



NOTES, MEMORANDA AND LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND CHINA

OCTOBER 1962-JANUARY 1963

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On 8 November 1962, the Prime Minister presented to Parliament the Seventh White Paper containing the notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the period July 1962-October 1962. This White Paper contains the notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the two Governments, since 24 October 1962. It also contains a few notes which had not been included in the previous White Paper.

Ministry of External Affairs,
New Delhi,
20th January 1963.

**Letter from Premier Chou En-lai to Prime Minister of India,
24 October 1962**

Your Excellency Respected Prime Minister,

It is most distressing that border clashes as serious as the present ones should have occurred between our two countries. Fierce fighting is still going on. At this critical moment, I do not propose to trace the origin of this conflict. I think we should look ahead; we should take measures to turn the tide. In order to seek a way to stop the border clashes, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question, the Chinese Government has already issued a statement, proposing the following:

(1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, though consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e., the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.

(3) In order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers

of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

For thousands of years, the peoples of China and India have been friendly to each other, and they should remain so from generation to generation. Our two countries jointly initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and took part in the Bandung Conference of historic significance. Our two peoples' common interests in their struggle against imperialism outweigh by far all the differences between our two countries. We have a major responsibility for Sino-Indian friendship, Asia-African solidarity and Asian peace. Driven by a deep sense of this responsibility I sincerely appeal to you that you may respond positively to the above three proposals.

Please accept, Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.) CHOU EN-LAI,
Premier of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China

Statement of the Chinese Government, 24 October 1962

Serious armed clashes have recently taken place on the Sino-Indian border. This occurrence is most unfortunate. The Chinese and Indian people have always been friendly to each other and should remain so from generation to generation. That China and India should cross words on account of the boundary question is something the Chinese Government and people are unwilling to see, it is also what the peace-loving countries and people of the whole world are unwilling to see.

The Sino-Indian boundary question is a question left over by history. There is a traditional customary boundary between the two countries, but the boundary between the two countries has never been formally delimited. The so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector is a line which the British imperialists attempted to force upon China by taking advantage of the powerlessness of the Chinese and the Indian peoples. It is illegal and has never been recognized by the Chinese Government. After the independence of India, and especially around the time of the peaceful liberation of the Tibet region of China, the Indian side gradually extended its scope of actual control in the eastern sector northward from the traditional customary line to the vicinity of the so-called McMahon Line. In the middle and western sectors, up to 1959 the extent of actual control by China and India in the main conformed to the traditional customary line, except at individual places. Although India occupied more than 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the eastern sector, provoked two border clashes in 1959 and made claim to large tracts of Chinese territory, the Chinese Government has always stood for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations and held that, pending, a peaceful settlement, the extent of actual control by each side should be respected and neither side should alter the state of the boundary by unilateral action. Seeking a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question Premier Chou En-lai went to New Delhi in April, 1960 to hold talks with Prime Minister Nehru,

and tried hard to reach a preliminary agreement conducive to a settlement of the boundary question. Regrettably, the sincere effort of the Chinese side did not evoke a response from the Indian side. Following that, the meeting of the officials of China and India likewise failed to yield results as it should.

The Chinese Government has always held that, even though China and India cannot for a time reach agreed opinions on the boundary question, this should not lead to border clashes. As early as 1959, the Chinese Government repeatedly proposed that the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres all along the border and stop frontier patrols so as to disengage the armed forces of the two sides and avoid conflict. After the Indian side rejected these proposals, China unilaterally stopped patrols on its side of the boundary in the hope that this might help ease the border situation. Contrary to our expectations, the Indian side, taking advantage of these circumstances, pressed forward steadily and penetrated deep into Chinese territory, first in the middle and western, and then in the eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary, set up scores of military strongpoints and continually caused armed clashes, thus making the border situation increasingly tense.

In the past year and more, the Chinese Government has again and again asked India to stop changing the status quo of the boundary by force and return to the table of negotiations. In the last three months, the Chinese Government three times proposed negotiating the Sino-Indian boundary question without any preconditions but all three times met with the refusal of the Indian Government. The Indian Government insisted that negotiations cannot start until China has withdrawn from vast tracts of China's own territory.

Especially shocking to China is the fact that the Indian Government, after rejecting China's peaceful proposal, on October 12 ordered the Indian forces to "free" Chinese frontiers of Chinese troops. Then, on October 20, Indian forces started a massive general offensive in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. In these serious

circumstances, the Chinese frontier guards had no choice but to strike back in self-defence.

Fierce fighting is now going on. The occurrence of this grave situation pains the Chinese Government and people and disturbs the Asian and African countries and people. After all, what issue is there between China and India that cannot be settled peacefully? What reason is there for bloody clashes to occur between China and India? China does not want a single inch of India's territory. In no circumstances is it conceivable for the Sino-Indian boundary question to be settled by force. China and India are both big countries of Asia having a major responsibility for peace in Asia and the world. They are initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and participants of the Bandung Conference. Although the relations between China and India are presently very tense, there is no reason to abandon the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the spirit of the Bandung Conference. The Chinese Government holds that both the Chinese and Indian Governments should take to heart the fundamental interests of the 1,100 million people of China and India, the common interests of the people of the two countries in their struggle against imperialism and the interests of Asian peace and Asian-African solidarity, and try their best to seek a way to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.

In line with its consistent stand for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the Chinese Government now solemnly puts forward the following three proposals:

(1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultations between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e., the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.

(3) The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

The Chinese Government appeals to the Indian Government for a positive response to the above three proposals. The Chinese Government appeals to the governments of Asian and African countries for an effort to bring about the materialization of these three proposals. The Chinese Government appeals to all the peace-loving countries and people to do their part in promoting Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and world peace.

**Letter from the Prime Minister of India, to Premier Chou En-lai, 27
October 1962**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for the copy of your message of 24th October which was delivered to the Ministry of External Affairs by your Charge d'Affaires in

Delhi on the evening of 24th October along with a copy of the statement issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the morning of the 24th.

Nothing in my long political career has hurt and grieved me more than the fact that the hopes and aspirations for peaceful and friendly neighbourly relations which we entertained, and to promote which my colleagues in the Government of India and myself worked so hard, ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, should have been shattered by the hostile and unfriendly twist given in India-China relations during the past few years. The current clashes on the India-China border arising out of what is in effect a Chinese invasion of India, which you have described as 'most distressing' are the final culmination of the deterioration in relations between India and China.

I would not, in this letter, go into the long history of this deterioration in India-China relations or argue as to where the fault lies because you are quite familiar with our views on this subject. All I would say is that the long preamble to the statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China of 24th October, enclosed with your letter, gives a distorted picture of the history of India-China relations. I agree with you, however, that we should look ahead and consider what can be done not merely to turn the tide as you suggest, but to reverse it and make a serious attempt to restore the relations between India and China to the warm and friendly pattern of earlier days and even to improve on that pattern.

As regards the three points mentioned in your letter which were put out in the statement of 24th October, the Government of India have already indicated their official reactions to the proposals in these three points. I enclose a copy of this official reaction for ready reference.

My colleagues and I have carefully considered the appeal made in your letter. We are not able to understand the niceties of the Chinese three-point proposals which talk about "lines of actual control", etc. I believe several other Governments interested in peaceful settlement of our differences have also not been able to understand or appreciate what these proposals actually mean.

We are of the considered view that a clear straightforward way of reversing the deteriorating trend in India-China relations would be for Your Excellency to accept the suggestion made in point (V) of the official reaction of the Government of India and to revert to the position as it prevailed all along the India-China boundary prior to 8th September, 1962. If this is agreed to, it can be implemented by both sides. We will, thereafter, be glad to welcome you or a delegation from your country at any level that is mutually acceptable to discuss and arrive at further agreed measures which can facilitate a peaceful settlement of our differences on this border question, in one stage or in more than one stage as may be necessary.

There have been repeated declarations by the Government of the People's Republic of China that they want to settle the differences on the border question with India by peaceful means, though what is happening today is in violent contradiction with these declarations. I would, however, presume that your letter is a reaffirmation of the earlier declarations and indicates a desire to revert to the paths of Peace and peaceful settlement. On this common basis of eschewing war and violence in the settlement of border differences, our proposal to revert to the status quo along the entire boundary as it prevailed before September, 1962, should be acceptable to you. We could after this is implemented, discuss our differences and see whether we can arrive at agreed measures and settle the differences either in one stage or in several stages. If we fail we can

consider what other agreed peaceful method of settling our differences should be adopted.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

**Annexure to letter from the Prime Minister of India to Premier
Chou En-lai, 27 October 1962**

The Government of India have seen Press Agency reports of the three-point statement issued by the People's Republic of China which the New China News Agency has put out this morning. There has been no official communication from the Chinese Government on this matter so far.

The Government of India have in previous notes and in statements made by the Prime Minister clearly indicated their attitude in this matter. Government of India's position is:

- (i) The Government of India wedded to peace and peaceful methods have always sought to resolve differences by talks and discussions in this case of border differences with the Government of China.
- (ii) On the 16th October, 1962, in a note sent to the Government of China they proposed the restoration of the status quo of the boundary as it prevailed before the Chinese aggression in the eastern sector on 8th September, 1962, prior to talks and discussions for easing of tension and for creating the appropriate climate for purposeful talks and discussions to resolve the differences between the Governments of India and China on the boundary question.
- (iii) Since then, it is the Government of China which on the morning of the 20th October, 1962, hurled its vast armies at various points on all sectors of the India-China boundary and enlarged the conflict. These Chinese forces have advanced in all sectors into Indian territory and are still advancing. India cannot and will not accept a position under which Chinese forces continue to commit aggression into Indian territory, occupy substantial Indian territories and use these as a bargaining counter to force a settlement on their terms.
- (iv) There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20 kilometres from what they call 'line of actual control'. What is this 'line of actual control'? Is this the line they have created by aggression since the

beginning of September? Advancing 40 or 60 kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw 20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which can fool nobody.

