-China. Now it is up to the two sides...to work the concrete problems within the next three weeks,,. Another question I did not mention is that of international supervision which was discussed in the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Maybe within the next three weeks it will become crystallised.... But one thing has been decided, that is, India will be the Chairman.... This is good and shows that we all have confidence in India. The efforts made by Mr Menon have a great bearing on this.

JN: Mr Eden asked me as to how far, we were willing to take responsibilities in any Commission that may be appointed. We replied that we were prepared to assume responsibilities in the interests of peace -- but obviously we could not come in unilaterally at the request of one party, but only if there was a settlement and both sides requested us.³² Secondly, we should like to know the terms of the settlement, functions of the Commission, etc. Subject to this, we would assume responsibilities....

Chou En-lai: ...The work and functions and responsibilities of the Commission ... will have to be worked out along with the armistice terms.

If the armistice terms are clear, the functions and responsibilities of the Commission are also clear.

Then we will have to settle the position of the Commission, but in any case India's place as Chairman of the Commission has been settled.... The status of India as a neutral State has been made clear after the Soviet delegate proposed India as Chairman.

³² See *ante*, p. 345.

JN: Your Excellency said that it has been settled that India should be Chairman of the Commission. Has that been accepted by all the parties?

Chou En-lai: Of course we have not reached agreement on this because the question of the composition is still at issue. But on this question of India's Chairmanship, I have contacted both sides concerned and I have not heard any objection. The US attitude is not very clear --sometimes they want UN and sometimes Colombo Powers....

JN: Did Mr Eden agree to India being Chairman?

Chou En-tai: I have said to him that we have settled the question of India as Chairman.... He did not say anything except that we should make the functions and responsibilities of the Commission clearer.

JN: Did Mendes-France say anything about it?

Chou En-Iai: I mentioned this question to Mendes-France.... He did not make any objection....

JN: It amounts to this that until the armistice is settled, the question of composition cannot be taken up and it is still more or less an open question.

Chou En-lai: Yes.... However, according to my judgment, asking India to be Chairman should be acceptable to all....

JN: I suppose the main responsibility of observing the armistice would be on the two armies and the main function of the Commission will be to act as observers and decide minor cases of infringement. Am I right?

Chou En-Iai: If we settle the question of drawing a line in Vietnam and if we also settle the question of Laos and Cambodia, then the international supervision can consist of three kinds of work:

- (i) work of a temporary nature, e.g., to observe whether the line is according to agreement, withdrawal of troops, transfer of prisoners of war...
- (ii) This would take long, e.g., specifying ports of entry in both areas and preventing introduction of new weapons and ammunition. new armed forces or armed personnel for either side...
- (iii) This is to see if there are any activities threatening peace...

Even in Korea, in spite of the continuous clamouring from Syngman Rhee, we still carried out the armistice.

JN: The Chairman will only come in if there is equality of votes, otherwise decisions will be by majority. Am I right?

Chou En-lai: No matter, whether we have five or three States to form the Commission, there will be one or two States closer to one side and the other two States closer to the other side. But India as Chairman would have the final voice.

JN: Yes. Now the various functions Your Excellency has mentioned -- all this would require a large number of troops. Who would supply these troops?

Chou En-lai: As to the armistice line, if we do as the French have proposed i.e., draw the line east to west, it should not be very long unlike in Korea As for the ports, there will be same number of ports as there are so many States. These will include land, air and sea ports.

JN: True, but who will supply the troops?

Chou En-lai: I have talked over with Mr Menon about this question. I said that troops will not be necessary....

JN: You have mentioned ports. Supposing an allegation is made that anus and

ammunition are coming in from China to Vietnam, who is to guard and carry out the supervision?

Chou En-lai: This becomes a political question, as we would have to station troops everywhere in all the three States-along the ports inland -- this would be tantamount to surrounding the three States-which is inconceivable. So this question should be settled by providing guarantees by the participating States. We can check the main ports and the imports through them. If we should be asked to guard the frontier of any one nation, we will have to guard the frontier of every nation.

JN: Of course, that is impossible. The land frontier is different from the seaports. What are they to do on the land frontier except to sit at one place and listen to complaints. They can do nothing except depend on the good faith of the parties concerned.

Chou En-lai: Yes. This depends on the 'two States concerned and also on the States participating in the Conference and others.... Good faith is of primary importance so that no foreign country sets up bases in Indo China.... We feel that if all parties concerned want an armistice, ...then there will be peace.... So the question is whether the US wants to fight; so, there is going to be war.

JN: If other countries do not want to fight, it will be difficult for the US to start the fight.

Chou En-lai: Yes. If other countries do not want to fight, it is possible to prevent war.

JN: I asked these questions to understand the position. I also wanted to point out the differences: (1) We have to deal with Indo-China as a whole and not with Laos and Cambodia only; (2) There is no question of employing large numbers of troops but only small number of forces for guard duties.

Chou En-Iai: Yes. That is just true.

JN: Would other countries supply part of the forces required or does one country supply the whole lot? What is your Excellency's conception of the number required-say 500-less or more?

Chou En-Iai: ...As for the number required, that will depend upon the number of ports selected. As for who should supply these forces - one or more powers - when we think about it, we shall convey our views through your Embassy in Peking or your Consul-General in Geneva.... This question is related with the armistice. So we have spent some time in giving Your Excellency some background information....

JN: When I asked these questions, I was thinking of the kind of picture that a settlement would present, e.g., the numbers of troops required.... Generally speaking we are prepared to cooperate with any country even though we may not like that country.

Chou En-Iai: Yes. We understand this spirit of India.

JN: The question I put to Your Excellency at the beginning of this session this evening was what are your Excellency's views regarding developing this area of peace -- in this part of Asia.

Chou En-Iai: As to making this part of Asia an area of peace, we would like to see the relationship existing between India and China to be prevalent in this area. For instance, in the preamble of our Trade Agreement on Tibet, between India and China, there were certain principles. If these principles are applied to all States of Asia, that would be very beneficial.... In this way we can prevent US attempts to organise military blocs in this area. As to how to extend this relationship which exists between India and China and how to make it apply to other States, I would like to hear Your Excellency's views, as your Excellency knows these States and their Governments in Asia much better.

JN: I agree with your line of thought-that these principles should be applied. They would be gladly accepted by these States. Certainly by Burma and Indonesia. How to give a more explicit and positive shape to this and when? I think the best time would be after the settlement in Indo-China.

Chou En-lai: Yes, we should make efforts to facilitate its settlement and this should be settled first because there is a war on....However, at the same time we should consider the question of Burma,.. I wonder whether Your Excellency considers that China should take the initiative in proposing to Burma a similar agreement as the one with India.

JN: Your Excellency will be meeting U Nu. I think it will be desirable for Your Excellency to suggest to U Nu something on these lines. Of course, our agreement dealt with a number of small matters. I do not know if there are any such small matters between China and Burma. But in any case, affirmation of these principles, even before an agreement is arrived at, a declaration by both China and Burma adhering to these principles, would be a step forward and these could later be followed by an agreement.

Chou En-lai: I thank Your Excellency for your advice. We shall consider it. If on my way back to Peking, U Nu is in Rangoon and willing to talk, I should be willing to take the initiative.

JN: May I suggest that the first step would be for China and Burma to make a declaration of this kind and then follow it up with Indonesia. That is, it is better perhaps to have bilateral declarations rather than joint declarations. For instance, India and China have done it and now China and Burma, then India and Burma, then China and Indonesia and then India and Indonesia and so on. This is the first step. Maybe later, it can take some other shape.

Chou En-lai: Yes. What Your Excellency suggests is a very good idea. I shall study Your Excellency's suggestion....

JN: Your Excellency must be aware of US proposals regarding South-East Asia Treaty Organisation³³ on the lines of NATO. We are totally opposed to it, Now Mr. Eden has proposed an Eastern Locarno.³⁴ We do not know what exactly his idea is.

Chou En-lai: Maybe his idea is that of a fraternity. Mr Eden did not make this suggestion in Geneva but may have thought of it later.

JN: Yes. Re has made it only yesterday.³⁵ I do not remember Locarno Treaty provisions in detail. The treaty was made more than 27 years ago and meant mainly for Germany and France and a kind of mutual agreement,³⁶ As far as I can make out, the idea of an Eastern Locarno means that the countries of

³³ On 4 April 1954 the US had proposed to Britain and France the establishment of an ad hoc coalition, comprising US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand the Philippines and the three Associated States or Indo-China for organizing the collective defence of South-East Asia in order to check "Communism expansion in the area. The proposal was formalized by the signing of the SLATO treaty on September 1954 at Manila by US, UK, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

³⁴ Eden expressed the hope in the House of Commons on 23 June that it might be possible to agree on some kind of a reciprocal arrangement for the defence of South-East Asia in which both sides took part such as Locarno. As reported by *The Times* (London), Eden said, "We could also have a defensive alliance such as NATO was in Europe.... Those two systems would be quite different but need not be inconsistent. He added that there would never be any real security in the region without the goodwill of the free Asian countries.

³⁵ In fact, replying to Nehru's message of 4 May 1954 [see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.25. pp. 435-4361, wherein he spoke of the possibility of guarantees by other countries, including India, to help to effect a settlement and ensure its continuance in Indo-China. Eden wrote on 9 May, "As I understand your message you favour an arrangement rather similar to the Locarno Treaty whereby the guaranteeing powers would undertake to oppose violation of the Agreement by any party.... I should certainly like to give it serious study for I have always felt this to be the best solution available."

³⁶ The agreement reached in 1925 at Locarno, Switzerland guaranteed post-1919 frontiers between France, Belgium and Germany and demilitarization of the Rhineland. The treaty was signed by France, Germany and Belgium and guaranteed by Britain and Italy. The 'spirit of Locarno' symbolized hopes for an era of international peace and goodwill.

South-East Asia should think of an area of peace. I do not know if this is what Mr Eden means.

Chou En-lai: It means that Mr Eden in his report to Parliament put these two ideas on the same side – on the one hand an Eastern Locarno and on the other SEATO.

JN: I think he made them as alternative proposals.

Chou En-lai: I merely read news agency reports. If this is so, then there it no conflict.

JN: I have also seen only news agency reports. Re further said that SEATO would have no meaning unless South-East Asian countries joined it.

Chou En-lai: That is true. If it is for peace and not war in South-East Asia these South-East Asian countries should be made parties. Otherwise it should be for war and not for peace.

JN: That is so. I think that Mr Eden has made the Americans' angry and therefore he is putting these alternatives before them. The solution is at organisation essentially based on South-East Asian countries plus some other countries, maybe.

Chou En-lai: I agree that part of Eden's statement was for the benefit of USA.

JN: I think Your Excellency is tired now. You had a long journey last night.

Chou En-lai: I hope we shall have a chance to continue discussion tomorrow.... I am very glad to have had such a rare chance of exchanging views with Your Excellency so frankly and fully.

JN: I also want to take full advantage of this opportunity. Incidentally, we may

have to tell the Press something. We may draft a short statement.

Chou En-lai: A joint statement perhaps? Shall we leave it to the host?

JN. Yes. We shall do so day after tomorrow morning when you go to Agra and then you may see it....

Conversation with Chou En-lai (III)³⁷

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Jawaharlal Nehru: I had a message from Moscow today. Our representative saw Mr Molotov³⁸. He seems to be partly pleased with the work at Geneva-not wholly. He hinted he may have to go back to Geneva by 10th July.

Chou En-lai: Yes, that is, within three weeks....

JN: Ever since the question of Your Excellency's coming here arose, some or the countries who were in the Colombo Conference were very much interested. I sent them messages³⁹ and I kept them informed, I shall now convey to them-not necessarily everything-but a brief indication of our talks so that they do not feel left out. There is no difficulty about Burma and Indonesia, but anything

JN: I send to Ceylon or Pakistan is bound to get out -- so I have to be careful

³⁷ Third session. New Delhi. 10.45 am to 12.15 pm, 26 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Extracts.

³⁸ P.N. Kaul, Second Secretary in the Indian Embassy in Moscow had conveyed to Molotov Nehru's appreciation of the important part played by him in the progress made in Geneva.

³⁹ Not printed here.

what to tell them.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Your Excellency has to decide what should be sent to these countries.

JN: One has to exercise one's discretion.

Chou En-lai: I am very anxious to know Your Excellency's views on the present situation in Asia.... I would also like to know Your Excellency's views on East Asia, especially on the Pacific area....

JN: About three weeks ago, I had the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr Casey, with me⁴⁰. Did your Excellency meet him?

Chou En-lai: Yes, I met him in Geneva when he went there this time.

JN: Australia and New Zealand are, on the one hand, very intimately connected with England-it is more emotion than anything else. But since the last War they have been drawn more to America, for example, the ANZUS Pact. When I met Casey, he said that they were feeling more and more that American foreign policy was unrealistic and would lead nowhere. They don't want to break with America, but he told me they would put pressure on USA to change its policy, to be more realistic, for example, regarding an armistice in Indo-China.

