

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Series II, Volume 16 II

Page 23

The Goal of a Cooperative Commonwealth

One member talked about foreign policy¹. In a document of this kind we have to say something about foreign policy because you must be clear about it in your own mind. But it is not desirable for you to discuss any particular foreign problem in a document of this kind unless it has an immediate bearing. For instance, what is happening in Tibet is not quite clear.² We know something; we do not know something else. New developments are taking place Why should we discuss it when we are not quite sure what is happening and what is not happening? Why should we put in a long paragraph about the United Nations? We are all in favour of the United Nations. We are supporting them, but we also know that we have difficulties with them.

Page 105

The Relevance of Mahatma Gandhi

But I would like to point out at the same time that nowadays many people talk a great deal about our Government's shortcomings and what we have done or not done. They make big promises about what they will do. They make these promises confidently because they are unlikely ever to have the opportunity of fulfilling them. So they can say what they like-they are not going to be believed in any case. It is my regret that they will never be put to the test because if they were, it would at once become clear how empty their promises are. But what is really worth noting is the situation in our

¹ Mahabir Singh said that the election manifesto should state India's foreign policy in unequivocal terms and insist on keeping aloof from power blocs and military commitments.

² In October 1950, Chinese troops marched into Tibet

neighbouring countries.

There is Pakistan, but leave that aside. There are Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran. Tibet, China, Burma, Malaya - all the countries of Asia. I compare the events in those countries in the last four years with our country's events. It is not good to compare and it is certainly not proper for me to speak ill of them here. There were certain developments which happened in those countries which I wish should have happened in ours too.

But when I look beyond Asia at the picture of Europe, then I certainly do not feel pessimistic. On the contrary, I feel that what we have achieved in the last four years has been quite spectacular. That does not mean that what we have done is enough or what we should boast about it and feel proud. What I am pointing out to you is that we must realise that what we have achieved.

Page 116

The Relevance of Mahatma Gandhi

You can see what is happening on the borders, in China and Tibet, Burma, Indonesia and other places. Take Kashmir. Whenever I go to Kashmir, I feel proud as well as a little ashamed. I feel proud that in the last three years, in spite of the war and tremendous difficulties, there has been so much progress in Kashmir. They have successfully solved the land issue in a few months' time and here we have been involved in court cases for years. All these developments are taking place all around us, and it is futile to think that nothing will happen here. This has to be done and will be done. But care has to be taken to do it fairly so that the loss to any individual is minimal.

Page 508

Rectification of the Assam-Bhutan Boundary³

³ Reply to a debate in Parliament, 7 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates (Official Report)*, Vol. XIV. Part 11 (6th August 1027 August 1951), columns 1/7.91. Extracts.

I confess that I see no difficulty at all about the various point raised.⁴ First of all, to consider this matter as a cession of territory, though it may be accurate strictly legally, hardly explains the position.⁵ It is a very small, minor rectification of a boundary, the kind of rectification which States have frequently to undergo, which does not mean very much and takes place when two States agree. I am not speaking as a lawyer for the moment, but from an ordinary, if I may say so, common-sense point of view, is it supposed that no rectification, no addition, no variation here and there is ever going to take place in the future? If so, who is going to do it? Parliament, of course, nobody else. To deny the right of Parliament or to say that nobody can ever add or subtract or vary or rectify the boundaries would be I think rather an extraordinary situation to face, because such things do happen, are bound to happen, and there must be some final authority by whose consent this could be done and that final authority can only be Parliament. Therefore, I beg to submit that it is hardly correct for us to say that Parliament itself cannot do it. If that is so, then the only course left open is to amend the Constitution, if the occasion for it arises, not now. But I do submit that these things are within the inherent power and authority of Parliament and the interpretation that some honourable friends have put about the State boundaries, etc. is a somewhat strained interpretation.⁶ Then again, my honourable friend Mr. Chaudhuri, I think, rather confused the

⁴ During the debate on the Assam Boundaries Bill for ceding to Bhutan an area of about 32 sq. miles in Assam called Dowangiri. R.K. Chaudhuri, H.V. Kamath, Pattabhi, Sitaramayya. V.S. Sarwate and P.S. Deshmukh had raised various points.

⁵ Kamath stated that Article 3(c) of the Constitution provided that boundaries of States could be changed. But there was no power conferred upon Parliament to cede or diminish any territory of the Indian Union.