(v) If the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let them go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 8th September, 1962. India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the status quo along the India-China boundary.

(vi) India is always prepared to resolve differences by talks and discussions but only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect and not under threat of military might of any country however strong it may be.

(vii) India would be prepared to welcome the Chinese Prime Minister or any suitable representative of the Chinese Government on a mutually agreed date if China is sincere in its professions of peaceful settlement and accepts the constructive proposal made in point (v) above which is fully consistent with dignity and self-respect both of India and China.

**Letter from Premier Chou En-lai, to the Prime Minister of India, 4
November 1962**

Respected Mr. Prime Minister,

I thank you for your letter dated October 27. I have also received the enclosed copy of the Indian Government's statement dated October 24.

It is indeed most painful to the Chinese Government and people that the current unfortunate border clashes should have eventually broken out and should have not yet ceased. The major enemy of China, as well as of the other Asian and African countries, is imperialism. The Chinese Government and people are by no means willing to see the two largest Asian countries crossing swords on account of differences between them, while they are confronted with the major enemy.

Though we interpret the cause of the current grave situation between China and India differently, I am glad that Your Excellency agrees that we should look ahead and should not merely turn the present tide but restore Sino-Indian relations to the warm and friendly pattern of earlier days and even improve on that pattern. I believe that if we really cherish such a common desire we shall certainly be able, through our joint efforts, to find a way to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully that is acceptable to both sides.

The three proposals of the Chinese Government of October 24 were advanced exactly in the spirit of resuming the friendly relations between the two countries prior to 1959. Your Excellency said that you and your colleagues were not so clear about the precise meaning of the Chinese Government's proposals. Although the Chinese Government already pointed out in its statement the origin and meaning of its proposals, I am still willing here to make some further explanations.

As pointed out in the October 24 statement of the Chinese Government, the proposals for the armed forces of China and India to withdraw 20 kilometres each from the line of actual control and to disengage was first put forward by the Chinese Government back in 1959, to put it more specifically, in my letter to you dated November 7, 1959. Now, the Chinese Government has reiterated this proposal. The "line of

actual control" mentioned in the proposal is basically still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on November 7, 1959. To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China. The reason why the Chinese Government put forward this proposal again emphatically is that we have deeply realised from the bitter experience of the past three years that it is very hard to avoid clashes in border areas under dispute if the armed forces of the two sides are not disengaged. The fact that the Chinese Government's proposal has taken as its basis the 1959 line of actual control and not the present line of actual contact between the armed forces of the two sides is full proof that the Chinese side has not tried to force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on account of the advances gained in the recent counter-attack in self-defence. According to this proposal of the Chinese Government, the undertakings of both sides are equal. Moreover as Your Excellency is surely aware, in concretely implementing this proposal the Chinese armed forces will have to withdraw much more than 20 kilometres from their present position in the eastern sector. The Chinese Government greatly regrets that the Indian Government in its statement of October 24 should describe this fair proposal of the Chinese Government as a deceptive device to fool anybody. As Your Excellency is clearly aware, implementation of this proposal of the Chinese Government is not tantamount to the settlement of the boundary question, and so it will in no way prejudice the position of either side in maintaining its claims with regard to the boundary. No matter how differently our two sides view the Sino-Indian boundary question, the question has in fact been in existence for a long time. Yet this situation did not prevent our two countries from living together on friendly terms before 1959, then how is it that they can no longer do so after 1959? Of course, we both wish to see the boundary question settled speedily in a friendly way, yet why is it that our two countries must resort

to arms before the boundary question is settled? The proposal of the Chinese Government for the armed forces of the two sides to withdraw 20 kilometres each from the line of actual control along the entire boundary and the disengage is precisely designed to create an atmosphere for the peaceful settlement of the boundary question; and even if the boundary question cannot be settled for the time being; avoidance of clashes along the border can be ensured.

The Indian Government said in its statement that India can enter into talks "only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect." I deem that the three proposals of the Chinese Government have precisely provided such a basis. Should the Indian Government agree to the Chinese Government's proposals, China and India can quickly designate officials to negotiate matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides and the cessation of their armed conflict. When these negotiations have yielded results and the results have been put into effect, the Prime Ministers of the two countries can then hold talks to proceed further to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

You have said in your letter that "a clear straight-forward way of reversing the deteriorating trend in India-China relations" is for the Chinese side to accept the suggestion made in point V of the Indian Government's statement, that is, to "revert to the position as it prevailed all along the India-China boundary prior to September 8, 1962." I cannot but state with regret, however, that this Indian suggestion is contrary to the aim of turning the present tide and resuming Sino-Indian friendly relations.

I do not wish to reopen the old argument. But since the state of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to September 8, 1962 has been referred to, I cannot but point out that that state was unfair and pregnant with the

danger of border conflict and hence should not be restored. So far as the eastern sector is concerned I believe the Indian Government must be in possession of the 1914 original map of the so-called McMahon Line. According to the original map the western end of the so-called McMahon Line clearly starts from 27° 44.6'N. Yet the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it started from 27°48'N and, on this pretext, it not only refused to withdraw the Indian troops from the Kechilang River area north of the Line, but made active dispositions for a massive military attack, attempting to clear the area of Chinese frontier guards defending it. Such was the position in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to September 8, 1962. How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position? As for the western sector, the Aksai Chin area has always been under China's jurisdiction. It was through this area that back in 1950 the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Ari district of Tibet from Sinkiang. Again, it was through this area that, from 1956 to 1957, the Chinese Government constructed the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway involving gigantic engineering work. Yet the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it was not until 1957 that the Chinese side came to this area and, on this pretext, unilaterally altered the state of the boundary in the western sector by force from 1961 onwards, occupied large tracts of Chinese territory east of the 1959 line of actual control and set up over 40 military strong-points. Such was the position in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to September 8, 1962. How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position?

The Chinese Government holds that the present border clashes should not have occurred at all and that in order quickly to stop the border clashes, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question, neither side should assume the attitude of a victor, no matter how the clashes may develop. It was precisely in this spirit that the Chinese Government put forward its three proposals of October 24. The three proposals are reciprocal and not one-sided, they are equitable

and not asking submission of one side, they are based on mutual accommodation and not Imposed on others, they are based on mutual respect and not bullying one side, and they are in the spirit of friendly negotiation and not arbitrary or dogmatic. However, the Indian Government has put to the Chinese Government humiliating conditions such as forced on a vanguished party. Your Excellency, Mr. Prime Minister, both our countries are sovereign states and neither can force its unilateral demands on the other. India has its self-respect, so has China. It was for the upholding of the self-respect, of both China and India that the Chinese Government put forward its three proposals of October 24. I sincerely appeal to Your Excellency once again to consider these three proposals and make a positive response.

Respected Mr. Prime Minister, since the unfortunate Sino- Indian border clashes began, many Asian and African countries have appealed to our two countries, expressing the hope that we may stop the clashes and resume negotiations. They say that imperialism and colonialism are the chief enemies of us newly- independent Asian and African countries, and that the Asian and African countries should settle their mutual disputes peacefully on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. I am convinced that their intentions are good and their viewpoint is correct. We should not disappoint their eager expectations.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.) CHOU EN-LAI,

Premier of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China.

**Letter from the Prime Minister of India, to Premier Chou En-lai, 14
November 1962**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 4th November. Our Charge d'Affaires in Peking to whom it was handed over sent us a copy by telegram.

My colleagues and I have carefully considered the elaboration of the three proposals of the Chinese Government of October 24, given in your letter.

Apart from the Chinese claims regarding the territorial boundary in various sectors of the India-China boundary, one fact stands out quite clearly. This is the basic fact that till the 8th September, 1962, no Chinese forces had crossed the frontier between India and China in the Eastern sector as defined by India, that is, along the highest watershed in the region, in accordance with the Agreement of 1914. It was on 8th September, 1962, that your forces crossed this frontier and threatened the Dhola frontier post of India. We took limited defensive measures to reinforce this post and at the same time made repeated approaches to the Chinese Government to withdraw their forces beyond the Thag La ridge which is the frontier in this region. Your forces not only did not withdraw to the position they occupied before 8th September, 1962, but after some probing attacks, mounted a massive attack and are now in occupation of large areas of Indian territory in this region and also in various other frontier areas of NEFA. That the attack was premeditated and carefully planned is clear from the fact that this attack at the Thag La ridge frontier which commenced on the morning of the 20th October, 1962, was not an isolated move; similar attacks against Indian defence posts started simultaneously along other parts not only of the eastern sector of the frontier, but also of the western sector of the frontier.