Chou En-lai: Mr Casey told me that he was in favour of neutralising Laos and Cambodia. This was after he heard what Mr Eden had told him.

JN: These countries feel that American policy is not the right one. At the same time, they do not want to break with America. So there are these two pulls. Of course, if something extreme happens, there might be even a break. They want to avoid that.

⁴⁰ On 10 June 1954, See ante pp 346-347.

The countries of West Asia are very backward -- everyone of them. They are small and very much under the influence of those who supply them with money and arms. In West Asia there have been large areas of British influence-now they tend to pass under American influence, chiefly because America is supplying them with money and arms. That is to say, the Governments and not the people of these States are under American influence. The big question for the Arab world is that of Israel. It is a small country, but it is probably strong enough to beat all the Arab countries put together. They are afraid of it. So they have no policy of any kind-they have reactions, they have fears and they do Riot even hold together amongst themselves.

Chou En-lai: When Your Excellency said that Israel is strong enough to deal with the Arab countries put together, did you mean militarily strong enough?

JN: Yes, the reason is not that Israel is strong, but that the others are weak. Israel almost defeated them, but the UN came in the way.⁴¹

American policy is very peculiar. On the one hand they are trying to win these Arab countries over from the British, and on the other hand the Jews in America are very powerful. On the one hand they want to win over the Arabs, and on the other they don't want to annoy the Jews.

Egypt probably wants a settlement about the Suez Canal. There has been a strong feeling against the MEDO, but no one can be sure what will happen, partly because of weakness and partly because whoever gives the arms gains the influence in these countries. In fact, in all these Arab countries there have been no popular movements-there have been occasionally popular insurrections.

I was in Egypt last year.⁴² Our relations are fairly good with all the Arab countries, as well as with Israel, except that Israel is a little distant. We have

⁴¹ As soon as the State of Israel was proclaimed on 4 May 1948, she was attacked by the forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. By 7 January 1949, when ceasefire was established under tile auspices of the UN, the Israel forces had not only repulsed the Arab forces but had gained control of 75% of the Palestinian territory and expelled about 800000 Palestinians from their homes.

recognised Israel, but we have no diplomatic relations with them yet. Last year when I met the Egyptians, they told me they wanted to recognise new China, but probably they are afraid of America. They said they would do it later.

Chou En-lai: Is the new Government in Egypt fairly established?

JN: It is firm at the moment, but at its head are young military officers. They are in earnest, but with no experience or political knowledge. They are nationalistic, but with no roots in the people except that they are popular because they kicked out the King.

The whole politics of Western Asia turns round oil. For instance, the King of Hejaz⁴³ gets royalties to the tune of three hundred to four hundred million dollars. Some other small rulers get fifty to hundred million dollars, that is, only in royalties. Iran and Iraq are also oil countries and oil determines everything there. The King of Hejaz came to Pakistan a few months ago.⁴⁴ He has so much money that he does not know what to do with it. He spent about two million rupees in about ten days in Pakistan giving presents to the Governor-General, the Prime Minister and everybody, like big American cars, etc.

One thing more.... In the old days, that is to say, fifty years ago or more, it was British policy to build up an Islamic bloc to support themselves, in that sense that policy was carried on recently through Pakistan-to have an Islamic bloc. But other West Asian countries did not support it. They are more nationalistic than religious⁴⁵...

Chou En-lai:Your Excellency said that the national and popular movements in West Asia are not mature. Does that mean that there is lack of mature

⁴² Nehru was in Cairo from 22 to 25 June 1953.

⁴³ Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (1902-1969), King of Saudi Arabia. 1953-64.' also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. 18, p.207.

⁴⁴ Accompanied by 22 princes and six ministers, King Abdul Aziz paid an official visit to Pakistan from 14 to 24 April 1954.

⁴⁵ At this stage, Nehru read out a telegram from Rangoon conveying U Nu's deep appreciation of Chou En-lai's proposed visit to Rangoon and asking him to stay the night there.

leaders in these States?

JN:I suppose so. There are many reasons. Middle Eastern politics is one of assassination and *coup d'état*.

Chou En-Iai: Is it the present situation that the United States is gradually replacing Britain and US influence is increasing?

JN: In a sense, yes, but only with Governments. The US is not popular with the people.

Chou En-Iai: The living conditions of people in this area are still very bad?

JN: Yes, of course, something flows out from oil and something remains behind

Chou En-Iai: Afghanistan has very good relations with India. Is it different from other West Asian States?

JN: Yes. Afghanistan has not good relations with Pakistan. That is because of the tribal area in the North of Pakistan. In the last one hundred years the British Government never succeeded in suppressing them. Their profession is riding and kidnapping. The British adopted two methods to deal with them- military expeditions and bribery.

Some of the tribal territory is in Pakistan and some in Afghanistan. It was not technically part of India, but semi-independent. Afghanistan wants this tribal area to be given independence, but Pakistan would not agree. This is a matter at issue between them. We have tried not to interfere in this matter, but our sympathies are with the tribal people. Some of their old leaders were our friends.

There was an attempt by the United States to make a League of Pakistan and Afghanistan,⁴⁶ but they failed.

⁴⁶ The US considered bringing about a confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan as of the means of strengthening Afghanistan and countering Soviet pressures. The possibility of some

None of the Western Asian States can be considered very stable. They are not well-organised, nor do they have stable leadership. But there is an emotional urge in the people which does not find satisfaction. The old British policy was to encourage religious sentiment, that is, the policy that Pakistan is following in these countries, to form an Islamic bloc. We are friendly with Egypt and with other Arab countries also. This Islamic bloc policy will not go down with them.

Chou En-Iai: In this area, the population is not much?

JN: Not much. It is a desert area. The total population of the Arab countries is less than thirty million and more than half of this is in Egypt.

Chou En-lai. Is Afghanistan included in this?

JN: No, Afghanistan is not Arab.

Chou En-lai: Iran and Afghanistan are also Islamic countries?

JN: Yes, they are both Islamic. Iran belongs to one particular sect of Islam different from the others.

In all these countries there is a certain Islamic renaissance movement. Sometimes it takes a narrow bigoted shape, sometimes not so narrow. Take, for example, Indonesia. There is a small revolt still going on there, a kind of very bigoted movement for a religious State.⁴⁷

form of confederation was explored at discussions between Pakistan and Afghan representatives in Karachi in March 1954. A policy statement approved by President Eisenhower on 11 December 1954, however, found undesirable positive US efforts in bringing about the confederation due to impracticality and the risk of adverse reaction from India and the USSR, though the concept of an eventual confederation developed logically and gradually, was not ruled out.

⁴⁷ Dar-ul-Islam, a Muslim terrorist organization aiming at the overthrow of the secular republic and its replacement by an Islamic State. organized armed revolts in several towns of North Sumatra in September 1953 and intensified its activities in West Java.

Then there is a big party partly Islamic and moderately socialistic.⁴⁸ They call it Islamic Socialism. The present party in power in Indonesia is the Indonesian Nationalist Party.

Chou En-Iai: Is it impossible for India to get Thailand into the South-East Asian countries-as it should be according to its position?

JN: Yes, it should be. Nothing is impossible, but Your Excellency knows the position in Thailand.

For the first time, Thailand is experiencing economic difficulties. So far the price of rice was high. Now the price has fallen and there is acute pressure on Thailand's economy which depends on rice. We can try. There is a small group of people on top and the rest of the people are lazy, as they do not need to work.

Chou En-lai: Do they export much rice?⁴⁹

JN: Yes, we have a Thai delegation here now wanting to sell us rice." But we do not want any.

Chou En-lai: They export large quantities of rice?

JN: Yes. Burma and Thailand are the two large rice exporting countries, but if we have to buy rice, we would rather buy it from Burma. All these countries in South-East and Western Asia are making frequent demands on us for teachers, doctors and engineers, technicians, etc., as they are afraid of getting them from England or America.

Chou En-lai: What is the policy of UK and USA towards Thailand?

JN: Usually we consider Thailand under the thumb of the US. Britain, I do not

⁴⁸ Masjmi or the Modernist Moslem Party.

⁴⁹ The official Thai trade mission met Nehru on 4 June 1954.

think, has very much to do there.

A rather interesting development in Africa is the coming of Sudan as a ~ country. We sent an expert to conduct the elections there.⁵⁰

Chou En-lai: What will happen after the elections? Will it be independent or associated with Egypt?

JN: England wanted it to be associated with herself and Egypt with herself.

What is likely is that it will become independent.

Chou En-lai: What is the relationship of India to Japan?

SN: There is no special relationship. We have our Ambassador there.⁵¹ There is some trade-nothing much. There is some competition in trade matters, because we export textiles and they cut us down.

Chou En-lai: how do they do it?

JN: By cutting down their prices. For example, our textiles go to Africa and South-East Asia, and meet with Japan's competition there.

Chou En-lai: Indonesia is going to hold a conference of Asian and African Powers. What is the exact state of affairs?

JN: I cannot understand it myself. It is not clear whether it will be at an official or non-official level.

⁵⁰ Sukumar Sen was sent to Sudan as the Chairman of the International Electoral Commission that conducted the general elections there from 2 November to 5 December 1953. The condominium of the UK and Egypt over Sudan had come to an end after the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12 February 1953.

⁵¹ M.A. Rauf.

Chou En-lai: Have there been any open contacts between the Governments in this matter?

JN: In 1947 we had here an Asian Conference⁵² -- not on political question~ but rather for cultural and other purposes. I convened it as a private person, but when it was held I was in the Government. Therefore, it got a little mixed up There were representatives of 8ovlet Asia also. Then, we held a conference on Indonesia in 1949 when the Dutch attacked Indonesia.⁵³ This was at an official level and consisted of Asian Countries and Australia. Actually nothing much happened again. It has been hanging fire. Various proposals have been made from time to time. Suppose, we call a conference, whom do we invite? -- Governments or the people who are oppressed. There are all kinds of difficulties. I think Your Excellency should rest a little before lunch.

Chou En-lai: This morning I asked Your Excellency many questions and have learnt a lot from Your Excellency....

Conversation with Chou En-lai (IV)⁵⁴

Jawaharlal Nehru: As Your Excellency was going away this morning you said you had one or two questions to ask me. I have also many questions to ask Your Excellency. Perhaps you would ask me first. Of course, there is not lack of

⁵² The Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Twenty-eight Asian countries attended the Conference. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 2, pp 501-523.

⁵³ The Asian Conference on Indonesia was held at New Delhi from 20 to 23 January 1949. Nehru was elected Chairman of the Conference. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.9, pp. 143.182.

⁵⁴ Fourth session. New Delhi, 3 pm to 5 pm, 26 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Extracts.

questions.

Chou En-Iai: All right. I shall start. It is our hope that after this meeting there will be even greater cooperation between our two countries in the economic, cultural and political spheres. What should, in Your Excellency's opinion, be done in furtherance of this?

JN: I agree with Your Excellency's view that we should work for further cooperation in these spheres. So far as the political sphere is concerned, it is difficult to define. For example, we are cooperating in finding a solution in Indo-China. Of course, we must also cooperate on the cultural and economic plane. The real basis is a feeling of friendly confidence in each other. I am not talking of India and China only but speaking generally.

Speaking of India, there is a slight fear -- not much - whether in Ceylon or Pakistan or Burma-that India is a bigger country, perhaps stronger than these. China is also a powerful country, an integrated and powerful State. Therefore, there is a fear, not in India but in other countries. It should be our effort to remove such fears regarding India and China, 'there is a big propaganda in Africa by Europeans-not by Africans-that India wants to expand, turn out Europeans and set up her empire in Africa.'⁵⁵ We have told our Indians there that they can only stay in these countries with the goodwill of the people of those countries. So we have to create confidence among the people of these Countries.

Chou En-lai: What Your Excellency said is very true.... Although the political systems in our two countries are not entirely alike, yet our countries have been liberated from imperialism and both our countries have certain common characteristics of oriental civilisation. So we can use these five principles to

⁵⁵ For example, D.F. Malan, the South African Prime Minister said in the South African Parliament on 4 May 1954, "Mr Nehru is not hiding the fact that he has his eyes on Africa.... He wants Europeans and the white man out of Africa. Therefore he has embarked on a policy of 'anti-colonialism'." He added. "Mr Nehru and I say this deliberately, is an enemy of the white man."

build our self-confidence and also our mutual confidence. This will have a great influence on other countries and will stake them feel gradually that peaceful coexistence is possible....

JN: The way for us to proceed is in the Light of those principles to which reference has been made. Therefore the more we refer to those principles -- and other countries too --the better it is. More than that it is the tangible confidence that we produce which is important. There are outside and internal forces which create fear. Therefore, one has to take positive steps to create confidence, even more than make declarations. In the world at large today, there are conflicts and tendencies to expand, but, more than anything else, there is a fear which leads countries to misbehave. If we could get over that fear -- first in our own area of South-East Asia and then elsewhere-it would help to solve the world's problems.