⁶ Sarwate from Madhya Bharat argued that Article (2) said: "the States and the territories thereof shall be the States and their territories specified in Part A, B and C of the First Schedule" If Article 3 were read with Article I. it implied that the boundaries of one State and another could be changed, but the whole territory which was referred to in Schedule I could not be changed unless the Constitution was amended.

issue by bringing Pakistan into the picture.⁷ That is a completely different thing which has nothing to do with this matter. Here we are talking about rectification of boundaries-between whom? Not with a foreign country, but with a State with which we are intimately allied, whose defence, whose foreign affairs and communications and various other things are under our control. It is not technically speaking a part of the Union of India, but it is very closely allied, and in fact, in some matters under the control of this Parliament, in regard to those subjects in which it has acceded, or is in alliance with India. It is not a new thing. It is the continuation of an old thing which has now been put on a permanent basis by a treaty, so that one must look upon this, not as though he was dealing with a foreign State, but rather as dealing with a State, which though not technically a part of the Union of India, yet is very closely allied with us.

Secondly, it is not really cession. It is a very small rectification of boundary, mostly of forest land. There are various fairs held in that border and because there was a certain amount, if I may say so of religious sanctity attached to a small area there, we felt that it was far better to give that small area to a close ally of ours, closely associated with us, to gain the goodwill rather than hold on to a bit of forest land, a very small patch.... May I also say quite clearly that the responsibility for this is largely that of the Government of India? But the Government of India's responsibility was not enough. We did try to have the assent and the goodwill of the Assam Government. Therefore, we approached the Government of Assam and after a great deal of consideration, argument, examination, conferences and the like, they agreed to the transfer of this particular territory. So, I submit that this issue does not raise any major legal or constitutional point, nor does it raise any material political point either in regard to the area involved or in regard to the State to which we are transferring this territory, because that State is

⁷ Chaudhuri said that Pakistan had captured Golagani which according to Assam did not belong to India and Dauki, one and a half miles inside Indian territory which according to Gopalaswami Ayyangar really belonged to Assam.

almost as near to us as any State of the Indian Union. I think it will be a good thing if we treat this State as closely allied to us as possible rather than consider it alien. Of course, Bhutanese subjects need not be considered to be Indian nationals. But when this Parliament finally controls major policies about that State, when the Government of India gives them annual subsidies and aids, it is far from an alien State. In fact we want to develop cordial relations with this State by a psychological approach. If we treat them as aliens they cannot come here, we cannot go there. Thus barriers grow up. We want in this treaty of alliance not only to provide for economic, political and other matters and our control so far as foreign affairs; communications and defence are concerned, but also to create a psychological feeling of oneness and kinship. They said that they attach value to this particular area from a religious point of view. Hardly any human beings live there-just a handful. We thought it a very good decision to arrive at to give that area to gain their goodwill. As a matter of fact the whole area does not go anywhere else...

Now all these frontier areas have a mixed population, culturally connected with both areas. Now Mr. Chaudhuri's own province of Assam - a very beautiful and fertile place potentially very rich, which unfortunately has been suffering from great calamities-has a rich variety of people. Right from the borders of Burma, China and Tibet you see people of all kinds. The term "tribal area" is a very vague one. As a matter of fact there is as much difference between one tribe and another, as between a tribe and the plains people. You cannot therefore consider all of them alike. Even now it is quite a possibility that you may have to deal with some of them in a somewhat different way. It is quite possible that they may come up to you even for slight amendments of the Constitution to deal with somebody in a slightly different way if Parliament agrees to it-about minor things, nothing major. But the main thing is to make them grow and feel that they are organic units of this great country and that they can live their lives without being imposed and exploited by others, because that is their great fear. People in the

mountains have certain virtues, and certain failings. People in the plains have certain other virtues and certain other failings. Normally, people in the plains are cleverer than the people in the mountains - though I am not prepared to admit that they are better. And people in the plains go to people in the mountains and often exploit them in a financial way, grab their land, and otherwise do a bad deal with them. And so a fear has grown among the people of the mountains all over the Himalayas, if I may say so - not confined to this area of Assam or Kashmir or somewhere in Kumaon-that the people of the plains come and exploit them and take away their lands or other things. Therefore they require protection.