As I said in my letter of 27th October, I do not want to go into the history of the last five years and the forcible, unilateral alteration of the status quo of the boundary by the Chinese forces in the western sector, on which a mass of notes and memoranda have been exchanged between our two Governments. The events since 8th September, 1962, however, have completely shattered any hope that that any one could have entertained about settling India-China differences peacefully in accordance with normal international principles observed by all civilized governments. This invasion, coming after 12 years of constant and consistent endeavour on our part to maintain and develop friendly relations with China, can only point to one and only one conclusion, namely, that the Government of China have taken a deliberate cold-blooded decision, in total disregard of all principles, which govern normal neighbourly relations between sovereign governments, to enforce their alleged boundary claims by military invasion of India. It is this crisis of confidence which has to be dealt with. I must state frankly, that we find no attempt, either in the three proposals as elaborated now or in the other parts of your letter, to deal with this main problem created by the massive Chinese aggression on India which began on 8th September, 1962, namely, the complete loss of confidence in the *bona fides* of the professions for a peaceful settlement repeatedly made in public statements of the Government of China. On the other hand, your letter proceeds on the unilateral assumption that the line of actual control created by the latest Chinese invasion of India should be accepted as a part of the cease-fire arrangements and implemented on the ground, the boundary differences being negotiated thereafter between the two Prime Ministers. In brief, China will keep what it has secured by this further invasion and is prepared to negotiate on the rest. India can never agree to this position.

The three proposals of the Chinese Government of October 24, 1962, have been examined carefully and in detail. The result of the

examination is given in the memorandum that I am attaching to this letter. The memorandum speaks for itself.

You have mentioned in your letter that according to the Chinese proposals, the Chinese armed forces will have to withdraw by more than 20 kilometres from their present positions and that the fact that the Chinese Government have taken as its basis the 1959 "line of actual control" and not the present "line of actual control" between the armed forces of the two sides, is full proof that the Chinese side has not tried to force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on account of the advances gained in what you still choose to call "recent counter-attacks in self-defence". What you call the 1959 "line of actual control" was no line but a series of positions of Chinese forces on Indian territory in Ladakh progressively established since 1957, which forcibly and unilaterally altered the status quo of the boundary. This was done even while assuring us since 1954 that China had no territorial claims against India. So far as the Central sector is concerned, the Chinese forces were always to the north of the Himalayan watershed ridge which is the traditional and customary boundary in this area.

The analysis given in the attached note will, however, show that even this 7th November, 1959, line of actual control is projected three years ahead to be identical with the line of actual control established by your forces since the massive attack on 20th October, 1962. Surely this must be clear to all concerned. To advance a few hundred kilometres and then offer to withdraw 20 kilometres is, as anybody can see, hardly a constructive proposal based on mutual accommodation. Your present proposal in brief amounts in broad terms to this: because India had been pressing China to remedy the forcible alteration of the status quo since 1957 in the Western sector, China has undertaken since 8th September, deliberately and in cold blood, a further massive aggression and occupied larger areas of Indian territory and is now making the magnanimous offer of retaining the gains of the earlier

aggression plus such other gains as it can secure by negotiations from the latest aggression on the basis of the Chinese three point proposals. If this is not the assumption of the attitude of a victor, I do not know what else it can be. This is a demand to which India will never submit whatever the consequences and however long and hard the struggle may be. We cannot do less than this if we are going to maintain the principles we cherish, namely, peace, good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence with all our neighbours including China. To do otherwise would mean mere existence at the mercy of an aggressive, arrogant and expansionist neighbour.

Despite the crisis of confidence created by the earlier Chinese aggression, we are, as I said in my letter of 27th October, prepared to consider entering into talks and discussions to deal with our differences and to re-establish good neighbourly relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence between our two countries, each following its own way of life, provided it was agreed that the status quo along the entire boundary as it prevailed before 8th September, 1962, should be restored. This is the minimum corrective action necessary. The damage to the very principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence done by the further aggression since 8th September, 1962, must be corrected before any other constructive step can be taken.

You have referred to the peaceful friendly relations between our two countries till 1959 despite the differences on the boundary question and asked why we could not have these relations after 1959, despite the differences on the boundary question. The reason I feel should be clear to you. It was in January, 1959, that you put forward a claim for 50,000 square miles of Indian territory under the guise of a boundary dispute. This was not a small adjustment of the boundary here or there involving a few hundred square miles but a demand for surrender of large areas of Indian territory. You did not stop at this preposterous demand. Though

we agreed to talks and discussions at various levels to examine the relevant historical, cartographic and other data on the subject, your forces continued to forcibly occupy substantial areas of Indian territory even while these talks and discussions were going on. This process continued throughout the subsequent years and, on 8th September, 1962, your forces started the further aggression in the Eastern sector which had been quiet and peaceful all these twelve years except for the minor differences over Longju.

In your letter as well as in the official note of your Government, there are references to the line of actual control as on 7th November, 1959, as the basis of the three-point proposals. If the Chinese Government really mean what they say regarding the restoration of 7th November, 1959, positions, of their forces in all sectors of the boundary, their withdrawal to those positions and the restoration of the positions of the Indian forces as they were prior to 8th September 1962, would, by and large, meet the problem of disengagement as there will be enough distances between the position of the forces of the two sides to prevent any risk of a clash. To put it concretely, in the Eastern sector the Chinese forces will go back to the positions they held on 7th November, 1959, that is, they will be on the other side of the boundary along the Himalayan watershed which they first crossed on 8th September, 1962. In the Central sector the position will be the same, that is, they will be to the north of the highest watershed ridge. In the Western sector the Chinese forces will go back to the positions they held on 7th November, 1959, as given in the attached note, that is, along the line connecting their Spanggur post, Khurnak Fort and Kongka La and then northwards to join the main Aksai Chin Road. The Indian forces will go back to the various defence posts they occupied in all the three sectors prior to 8th September, 1962. This arrangement will secure not only adequate disengagement of forces of both sides but will not in any way prejudice either the alignment of the customary and traditional boundary in the

Western and the Central sectors as claimed by the two sides or the alignment of the McMahon Line boundary in the Eastern sector.

You have, Mr. Prime Minister, referred in your letter to the appeal made by Asian African countries. I agree that this appeal should evoke a constructive response. You must have seen in this connection the four-point suggestion made by the President of the U.A.R. mentioned in the U.A.R. Presidential communique of 31st October and my message to the President of the U.A.R. dated 27th October.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

**Annexure to letter dated 14 November 1962, from the Prime
Minister of India**

The implications of the three-point proposal of the Chinese Government presented on the 24th of October and further elaborated

upon in Prime Minister Chou En-lai's letter, dated 4th November 1962, are given below:

Western Sector

The line of actual control in November 1959 was no line but a series of positions of Chinese forces on Indian territory. These positions had been progressively established since 1957 by forcibly and unilaterally altering the traditional status quo of the boundary, even while the Government of China were assuring the Government of India that they had no territorial claims against India. In November 1959, Chinese posts in the Western sector were at Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka La and along the main Aksai Chin Road. Within three years, i.e., by September 1962, the Chinese had constructed a large network of military roads and posts, beginning with posts opposite Daulat Beg Oldi in the north, along the Chip Chap river valley and across the Galwan River to the Pangong and Spanggur lake areas. At certain points the network of military posts was more than one hundred miles to the west of Chinese positions in 1959.

The Chinese three-point proposal, taken with its clarifications, is that, in the Western sector, both parties agree to respect the "line of actual control" between the two sides. In his clarificatory letter Premier Chou En-lai states that "the line of actual control" "is basically still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and the Indian sides in November 1959". The normal deduction would be that this line of control would, therefore, be a line connecting Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka La and proceeding northwards to join the main Aksai Chin Road. However, Premier Chou En-lai's letter states that "in the Western and Middle Sectors it (the line of actual control) coincides in the main with the traditional customary line". In short, while referring to the line of control as it existed in 1959, the Chinese actually project it to the line they claimed in the meeting between the officials of the two sides in 1960 and

the line they physically hold now since their massive attack which commenced in this region on 20th October 1962. This line not only includes all the Chinese posts established in the three years since 1959, but also includes all the Indian posts in the territory that existed till 20th October 1962 and extends even farther westwards, thus taking in an additional 5,000 to 6,000 square miles since their 7th November 1959 position.

According to the Chinese proposal, after this "line of actual control" is determined, India would have to further withdraw yet another 20 kilometres inside territory accepted by the Chinese as undoubtedly Indian, while the Chinese withdrawal of 20 kilometres would be only 20 kilometres inside Indian territory claimed by them leaving the Chinese forces well over a hundred kilometres deep into territory belonging to India. The total effect of this would be that the entire network of Chinese aggressive posts which existed on 20th October 1962, and some more would remain intact poised for a further attack, while all Indian defence posts in Indian territory claimed by China will be eliminated and even posts in territory accepted as Indian including such key posts as Daulat Beg Oldi, Chushul and Hanle would be dismantled and eliminated.

Middle Sector

In the middle sector, the suggestion that the "line of actual control", whether on 7th November 1959 or now, coincides only "in the main" with the traditional and customary boundary is absolutely without foundation. The Chinese Government have never had any authority south of the main Himalayan watershed ridge, which is the traditional boundary in this sector. Some Tibetan officials along with some Chinese troops did intrude into Barahoti on various occasions since 1954; and, in 1958, the two Governments agreed to withdraw their armed personnel from the locality. But Indian civilian personnel have throughout been functioning in the area. A conference held in 1958 to discuss the question made clear

that the Chinese Government had not even precise knowledge of the area they were claiming.