If I may strike a personal note--because I want to be frank -- if I may say so, I do not consider myself much of a politician -- not the normal type of politician. Politicians differ no doubt. Your Excellency has gone through very great experience and hardships throughout your life. In our life, we have also gone through hardships and spent many years in prison. Some factors may be different, but there is a certain commonness, and so I do not find any difficulty in understanding and appreciating the background of China -- the recent developments during the last ten or twenty years. Unfortunately, I have not been there and I want to go there. It is my earliest desire that China and India as they are circumstanced today, can play a considerable part in security peace in the world and helping each other. I am very anxious to further that end -- it is a selfish end too because want my own country to be part of the area of peace. We want to build our countries. I have not the least conflict in my mind. All our effort is towards constructive purpose and there is no conflict. I am, therefore, very happy that Your Excellency has come here not merely because of the Indo-China problem but because of this larger background. I have been influenced and my whole generation in India has been powerfully influenced by Mr Gandhi. And we achieved our results in a rather different way from what we ourselves imagined. For instance, we gained our Independence,

and, at the same time, we did not become hostile to England. We decided to maintain some kind of a loose and vague link with the Commonwealth. It is very vague and is not even mentioned in our Constitution. We can break it by merely writing a letter to England. We decided to continue the link not only to derive some benefit but because we thought it would contribute to world peace. For instance, we have broken our relations with South Africa.⁵⁶ Our relations with Canada are not much though they are closer than with Australia. In the Commonwealth India's influence has become more and more and we have influenced the policy of the Commonwealth considerably. Therefore, we have tried to gain our objective without breaking away from the Commonwealth. As I told Your Excellency last evening, we wiped out all the Princely States peacefully by giving the Rulers pensions...not that the pensions will last long. We could have wiped them out by force also, but we did not do this. This is due to Gandhiji's approach. We make mistakes, but we try to learn from our mistakes.

Our relations with the United States are not good. We follow our policy but we avoid publicly denouncing the USA. Of course, our policy is different. We follow our own policy as clearly as possible without denouncing any one because there is already too much denouncing in the world today. Why should we add to it?

Chou En-Iai: ...If we want to construct peace and prevent war. I agree entirely with your Excellency that China and India bear great responsibility in making this effort especially in Asia.

JN: If we consider the present moment, perhaps no country is more afraid

⁵⁶ On 26 June 1954, the GOI announced their decision to close the Indian High Commission in South Africa, after the Union of South Africa informed them on March 1954 that the Union could no longer accept the 'anomalous position' that India had maintained representation in the Union for eight years while continuing trade sanctions against her. In February 1946, India had terminated her trade agreement with South Africa as a protest against the introduction in the Union Parliament of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill prohibiting the occupation and acquisition of property by Indians in Natal and called her High Commissioner back when the Bill was passed on 25 May 1946.

than the USA. It is a powerful country and yet it is afraid,⁵⁷ and it is more afraid than any country in Europe although, actually, if there is war, England will be in greater danger. It is mainly fear and pride in sticking to wrong policy. Their policy is based on their fear of what they call "international communism" which they think wants to conquer the world. To some extent, though to a much less extent, people in Western Europe are also afraid. On the other hand, the United States is building hundreds of bases around Soviet Russia and China thereby creating an impression in the minds of Soviet Russia and China that they will be attacked. Thus we get this vicious circle of fear.

I cannot influence American thought very much although I get large numbers of letters from ordinary people from America against American policy at present and appreciating India's policy. But, apart from America, Asia and Europe act and react on each other.

Chou En-lai: Yes, we must make efforts to remove such entirely groundless, baseless fear which exists in Asia.... If we can do this in Asia, we can. First of all in Asia, frustrate this attempt of the United States to create fear. That will have a good effect on the rest of the world.

JN: That is so. Revolution, that is, real revolution, cannot be exported. The kind of fear in certain countries is of a conspiratorial character which may or may not lead to a revolution but which upsets the balance. American propaganda against "international communism" has not much effect except in some countries. For example, certain groups of people belonging to the Communist Party are thought to act according to the dictates of a foreign country. This rubs against the nationalist feeling and is, therefore, exploited.

Chou En-lai: do not know exactly the activities of the Communist Parties in different countries. The second question is regarding propaganda. After World War II, the USA has monopolised propaganda. We had American propaganda also in China for a few years, but it failed because it was not popular....As Your Excellency talked to me frankly I also told you frankly what I know about the

⁵⁷ Chou En-lai laughed at that remark.

actual situation.

JN: United States propaganda has been on the whole remarkably unsuccessful. They think they can win over the minds of people by money but the minds of masses cannot be won over by money. What I was referring to was not the attitude of great States like Soviet Russia and China but rather the attitude of local Communist Parties which some times rub up against nationalist feelings. Thus, they would run down their own country and leaders and praise others outside and appear to be more interested in others than in their own country and people. I shall tell you an interesting thing. For instance, about a year or two after the Chinese revolution, the Communist Party of India criticised the Communist Party of China and called it deviationist, but later they realised their mistake and praised the Communist Party of China.⁵⁸

Chou En-lai: That is exactly why the Communist Party of India has not yet achieved anything

JN: To come back to our particular problem of India and China in South-East Asia, there are three factors involved:

(I) We are both big countries, and, to some extent, actually strong and potentially strong or going to be strong. Therefore, there is apprehension in some small countries about us.

(2) Many of our nationals have gone abroad. In South-East Asia, there are more Chinese than Indians while in West Asia and Ceylon, there are more

⁵⁸ B.T. Ranadive, General Secretary, CPI, had been opposing a trend within the Party towards "right" deviation urging collaboration with the peasantry and 'soft-peddling of the proletarian dictatorship. He also condemned Mao Tse Tung's theories as 'horrible and reactionary.'" After the Cominform journal. *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, editorially announced on 27 January 1950 that the path pursued by the Chinese Communists was the only correct path for colonial and dependent peoples and the CPI had to learn a lot from them, the CPI journal, *Communist* in its issue of February-March 1950 declared the adherence of the Party to the Cominform line. On 19 July 1950, Ranadive was replaced by Rajeshwar Rao as General Secretary.

Indians. That is also a cause of fear in these countries.

(3) Fear of "international communism" through the activities of local Communist Parties.

We have been discussing how to meet these difficulties. If we can remove these fears, the task becomes easier. Each country has to be considered separately.

Does Your Excellency know the Burmese people?

Chou En-lai: I had no chance to know them.

JN: They are a very friendly people rather childlike. They have the virtues and failings of children. They are calm and composed. They are very proud, and, therefore, sometimes take offence very easily. But they are a very nice people and hospitable and friendly. U Nu is different from the average Burman. He is a very fine man. It is not U Nu but some of his colleagues in his Cabinet who have been causing trouble. When I was in Colombo, he said to me, "You can agree to anything you like, but I have to refer everything to my Cabinet." If I may say so without conceit -- of all these people in South-East Asia, the Chinese and Indians are the most mature, individuals apart. So one has to be very careful and to be friendly with the others so that they may not get ally inferiority complex.

Tomorrow when Your Excellency goes to Agra, we shall try to draft a statement.... What should be the contents of this statement?

JN: ...I certainly agree that these principles should be mentioned. Certainly, we should say something about the desirability of a speedy ceasefire in Indo-China and that that should lead to a settlement. In this connection, shall we say in regard to South-East Asian countries, more especially Indo-China, that we would like to see them as independent neutral States which are not used for any aggressive purposes?

Chou En-lai: If you are going to make a reference to tile Indo-China question,

then we have to mention...that all the three States should be independent, and that none of these States should be used as military bases by any foreign country or to use. Your Excellency's phrase, "None of these States should be used for aggressive purposes."... Your Excellency has said, "neutral". I say, "of the South-East Asian type." We have to consider how we should word this....

JN: Could we not say that each of these countries should be independent and should be allowed to develop according to its wishes and genius and should not be used for any aggressive purpose? I quite appreciate that "neutral" is used loosely and has no clear significance. What I mean is that they should have the freedom to develop according to their light and not be used for aggression against their neighbours. We need not name any countries. It would include the countries outside Indo-China too.

Chou En-lai: ...And as to the third point regarding neighbouring countries, could we not say this? -- "Any of the three countries should not be used for aggressive purposes by any of the three Countries or other countries besides them" or something like that.

JN: This statement should be helpful for a settlement in Geneva, that is, it should be friendly in approach and not condemnatory as that does not help...,

Sino-Indian Cooperation for World Peace⁵⁹.

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Fifteen years ago, I went to China⁶⁰ and had hoped to stay there for a month or more. Among the people I had particularly hoped to meet there was Mr Chou En-lai. But before many days were past, war broke out in Europe, which

⁵⁹ Speech at a State Banquet given in honour of Chou En-lai. New Delhi, 26 June 1954. From Press Information Bureau.

⁶⁰ Nehru visited China during August-September 1939. See *Selected Works (first series)* Vol.10. pp. 73-114.

developed into the Second World War and I had to hurry back to my country. To lily regret I did not meet Mr Chou En-Iai then. Now, after these fifteen years of storm and stress and change, my old wish has been fulfilled. I am happy to meet an eminent statesman of our neighbour country and I am happier still to meet the distinguished representative of a great people.

We meet as individuals but we meet also as representatives of great titans, India and China, both with a tremendous past. It is a matter of interest and significance, not only to our two countries, but to Asia and even the world, how these countries behave to each other, how far they can cooperate for the peace and well-being of the world.

The past two thousand years stand witness to our mutual relations. We have been neighbours during this long stretch of years and we have been vital countries throwing out our thought and culture to each other and to other neighbouring countries. Our people have come into contact in many lands, more especially in South-East Asia, yet there is no record of war between us. This long period is of the peaceful commerce of ideas, of religion and art and culture.

Both China and India have their particular and individual backgrounds. Each has her own special cultural inheritance. In many ways they are different. They have grown according to their own genius. Yet, in spite of these differences, we have been good neighbours and friends and have not come into conflict with each other during two millennia of history.

This is the witness of the past and as we stand on the fine edge of the present in this turbulent world of ours, we can learn a lesson from that past, which will help us in the present and in the future. Both our countries have recently succeeded in achieving freedom and the opportunity to work out our destiny according to our will. We achieved our freedom under different circumstances and by different methods. Our great leader and master, Mahatma Gandhi, led us by peaceful methods through travail and many bitter experiences to freedom. China's course was differently fashioned. Both our countries have placed the good of the common man before them and are aiming, in their different ways, to raise millions who have suffered so much in the past and now live in the hope of a better future. That future for us or for any country in

the world depends primarily on the avoidance of war and the assurance of peace and security.

The major question before the world today therefore is how to get rid of the spectre of war and fear and hatred which oppress so many countries and peoples today.

You have been recently engaged, Sir, with other eminent statesmen, in wrestling with these great problems of war and peace. We have been happy to learn that some success has attended your efforts and the efforts of the other statesmen at Geneva. We congratulate you and the others who participated in the Geneva Conference on this happy turn of events. We earnestly hope that this will lead to an early termination of hostilities in Indo-China and that this will be followed by a settlement which will ensure peace and freedom to all the countries there.

If we can remove the fear of war and aggression that oppresses people and ensure that each country will have freedom to work its destiny according to its own wishes without interfering with other countries, we shall have served our generation well and laid the foundation of enduring peace in the world. Peace is necessary for the entire world and peace is indivisible today. But in Asia, peace is even more vital and necessary than elsewhere, for we have to build our nations and we want to utilize all our energies in the task of construction and not of destruction.

There are divisions and differences in the world, but there is also a sense of unity and of growing oneness. I earnestly trust that our minds will be directed towards this growing feeling of oneness and to the pursuit and realization of the common ideals that animate humanity today, instead of laying stress on the divisions and differences.

Recently India and China came to an agreement about certain matters,⁶¹ and in the case of that agreement, we have laid down certain principles, which have governed the relations of our two countries. These principles are recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country, of mutual non-interference with each other's Internal affairs, of equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These principles are not only good for

⁶¹ An agreement in regard to Tibet was signed on 29 April 1954.

our two countries but for others as well, for whom they might well serve as an example. If these principles can be recognized in wider spheres, then the fear of war would disappear and the spirit of cooperation between nations would develop. Each country would have freedom to follow its own policy and work out its own destiny, learning from others and Cooperating with others, but basing itself essentially on its own genius. Modern science offers us an opportunity to rid the world of the evils that have oppressed it in the past. Unfortunately, that science is utilized more for the works of destruction than for the works of construction. If we seize the present and give to it a turn in the direction of peace and cooperative effort and make science serve good of humanity instead of being a curse, we shall make the minds of men turn away from fear and hatred towards understanding and cooperation. Thus we shall build a climate of peace and change the face of the earth.

Destiny beckon to our countries and I hope that neither of them will be found wanting at this great moment of history.

I earnestly hope that your efforts, Sir, and those of other eminent statesmen at Geneva will meet with success and I hope also that our two countries will stand for peace and will live amicably together and cooperate together in the cause of peace and human advance as they have done through the past two thousand years of human history.

Conversation with Chou En-lai (V)⁶²

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Jawaharlal Nehru: Did Your Excellency see the draft statement?