This has nothing to do with this Bill. What I am venturing to point out is that these border areas are difficult areas and that they have to be approached not with a big stick but, psychologically, in a friendly way so that they may feel that they are meeting with friends and not people who impose themselves on them. They have affections on either side; they have marriage ties on either side of the border. They come and go. Culturally speaking, it is a very mixed area. On the one side there is the Tibetan culture flowing into India, and on the other side there is the typical Indian *culture* going up *there*. It is good that this is so. I do not object to it. But it does create problems, and one had to adjust oneself to those problems by making those People feel that they can live their own lives and grow without imposition, and by their own free will they become nearer and hearer to us. We want the people of Bhutan as a whole to be much closer to India and looking to India not only politically but even culturally, than to any other place.

If in order to do that we come to certain minor adjustments of territory, a little bit of forest etc., without upsetting anybody, I do not see how we do the slightest injury to our great country. In fact we do something which a great country should always do - to show how it looks upon its little brothers in a friendly generous way and protects and helps them to grow.

I submit that this little Bill which my honourable colleague, the Deputy

Minister⁸, has put forward is a very simple proposition which raises no basic issues, constitutional or political, and which, the House may remember, is a story that started a long time ago, years ago. In fact, before the Republic came into existence under this Constitution the thing was really completed, but owing to certain difficulties in giving effect to it the matter has hung over, and we should finalise it now. Not to do so does not do much good or harm to us. But it does make the people feel that we have not kept our word with them and that something that we had agreed to three years ago and more has been disagreed to and the whole thing is upset and all kinds of difficulties are produced about a very small matter.

Page 541

To Sampurnanand

New Delhi
October 31, 1951

My dear Sampurnanand⁹,

Thank you for your letter of October 28th¹⁰.

We have not been entirely negligent about our Tibetan border. Full enquiries have been made by air and on land and we are considering reports of these enquiries. Some steps have already been taken on the lines of the recommendations made.

While I agree with you that all necessary steps, within our resources, should be taken as soon as possible, I do not think that we need take too gloomy a view of the situation.

⁸ B.V. Kesakar

⁹ J.N. Collection.

¹⁰ Sampurnanand, a Minister in the U.P. Government, wrote that some areas adjoining Tibet had become vulnerable because of Tibetan activities supported by China. He wanted the Government to take necessary precautions by laying strategic roads, constructing barracks for soldiers and establishing army outposts on the Indian side.

I am a little surprised to learn that prices of rice and sugar etc., have been brought down considerably. Could you send me some further information on this subject?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

Page 559

To King Tribhuvan

What troubles me most is the rather casual way in which proposals are made and contradicted. and the lack of an impersonal and cooperative approach to the grave problems that confront the country. Personalities count and must continue to count. but problems should not be considered in terms of personalities only, otherwise they would be reduced to the level of personal intrigues.

Your Majesty is aware of the developments in Tibet.¹¹ Both India and Nepal have a long frontier with Tibet and such developments, therefore, must necessarily affect both our countries. Fortunately our relations with the People's Government of China are good. We hope that in the near future we shall still further stabilise these relations and come to an agreement about matters that might still be considered to be in doubt. Such an agreement would Obviously be to the advantage of all countries concerned, including Nepal. But any attempt at such agreement would be hindered if the situation in Nepal deteriorates in any way.

Page 560

The Threat from Tibet¹²

¹¹ China occupied Tibet in 1950 and rejected India's suggestion that Tibet's autonomy be respected.

¹² Nehru's comments on the note written by G.S. Bajpai, Secretary-General, Ministry of

...The possibility of a regular invasion of Nepal or India by Chinese forces through Tibet can be ruled out even as a remote contingency. In any event, in the present state of affairs, it is not a proposition which we need consider. I need not go into the reasons for this, but it seems to me an obvious conclusion. What might happen is some petty trouble in the borders and unarmed infiltration. To some extent this can be stopped by checkposts, which are necessary. Ultimately, however, armies do not stop communist infiltration or communist ideas. They have to be dealt with by other methods, namely a strong, stable and progressive civil government undertaking major reforms, more particularly relating to land. Any large expenditure on the army will starve the development of the country and social progress. That is much more likely to endanger the stability than the lack of army to protect frontiers.