Eastern Sector

In the Eastern sector the Chinese Government are willing to withdraw their troops to the north of the "line of actual control". This "line of actual control" has been clarified in Premier Chou En-lai's letter as coinciding "in the main" with the McMahon Line. The Chinese Government by this ambiguous statement indicates that there are portions of the "line of actual control" as envisaged by them which do not coincide with the McMahon Line. These divergencies have not, however, been revealed. The fact remains, however, that Chinese positions have always remained to the north of the highest Himalayan ridge in the Eastern sector of the India- China border and the alignment of the McMahon Line has never been questioned by China. The Chinese were nowhere in the vicinity of this watershed boundary either in November 1959 or later till 8th September 1962, when they started their aggression into Indian territory in this region.

Premier Chou En-lai has in his letter referred to the 1914 original map of the McMahon Line and the coordinates given in this map. The Agreement of 1914 only formalised what was the traditional and customary boundary in the area which lies along the highest Himalayan watershed ridges. The maps attached to the Agreement were of small scale of 1 inch to 8 miles. They were sketch maps and intended to be only illustrative. All that they made clear was that the boundary ran along the main watershed ridges of the area. The parallels and meridians were shown only approximately in accordance with the progress achieved at that time in the sphere of scientific surveys. This is a common cartographic feature and the Chinese Government have themselves recognised this in Article 48 of their 1960 Treaty with Burma. If the maps and the coordinates given therein were taken literally it is impossible to

explain the discrepancy between the existing distances and those given in the map between various villages in the area. Also Migyitun according to the maps is at latitude 28° 38' north while its actual position as ascertained by the latest surveys is much further north. Tulung La has been shown on the 1914 maps at 27° 47' N while its position on the ground is further north of this point. Strict adherence to the co-ordinates shown on the McMahon Line maps would result in advancing the Indian boundary in both the areas of Migyitun and Tulung La further north thereby including both these places inside Indian territory. In the area east of Tsari Sarpa, strict adherence to the coordinates of Lola in the McMahon Line maps would result in advancing the boundary of India into this area by at least 7 miles to the north. This would mean including at least 70 square miles of Tibetan territory within India. The Government of India recognising the principle underlying the McMahon Line agreement that the boundaries lie along the highest watershed ridges actually confined their jurisdiction to the area south of this boundary and did not try to take over Tibetan territory beyond the highest watershed ridge on the basis of the inaccurate coordinates given in the 1914 maps. This must be known to the Chinese authorities and yet they ignore this and seek to use the inaccurate coordinates given in the maps where they are favourable to their fanciful claims made to support their latest aggression. The Chinese authorities cannot have it both ways. They cannot accept the highest watershed as the boundary in parts of the Eastern sector where it suits them though this is not consistent with the co-ordinates given in the 1914 maps and quote the coordinates in these very maps in their favour in other parts of the sector to make demands for territorial concessions from India.

The Chinese proposal envisages a further withdrawal of 20 kilometres on either side of the McMahon Line as understood by them. This would leave Chinese forces in command of the passes leading into India while Indian forces would be 20 kilometres to the south leaving the

entire Indian frontier defenceless and at the mercy of any fresh invasion. The present Chinese invasion which commenced on 8th September, 1962, was known because there was a defence post near the border. If there are no border posts at or near the passes, Chinese aggression could recur without India knowing about it for quite some time.

The objective of the Chinese three-point proposal is to secure for the Chinese side guaranteed occupation of the Indian areas in the Western and Central sectors which they claim while they retain their right to negotiate, and negotiations failing, to enforce, whatever territorial adjustments they want in the Eastern sector.

Western Sector.-India should not dispute on the ground, though it will be allowed to talk about its juridical claim, the Chinese occupation of 14,000 square miles of Indian territory including 2,000 squares miles forcibly occupied since 20th October 1962. India has to agree not only to respect this so-called line of actual control but must also dismantle and withdraw its defences in the region a further 20 kilometres into admittedly Indian territory involving withdrawal from points like Chushul, etc.

Middle Sector.-The Chinese claims must be fully satisfied so far as physical occupation is concerned.

Eastern Sector.-The principles of the highest watershed, which is the boundary and which had 'been respected till 8th September, 1962 should be given up in favour of whatever interpretation the Government of China decide to put on the McMahon Line. There should be a further withdrawal of 20 kilometres. Thus, India must give up control of the passes in the highest watershed ridges in the areas, with no guarantee that the Chinese side will not cross the actual line of control whichever it may be.

In short, the Chinese three-point proposal, despite the manner in which it is put forth, is a demand for surrender on terms which have to be accepted while the Chinese forces in great strength are occupying large areas of Indian territory which they have acquired since their further aggression which commenced on 8th September, 1962, and the massive attack which they started on 20th October, 1962.

Statement given by the Chinese Government, 21 November 1962

In the past two years, first in the western and then in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, Indian troops crossed the line of actual control between China and India, nibbled Chinese territory, set up strongpoints for aggression and provoked a number of border clashes. Relying on the advantageous military positions they had occupied and having made full preparations, the Indian troops eventually launched massive armed attacks all along the line on the Chinese frontier guards on October 20, 1962. This border conflict deliberately provoked by India has been going on for a month.

The Chinese Government served repeated warnings in regard to the increasingly serious Indian encroachments and provocations, and pointed out the gravity of their consequences. The Chinese frontier guards all along maintained maximum self-restraint and forbearance in order to avert any border conflict. However, all these efforts by China proved of no avail, and the Indian acts of aggression steadily increased. Pressed beyond the limits of endurance and left with no room for retreat, the Chinese frontier guards finally had no choice but to strike back resolutely in self-defence. After the present large scale border conflict broke out, the Chinese Government quickly took Initiative measures in an effort to extinguish the flames of conflict that had been kindled. On October 24, that is, four days after the outbreak of the current border clashes, the Chinese Government put forward three reasonable proposals for stopping the border clashes, reopening peaceful negotiations and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question. The three proposals are as follows: -

(1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the

two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e., the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Government respectively.

(3) The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

On the very day it received them, the Indian Government hastily rejected the Chinese Government's three proposals and insisted that the Chinese Government should agree to restore the state of the boundary as it prevailed prior to September 8, 1962, that is to say, India wanted to reoccupy large tracts of Chinese territory so that the Indian troops might regain the position from which they could launch massive armed attacks on the Chinese frontier guards at any time. In his reply to Premier Chou En-lai dated November 14, Prime Minister Nehru put forward even more unreasonable demands, which, on the one hand, required the Chinese

Government to agree to the Indian troops reverting to their positions prior to September 8, and, on the other hand, required the Chinese frontier guards not only to withdraw to their positions as on September 8, but to retreat farther in the western sector to the so-called positions of November 7, 1959, as defined for them by India unilaterally, that is, requiring China to cede five to six thousand square miles (thirteen to fifteen thousand square kilometres) more of Chinese territory. In the meantime the Indian Government, relying on large amounts of U.S. military aid, again launched powerful attacks in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border in an obstinate attempt to expand the border conflict.

It is by no means accidental that the Indian Government has taken such an extremely unreasonable attitude. To meet the needs of its internal and external politics, the Indian Government has long pursued the policy of deliberately keeping the Sino-Indian boundary question unsettled, keeping the armed forces of the two countries engaged and maintaining tension along the Sino-Indian border.

Whenever it considered the time favourable, the Indian Government made use of this situation to carry out armed invasion and provocation on the Sino-Indian border, and even went to the length of provoking an armed clash. Or else, it made use of the situation to conduct cold war against China. The experience of many years shows that the Indian Government has invariably tried by hook or by crook to block the path which was opened up by the Chinese Government for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. This policy of the Indian Government runs diametrically counter to the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the common desires of all the peoples of the world, and serves only the interests of imperialism.

The Chinese Government's three proposals are most fair and reasonable; they are the only proposals capable of averting border clashes, ensuring border tranquillity and bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese Government perseveres in these three proposals. However, the Indian Government has so far rejected these three proposals and continued to expand the border conflict, thus daily aggravating the Sino-Indian border situation. In order to reverse this trend, the Chinese Government has decided to take initiative measures in order to promote the realization of these three proposals.

The Chinese Government hereby declares the following:

(1) Beginning from the day following that of the issuance of the present statement, i.e., from 00:00 hours on November 22, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border.

(2) Beginning from December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.

In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting back in self-defence on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the line of actual control, that is, north of the illegal McMahon line, and to withdraw 20 kilometres farther back from that line.

In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control.

(3) In order to ensure the normal movement of the inhabitants in the Sino-Indian border area, forestall the activities of saboteurs and

maintain order there, China will set up checkpoints at a number of places on its side of the line of actual control with a certain number of civil police assigned to each checkpoint. The Chinese Government will notify the Indian Government of the location of these checkpoints through diplomatic channels.

These measures taken by the Chinese Government on its own initiative demonstrate its great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully. It should be pointed out, in particular, that, after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962. The Chinese Government hopes that, as a result of the abovementioned initiative measures taken by China, the Indian Government will take into consideration the desires of the Indian people and peoples of the world, make a new start and give a positive response. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to take corresponding measures, the Chinese and Indian Government can immediately appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the Sino-Indian border to discuss matters relating to the 20 kilometres withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to fix a demilitarized zone, the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel.

When the talks between the officials of the two parties have yielded results and the results have been put into effect, talks can be held by the Prime Ministers of the two countries for further seeking an amicable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for the talks.

The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will make a positive response. Even if the Indian Government fails to make such a response in good time, the Chinese Government will take the initiative to carry out the above-mentioned measures as scheduled.