Chou En-lai: Yes. I saw it a few minutes⁶³ before I went to ace the picture⁶³ It is

⁶² Fifth session. New Delhi, 3 pm to 5.15 pm, 27 June 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

a good picture. It is in technicolour.

JN: The story is not so good.

Chou En-lai: It is quite good and represents resistance against foreigners.

JN: It was a resistance by the feudal elements against foreigners.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Resistance always starts from the upper classes....

We are translating the draft statement into Chinese so that we may study it carefully.... In order to decide the exact formulation we may take some more of Your Excellency's time.

JN: Certainly.... Can we finalise it in the evening?

Chou En-lai: Yes. With Your Excellency's permission, I should like to discuss the following: If we two are to issue this joint statement, then after my talks in Burma, a joint declaration of a similar nature may be issued.... Then there may be a similar joint statement with Indonesia. If there is any difficulty regarding a meeting, perhaps contact could be made through diplomatic channels....

JN: I think that any such step would be conditioned by a settlement in Indo-China.

The next step is that Your Excellency is going to Burma and alter your talks with U Nu, you may be in a position to state -- or U Nu may state--that you are in general agreement with the statement, or the principles of our statement should be applied to the relations as between Burma and China....

As regards Indonesia, as Your Excellency is not going there just now, diplomatic approaches would be desirable. I propose to write to the Prime Minister of Indonesia, telling him about these talks and send him a copy of our

⁶³ The reference is to "*Jhansi ki Rani*", directed by Sobrab Modi and released in 1953. The film is based on the life of Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, one of the leaders in Bundelkhand and Central India of the Uprising of 1857.

joint statement.⁶⁴ Maybe then we could inform you through his Ambassador that he is in agreement with the general principles. That would be the next step. Thereafter the settlement in Indo-China will partly condition what is to be done later.

Chou En-Iai: If as a first step China and India issue this joint statement and China and Burma, and Indonesia and China issue a similar statement, that will make a great difference in Asia, There may be other countries also wishing to make similar statements....If peace can be restored in Indo-China, there are a number of possibilities. Therefore it is more practical not to restrict the form now. On the other hand we should have this understanding that this step we are taking is in the interests of peace in Indo-China. Therefore we should continue such efforts even after we have achieved success in Indo-China....

JN: We should certainly continue our efforts but my own mind is not very clear as to the form it may take, because there are a number of uncertain factors. In increasing the area of peace and strengthening the forces of peace, if we arouse, directly or indirectly, other forces opposed to it, then we create or tend to create obstacles. Therefore the steps we take should strengthen peace without having the other adverse effect. There is a set of difficult circumstances which makes it difficult to lay down exactly as to what we should do. These matters have naturally to be considered in the larger context of what is happening. For example, there is in USA today a violent reaction 'against what Mr Eden said three days ago regarding an Eastern Locarno.'⁶⁵ It is interesting because the British Government's thinking' is getting further apart

⁶⁴ Nehru sent a message to Ali Sastroamidjojo on 27 June giving a gist of his talks with Chou En Lai. Similar messages were also sent to John Kotelawala and Mohammed Ali. For the joint statement or Nehru and Chou En-lai, see *ante* pp.410-412.

⁶⁵ In a letter to President Eisenhower, twelve members of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee advised him to reject Eden's call for a non-aggression pact in Asia or face a complete review of foreign aid, as such a pact would in their view not only accept Communist conquests but 'guarantee' them. On 25 June, the *New York Times* remarked that no "Locarno" could guard against the methods used by the Communists, like subversion, infiltration and the use of "volunteers".

from the American Government's. Probably British Government's thinking in this matter is supported by Canada,⁶⁶⁵ Australia⁶⁷ and also New Zealand. In this context we would like to encourage some of these countries. One should not like to do something now which gives a handle to the British or Americans to line up against what one does. The present development is helpful in the cause of peace. UK, France, etc., are thinking differently from the USA, but there are internal conflicts in them and they may either line up with, America or go against her.

I referred the other day to Mr Eden's reference to Locarno. I was looking into this. Locarno has no great importance but represented the coming together of opposing countries to guarantee something. Mr Eden's idea is to bring together opposing countries, which would be France, America, China, USSR and others. This is a different approach from that of Americans, who do not wish to cooperate. Therefore I feel that without making any commitments we should encourage Mr Eden's approach.

Chou En-lai: I agree with the analysis made by Your Excellency.

At the Geneva Conference, France made a proposal that the States participating in the Conference should jointly guarantee the States of Indo-China. Mr Menon assured me that if this is agreed to, maybe the number of countries joining this guarantee could be enlarged. China and USSR supported this proposal. But the USA kept quiet....

Regarding Eden's Locarno pact, I suppose he used this phrase because it is more easily understood in Europe.

JN: Yes. I think so. Locarno is well understood in Europe. United States are occupying an extreme position and they do not want to change that position either by themselves or by others. They would like surrender and not a

⁶⁶ Escott Reid. Canadian High Commissioner to India at this time had strongly recommended to the Canadian Government the formation of a Locarno-type pact with Indian participation. instead of SEATO.

⁶⁷ R.G. Casey said in New York on 26 June that he was "not particularly horrified" a Eden's idea of an Asian Locarno pact.

settlement. Other countries like the UK and France are more realistic and want a settlement. Now, in these circumstances, it is desirable to encourage these countries as long as they feel a settlement is possible. In this, Canada has played an important part. Although it is chiefly associated with USA, we have found much easier to talk through Canada, as it is much easier to get it across that way.

Chou En-lai: Can we clarify the matter in this way? We should facilitate collective peace in Asia and, first of all, in South Asia.... The number of States participating in such efforts... should include as many States as possible on both sides to make USA feel that it must also participate....

JN: Yes. That seems to be a way to look at it. I might tell Your Excellency that before the Geneva Conference Eden sent me a number of messages asking if India would be prepared to become a member of a collective system of defence.⁶⁸ He did not define that system. When Krishna Menon was going there, I told him: (1) We cannot be members of a collective system, which is unilateral; (2) The other question was whether it was a collective system. I told him that although we are keen to be a party to peace, we are reluctant to commit ourselves to any possible entanglement in war. That is broadly speaking India's position. Some kind of a collective system is good to have, but it must be clear what kind of system it is.⁶⁹

Chou En-lai: ... What, if we take the French proposal, add to it Eden's proposal

⁶⁸ In a message sent from Geneva on 28 April. Eden said that he was anxious that any settlement over Indo-China should be acceptable to Asian opinion as a whole and added that Britain had made it clear to the US and France that she would be prepared to guarantee any such settlement. He asked Nehru whether he could contemplate associating India in any form with such a guarantee or any other action which the Commonwealth countries could take either individually or collectively to reinforce the settlement.

⁶⁹ Nehru in his message of 4 May 1954 assured Eden that India would assist in promoting and maintaining a settlement in Indo-China, but expressed his inability to make commitments or guaranteeing a settlement until more was known about the nature of the settlement and of the guarantees required. See *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. 25. pp. 435-436.

and add to that Menon's proposal, would such an organisation be possible even if USA objected? ... US may oppose it at first, but may be pressed to accept it in the end.

JN: Your Excellency must remember that the US Constitution has many things bad in it.... There are many stops and checks. Therefore, even if the Government wants to do it, Congress may stop it. There are always some elections going on in the States. Casey told me that he had told Dulles:⁷⁰ "You cannot stop the trouble in Far East without recognising new China and giving them their place in the UN". Dulles replied that he could not do this because of the November elections. Whatever America does or does not do, her policy is confused, If the USA was isolated, the possibility is that she would go isolationist. They cannot do it of course, but that will be a tendency. Actually, as they realise the real situation, they may come in with the others. American politics are so confused that no one knows what is going to happen. No one can speak with authority in America-not even the President, because the Congress may pull him up.

Chou En-Iai: Yes. All these things are complicated. However, we cannot just wait and see. Once there is peace in Indo-China, the question of guarantees will come up. If US refuses to participate, and that leads to failure, then it will be regrettable as it may lead to war.

JN: What USA will or will not do cannot stop our efforts. But one has to do what is best. We are in the most crucial period of Anglo-American relations and should like UK to feel that they have the broad support of other countries so that they are not isolated.

Chou En-lai: I agree with the last point Your Excellency has made.... I wonder if we can constantly exchange views in future, as that would be a great force for peace.

⁷⁰ John Foster Dulles (1888-1959), US Secretary of State, 1953-59. also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. I, p.572.

JN: Of course, I hope so. There is one corollary that follows from what I said before. The American people are terribly frustrated as no one is following them, and one never knows what a frustrated person may do.

I do not know what Your Excellency has decided, but I believe some talk between the Chinese Government and the UK Government is highly desirable.

Chou En-lai: Yes. At the Geneva Conference, relations between China and UK have had a good start.... We shall go step by step, but in our talks with Britain, we cannot be as frank as with you.

JN: Yes.

What I wanted to know is if the Chinese Government is going to have diplomatic Ambassador in UK.

Chou En-lai: It is possible. Just now we are sending a Chargé d'Affaires. The specific question is, as Your Excellency knows, that the attitude taken by UK in the UN should change.... However, we expect UK to make her attitude clear.

JN: That is quite true. However, if I may say so, UK's attitude is not quite clear-though they are in favour of your representative sitting in the UN, they are also afraid of USA. They have to balance these two attitudes.

London is still an important diplomatic centre -- even more important than Washington-in some ways. Washington may be more powerful, but London is more important, especially for Europe. Therefore, it would be useful if Your Excellency had an able representative there.

Chou En-lai: Yes. The Chargé d'Affaires we are sending and the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking are no longer mere "negotiating representatives" but will be in the diplomatic list and can look after trade, nationals and other diplomatic matters, etc. Thus it may be considered a transitional stage. It is a peculiar solution to a peculiar situation.

JN: As long as they have someone to talk with and to deal with, it is all right. I should like to tell you that two weeks after your Government was set up on the 1st of October 1949, I went to UK and USA. I asked Bevin⁷¹ about recognising it and he said, "We shall see what others do and we shall then recognise." When I met Dean Acheson⁷² in USA, he said "Yes. I realise we should do it, but we cannot, because our public would not swallow it."⁷³ There is one matter, which is entirely different.... Your Excellency said that the Korean question was closed. The USA are very annoyed and frustrated by the developments on Indo-China at Geneva, as their colleagues have deserted them. They have suffered a diplomatic defeat on Indo-China. They seem to have become more rigid on Korea. That is my feeling. Now, if Korea goes before the UN, nothing will come of it, not at present anyway. In my opinion, therefore, it may be better not to bring it formally before the Geneva Conference now, as then there may be a complete break-up.

Chou En-lai: Yes....

I wish to come back now to another question regarding relations between India and China.

JN: Yes. But I should like to say just one thing more. These countries talk loudly in USA -- countries like France, UK, Australia, etc.-but they do not mean all they say. Mr Casey told me, "I have told USA privately that they are wrong,

⁷¹ Ernest Bevin (1881-1951): Foreign Secretary of the UK, 1945-51: also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.2, p.472. Nehru met Bevin on 12 November during his visit to Britain from 8 to 13 November 1949.

⁷² Dean Acheson (1893-1971); US Secretary of State. 1949-53: also see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol. I. p. 511. For Nehru's conversation with Acheson held in Washington DC on 12 October 1949, see *Selected Works* (second series). Vol.13. pp. 295-298.

⁷³ The question of American citizens under arrest in China was also taken up during the talks with Chou En-lai, Nehru wrote in a letter to Amrit Kaur on 21 July 1954. He (Chou En-lai) said that there were 10,000 Chinese students in the US and the American Government was refusing to allow any of them to return to China.... Chou En-lai said that he had permitted thousands of Americans to go back from China. Some few had been kept back, partly because they had offended against some law and partly because the Americans would not allow the Chinese students to go back. I think there is much force in his argument."

but I cannot tell them this publicly."

Chou En-lai: Yes. We have seen this especially on the last day of the Korean question at Geneva....

JN: Now, Your Excellency must have seen what has happened, in Guatemala.⁷⁴ England and France did not vote in the Security Council, although they were against USA in this 'matter, and New Zealand voted against USA.⁷⁵ Churchill is in USA now and the British are unpopular there at the moment. Therefore they could not vote against USA. I had a telegram from the Foreign Minister of Guatemala yesterday, but what can I do about Guatemala?⁷⁶

One small thing about Burma, U Nu is an ardent Buddhist and spends several hours every day in prayers and does his rosary. He often says he is becoming a monk, but I do not think he is going to do it-not in the near future-because there is no one else to take his place.

I told Your Excellency that I shall keep the so-called Colombo countries informed. But I deal with them in two ways. I give broad general information which appears in the Press to all the four, but to Burma and Indonesia I write more intimately. That is how I deal with them.

Chou En-lai: That is fine.

I come back to the relations between our two countries. We wonder if Your Excellency can visit our country before the end of this year.

⁷⁴ On 18 June, Guatemalan insurgent forces advanced into Guatemala at several points, crossing the frontier from Honduras. The Guatemalan President, Arbenz Guzman in a broadcast the same day accused Honduras and Nicaragua of conducting an "open aggression in conjunction with the US.