Page 627

Closer Indo-U.S. Relations¹³

The American Ambassador and Mrs. Henderson came to lunch with me today. After lunch I had a fairly long talk with Mr. Henderson. I began by saying that I wished to make two points clear. One was that it was my firm opinion that, in spite of marked differences of opinion between India and the U.S. in regard to various matters, there was basic community of views, or, to put it differently, our differences were not deep but rather superficial and temporary. We had no ill-will against each other. Our differences flowed from a different background. We, as a newly independent nation, were powerfully

External Affairs. who had suggested that "though a large Chinese army or a Tibetan army under Chinese inspiration and leadership may not attempt an invasion of India, the possibility of small forces dribbling in through the numerous passes and then combining to make trouble for us cannot be and had not been ruled out." 5 October 1951. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

¹³ Nehru's note on his talk with Loy Henderson, New Delhi. 15 September 1951. J.N.

influenced by our way of thinking which had developed during our struggle for freedom, and by the fact that we did not wish to be entangled. It would be quite wrong to think that there was any real ill-will in India for the people of the U.S. Certainly I desired the best of relations between the two countries.

My second point was that whatever differences had arisen between the U.S. and India were due to certain developments which could not be controlled by either party. It was not the fault of individuals. Personally I felt that no Ambassador to India from the U.S. could have done more for the promotion of good relations between the two countries than Mr. Henderson. I wish to make this clear as there had been various hints, chiefly in the American press that we did not get on well together. There was absolutely no truth in this and, as Mr. Henderson knew well, we had no such difficulty in understanding and getting on with each other. And I greatly appreciated the work he had done in India.

Mr. Henderson was rather moved by what I said, and said that he was happy to hear this from me though he himself knew that our relations had been always good. He did not thrust himself upon me too often because I was a very busy man. The criticisms that appeared in the public press were not based on any facts. He instanced the criticisms in Parliament here of our Ambassador in the U.S. He said that these criticisms here of Mrs Pandit were completely unjustified and misconceived because Mrs Pandit had always had the best of relations with the State Department and indeed was held in higher esteem than any other ambassador in Washington.

As for himself, he had tried his utmost to promote good relations between the two countries and it was a matter of sorrow for him that he had not achieved the results that he had hoped for. I pointed out that this certainly was not his fault or, for the matter of that, anybody else's fault. In any event his attempts had not failed, though they have not borne obvious results. I was sure that his stay here as U.S. ambassador had done a lot of good. Regarding my other points he said he was very glad to know from me that, in

my opinion, the differences between India and the U.S. were not deep at all and he would like to convey that to the State Department.

The Japanese treaty and India's attitude to it had produced strong reactions in the U.S. and it was being said that India's policy was:

- (1) to try to separate China from the USSR,
- (2) to try to separate Japan from the U.S.A.

I replied that, while it was not true to say that we were trying to separate China from the USSR, we would certainly like China to function independently and not to be tied up too much with the USSR I felt sure that that would happen in the course of time because I could not imagine a great country like China being submerged in a way in the USSR or to become just a dependent member of the Soviet system. While that was certain in the long run, a short run counted and, therefore, I was anxious that China should have other openings and other contacts, so as not to depend too much upon the USSR. China was a great power and was bound to function as such.

The developments in Tibet and Chinese forces coming right near the Indian border has created a new situation for us. We did not think for a moment that there was any danger of invasion of India *via* Tibet (Mr Henderson entirely agreed with this). But, nevertheless, the new situation made us somewhat apprehensive of this long frontier and we had to take some steps in regard to it. Previously we had completely ignored this frontier. Now we could not do that.

Our general policy towards China was governed by the fact that we thought peace could only be assured in the Far East by proper recognition of China, as China is a great nation, and by peaceful settlement of questions in which China was concerned.

Both China and the USSR were great and powerful nations. Communism came in the way of our understanding the situation, which was the development of two great and vital nations tending to expand. There was always the possibility of aggression. I thought that it would be exceedingly bad if China went beyond its own legitimate borders. That would create new

and dangerous problems not only in the present but for the future. As regards the allegation that I want to come in the way of U.S.-Japanese relations and to isolate Japan from the U.S., I said that this was a novel suggestion which had never occurred to me. It was true that it seemed to me quite inevitable that geographically and economically Japan should have close relations with China. They supplied each other's needs and to stop this natural intercourse was to go against normal developments. I had no idea at any time that Japan should be cut off from the U.S. or not have friendly and cooperative relations. Indeed, from a larger point of view and in order to maintain a certain balance in the Far East, it seemed to me desirable that the U.S. should have close relations with Japan just as China ought to have with them. We had previously laid stress on the latter because we felt that there could be no peace in the Far East if China was excluded from the settlement. The same argument applied very much to any attempt at peace which did not have the concurrence of the U.S.