However, the Chinese Government cannot but take into account the following possible eventualities: (1) that the Indian troops should continue their attack after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and when they are withdrawing; (2) that, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, i.e., the illegal McMahon Line and/ or refuse to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control in the middle and western sectors; and (3) that, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should cross the line of actual control and recover their positions prior to September 8, that is to say, again cross the illegal McMahon line and reoccupy the Kechilang River area north of the line in the eastern sector, reoccupy Wuje in the Middle sector, and restore their 43 strongpoints for aggression in the Chip Chap River Valley, the Galwan River Valley the Pangong Lake area, and the Demchok area or set up more strongpoints for aggression on Chinese territory in the western sector. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that, should the above eventualities occur, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom. The people of the world will then see even more clearly who is peace-loving and who is bellicose, who upholds friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and Asian-African solidarity and who is undermining them, who is protecting the common interests of the Asian and African peoples in their struggle

against imperialism and colonialism and who is violating and damaging these common interests.

The Sino-Indian boundary question is an issue between two Asian countries. China and India should settle this issue peacefully; they should not cross swords on account of this issue and even less allow U.S. imperialism to poke in its hand and develop the present unfortunate border conflict into a war in which Asians are made to fight Asians. It is from its consistent stand of protecting fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples, strengthening Asian- African solidarity and preserving world peace that the Chinese Government has, after considering the matter over and over, decided to take these important measures. The Chinese Government calls upon all Asian and African countries and all peace-loving countries and people to exert efforts to urge the Indian Government to take corresponding measures so as to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.

**Memorandum given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to
the Embassy of India in China, 26 November 1962**

On November 23, 1962, the Indian Foreign Secretary met the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Chinese Embassy in India by appointment and orally asked for clarification on five points relating to the Chinese Government's Statement of November 21. The Chinese Government gives its answers as follows:

Question: It is stated in point 2 of the Chinese Government's Statement that Chinese troops will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control. Does this refer to the western sector only?

Answer: It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that Chinese frontier guards will withdraw along the entire Sino-Indian border to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed on November 7, 1959. In other words, this applies, without exception, to the western as well as the eastern and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian border.

Question: It is stated in point 2 of the Chinese Government's Statement that Chinese troops will withdraw 20 kilometres north of the so-called McMahon Line. Where will that be? Will that be behind the positions of September 8, 1962, as suggested by the Indian Government?

Answer: It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that, after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962. In the eastern sector the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres north of the illegal McMahon Line, that is, they will withdraw not only from the Kechilang River and Che Dong area, but also from Le village, Migyitun and Tsayul. China will, of course, continue to exercise administrative jurisdiction in the above-mentioned areas.

Question: The Chinese Government's decision to cease fire and take these measures is China's unilateral action. Where, according to the interpretation of the Chinese side, should the Indian troops be in order not to go against the three measures and to evoke China's reaction?

Answer: It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that it is out of its great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully that the Chinese Government is taking these three measures on its own initiative. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will give a positive response and take corresponding measures. In other words, it hopes that the Indian armed forces will similarly withdraw 20 kilometres on its side from the line of the actual control along the entire Sino-Indian border. When this is done, the armed forces of the two sides will disengage on an equitable basis, tranquillity along the border will be effectively ensured and recurrence of border clashes will be prevented. It goes without saying that respect by both China and India of the line of actual control up to which each side exercised administrative jurisdiction on November 7, 1959 and an equitable withdrawal of their respective armed forces from this line will in no way prejudice each side's adherence to its claims with regard to the boundary. However, as pointed out in the Chinese Government's Statement, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence in case, after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and withdrawn, Indian troops should continue to attack the Chinese frontier guards, or again advance to the line of actual control, or refuse to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control, or against cross it.

Question: Will China's checkpoints be set up only in the areas within 20 kilometres of what China considers to be the boundary, or in other areas as well? In the middle and western sectors China will probably set up checkpoints within 20 kilometres on its side of the customary line, but in the eastern sector will it set up checkpoints within 20 kilometres north of the McMahon Line or, for a period of time, south of the line too?

Answer: It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's Statement that China will set up checkpoints at a number of places on its side of the entire line of actual control which existed on November 7, 1959. Therefore, the question of China setting up checkpoints south of the

line of actual control in the eastern sector does not arise at all. As for the concrete location of the line of actual control of November 7, 1959, reference is made to maps 3 and 5 attached to Premier Chou En-lai's letter of November 15, 1962 addressed to the leaders of Asian and African countries.

Question: The McMahon Line was mentioned in Premier Chou's letters of November 4. India has always held that this line should follow the highest ridge. The map of the McMahon Line is merely a sketch map. If, as China says, one should go by the co-ordinates on the map, 140 square miles of territory would be included into India, which territory, however, is now under the jurisdiction of Tibet. The Indian side hopes that China will clarify as to which delineation it supports.

Answer: The so-called McMahon Line is illegal and the Chinese Government has never recognized it. The reason why the Chinese Government pointed out the coordinates of the western extremity of the so-called McMahon Line was to show that Indian troops had crossed this line and intruded into the Kechilang River area. The Indian Government asserts that the so-called McMahon Line should follow the highest ridge. But this is an entirely groundless assertion. The Chinese Government considers that at present both sides should first adopt measures to disengage their armed forces, with the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 as the basic line, and prevent the recurrence of clashes so as to create an atmosphere conducive to boundary negotiations. Both sides should defer the differences on the boundary question for settlement by future negotiations, and refrain from haggling over them now endlessly.

**Memorandum given by the Embassy of China in India, to the
Ministry of External Affairs, 26 November 1962**

On November 21, 1962 Mr. A. P. Venkateswaran, Deputy Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, orally asked Mr. Yin Shang-chih, First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy, for clarification on three points relating to the Chinese Government's statement of November 21. The Chinese Embassy replies as follows:

Question: Beginning from December 1, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959. Is this line of actual control the one which was interpreted in the People's Daily of November 8?

Answer: Beginning from December 1, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959. This line of actual control is described in detail in the letter from Premier Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru dated November 4, and in the letter and attached maps from Premier Chou En-lai to the leaders of Asian and African countries dated November 15; the People's Daily of November 8 can also serve as a reference.

Question: According to the Statement, the Chinese frontier guards, after withdrawing 20 kilometres from the line of actual control, will be far behind their positions prior to September 8. How would you define this? Because even according to the so-called line of actual control claimed by China, Chinese troops, after withdrawing 20 kilometres, would still have crossed the line of September 8 at certain places.

Answer: The Chinese frontier guards, after withdrawing 20 kilometres from the line of actual control, will be far behind their positions prior to September 8 (reference documents mentioned above). In the eastern sector, China will even have to withdraw its frontier guards in Tsayul and

Le Village; in the western sector, many Chinese posts in the Chip Chap River Valley, the Galwan River Vally, the Kongka Pass, the Pangong Lake and the Spanggur lake areas will be withdrawn.

Question: Please clarify point (2) of the "possible eventualities" in the statement.

Answer: It means that should the Indian side, taking advantage of the withdrawal by the Chinese side, again advance to the line of actual control or remain on it, this cannot but be regarded as the Indian side deliberately maintaining border tension, preparing for new intrusion at any moment and provoking clashes. The Chinese side hopes that such a situation will not arise.

**Letter from Premier Chou En-lai to the Prime Minister of India, 28
November, 1962**

Respected Mr. Prime Minister,

As a result of the cease-fire by the Chinese frontier guards on their own initiative along the entire Sino-Indian border from 00:00 hour

November 22, 1962, the unfortunate border conflict between our two countries has come to a halt, and the situation has been eased somewhat. Beginning from December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards, in pursuance of the Chinese Government's decision, will withdraw on their own initiative all the way to positions on the Chinese side 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959. The moment when the situation takes a turn, I consider it necessary to write to you in directly appealing to the Indian Government to take corresponding measures in good time so that our two sides may jointly move the present situation towards further relaxation.

Your Excellency must have taken note of the Chinese Government's Statement of November 21. This Statement is very clear in itself. Earlier, on November 19 and 20, I had explained in detail the spirit and substance on this Statement to Mr. Banerjee, the Indian charge d'Affaires in China. I believe he must have reported back to you. It is regrettable that so far I have failed to get a due response from Your Excellency.

Both our sides are well aware of the differences between us on the boundary question. It is not necessary to repeat them at present. The Chinese Government holds that the present task before our two sides is to terminate the border conflict, separate the armed forces of the two parties and create a proper atmosphere so as to settle our boundary differences through negotiations; and we should be confident that these differences can be settled in a friendly way through peaceful negotiations.

We should not get these differences entangled with the present task, lest the border conflict could not be terminated and negotiations could not be started at all. It was precisely out of these considerations that the Chinese Government decided to take the lead in ceasing fire and withdrawing its frontier guards.

In taking its decision, the Chinese Government had given full consideration to the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides. The initiative measures which the Chinese Government has decided to take are not conditional on simultaneous corresponding measures to be taken by the Indian side. According to the Chinese Government's decision, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control of November 7, 1959. That is to say, they will not only evacuate the areas they reached in their recent fight in self-defence but will withdraw to positions far behind those they held on September 8 or October 20, 1962. The line of actual control of November 7, 1959 had taken shape on the basis of the extent of administration by each side at the time; it existed objectively and cannot be defined or interpreted according to the free will of either side. In withdrawing 20 kilometres from this line, the armed forces of each side would be evacuating areas under its own administration; hence the question of one side achieving gains and the other suffering losses does not arise. Moreover, this would not prevent either side from continuing to administer the area evacuated by its armed forces on its side of the line, nor will this prejudice either side's position in regard to the boundary alignment.