⁷⁵ On 25 June, the UN Security Council refused to adopt by five votes to four, an agenda containing Guatemala's demand for action against Honduras and Nicaragua. The US and its supporters wanted the matter to be first dealt with by the Organisation of American States.

⁷⁶ With reference to the request of Guillermo Toriello, Foreign Minister of Guatemala, for India's intervention, Nehru telegraphed to Krishna Menon in New York on 27 June. "Obviously we cannot intervene. Perhaps you might convey our deep concern.. to Secretary General and some representatives of countries at UN, more especially UK and Canada. This should be done

JN: I should love to visit your country. But it is difficult to fix the time now.... Partly it would depend on our Parliament session, as I should like to be present during the session and it would be better to have it at a suitable time, for example, after an armistice in Indo-China....

Chou En-lai: Well, of course, we have to suit your convenience. Maybe we can fix the date later, But we hope Your Excellency's visit to our country will take place this year, as we have been expecting your visit for a long time-more than one and a half years.⁷⁷"

JN: I should very much like to come-if possible, this year.

Chou En-lai: As far trade and cultural exchange between China and India, it is our view that we should do more work and have more contacts; frequent visits are most important,

JN: I agree entirely.

Chou En-lai: At this Press Conference, if the correspondents should ask me about our talks, can I tell them that we are going to issue a joint statement or a communiqué. Of course, I would not tell them the contents of the statement yet.

JN: Yes, of course.

Chou En-lai: In the evening after we finalise the statement, would Your Excellency like to announce it in a Press Conference?

informally and privately as we do not wish to get entangled in South American affairs."

⁷⁷ Chou En-lai had told Vijayalakshmi Pandit, during her visit to China in May 1952 as the leader of an Indian cultural delegation, that the Chinese Government regarded Nehru as one statesman who had unwaveringly and constantly spoken for them and that they were anxious to invite him, to China immediately after the conclusion of the Korea's war and honour him in a

JN: It will be too late tonight. Your Excellency is going away early tomorrow morning and I am leaving ten minutes later.⁷⁸ Besides, it is better that they read and absorb the statement⁷⁹ and then I can hold a Press Conference a week later after I come back.⁸⁰

Chou En-lai: At today's Press Conference, with quite a number of correspondents, I will not be able to answer any questions. I did not hold any Press Conference in Geneva.

JN: I myself have not held any Press Conference for some time and have refused to see Press correspondents although they have come especially from abroad for this purpose and gone back.

Chou En-lai: Yes, exactly. May I say that in deference to Your Excellency's wishes. I agreed only to meet the Press?⁸¹

JN: Yes. Your Excellency knows it of course that the best way to deal with the Press, if you do not, want to answer a question, is to be humorous....

To U Nu¹⁸²

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befitting manner.

⁷⁸ Chou En-lai left for Rangoon on the morning of 28 June. Nehru took off for Ambala on his way to Mashobra near Shimla.

⁷⁹ The joint Statement of Nehru and Chou En-lai was issued on 28 June 1954.

⁸⁰ Nehru did not address any Press Conference during the period covered in this volume.

⁸¹ Later in the day, Chou En-lai addressed a Press Conference lasting half an hour during which he gave answers, in written form, to five questions among the many submitted to him in advance. He declined to entertain supplementaries.

⁸² JN Collection. Extracts.

New Delhi
June 27, 1954

My dear U Nu,

I have sent you a telegram⁸³ through our Ambassador⁸⁴ in Rangoon today. That telegram was also sent to the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, Ceylon and Pakistan. I wish, however, to add to that. I am, therefore, writing this letter with some haste because I want this to be taken personally by our Secretary General, N.R. Pillai,⁸⁵ who will be accompanying the Chinese Prime Minister's party to Canton. He will, therefore, hand this to you personally and I should like you read it, if possible, before your talks with Chou En-lai.

2. We are likely to issue a joint statement⁸⁶ tonight. It has not been quite finalised yet because it is in the process of translation into Chinese and Chou En-lai wants to see a Chinese draft before he finally passes it. If this statement is ready in time, as I hope it will be, I shall enclose a copy. Of course, it is bound to appear in the newspapers.

3- This statement necessarily deals rather broadly with various aspects of the problems facing us. Nevertheless, it gives some indication of the way of our thinking. You will notice that particular care has been taken to avoid saying anything which is in condemnation of any country or group of nations. The normal way, both in America and in the Communist countries, is to condemn the other lot. That is not our way and Chou En-lai agreed willingly to the approach I suggested. Of course, what we say in this statement will not be liked by the US Government. Indeed, my meeting with Chou En-lai also came as a slight shock to them. That cannot be helped. But I do wish to avoid any language which might widen the gulf or create more difficulties, You will have noticed that Anthony Eden's recent speech in the British House of Commons, in which he talked about an Eastern Locarno, has angered the Americans greatly.

⁸³ In the telegram, not printed. Nehru gave a gist of his talks with Chou En-lai.

⁸⁴ K.K. Chettur.

⁸⁵ (1898-1992): Secretary General. Ministry of External Affairs, 1952-60: also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. I. p.598.

⁸⁶ See *post* pp. 410-412.

4- The fact is that the Americans are feeling greatly frustrated from the developments at the Geneva Conference. They have played a relatively unimportant and almost passive part there. They have hardly put forward any concrete proposals. They have contended themselves by not agreeing with some of the proposals made. Essentially their attitude is against a settlement or to put it differently, their idea of a settlement is a surrender by those opposed to them. It is manifest that neither the political nor the military situation is favourable to the Americans or in Indo-China to the French. To talk, therefore, of surrender is to be completely unrealistic. The UK Government and France have realised this and have made various attempts to reach some kind of a negotiated settlement....

5- The favourable turn in Geneva was largely due to the announcement by Chou En-lai about Laos and Cambodia. In effect, this announcement meant that Laos and Cambodia will be left to themselves and all foreign troops are to be withdrawn. The resistance movements there become internal problems only. In Cambodia, there is not much of a resistance movement, but in Laos It is fairly strong and is under the leadership of some members of the Royal family. However, Chou En-lai and Vietminh have agreed to recognise and deal with the present Governments of Laos and Cambodia. I think that it will not be difficult for some internal compromise to be arrived at between the existing Governments and these resistance movements. There is some talk of elections later on....

7- It seemed to me clear that Chou En-lai was very desirous of a peaceful settlement in South-East Asia. From all accounts that I have had, the Vietminh attitude is also reasonable and compromising. The Vietminh representative at Geneva, Van Dong⁸⁷, is well spoken of as reasonable and receptive to suggestions. Chou En-lai is anxious that any fears or apprehensions of the South-East Asia countries should be removed. He asked

⁸⁷ Pham Van Dong (b.1906): Vietnamese politician and close associate of Ho Chi Minh, underground Communist worker from 1925; imprisoned by French authorities for seven years: a founder of the Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam (the Vietminh). 1941: Foreign Minister. Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1954-61, and Prime Minister. 1955-76. Prime Minister, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1981-86.

me repeatedly how this could be done, as he was anxious to do it. His chief fear has been that these countries might be utilised to set up American military bases. If it is quite clear that this will not be done, then he is not too much interested in these countries. He would like them to be free and independent and to settle their internal problems themselves.

8- He said repeatedly that Laos and Cambodia should become the South-East Asia type of country. By this presumably he referred to Burma, India and Indonesia, that is, to countries which are not aligned with any of the power blocs and follow a neutral policy. About Vietnam, the position was not quite the same because of the position of the French and maybe other reasons. But, if Laos and Cambodia are, if I may say so "neutralised", this will certainly have a certain good and settling effect in the whole area.

9- Chou En-lai himself suggested his stopping at Rangoon to meet you. I welcomed this suggestion and said it was a very good idea. I am glad you will have a chance of having a good talk with him. He strikes one as a frank and forthright person, which is rather unusual in the average Communist leader. He speaks with some authority and is receptive to ideas. He thinks a good deal in terms of Asia and even more so in terms of South-East Asia. He is thus particularly anxious to develop friendly relations with all the South-East Asia countries and is prepared to do anything in reason to remove their fears. He thinks that the relations of all these countries might well be governed by the principles which we have accepted in the agreement between India and China recently made. You will remember these principles about territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, etc. We are repeating them in our joint statement. I think also that those principles are good and should be repeated.

10- He asked me what he should do to give assurance to the various South-East Asia countries. Possibly, he was thinking of some pacts, etc. I suggested to him that the first step might well be joint bilateral declarations on the basis of those principles. Later, we could think what else might be done. That would depend upon various developments, and, more especially, and, what happens in Indo-China. Thus, Burma and China could make a declaration that they wish their relations to be governed by those principles and thus not only to promote friendly relations between the two countries but also to advance the cause of

peace in South-East Asia, Similarly, China and Indonesia could do likewise at a later stage and Burma and Indonesia. India also can have such bilateral declarations.

11- I think that, at this stage, we should take only this step. We can consider the next step later.

12- You will see the joint statement we are issuing here. If you agree with it, you might issue a joint statement with Chou En-lai stating briefly that you agree with the broad approach of the joint statement issued by the Prime Ministers of China and India and further that you would like the relations of Burma and China to be governed by the five principles laid down in that statement.⁸⁸

13 Chou En-lai does not know much about Burma. He asked me many questions and I tried to answer' them. His whole approach was a friendly one desiring to understand. I told him briefly of your complaints.⁸⁹ He said that they must have been due to misunderstandings, and, anyhow, he would do his best to remove any cause for complaint....

This is a letter hastily written just to give you the background of our talks as this might help you in your own talks. If necessary, I shall write further to you later....

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

⁸⁸ The joint statement of the Prime Ministers of China and Myanmar issued at Rangoon, on 29 June affirmed the principles agreed upon between China and India should also be the guiding principles for relationship between China and Burma.

⁸⁹ U Nu had written to Nehru on 7 June 1954 about the interference of the Chinese Communists in the internal affairs of Myanmar. Nehru replied on 15 June suggesting that it would be desirable for your Ambassador in Peking to refer to the two instances you have given in your letter to the course of an informal talk with the Chinese Foreign Office. It would be better not to make a formal complaint in writing. The Chinese Government will very probably deny this. It is possible of course that the Chinese Government do not know about it, but even that does not wholly absolve them.

Message to V.K. Krishna Menon⁹⁰

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I am too tired to send you long message. We have been struggling for the greater part of the night with the difficulties of translation into Chinese. Soon Chou En-la will be leaving for Rangoon and I shall go to Mashobra.

Our talks have covered a wide field and have been very helpful. Chou En-lai is, I think, impressed by much that he saw here and we have got to know each other fairly well. He is now very Asia-conscious and is anxious to understand other Asian countries about which he knows little. Repeatedly talked about India being economically and industrially more advanced than China and great responsibilities of our two countries. Anxious also to remove apprehensions of smaller countries of Asia.

His visit has certainly brought our two countries nearer to one another.

Panchsheel -A Model Code for Bilateral Relations⁹¹

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His Excellency Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People's

⁹⁰ Written at 2.30 after midnight. 27 June 1954. File No. 12/86/NGO/54 & 12/88/NGO/54, MEA. Krishna Menon was in New York at this time.

⁹¹ Joint statement issued after the talks between Nehru and Chou En-lai. New Delhi. 28 June 1954. Printed in the leading newspapers, 29 June 1954.

Republic of China, came to Delhi at the invitation of His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of India, He stayed here for three days. During this period the two Prime Ministers discussed many matters of common concern to India and China. In particular, they discussed the prospects of peace in South-East Asia and the developments that had taken place in the Geneva Conference in regard to Indo-China. The situation in Indo-China was of vital importance to the peace of Asia and the world and the Prime Ministers were anxious that the efforts that were being made at Geneva should succeed. They noted with satisfaction that some progress had been made in the talks at Geneva in regard to an armistice. They earnestly hoped that these efforts will meet with success in the near future and that they would result in a political settlement of the problems of that area.

The talks between the Prime Ministers aimed at helping, in such ways as were possible, the efforts at peaceful settlement that were being made in Geneva and elsewhere. Their main purpose was to arrive at a clearer understanding of each other's point of view in order to help in the maintenance of peace, both in cooperation with each other and with other countries.

Recently, India and China have come to an agreement in which they have laid down certain principles, which should guide the relations between the two countries. These principles are:

- mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- equality and mutual benefit; and
- peaceful coexistence.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would

give place to a feeling of confidence,

The Prime Ministers recognized that different social and political systems exist in various parts of Asia and the world. If, however, the above-mentioned principles are accepted and acted upon and there is no interference by any one country with another, these differences should not come in the way of peace or create conflicts. With the assurance of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country and of non-aggression. there would be peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between the countries concerned. This would lessen the tensions that exist in the world today and help in creating a climate of peace. In particular, the Prime Ministers hoped that these principles would be applied to the solution of the problems in Indo-China where the political settlement should aim at the creation of free, democratic, unified and independent States, which should not be used for aggressive purposes, or be subjected to foreign intervention. This will lead to a growth of self-confidence in these countries as well as to friendly relations between them and their neighbours. The adoption of the principles referred to above will also help in creating an area of peace which, as circumstances permit, can be enlarged, thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world.