Mr Henderson expressed his appreciation of what I said, and added that he would like to convey all these to the State Department. He assured me that the U.S. realised that China must inevitably play her part as a great nation in the Far East and that it was natural for her to develop good relations with Japan. Unfortunately the Korean war had come in the way. If this matter was resolved, other natural developments would follow.

Mr Henderson assured me that the U.S. did not wish in any way to interfere in our domestic or other policy and he hoped that, whenever there was any misapprehension about this matter, we would talk freely with the new Ambassador.¹⁴ He further said that there had been some misunderstanding about the U.S.I.S. and it had been said that the U.S.I.S. was interfering with our domestic affairs through their publications and by trying to influence the press here. This was not true, and he wished to assure me that this was not their policy. Some foolish individual temporarily connected with the U.S.I.S.

¹⁴ Chester Bowles.

had made a suggestion to Karaka¹⁵ which was entirely unauthorised and improper. What the U.S.I.S. wanted to do was to put down their own positive points of view in order somewhat to counteract the communist propaganda in India. Some papers here were attacking America all the time (when I asked him for names, he mentioned *Crossroads*, *Blitz* and, to some extent, others). Also the bookshops here were full of communist pamphlets and literature. Americans who came here complained, when they went back to the U.S., of the absence of any U.S. publicity here, while communist publicity was obvious.

We had some talk also about Iran where Mr Henderson is going.

Page 643

Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹⁶

We have given preliminary but careful consideration to your telegram No. 327 of 28th September¹⁷. We fully share new China's desire for friendly relations among Asian countries in general and India, China, Nepal, Burma and Indonesia in particular. I have little doubt that Chou En-lai's talk with you is related to the larger framework of China's policy vis-à-vis neighbour or near-neighbour countries in South and South East Asia. of which Tibet's boundary with India and Nepal and China's boundary with Burma are only parts.

Chinese Ambassador¹⁸ has not yet raised with us question of conversations suggested by Premier Chou to you. Our provisional view is that in first

¹⁵ D.F. Karaka, editor of *Current* published from Bombay

¹⁶ New Delhi. 2 October 1951. J.N. Collection

¹⁷ At a dinner given by Chou En-lai's wife to Indian Ambassador's wife on 27 September 1951. Chou En-lai had laid special emphasis on the necessity of friendship between India, Burma, Indonesia and China. He was looking forward to Shabrir's visit and hoped that it would lead to a better understanding in South East Asian countries of the Chinese position.

¹⁸ Yuan Chung.Laien.

instance, conversations should take place between China and us regarding our interests in Tibet and common boundary between Tibet and India¹⁹. If, as we hope, these progress smoothly and satisfactorily. Nepal can be brought in at later stage. We are not aware of any boundary disputes. at least in recent times between Tibet and Nepal. Real purpose of suggestion to include Nepal in conversations probably is to prepare ground for early establishment of diplomatic relations between China and that country. For your own information, internal conditions in Nepal are still unsettled. owing to continuing differences between Congress and Rana wings of Cabinet. and growth of numerous small groups which want to share power. Communist element is trying to exploit situation to its own advantage. Until Nepalese Government functions harmoniously, it is doubtful whether it can have ally firm policy towards China and there is risk of disgruntled elements in Nepal trying to play India and China off against each other. I am trying my best to impress upon the Nepalese Government through the King the imperative need for cooperative working and creation of stable internal conditions. Frontier between China and Burma has, as you know, been cause of disputes in past and remains undemarcated. Burma is also much more vulnerable from the north than India. It is in our interest and in general interest of peace in this region that Sino-Burmese frontier should not become cause of dispute. Thakin Nu is coming here about October 22nd and I am informing him privately through our Ambassador of Chou's approach to you so that, during his stay in Delhi, Thakin Nu can exchange ideas with us. We would certainly welcome discussion between China and Burma and be ready to lend our good offices by direct participation in conversations if both parties desire this, aiming at placing of Sino-Burmese relations on firm and lasting friendly

¹⁹ Chou En-li had mentioned that there was no difference of point of view in regard to Tibet between India and China and that he was particularly anxious to safeguard in every way Indian interests in Tibet. He further emphasised that the question of stabilisation of the Tibetan frontier was a matter of common interest to India, Nepal and China and could best be done by discussions among the three countries

basis. Chronologically, however, we think that these conversations should follow rather than be simultaneously with those between India and China regarding Tibet.