I would like to stress that withdrawal by China alone of its frontier guards beyond 20 kilometres on its side of the 1959 line of actual control cannot ensure the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, nor can it prevent the recurrence of border clashes. On the contrary, in case the Indian side should refuse to co-operate, even the cease-fire which has been effected is liable to be upset. Therefore, the Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will take corresponding measures. If the Indian Government agrees to do so, I specifically propose that the Governments of our two countries appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the Sino-Indian border to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometres withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to form a

demilitarised zone, the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its own side of the line of actual control, and the return of captured personnel.

The meeting of the officials of the two countries will itself be of great positive significance because it will signify the return of our two sides from the battlefield to the conference table. If the meeting of the officials of the two countries achieves results and the results are put into effect, the Prime Ministers of our two countries can then hold talks and proceed further to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

The border conflict in the past month has greatly strained the relations between our two countries. China's Embassy, Consulates, bank establishments and nationals in India have been subjected to treatment which is rarely seen even when war has been formally declared between two states. In my view, such an abnormal state of affairs unnecessarily poisons the atmosphere between our two countries and obviously should not continue any longer.

Your Excellency Mr. Prime Minister, only a handful of ill-intentioned people in the world want our two countries to keep on fighting. The common friends of our two countries are all heartened by the realization of cease-fire between us. They ardently hope that we will make joint efforts to transform the cease-fire which has been effected into the starting point of a peaceful settlement of the boundary question. The Chinese Government has taken the first steps, i.e., cease-fire, and is going to take the second step, i.e., withdrawal. I hope the Indian Government will give a positive response and make efforts in the same direction. I am awaiting your reply.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.) CHOU EN-LAI, Premier of the State

Council

of the People's Republic of China

**Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
to the Embassy of China in India, 30 November 1962**

The clarifications of the Government of China, delivered on the 26th November 1962, are, in several respects, vague and would require further elaboration before the Chinese ceasefire proposals can be fully considered by the Government of India.

Maps 3 and 5 while correctly indicating Demchok area as within the line of actual control of India in the Western sector show large areas of Ladakh including Qiziljilga, Shinglung, Debra, Samzungling and areas to the west of these locations as within the Chinese line of actual control as on 7th November 1959. A reference to the notes exchanged between the Governments of India and China during the last three years would establish clearly that none of these areas were under Chinese control in November 1959. Some of these areas were occupied by Chinese forces later in 1959 and in 1960 while exchange of notes and discussions at various levels were going on, some other areas were subsequently occupied in 1961 and 1962 upto the beginning of September but about 2,000 square miles more were taken by the Chinese after they mounted their massive attack on 20th October 1962 and after stiff fighting with numerous small Indian posts existing in this area. In view of this factual background the Government of India would be grateful for an objective and factual clarification of the Chinese line of actual control in the Western sector based on the position on the ground as on 7th November 1959 and not on the basis of any theoretical claims or surreptitious or forcible advances made by Chinese forces since then.

Maps 3 and 5 while correctly indicating Khinzemane as within the line of actual control of India have shown the Dholu area (Tse Dong), Longju and Bara Hoti as lying outside it. This is an evident violation of the line of actual control in regard to all these locations. There was a specific

understanding with the Chinese Government that Indian police personnel would exercise control in Bara Hoti. In Longju both Governments agreed that neither Chinese nor Indian personnel should occupy the village. However, it is known that Longju lies within the Indian side of the line of control, whereas Migyitun is on the Chinese side. As regards the Dhola area (Tse Dong) this has always been under Indian control till the further Chinese aggression in this area on 8th September 1962. This has been indisputably established in the numerous notes sent by the Government of India to the Government of China since 8th September 1962.

Clarifications were sought on clause 3 of the Chinese ceasefire proposals which referred to the establishment of Chinese civilian checkpoints. While vague reference has been made in the original proposal to the possibility of the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its side of the line of actual control, no indication has been given in the clarifications on Indian civilian checkpoints to be established on the line of actual control. It is presumed that the arrangements for the establishment of checkpoints are reciprocal and that Indian civilian checkpoints may be established up to the line of actual control.

No indication has been given in the clarifications of the manner in which Civilian checkpoints would function to ensure normal movement of the inhabitants or forestall activities of the saboteurs or maintain order. For these purposes, it is presumed that personnel of these civilian checkpoints would carry such small arms as are necessary and that there would be a parity both in the number of posts and the number of personnel between Indian and Chinese checkpoints.

The memorandum handed over to the Director of the China Division at the Ministry of External Affairs and to the Indian Charge d'Affaires in Peking, stated that "China reserves the right to strike back in

self-defence in case, after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and withdrawn, Indian troops should continue to attack the Chinese frontier guards, or again advance to the line of actual control or refuse to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control, or again cross it". This is in fact a reproduction of the relevant portion of the Chinese statement of 21st November on unilateral ceasefire and withdrawals. Yet, in a further Memorandum sent at 11:00 p.m. on the night of 26th November, a clarification to the same question has been given by the Chinese Embassy as follows: "It means that should the Indian side, taking advantage of the withdrawal by the Chinese side, again advance to the line of actual control or remain on it, this cannot but be regarded as the Indian side deliberately maintaining border tension, preparing for new intrusion at any moment and provoking clashes. The Chinese side hopes that such a situation will not arise". As this is a substantial modification and not a mere clarification, it is imperative that the attitude of the Chinese Government to a question that has considerable relevance to effective operation of the unilateral Chinese ceasefire proposals is clearly indicated.

The Memorandum of the Government of China has brushed aside as being mere haggling an extremely relevant query of the Government of India in regard to the alignment of the McMahon Line. It must be clearly understood that since the Chinese Government has defined "the line of actual control" as coinciding in the main with the McMahon Line, no clear interpretation of the ceasefire proposals is possible, when the very alignment of the line of control is vague and unclear. The Chinese clarifications state that the Chinese Government had never recognised the McMahon Line; but surely if the ceasefire proposals are to have any meaning at all, since they are based upon the McMahon Line as the line of actual control, a precise definition of the alignment of the McMahon Line is imperative. If both sides are, as the Chinese clarifications suggest, to defer the differences on the boundary question for settlement by further

negotiations and to refrain from haggling over them now, surely the Chinese side should not haggle over Longju and the Kechilang River area which have always been within Indian control till displaced by force by the Chinese in August 1959 and on 8th September 1962.

**Letter from the Prime Minister of India to Premier Chou En-lai, 1
December, 1962**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message of 28th November, which was delivered by your Charge d' Affaires to our Foreign Office at midnight, on 28th/29th November, 1962.

In the letters that have been exchanged between us since the further aggression by your forces commenced on 8th September, 1962, the following principles, on the basis of which our differences can be resolved peacefully, have emerged:

(i) We should create a proper atmosphere for peaceful settlement of our differences. (This has also been mentioned in your message of 28th November).

(ii) We should settle our differences in a friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions. (This has also been reiterated in your message of 28th November). If we fail, we can consider what other agreed peaceful method of settling our differences should be adopted (my letter of 27th October, 1962).

(iii) There should be no attempt to force any unilateral demand on either side on account of the advances gained in the recent clashes. (Your letter of 4th November, 1962).

(iv) The necessary preliminaries for talks and discussions suggested should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides. (Your message of 28th November).

(v)The implementation of these proposed arrangements will not in any way prejudice either side's position in regard to the correct boundary alignment. (Your message of 4th November and your message of 28th November, 1962).

The withdrawal arrangements, however, that you propose, behind what you refer to as "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959", are inconsistent with the principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

In spite of the clarifications given, I cannot understand how "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" can be as delineated in your maps 3 and 5 which were sent as accompaniments to your letter of 15th November to Heads of States/Governments of some Asian-African countries and to which reference was made in the clarifications given regarding "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959". I would in this connection refer you to the last but one paragraph of my letter of 14th November, 1962, which gives, what we regard, as the line of actual Chinese control as it existed on the ground on 7th November, 1959.

You have mentioned in your letter that this line cannot be defined or interpreted according to the free will of either side. This is exactly, however, what your Government have done in the clarification given to the Indian Government regarding "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959".

What you call "the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959" in the western sector was only a series of isolated military posts. You are aware that in November 1959 there were no Chinese posts of any kind either at Qiziljilga, Shinglung, Dehra, Samzangling or any areas to the west of these locations nor did the Chinese have any posts to the south or west of Spanggur. Despite this, "the line of actual control as on November

7, 1959", as your Government now claim in Ladakh, is along the line of control established by your forces after the massive attacks mounted since 20th October, 1962. This is a definite attempt to retain under cover of preliminary ceasefire arrangements, physical possession over the area which China claims and to secure which the massive attack since 20th October, 1962, was mounted by your forces. This we cannot agree to. This also violates principles (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) mentioned in paragraph 2 above, which you have been reiterating in all your communications.

The same remarks apply to "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" defined by your Government in the central and the eastern sectors. Barahoti, which your Government call Wuje, had never been under Chinese control. As a matter of fact, if you will refer to the past communications on this subject, you would find that there is an understanding that the administrative control of Barahoti will remain with the Indian side, only unarmed civil administrative personnel being in charge of the area. As regards the eastern sector, Longju was under Indian administrative control till August 1959 when Chinese forces attacked the Indian garrison there. Since then it has not been under the administrative control of either side. Again various communications exchanged between our two Governments would show clearly that Khinzemane and the Dhola region to the south of the Thagla ridge, which the Chinese clarification describe as the Kechilang river and Chedong area, have always been under Indian administrative control till Chinese forces started their further aggression on 8th September, 1962, in this region.