The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as other countries of Asia. These conversations were held with a view to helping in bringing about a greater understanding of the problems of Asia and to further a peaceful and cooperative effort, in common with other countries of the world, in solving these and like problems.

The Prime Ministers agreed that their respective countries should maintain close contacts so that there should continue to be full understanding between them. They appreciated greatly the present opportunity of meeting together and having a full exchange of ideas leading to a clearer understanding and cooperation in the cause or peace.

To U Nu⁹²

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New Delhi
July 9, 1954

My dear Maung Nu,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st July. I m glad you have written to me fully about your talks with the Chinese Prime Minister.⁹³ Your report gives me a good idea of the nature of your discussions.

These discussions of yours appear to me to have been helpful in carrying matters a little further from what they were after my talks with Chou En-lai. So far as the border questions are concerned, we have, on our part, no matter to raise with them. Our border is quite clear. Since we were clear about this ourselves and have stated so quite openly, there was no point in my raising this question with him. In your case, however, there is a difference and so it is as well that you raise this matter clearly.⁹⁴

I am sure that Chou En-lai's visit to Rangoon will have the effect of checking local Communists in Burma.

As you know, on his way back to Peking Chou En-lai met Ho Chi Minh and spent two or three days with him in some place on the border. Tomorrow Chou En-lai will be leaving for Geneva to take part in the Conference there. The

⁹² JN Collection.

⁹³ Chou En-lai had talks with U Nu at Rangoon on 28 and 29 June 1954. U Nu wrote to Nehru on 1 July. "Chou En-lai, by his open countenance and naturalness of manners has made a very good impression upon all those who met him here. I am sure his visit has largely contributed to future easier relations between the two countries."

⁹⁴ U Nu wrote that Chou En-lai had told him that the question of China-Myanmar frontier had never been settled in the past and "that it was a matter of which by himself alone was not able to make any statement." Chou En-lai also said that even though the frontier had not been fully demarcated, "our peoples along the frontier had been living in complete amity." U Nu informed Chou En-lai that Myanmar would in due course make an approach to the Chinese Government through her Ambassador on this subject.

other Foreign Ministers are also gathering there. This is going to be a difficult period in Geneva and I am by no means clear what will happen. On the whole, it seems that a ceasefire in Indo-China will come off. All the governments concerned except the USA and, perhaps, Bao Dai's government, are anxious for a ceasefire. If it comes off, that will certainly be a major gain, though the remaining questions are still very difficult. As you know, both politically and militarily the French-Bao Dai position is very weak there and they are in no way capable of defending themselves adequately.

The whole position depends very much on the USA attitude. This has stiffened lately and, to some extent, though not very much, it has affected the UK attitude. President Eisenhower⁹⁵ and Dulles go about saying very positively that they will on no account recognize the People's Government of China or agree to its admission to the UN.⁹⁶ As a matter of fact, practically every other government feels that China should be given a place in the UN. You must have seen the statement of the New Zealand Minister on this subject.⁹⁷ Casey privately told me the same thing. But in view of the US attitude these countries are hardly likely to go against it. The US attitude hangs round the November elections in the US and so nothing need be expected till then. Meanwhile, of course, the Geneva Conference will have to come to some decisions. The question of Chinese representation in the UN is not before Geneva but, in a sense, it does affect the problems there. Any settlement in Indo-China must necessarily involve some kind of assurances by certain Powers, including China and the US. The US will not give such an assurance even if indirectly this involves the recognition of China.

The Korean question has also arrived at a deadlocked stage and I am not at all

⁹⁵ Dwight David Eisenhower (1890-1969); President of the USA. 1952-60: also see *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 14, p.28.

⁹⁶ Eisenhower stated on 7 July that he was unalterably opposed to the admission of China to the UN in the existing circumstances, when China was still at war with the UN. was a declared aggressor under a UN resolution, and "was concluding some of the worst diplomatic deportment." Dulles said on 8 July that he was confident the General Assembly would reject any bid to seat China in the UN.

⁹⁷ Clifton Webb. Foreign Minister of New Zealand, stated on 7 July that he was firmly convinced that failure to admit China to the UN had prevented a reduction in world tension.

sure if anything can be done about it. There is some talk of this being raised in the UN Assembly, but the US, the UK and Canada are opposed to this, for the time being at least. Possibly there will be a session of the UN Assembly to consider the Thai request for Observers. This session might take place about the middle of August. We feel that this should not be a special session, but a continuation of the last Eighth Session of the Assembly. If it is such a continuation, it will naturally have the old items on the agenda, including Korea. Korea need not necessarily be taken up then, but it is better for the matter to be on the agenda. In case necessity arises, they can discuss it. As all the Foreign Ministers are gathering in Geneva for these delicate negotiations, I have thought it desirable to ask Krishna Menon to be present there, in case he can be of any help. I shall keep you informed of any developments that come to our knowledge.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

China

Tibet and China⁹⁸

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The various questions raised in these notes and in Mr Kapur's⁹⁹ letter are important not only in themselves, but because they are concerned with much larger issues. Indeed, they are concerned with our wider policy towards China and our general world policy.

2- Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far and cannot be allowed to interfere with a realistic understanding of the situation and of our policy. I have an impression that Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours. It is necessary, therefore, that he and

⁹⁸ Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Joint Secretary, MEA, 18 June 1954. JN Collection.

⁹⁹ B.K. Kapur (b.1910), political officer posted in Sikkim from March 1952 to March 1955, also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4, p.160.

others concerned should understand it and should realise that this policy is the only one which might be helpful to the Tibetans, not in the measure perhaps that they desire, but to some extent. Any other policy of encouraging the Tibetans to oppose Chinese overlordship over Tibet would be raising false hopes in the Tibetans which we cannot fulfil and is likely to react unfavorably on the Tibetans. It would, of course, be opposed to the principles we have laid down in our recent Agreement with China.

3- Mr Kapur talks that the Chinese Government is not likely to be influenced by considerations of non-interference, etc. At the same time he hints that we should also not be influenced by any such considerations, except in so far as that we should not do anything which might create obvious difficulties for us. That is neither a moral nor a practical proposition.

4- No country can ultimately rely upon the permanent goodwill or bona fides of another country, even though they might be in close friendship with each other. It is conceivable that the Western Atlantic alliance may not function as it was intended to and there might be ill will between the countries concerned. It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union may not continue to be as friendly as they are now. Certainly it is conceivable that our relations with China might worsen, though there is no immediate likelihood of that.

Therefore, we have always to keep in mind the possibility of a change and not be taken unawares. Adequate precautions have to be taken. If we come to an agreement with China in regard to Tibet, that is not a permanent guarantee, but that itself is one major step to help us in the present and in the foreseeable future in various ways. If there is an agreement at Geneva about the problems of Indo-China and Korea, that is no guarantee about the future, but it is certainly a big step forward to lessen tension which enables the countries concerned to think more objectively and peacefully and perhaps find a surer basis for peace. In spite of that agreement they will not give up their suspicions or their preparations, but other factors will also come into the picture. At present an objective and realistic understanding is made almost impossible by emotional responses. The Russians and the Chinese are full of charges against "Western Imperialism" and aggression and all that. The Americans and others can only think in terms of Communist aggression and

villainy, of international communism trying to dominate over the world. and so on. All this prevents intelligent thought. If we wish to discuss these matters helpfully, we must avoid certain terms which create powerful reactions in the mind, such as imperialists, communists and the like. I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government. In the same way, I do not like people talking about the Iron Curtain. The mere mention of these words confuses thought and shows that we are not considering a matter objectively.

5- Of course, both the Soviet Union and China are expansive. They are expansive for evils other than communism, although communism may be made a tool for the purpose. Chinese expansionism has been evident during various periods of Asian history for a thousand years or so. We are perhaps facing a new period of such expansionism. Let us consider that and fashion our policy to prevent it coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.

6-I can quite understand that many people in Tibet have been disappointed at the agreement between us in China over Tibet. This must be partly because of the colour put on it by the Chinese in Tibet. That agreement, however, was quite inevitable. It was a recognition of a certain factual situation which we could not possibly change. We have, in fact, at least got some advantage out of that agreement in other respects. If we had not had that agreement, the position would have been no better for us in Tibet and a little worse for the Tibetans. It certainly would have been worse for us from a wider point of view.

7- We must remember that our so-called interests in Tibet derive largely from our inheriting certain British interests to which they succeeded in establishing in the days of British expansionism. We became the inheritors of British imperialism to a slight extent. We were popular with the ruling classes of Tibet at this stage because they thought we would come in the way of Chinese expansionism. We could not do so in Tibet and we could not possibly hang on to privileges which had no meaning in the present state of affairs.

8- Mr Kapur says something about our not throwing cold water on various movements in Tibet against the Chinese though we should not associate ourselves with them, that we should allow them to simmer and not die out. Let

us be clear about this. Whatever happens in Tibet proper is beyond our reach. We can neither help nor hinder it. The question is what we do in our own territory. Do we encourage this or not? It is clear that we cannot encourage it. At best we can tolerate it, provided it is not too obvious or aggressive. A very delicate balance will have to be kept up.

9- Kalimpong is and has been a nest of intrigues and spies. It is not only a centre of Tibetan émigrés, but also of Communists (Chinese). Also of Americans, White Russians and many others. We tolerate all these persons and we can tolerate also the Tibetans of various kinds and views. But if any of these indulge in aggressive activities which might lead to violence, then obviously we cannot tolerate them. I am sure that the Tibetan émigrés in Kalimpong, etc, are in close touch with the Americans, White Russians, etc, and are being encouraged by them with money and in other ways. In fact, I heard that there was a question of their collecting arms also. All this seems to me childish and totally unrealistic.

10- Even one of the major and much advertised efforts of the Americans to bring down the People's Government of China through Formosa is now recognised to be futile. Is it then in the slightest degree conceivable that some petty violent effort organised by Tibetans and others on our border would produce results in Tibet? This can only be thought of in terms of some aggressive Americans as a diversion from their larger world policy or in case a big war occurs. From the Tibetan point of view, it can only prove harmful. There is not the least chance in the world of China leaving Tibet or being driven out of Tibet unless China is defeated in war. Of that there appears to be no chance. Therefore, these adventurous tactics beyond the borders of Tibet have no meaning and call only embarrass and prove harmful. We need not come in the way if they are peaceful and unobtrusive but I quite agree with SG that we should explain our policy and the world situation to the people from Tibet so that they may not misunderstand us. It is clear that if they indulge in any aggressive action and the Chinese Government complains to us, we shall have no alternative left but to take some steps against them, at any rate to curb them. We shall certainly not hand them over to the Chinese State, because they have a right of asylum in our country and we can give them the

fullest assurance about this. At the same time we cannot permit our territory to be used as a base of operations against the Chinese.

11- The real argument in favour of Tibetan freedom or autonomy is the nature of the country. It is most inhospitable to others, it cannot maintain large numbers of foreigners and the like. If the Tibetans are stout enough to keep up a spirit of freedom, they will maintain a large measure of autonomy and the Chinese will not interfere. If the Tibetans actively rebel, they will be ruthlessly put down by the Chinese and even their autonomy will go. They are between the Soviet Union and China and one or other of these two Powers will have a dominating political influence there. We in India cannot exercise it for geographical as well as other reasons. As a friendly Power to China we can be helpful occasionally in the diplomatic field.

12- The brother of the Dalai Lama¹⁰⁰, whom I met some years ago, is obviously connected with various under-ground activities. Some time back we warned our officers not to get entangled in them. That warning should be given again. That does not mean that we should be unfriendly to him. It simply means that we should be friendly and frank and should explain the limitations of the position.

13- We must remember that Tibet has been cut off from the world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very backward and feudal. Changes are bound to come there to the disadvantage of the small ruling class and the big monasteries. Religion may continue to be a powerful force to hold the Tibetans together, but social forces are also powerful. Thus far the Chinese have been careful not to interfere with social customs, religion, etc.

So far as I know, they have not even interfered with the land system which is feudal. I can very well understand these feudal chiefs being annoyed with the new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of feudalism.

14- I want to make one thing perfectly clear, and this should be made clear to the Tibetans who are in India, that there is no question of our handing them over to the Chinese. They have every right to live in India or to seek asylum in India and we shall respect that.

¹⁰⁰ Dalai Lama (b. 1935) temporal and spiritual leader of Tibet, also see Selected Works (second series) Vol. 16 Pt II, p. 647.

15- As regards the Tibetan Mission in Kalimpong, we need not take any step about it and so far as we are concerned, they can continue for the present, but I rather doubt if they will be allowed to continue by the Chinese authorities. We must make sure, however, that the Tibetan Mission, as the Joint Secretary says, is not used as a cover for something else.