While I agree that Chou's reference to Indonesia is a hopeful sign, I am not sure that Indonesia need be brought into our talks at this stage. Even from the standpoint of overall policy, there is merit in moving diplomatically step by step while keeping the larger goal in view.

I leave it to your discretion to decide how much (apart from what I have said regarding internal situation of Nepal, which is for your own information only) you should mention to Chou En-lai before you leave. Some indication of the friendly response of India to the suggestion for settling matters of common interest by diplomatic negotiation seems desirable before you leave.

Page 647

The Tibetan Delegation in India²⁰

From today's papers it appears that the Dalai Lama²¹ has definitely decided to go to Lhasa²². The question of his coming to India therefore does not arise now.

2. So far as the Peking agreement²³ is concerned, there is no question of our approval or disapproval. We have had nothing to do with it and we have not been consulted at any stage either by the Tibetans or tile Chinese. our

²⁰ Note to S.N. Haksar, Joint Secretary. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. 21 July 1951. J.N. Collection

²¹ (b. 1935), recognised as the fourteenth incarnation, temporal and spiritual leader of Tibet: left Lhasa for refuge in India, March 1959

²² It was reported on July 1951 that arrangements had been completed at Dongkar Monastery for the Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa in December 1950 for the Chumbi Valley near the Indian Border, to return to Lhasa. He was back in August 1951.

²³ On 23 May 1951, an agreement was signed at Beijing by the Government of China and a Tibetan delegation sent by the Dalai Lama. The main provisions were that Tibet would have regional autonomy and China would be responsible for dealing with Tibet's foreign relations.

general advice to the Tibetan delegation. when it came here. was that we hoped that they would come to a peaceful settlement with the Chinese. preserving their autonomy. This advice was largely based on the fact that it seemed to US that Tibet was incapable of offering any effective resistance, and any attempt at ineffective resistance would probably lead to far greater control of China. It was quite impossible for us to give any assistance and therefore it was not proper for us to raise any hopes in this direction.

3. How exactly we can help the Dalai Lama and Tibet at this stage is not clear to me. The U.S.A., as a part of their larger policy, cats incite the Dalai Lama to reject the Chinese treaty. For us to do so would mean no help to Tibet and would simply mean almost our breaking with China. When occasion arises, we can certainly put in a good word on the diplomatic plane to China. For the rest, the only policy we can adopt is to remain quiet observers.

4. As we have said previously, if the Dalai Lama or anyone else came to seek asylum here, we would naturally give it, subject to the condition that India was not made the base of political activity. This question presumably does not arise now as the Dalai Lama is going to Lhasa.

5. You might convey the substance of this note to our representative²⁴ in Sikkim.

Page 726

Letters to Chief Ministers

Thakin Nu, Prime Minister of Burma, is likely to come to Delhi for consultations about the 22nd October. India and Burma were the two countries which adopted an identical policy in regard to the Japanese peace treaty. We shall discuss future steps in this matter as well as many other matters of common concern. Recent developments in China and Tibet have raised new problems for both of us. Fortunately, as you know, our relations

²⁴ Harishwar Dayal.

with the People's Government of China are good and we hope that a friendly settlement of any outstanding issues will be arrived at. I might mention that a strong cultural mission from China is coming to India towards the end of this month.²⁵ They will be the guests of our Government and they will tour India in two parties, one consisting chiefly of scientists and the other of literary men and the like. I hope that if they visit your State, you will give them a warm welcome.

Page 726

Letters to Chief Ministers

Shri Panikkar has just arrived²⁶ in Delhi for consultation and we shall take full advantage of this visit. It is important that we should know what the new China is and in what direction it is going. It seems clear that the People's Government of China has strengthened and consolidated itself and is a very popular one. For the first time, China possesses a strong Central Government whose decrees run even to Sinkiang and Tibet. Our own relations with China are definitely friendly. China's cultural mission will be coming to India soon and will spend about six weeks here.

²⁵ The Mission led by Ting Si-lin reached Calcutta on 28 October 1951.

²⁶ On 16 October 1951.