The three-point proposals of October 24, 1962 and the statement on cease-fire and withdrawals of 21st November, 1962, clearly aim at securing physical control of areas which were never under Chinese administrative control either on 7th November, 1959 or at any time prior to 8th September, 1962. These proposals not only violate principles (iii)

and (iv) mentioned in para 2 above, but are a definite attempt to prejudice India's position in maintaining its stand as regards the boundary.

You have mentioned in your message of 28th November that "the initiative measures which the Chinese Government have decided to take are not conditional on simultaneous corresponding measures to be taken by the Indian side". And yet, later on in your message you state "that withdrawal by China alone of its frontier guards beyond 20 kilometres on its side of the 1959 line of actual control cannot ensure the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, nor can it prevent the recurrence of border clashes. On the contrary, in case the Indian side should refuse to co-operate, even the cease-fire which has been effected is liable to be upset." These observations appear to be contradictory. In any case, if the Government of India are to take any attitude to the so-called unilateral measures of cease-fire and withdrawals announced by the Chinese Government, they must clearly know what the "line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" is, nor can that line be unilaterally determined by the Chinese Government either on the basis of their alleged claims or on the basis of the position reached as a result of their further aggression.

In the light of the above, I would once again commend for your acceptance the clear and straightforward proposal made by us, namely, at least the status quo prior to 8th September, 1962, should be restored so that the necessary atmosphere for reverting to peaceful processes may be created. There is no danger of any clashes under this arrangement if both sides are genuinely sincere in their desire to revert to paths of peace. As you know, the earlier minor clashes occurred because your forces attacked the small Indian patrols of posts guarding against surreptitious aggressive intrusions in Indian territory which had been going on since

1957, and the major clashes started since 8th September, 1962, when your forces started an unprovoked wanton invasion of Indian territory.

Our Foreign Office has presented a written note to your Charge d' Affaires in Delhi on 30th November for further clarification of "the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959". I hope that the written memorandum presented by our Foreign Office and my present letter will result in positive clarifications on this rather confusing and complicated question of what you call "the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959".

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

**Memorandum given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to
the Embassy of India in China, 8 December 1962**

1. In compliance with the request of the Indian Government, the Government of China has twice made clarifications concerning its statement of November 21, 1962, which is itself very clear. But the Indian Government alleged in its memorandum delivered on November 30 that the Chinese clarifications are "vague and would require further elaboration before the Chinese ceasefire proposals can be fully considered by the Government of India". While failing so far to make a positive response to the three measures taken by the Chinese Government on its own initiative, the Indian Government has created side issues and time and again raised meaningless and trouble-making questions, asking for clarifications from the Chinese Government. The Government of China cannot but express deep regret at this line of action taken by the Indian Government out of unrevealed motives.

2. In its memorandum, the Indian Government distorted the November 7, 1959 line of actual control in an attempt to deny the Chinese Government's exercise of administrative jurisdiction over large tracts of Chinese territory. The Chinese Government resolutely refutes such a groundless argument.

A. The Chinese Government has already set forth in detail in its many previous documents facts about the Chinese Government's exercise of administrative jurisdiction over the vast areas on the Chinese side of the traditional customary line in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. Chinese administrative jurisdiction has extended right up to the traditional customary line, the areas including QizilJilga, Shinglung, Dehra, Samzungling and places to the west of these locations have without exception been under the effective jurisdiction of China. By intentionally confusing the extent of, China's administrative jurisdiction and the location of China's frontier posts, the Indian Government

attempts to prove that China's jurisdiction has not reached these areas. The very premise of this argument is wrong. But, even speaking of frontier posts, China had set up before November 7, 1959 seven posts close by the traditional customary line, with the northernmost one near the Karakoram Pass and the southernmost one near Spanggur Lake and with close ground contact maintained among these posts and between them and the rear. It is precisely because of the effective jurisdiction exercised by the Chinese Government that when armed Indian personnel on two occasions in September 1958 and July 1959 sneaked into these areas they were promptly detained by Chinese frontier guards, and that when armed Indian personnel intruded into Kongka Pass and provoked a border conflict in October 1959, they were immediately repulsed. Apart from these three occasions, not single Indian personnel had entered these areas before 1961. What the Indian side had been able to do since then was confined to the establishment of 43 strongpoints of aggression within 20 kilometres on the Chinese side of the line of actual control, and the Indian side was able to do this surreptitiously only by taking advantage of China's unilateral cessation of border patrols. In order to resist Indian intrusions, beginning from May 1962 the Chinese side restored its patrols in these desolate border areas and set up a number of new frontier posts. Thus there had arisen prior to September 8, 1962 a situation of the posts of the two sides confronting each other in a manner of interlocked jigsaw puzzle within 20 kilometres on the Chinese side of the line of actual control in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.

B. In the eastern and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian border, India tried to describe the Che Dong area, Longju and Wuje as situated on the Indian side of the line of actual control. This is wholly groundless.

Regarding the Che Dong area, China has in its previous notes and statements repeatedly given in contestable proof that this area is to the

north of the illegal McMahon Line and under China's effective jurisdiction. There is no need to repeat it here.

Longju is a village in the Migyitun area, and India itself has admitted that Migyitun is situated to the north of the illegal McMahon Line. This village was invaded and occupied by Indian troops in June 1959, but was recovered by China after the armed conflict instigated by Indian troops in August 1959. Following that, China not only restored its administrative control over Longju, but also maintained a post there for a period of time. The Indian memorandum alleges that both sides agreed that neither Chinese nor Indian personnel should occupy the village. This is pure fabrication. It is appropriate to ask: When and in what manner did the two Governments agree to refrain from "occupying" Longju? It is impossible for the Indian Government to produce any definite evidence on this question.

As for Wuje, the Indian Government is clearly aware that, owing to the intrusion of Indian troops into this area after 1954, an agreement of non-stationing of either side's troops there was reached between China and India on the initiative of China. However, there has never been any interruption in China's administrative control over the place. The Indian memorandum asserts that "there was specific understanding with the Chinese Government that Indian police personnel would exercise control in Bara Hoti (Wuje)". This is also pure fabrication. It is appropriate to ask: When and in what manner did the Chinese Government agree to the "control" of Wuje by Indian police personnel? On this question too, it is impossible for the Indian Government to produce any definite evidence.

The line of actual control of November 7, 1959 was a result of India's forcible violation of the traditional customary line and its seizure of large tracts of Chinese territory. China has already shown great forbearance and accommodation by renewing the proposal of taking this

line as the base line for the withdrawal and separation of the armed forces of the two sides. It goes without saying that this line is not the final boundary line between China and India. Yet now India is not satisfied with this, but attempts to describe the Chinese territory which India has never occupied or has failed in its attempt to occupy as situated on the Indian side of the line of actual control of November 7, 1959. This is most unreasonable.

3. Regarding the question of checkpoints, the Chinese Government's statement of November 21 made it quite clear that after the withdrawal of the Chinese frontier guards, China will establish checkpoints on its own side of the line of actual control. Of course, China will have no objection to India's establishing checkpoints on the Indian side of the line and manning them with an appropriate number of civil police equipped with weapons for self-defence. The memorandum, however, poses the so-called question of establishing check posts on the line. If this is not deliberate trouble-making, it shows that India intends to edge into the Chinese side of the line of actual control on the pretext of establishing checkpoints. This is absolutely impermissible. As for details relating to the establishment of check- posts, it has also been clearly explained in the Chinese Government's statement that they can be discussed and settled by the officials to be designated by the Governments of the two countries. While avoiding saying whether it is prepared to make a positive response to the three measures taken by China on China's own initiative, the Indian side unwarrantedly asked China to clarify the details. This was obviously deliberate haggling and evading an answer to the substantive question.

4. It is clearly stated in the Chinese Government's statement in what eventualities China reserves the right to strike back in self- defence after the cease-fire and withdrawal of the Chinese frontier guards. This stand of China's was further explained in the Chinese memorandum of

November 25. The hope was expressed in the Chinese memorandum of November 26 that the possible eventualities mentioned in the statement of the Chinese Government might not occur. The stand of the Chinese Government is consistent. But the Indian Government asserted that China's clarification on November 26 was "a substantial modification and not a mere clarification". It may be asked: What is the substantial difference between China's reservation of the right to strike back in self-defence under certain circumstances and its simultaneously expressed hope that such circumstances might not occur? The Indian Government has been either deliberately refusing to understand China's statement and clarifications, or intentionally making trouble. Should the Indian side further try to seek loopholes in China's clarification in order to make new provocations; the Chinese Government must point out here that this is dangerous and will never bring India any good.

5. By means of oral and written explanations and of maps, China has made it clear in detail the location of the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959 in the eastern sector and its relation with the illegal McMahon Line. Since the Indian side advanced to the illegal McMahon Line, both sides have been clearly aware of the extent of each other's administrative control. In other words, there objectively existed between the two sides a line of actual control formed by the extent of each side's administrative control. This was the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 as pointed out by China. Since November 7, 1959, the only dispute between the two sides has concerned the Che Dong area. This also proves that both sides are clear about and have no differences over the location of this line of actual control. There is nothing vague about the Chinese Government's proposal to take this perfectly clear line of actual control as the base line for separating the armed forces of the two sides, and no clarification whatsoever is needed.