16- As regards the Dalai Lama's treasure which is now in Gangtok, I do not see the point of transferring it to Calcutta or elsewhere. First of all we have no direct knowledge of the Dalai Lama's wishes. Secondly, so long as it is in India, it does not much matter whether it is in Gangtok or in Calcutta. It is under our control. If adequate guards are not there, we should make arrangements for proper protection. Any attempt to move it will probably get some kind of publicity. It is far better to allow this matter to lie low. If at any time the Chinese claim it, then we shall have to consider what we should do about it. For the present, our view should be that it is a private treasure of the Dalai Lama and it is for the Dalai Lama to dispose of it.

17- Our policy thus should be an observance, in letter and spirit of our agreement with China in regard to Tibet, at the same time we continue our friendly feelings for Tibet and her people and make it clear that our traditional friendship with them continues. This, however, cannot lead us to any course of action which is against our agreement with China and which we think will be harmful even to Tibet and her people. For the rest, we have to be vigilant and wide awake.

18- SG suggests a holiday camp for soldiers at Kalimpong. This is not a bad idea and it might be investigated.

19- Our general position as contained in this note should be explained to Mr Kapur.

20- Mr MuIlik¹⁰¹, the DIB, should also be made to understand it. I shall be seeing him also. We have to be very careful about our activities in Kalimpong because of the espionage and counter-espionage that is continually going on

¹⁰¹ Bhota Nath Mullik (b. 1903), joined the Indian Police in 1927 and served in various capacities in Bihar and Orissa; Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India 1950-1964, author of several books including, *My years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal*, 1971 and *My Years with Nehru: Kashmir*, 1971.

there.

Trade and Frontier with China¹⁰²

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I have read the fuller report of Dr K. Gopalachari¹⁰³ on the Sino-Indian Conference held in Peking.¹⁰⁴ This report is a good one and gives a detailed account of the background as well as of the negotiations.

2- Since this Agreement was concluded, an important event has taken place affecting the relations of India and China. This is the visit of Mr Chou En-lai to Delhi, the talks he had with us and the joint statement issued at the end of those talks.¹⁰⁵ This visit and the joint statement undoubtedly mark an important step forward in our relations with China.

3- I have previously written on several occasions about our general approach to China and Tibet. I need not say anything more about it here. I agree with the approach Indicated in Joint Secretary's note.

4- The Agreement between India and China over Tibet marks a new starting point for our relations with China and Tibet.¹⁰⁶ The previous agreements have only a certain historical importance now. In any future consideration of this matter, the basis will be our Agreement of 1954.

¹⁰² Note to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary. 1 July 1954, JN Collection.

¹⁰³ Adviser to N. Raghavan, the Ambassador who led the Indian Delegation at the Conference.

¹⁰⁴ The reference is to the negotiations between the officials at Beijing between 31 December 1953 and 29 April 1954 when the Agreement on Tibet was signed by India and China.

¹⁰⁵ For text of the joint statement Issued after talks between Nehru and Chou En-Iai in New Delhi on 28 June 1954, see ante pp.410-412.

¹⁰⁶ When the issue of selling rice to China came up, Nehru wrote a note to the Foreign Secretary (not printed.) on 25 July 1954: 'I am clearly of opinion that we should agree to sell rice to China almost in any quantity. We have got large stocks... If the Chinese want to send rice to Tibet we should not object to it... Our selling rice to China... will indicate our healthy food position and that of China in this respect.'

5 - We must work this Agreement with the full Intention of giving effect to it. That is to say, we must work it in a friendly way, friendly to China and Tibet. This means that all our Officers, Trade Agents etc. who have to deal with matters concerning Tibet, must understand our basic policy and must realise that they have to function in accordance with not only this Agreement but in keeping with that basic policy of ours vis-à-vis China. Our Consul-General in Lhasa as well as our Trade Agent and officers at check-posts should be made to appreciate this fully. I agree that Trade Agents etc. should be carefully chosen. But I doubt if it is necessary to have a special cadre of officers for the border region. This may be examined. While there is a certain advantage in having special cadres for specialised posts, there is also the disadvantage of having too many such special cadres. Specialisation is good, but. there is always the danger of the specialists losing sight of the larger picture.

6- In future, we should give up references, except in some historical context, to the McMahon Line or to any other frontier line by date or otherwise. We should simply refer to our frontier. Indeed, the use of the name McMahon is unfortunate and takes us back to the British days of expansion.

7- All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any "line". These new maps should also not state there is any undemarcated territory. The new maps should be sent to our Embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges etc.

8- Both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our Agreement with China, this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody. There may be very minor points of discussion. Even these should not be raised by us. It is necessary that the system of check-posts should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially, we should have check-posts in such places as might be considered disputed areas.

9- Our frontier has been finalised not only by implication in this Agreement but the specific passes mentioned are direct recognitions of our frontier there. Check-posts are necessary not only to control traffic, prevent unauthorised

infiltration but as symbols of India's frontier. As Demchok is considered by the Chinese as a disputed territory, we should locate a check-post there. So also at Tsang Chokla.

10- In particular, we should have proper check-posts along the UP-Tibet border and on the passes etc. leading to Joshi Math, Badrinath etc.

11- The Joint Secretary in his note has mentioned the possibility of out increasing the strength of our garrisons at some of our border towns such Gangkok, Leh, Simla, Almora etc. I do not think this is necessary from the point of view of guarding this North Eastern frontier. In Leh, we have adequate forces. Round about Simla in the Punjab, we have also quite adequate forces. But, apart from this, I do not consider it at all necessary to keep large contingent of our forces near this border area. Apart from check-posts, -we should have some kind of border militia. I like the idea that this Border Militia should be raised locally and used for the construction of roads etc. This will not only give a sensation of security to the people there but add to their self-respect. These people in the Border Militia would be the leaders in their villages and they could help greatly in organising construction work with voluntary labour etc. It is not necessary for this Border Militia to have a high standard of professional efficiency such as our border Scouts or the Assam Rifles have. It seems to me important that one of their principal duties should be that of construction, cottage industries and the like. This would be an innovation for us but it is a right and natural development. The Defence Ministry should be requested to examine this matter.

12- I think that we should definitely encourage trade with Tibet. There has been some hesitation on our part to do so and some items have been practically banned. I do not see why we should ban any item except arms and ammunition, or anything in which we are in short supply. Tibet is a natural market for India. it is not a big market from the point of view of quantity. We should retain this market and supply them with various quantities of manufactured goods that they require. We must not think that by doing this we are strengthening China's control over Tibet. The small trade that will take place in this way will make little difference to the political or the military aspect. From the economic and psychological points of view, it will be

advantageous to us.

13- We have stated previously that we cannot allow much trade on the ground of transport difficulties. That seems to me a wrong way to put it. We should allow as much trade as possible. If transport difficulties come in the way, they will limit the trade. It is not for us to plead transport difficulties and refuse permission for trade. Therefore, we should agree to free and unrestricted transit of goods to Tibet through India subject only to our own demand and supply position. Naturally the quantity sent to Tibet will be limited by transport difficulties.

14- As a matter of fact, the demand in Tibet for some articles is so great that these are smuggled across the Nepal-Tibet frontier, and they fetch fantastic prices in Tibet. Articles like bicycles, radios, textiles and any number of other things could easily be sent to Tibet through our normal channels.

15- There has been a certain reluctance in sending petrol across. The apprehension was that this would be used by the Chinese Army. We have sent small quantities of petrol. I think we should be prepared to increase these quantities. In any event, the total quantity sent is not likely to be much. The petrol that is smuggled through Nepal to Tibet sells there, I am told, at Rs 50 a gallon! Oil lubricants can also be sent. In fact, we should develop a normal and healthy trade with Tibet. This will be advantageous also to our border people

16- As I have said above, we need not raise the question of our frontier. But if we find that the Chinese maps continue to indicate that part of our territory is on their side, then we shall have to point this out to the Chinese Government. We need not do this immediately, but we should not put up with this for long and the matter will have to be taken up.

17- As this note deals with defence as well as trade matters, I am sending copies of it to the Ministries of Defence and Commerce and Industry.

To Chou En-lai¹⁰⁷

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New Delhi

¹⁰⁷ JN Collection.

September 21, 1954

My dear Prime Minister,

I have now received from our Ambassador in Peking Your Excellency's letter: dated August 25, 1954, conveying on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, an invitation¹⁰⁸ to me to visit China. I have already communicated through our Ambassador my acceptance of your kind invitation, and wish to express to you once again my grateful thanks for the opportunity afforded me of visiting your great country.¹⁰⁹ It was a great pleasure for all of us to meet Your Excellency in Delhi last June and I shall be very happy to renew the contacts then made and to meet His Excellency the Chairman and other members of the Central People's Government in Peking.

You have been good enough to leave to me to indicate a date for the visit which would suit my convenience. I have accordingly communicated to you through our Ambassador my proposals in this regard, and I am glad to know, that these have been found acceptable to you.

Allow me, Your Excellency, to avail myself of this opportunity to express my highest regard.

Yours sincerely
Jawaharlal Nehru

¹⁰⁸ Earlier Chou En-lai who had extended a similar invitation to U Nu and agreed to Nu's request for a joint visit, wished to know Nehru's views on this. Nehru in a cable of 27 August asked N. Raghavan, Ambassador in China to explain to Chou En-lai that while it was "a pleasure to me to be with Premier Nu... the two of us coming together to Peking at this juncture would rather look like a conference and would take away from other aspects of this visit. It would be better if we visited Peking separately and had full talks there. Inevitably there is some difference between two persons meeting and three." On 30 August U Nu sent a message agreeing with Nehru that "a joint visit might create misunderstandings.... We could even be accused of definite alignment as against SEATO..."

¹⁰⁹ Nehru visited the People's Republic of China from 18 October to 2 November 1954.

Letters to Chief Ministers

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New Delhi
22 June, 1954

My dear Chief Minister,

For a change, I am writing to you before time. My last letter was sent to you just a little over a week ago. Certain developments have, however, taken place recently to which I should like to draw your attention. To some extent you are acquainted with them from the press. But that is, perhaps, not enough.

2- This morning I was to have gone to Mashobra near Simla for about a week's stay. I had fixed this up long ago and had made all necessary arrangements about my work, etc I had conditioned my mind to go there. Suddenly almost at the last moment yesterday, I had to switch off my mind and to give up this visit.

3- You know now the reason for this. Mr Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of China, is paying a short visit to Delhi. He is due to arrive here day after tomorrow and is likely to stay for about three days. He is on his way back from Geneva to China. Nearly two months ago, I had conveyed informally an invitation to Mr Chou En-lai to visit India on his way back from Geneva. He informed me yesterday that he had accepted this invitation. At his request, we have arranged to send an Air India International constellation to Geneva to bring him to Delhi. From here he will presumably go to Peking.

4- This visit of the Prime Minister of China to India is a matter of considerable significance and historical importance. It will be followed with the close interest in other countries, There is nothing very special about it and it is really in line with various developments that have taken place in recent years. During the last two years I have been invited on more than one occasion by Chairman Mao Tse-tung to pay a visit to China. The invitations have been informal because a formal invitation only comes when matters have been otherwise

fixed up. On every occasion, when this invitation reached me, I expressed my appreciation of it and my desire to go to China. But I pointed out then that I could not pay this visit so long as war was going on in Korea. When a settlement came, I would gladly think of such a visit. After the Korean truce, we got tied up with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and again it became rather embarrassing for me to go there. Later, the Indo-China war flared up and became a world issue, and again it was not very suitable for me to go.

5- Although Mr Chou En-lai's visit might be considered to be in the normal course and quite natural on his way back from Geneva, it is, nevertheless, both in the context of history and of present-day politics, a very special event. The future of Asia depends upon many factors. One of these is the relationship between the two great countries of Asia--- India and China. In our internal and external policies there are great differences. Nevertheless, we have endeavoured to come closer to one another without in any way varying our own particular policies. We have in fact proceeded in this matter, as in regard to other countries, on the basis of live and let live and non-interference. Our agreement with China in regard to Tibet laid down certain principles to which I have already drawn your attention. These principles are important not only as between us and China, but also in a wider field, whether that is Asia or even the world. It is clear that in no other way can peace be secured in the world in our generation. The alternative is conflict and war and destruction. Neither of the groups of Great Powers opposed to each other is so strong as to impose its will on the other. Neither is prepared to surrender to the other. The only way, therefore, is some kind of a negotiated settlement of the problems that face us. Such a settlement eases the tension and lessens the bitter hostilities that consume the world. But, what is even more necessary is the development of a feeling of tolerance and a realistic appreciation of the facts of life in the world today.

Letters to Chief Ministers

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New Delhi

1 July 1954

6- We have not proceeded on the assumption, as some countries do, that one country or one group is full of virtue and the other country or group is full of evil. We are, all of us, a mixture of the two. And, in any event, an attempt to remedy what we consider evil by force is likely to lead to infinitely greater evil. This, the broad policy we pursue is, externally, to tolerate other countries' views and policies and not to interfere with them and, at the same time, 'not to tolerate their interference with us; internally, to pursue our own policy and not in the world, and the desire for cooperation on the part of India, there could not be this cooperation unless China came at least halfway.

6 This realization came to me soon after the success of the Chinese revolution and the formation of the new Chinese Government on the 1st October 1949. I visited England and the United States in October, November that year and I discussed this subject particularly with the British Foreign Minister and Mr Dean Acheson, the then Secretary of State of the United States. The question before us was the recognition of the new Chinese Government. The British Foreign Minister, Mr Bevin, agreed with me but said that we should try to function jointly in this matter. Mr Acheson partly agreed with me but pointed out that he could not go against American public opinion in regard to the recognition of the new China. Of course, the United States was tied up with Chiang Kai-shek also.

7- We did not know then how the new Chinese Government would develop and whether it was possible to have friendly relations with it. In any event, it seemed to me desirable that we should, for our part, go half way to meet it, making it perfectly clear what our own position and policy were, internally and externally. That is, our approach to China was to be friendly as well as firm. We recognized the new Chinese Government on the last day, I think, of 1949

and the UK and some other countries followed soon after. The Chinese Government treated us much better than they did other countries, excepting the Communist countries. Our Ambassador got on well with them, but there was always some uncertainty in my mind as to what the Chinese Government might do. There was the Tibet question. It was clear that China would establish its sovereignty over Tibet. This had been China's policy for hundreds of years, and, now that a strong Chinese State had been formed, this policy would inevitably be given effect to. We could not stop it in any way, nor indeed had we any legal justification for trying to do so. All we could hope for was that a measure of autonomy would be left to Tibet under Chinese sovereignty.

8 It must be remembered that we had succeeded in Tibet to certain special privileges which the British had acquired there. In effect, therefore, we were successors to certain expansionist policies of the old British Government. It was not possible for us to hold on to all these privileges because no independent country would accept that position. Thus we had a small number of troops in some towns of Tibet to guard our trade routes. We could not possibly keep these troops there. Our other privileges were in regard to trade matters and communications. The real influence of India, however was something insubstantial but important. This was the reliance to some extent of the Tibetan Government on the advice of the Indian representative, whose position was also rather vague and not wholly justifiable by treaty. The Tibetan Government on our part partly because this tendency was a relic from the old days of British dominance and partly because they were afraid of China coming more firmly into the picture. In the new circumstances that had arisen, this influence could not possibly be exercised. All that we could do was to use our diplomatic influence in favour of Tibetan autonomy. We did that as tactfully as we could, knowing that we could not make very much difference. I think, however, that our efforts had some influence and somewhat delayed the Chinese invasion of Tibet.

9- It is patent that we could not help Tibet in any way to resist the-growth of China's power in Tibet. This was wholly outside the range of practical politics and it would have been of very doubtful legality. We explained this position to the Tibetan Government and assured them of our friendliness and of our wish

to help within the obvious limitations. Gradually, the Chinese established themselves at various strategic points in Tibet and were in a position to control the Tibetan Government and its activities. They have taken care, however, not to interfere with the domestic set-up much and have not interfered at all with their social conditions, although these are very feudal. They have naturally built roads, etc., and established airfields because communications in Tibet were very bad. There has been much talk of Chinese troops' concentrations on our frontier with Tibet. There is not much truth in this except that some Chinese troops are present on the frontier and in various parts of Tibet. The total numbers are not great and are spread out. Indeed, the chief defence of Tibet is its very difficult terrain and the inhospitable nature of the climate. It is no easy matter for very large numbers of people from outside to live there. We get news often from Kalimpong about these Chinese military preparations in Tibet. It must be remembered that Kalimpong is a nest of all kinds of spies and the information these people gather is utterly unreliable. It usually comes from some emigres who leave Tibet.

10- Being clear in our minds as to how far we could go into Tibet and how far we could not, we concentrated on one matter which was important to us. This was our frontier with Tibet. It took weeks and even months for our forces to reach that frontier. However, on this matter we were not prepared to parley with anyone, and I declared publicly in Parliament and elsewhere that this frontier, including the McMahon line was a firm one and was not open to discussion. Indeed, I went further and said that, from the defence point of view we considered the Nepal frontier with Tibet also our defence line. I said all this deliberately so that the Chinese Government might have no doubts about our attitude. I did not think it necessary to address the Chinese Government on this question because that itself would have shown some doubt on our part.

11- The behaviour of the Chinese Government towards us was, during the first two or three years, on the whole, good, though there were a number of petty instances which we found rather irritating. To begin with also there was the usual Communist condemnation of some things in India. At the back of their minds they thought that we were tied up still with British policy. Gradually, however, the realization came that we were following an independent policy of

our own and we took orders from nobody. This change may be dated from the date when we refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty. Since then, the behaviour of the Chinese Government was much better. So far as our Ambassadors in Peking were concerned, they were always treated with some consideration.

12- Then came the Korean war and later the armistice in Korea and the part we took in the post-armistice period. Much that was done by our representatives in Korea was not liked by the Chinese at all. But, on the whole, they did not challenge our bona fides. About this time, we started our talks about Tibet which ultimately led to the Agreement. Most people have recognized this Agreement as definitely a good thing. A few have criticized it on the basis that we have given up something which we should not have done. As a matter of fact, we have given up nothing which we held or could hold. Obviously, we cannot function within Tibet as if Tibet was under our influence, We have recognized certain obvious facts of the situation and come to understandings about trade, pilgrimage routes between India and Tibet, etc. There is no giving in at all. Two important aspects of this Agreement are.

1. that indirectly the question of our long frontier is settled, and
2. the principles of non-aggression and non-interference, etc.. are laid down.

13- I have given this rather long history of our relations with the new Chinese Government since its inception because I want you and others to bear this picture in mind. Those relations have not grown up accidentally but have resulted from a set policy pursued right from the beginning. That policy, I repeat, was one of firm but friendly approach of holding to our policy and preserving our interest, and at the same time, to cooperate where possible with China. This policy seemed to us not only the right one in the present but the proper one in the future. China and India were not only neighbours today but were going to continue to be so and we should lay, therefore, the foundations for that future also. From the point of view of Asia that seemed to be right and from the point of view of the world this appeared to be so also.

Naturally, that policy could not be unilaterally pursued. It depended at every step on what China did.

14- The Tibetan Agreement was a solid consequence of that policy. It represented a friendly approach of both countries to this question. Previously, Korean truce, resulting from our initiative at the United Nations, was also a consequence of that policy. It is doubtful if there would have been a Korean truce but for India's initiative. In regard to Indo-China, I began by making certain statements in Parliament and followed them up in the Colombo Conference, The resolutions of that conference became one of the major factors to be considered at Geneva, Because of the important part that India was playing in these matters, the informal visit of V.K. Krishna Menon to Geneva itself became a major event and in fact made a difference to the deliberations there, It may be said that the turn for the better that took place in regard to Indo-China towards the end was partly due to our efforts.

15- It was in this context of past and present events that Chou En-lai came 'to Delhi. We had long discussions daily. We talked through interpreters and everything had to be taken down so that it might be translated. This took time. Anyway, this had the advantage of our having a fairly full record of all that was said. Right from the beginning, there was a lack of rigidity about our talks 'and the atmosphere was friendly. He told me that he was not well-acquainted with most of the Asian countries -- meaning thereby Burma, Indonesia. Ceylon, as well as the Western Asian countries -- and would like me to tell him about them. He also said more than once that India was economically and industrially more advanced than China. I mention this to show that he took up no superior attitude at all in any matter. He was exceedingly receptive and wanted to know about India and these other countries. He was particularly anxious, of course, for the friendship and cooperation of India. He felt that India and China had an important role to play in Asia and that it was essential for them to co-operate for this purpose. He realized that in regard to some of the countries of Asia we were in a much better position to know about them and to have their confidence. I pointed out to him that many of these countries of Asia were a

little afraid of these two giants, China and India. So far as we in India were concerned, we were anxious to remove all fears and apprehensions, even from Pakistan. Our people and our interests were spread out in many parts of Africa also, and the policy we had laid down for our people was that they must in no way exploit the people of Africa, they must help them and if they were not wanted in Africa by the Africans, they would have no place there. Chou En-Iai said that that was exactly the policy he wanted to pursue in regard to all his neighbouring countries. He wanted to convince them that China had no aggressive designs on them and the Chinese living abroad must behave properly. In regard to these Chinese overseas he said something which was new to me. Previously, all Governments of China had claimed the Chinese overseas as their nationals, whether they wanted to be so or not. Chou En-lai said that he was quite clear that the Chinese living abroad should either accept the nationality of that country and cut themselves away from China, politically speaking, or if they remained Chinese nationals, they should in no way interfere with the politics of the other country. All this indicated to me his extreme desire to develop friendly relations with these various countries and to remove all apprehensions from their minds. All this can, of course, be clever strategy looking to the distant future. No one can judge of inner motives. But it seemed to me that- Chou Enlai was quite honest about what he said. His mind was concentrated on developing his own country industrially and otherwise and not getting entangled in any difficulties. In particular, he was always thinking of Asia and China's and India's responsibility to Asia.

16. His talk was wholly different from the normal approach of the average Communist, which is full of certain slogans and clichés. He hardly mentioned communism or the Soviet Union or European politics. I explained to him about our relations with Pakistan. I spoke to him at some length about our peaceful struggle for Independence under Gandhiji's leadership and how this had conditioned us. Our policies had developed from that struggle and we proposed to follow them. We avoided deliberately condemning any country or any people, even though we disagreed with them, because we felt that peace required a peaceful approach. We did not wish to interfere with other people or

their policies which had developed under different circumstances and had been conditioned in other ways. I saw no reason, however, why we should not co-operate in many matters with other countries, It is interesting to note that Chou En-Iai said that it was a good thing that we had remained in the Commonwealth and that we should continue to do so, because it was good for us and good for world peace. That remark of his shows his realistic appreciation of the situation which many of our own people have not fully grasped yet, because they live in a world of out of date slogans and have little understanding of today.

17. I raised the question with him of "international communism." And the functioning of Communist parties in other countries, including India. I pointed out the fear of what was called "international communism" and how this was exploited by interested countries. I also indicated how Communist parties created mischief. He agreed with me, partly at least, and said that this fear and apprehension should go; and as for local Communist parties they were often very foolish and lacked understanding.

Letters to Chief Ministers

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Dalhousie
5 August 1954

15. Our engineers told us that they were particularly struck by the enthusiasm of the people working on these projects. The Chinese Government took great pains to rouse up this enthusiasm and to make these people feel that they were working for the nation and for themselves. Probably, the wages paid to them were not high. But the Government provided all kinds of amenities for these worker -- theatres, music and dancing, club houses and full information

about the work that was being done so that they could understand it. They sang while they worked and so the work appeared lighter than it was.

16- Why should we not be able to learn from this example and succeed in getting big works done without relying too much on machinery imported from abroad. There is no harm in getting the machinery and, in some cases, it is obviously necessary. But, situated as we are with our large number of unemployed, it is obviously desirable to use manual labour, unless this is not feasible for some reason or other. The Chinese example has shown that it need not be expensive, if properly organized, and that it need not even take more time. Perhaps our engineers are getting a little too much machine-minded.

17- I think we should revise our ideas and think in terms of rapid and effective action to control some of these floods. This question arises especially in Bihar and Assam. The Kosi river has become a curse for vast numbers of people and we have made scheme alter scheme to do something about it. We have, I believe, approved of a certain scheme now which does not include at present the building of the big dam near the Nepal border, but which nevertheless can bring a good deal of relief. I think that our engineers should immediately think of undertaking this work, keeping the Chinese example in view and trying to use organized hand labour to the largest possible extent. That will also bring relief to the vast numbers who have suffered during the floods. In Assam also we have to tackle the problem much more effectively than we have been able to do thus far.

18- Floods have not only descended upon us in India, but they have surprisingly even descended upon Gyantse in Tibet. Apparently these floods came suddenly and with great rapidity and the old fort collapsed bringing death to many of our civil and military personnel there, as well as our Trade Agent.

19- I wrote to you in my last letter about the marked change that has come over the Indian people and the sense of gradual fulfilment that is evident all over the country. I do not wish to exaggerate this, but I have no doubt that there is satisfaction among our people at our achievements. I sit in an office most of the time, but fortunately I move out also among the people and many come to see me. Thus, to some extent though not adequately, I try to retain

the common touch. I have noticed, more particularly, a feeling of satisfaction in regard to three events, and this satisfaction goes right down to the people in the fields and in the marketplace. There is a sense of exhilaration at the part that India has played in helping to bring peace in the world; there is marked satisfaction at the great progress we have made in regard to the production of food and the abolition of controls and, in the north especially, Bhakra-Nangal has become a symbol of achievement, We must rejoice at this new climate of achievement. Nevertheless, there are many who do not share it because of their own troubles and difficulties. It is difficult for them to imagine that they are sharers in this when they get no benefit from it at all and their present misfortune continues. It is true that we cannot change the face of India suddenly or bring relief to all those who suffer. And yet, we are continually faced with this problem, which in the main may be said to be that of unemployment.