The Che Dong area has always been under China's administrative jurisdiction. If India takes exception to this fact, the only thing it can go by is the original 1914 map, and cannot be any so-called geographical principle laid down by India unilaterally. While the so-called Thagla ridge on which India bases itself in unilaterally defining the alignment of the illegal McMahon Line in this area is not to be found on the original 1914 map, the coordinates which are clearly there indisputably show that the Che Dong area is to the north of the illegal McMahon Line. The Indian side has been haggling about this question and held that it has the right to define unilaterally the specific location of the illegal McMahon Line. This is clearly an attempt to create confusion about the 1959 line of actual control, which is very clear itself.

6. The November 21 statement of the Chinese Government is explicit and contains nothing vague. Many of the points raised by India for clarification were no questions at all, some of them were even deliberately raised to confuse right and wrong, and the object was nothing but putting off any response to the measures which China has taken on its own initiative.

It should be pointed out that what is really vague is the attitude of the Indian Government. The Indian Government faces a series of questions to which it cannot long avoid giving a frontal answer.

These questions are:

(1) Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree, to a cease-fire? In the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border, Indian troops and aircraft have taken advantage of the fact that the Chinese frontier troops have ceased fire and begun to withdraw on China's own

initial.....
..... signal. It is now for the Indian Government to clarify whether the

Indian troops intend to continue their provocations against the Chinese frontier troops.

(2) Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree, that the armed forces of the two sides should disengage and withdraw 20 kilometres each from the November 7, 1959 line of actual control? The Indian Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs Mrs. Menon openly declared in Colombo on December 4 that India would move its troops right up to the so-called McMahon Line and that India must gain control of the passes in the "Northeast frontier Agency". It must be stressed that the Chinese frontier guards are withdrawing from the nearly 20,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border in order to urge the Indian Government to make a positive response and seek a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. Now it is for the Indian Government to clarify whether the above statement made by the Indian Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs represents the official reply of the Indian Government to the fact that the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and begun to withdraw on China's own initiatives.

(3) Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree, that officials of the two sides should meet and discuss matters relating to the 20 kilometre withdrawal of the armed forces of each party from the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 to form a demilitarized zone, the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel. The Chinese side is prepared, in the officials' meeting, to discuss with the Indian side any specific details relating to the above-mentioned matters.

It is hoped that the Indian Government will give a clear and definite reply.

**Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
to the Embassy of China in India, 19 December, 1962**

The Memorandum handed over to the Indian Embassy at Peking by the Chinese Foreign Office on 9th December, 1962, apart from containing three questions couched in a peremptory and dictatorial tone, is replete with factual distortions.

It is utterly fallacious to state that the Chinese Government have already set forth in detail in their many previous documents facts about their exercise of administrative jurisdiction over vast areas on the Chinese side of what they refer to as the traditional and customary line in the Western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary.

During the talks of the Officials of the two Governments in 1960 the Chinese side brought forward no evidence at all of having administered even the Aksai Chin area, let alone regions further west stretching up to their so-called line of actual control. The Indian side, on the other hand, produced considerable evidence of tax collection, revenue assessment, maintenance of law and order and construction of public works in this area. All that Chinese officials were able to show were unsubstantiated claims to have collected taxes in the Aksai Chin. The only document they could produce which they claimed referred to the Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang areas was a petition from the Governor of Sinkiang in 1927 and an order passed the next year by the Chinese Government in that connection. A careful study of the document would indicate that it did not refer at all the Aksai Chin, but to an area north of the Kuen Lun range. Despite the Chinese claim that the Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang areas since the 18th century had been extensively used for salt mining, pasturing and grazing, not a single document from either the archives of the Sinkiang Administration or from contemporary records or accounts was produced by them to establish the prevalence of this practice. To state brazenly that documents are available establishing the fact of

Chinese administration upto their so-called traditional and customary line is patently fallacious when they are unable to produce evidence of administrative control even in the Aksai Chin region.

The Chinese Memorandum in referring to three incidents in 1958 and 1959 between Indian and Chinese forces states that "apart from these three occasions not a single Indian personnel had entered these areas before 1961". The facts are that Indian official survey parties and patrols have constantly visited this area even after 1950, the year when the Chinese Government falsely claimed that they were present in the Aksai Chin area. In 1951, a group went from Leh to Lingzi Tang and Aksai Chin. In 1952, a party went upto Lanak La via Kongka Pass. In 1954 and 1956, patrols went to Lanak La. In September 1957, a party went to the Qara Tagh pass via Shamallungpa. In the summer of 1958, another party went to Sarigh Jilganang and Amtoghar lake regions. The entire area was constantly being patrolled by Indian officials. These facts were very clearly brought to the notice of the Chinese side during the discussion of the officials in 1960, though the Chinese Government now choose to ignore all knowledge of these facts.

The Chinese Memorandum states that beginning from May 1962, in order to resist Indian intrusions, "the Chinese side restored its patrols in these desolate areas and set up a number of new frontier posts." The patent falsehood of this assertion is established by the fact that, well before May 1962, the Indian Government had protested on numerous occasions on aggressive Chinese forward patrolling, on harassment of Indian personnel proceeding on normal duties and on establishment of military posts in the Western sector. The Government of India's notes of 2nd July 1958, 8th November 1958, 30th July 1959, 4th November 1959, 31st October 1961 provide ample evidence of aggressive forward patrolling and establishment of military posts by Chinese forces throughout this earlier period.

While the Chinese Government has continued to make statements that the "Che Dong" area is north of the McMahon Line and within its effective jurisdiction, it has in no way substantiated it with what the Chinese Memorandum refers to as "incontestable proof that it was under China's effective jurisdiction". On the contrary, the Government of India have, time and again, given detailed facts to prove that this area has been under the direct administrative control of the Government apart from the substantive fact of its being south of the highest watershed ridge which forms the McMahon Line in this area. There is evidence in writing even as recently as August 1953 by the Chinese official at Tsona in Tibet to the effect that taxes collected should be deposited with the Government of India. The baseless character of the Chinese assertion has been very clearly indicated in the Indian Government note of 16th October, 1962.

Reference in this connection is invited to the comments under "Eastern Sector" in the Memorandum attached to the Prime Minister of India's letter of 14th November to Prime Minister Chou En-lai. The Chinese authorities should state clearly whether they accept the highest watershed principle or want to follow strictly the coordinates given in the 1914 maps. If they follow the latter for the purpose of supporting their so-called claim to the "Che Dong area", they should be prepared to accept on the same analogy that the areas of Migyitun and Tu Lung La should form part of Indian territory.

In referring to Longju, the Memorandum very boldly asserts: "The Indian Memorandum alleges that both sides agreed that neither Chinese nor Indian personnel should occupy the village. This is pure fabrication. It is appropriate to ask: When and in what manner did the two Governments agree to refrain from 'occupying' Longju? It is impossible for the Indian

Government to produce any definite evidence on this question ". The Chinese Government is requested to refer to para 3 of the letter dated 17th December, 1959, of Premier Chou En-lai to the Prime Minister of India, in which it has been stated as follows:

"Pending the above-mentioned agreement, the Chinese Government, in a conciliatory spirit and out of the desire to move towards the withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border, is prepared to agree first to reach a partial solution by applying the proposal you have made in your letter for the non-stationing of the armed forces of both sides at Longju to the other disputed places on the border as well."

In regard to Wuje, the Chinese Government will recollect that in their Note of 13th September, 1959, the Government of India had mentioned that: "if the Government of China are not agreeable this suggestion the Government of India will continue as in previous years to send its civil personnel to exercise jurisdiction over an area which the Government of India have always considered as part of Indian territory. Such personnel however will not carry any arms".

No reply was received to this communication and the Government of India have been sending Indian police personnel to Bara Hoti during the summer season.

The attitude of the Government of India to the three questions posed by the Government of China has been indicated by the Prime Minister of India in his statement in the Indian Parliament on 10th December, 1962:

(1) The cease-fire and withdrawal declaration by the Government of China was a unilateral one. But in so far as the cease-fire is concerned,

nothing has been done by the Indian side to impede the implementation of the cease-fire declaration.

(2) India is in favour of the disengagement of the forces of the two sides on the basis of a commonly agreed arrangement. Such an arrangement, however, can only be on the basis of undoing the further aggression committed by the Government of China on Indian territory on the 8th September, 1962. If the Government of China dispute that a particular areas is Indian territory, this is a matter for juridical or the like decision. The fact, however, is that the areas in which aggression had been committed by China had long been in Indian occupation and this is something which cannot be disputed. The Government of India have given their understanding of the so-called line of actual control of November 7, 1959. They do not agree with the Chinese interpretation which is not in accordance with the facts. These facts can, as evidenced by the instances given in the earlier part of this Memorandum, be determined from the correspondence between the two Governments during the last five years. The Government of China cannot expect India to agree to the so-called line of actual control of November 7, 1959, which is manifestly not in accordance with facts.

(3) It is obvious that if the officials of the two sides are to meet, they must have clear and precise instructions as to the cease-fire and withdrawal arrangements which they are supposed to implement. Unless they receive these instructions, which must be the result of an agreement between the two Governments of India and China, they will be unable to function. Therefore, it has to be determined previously which line is to be implemented. Between the line of actual control immediately prior to the 8th September, 1962, and that on the 7th November, 1959, as defined by Chinese Government, there is a difference of about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory which China has occupied as a result of invasion and massive attacks during the last three months. The Government of India

cannot agree to the Chinese authorities retaining the advantages secured by this latest invasion of Indian territory.

The Government of India regret that the Chinese authorities are deliberately confusing the line of actual control as on 7th November, 1959, with their so-called territorial claims, particularly in the Western sector, and holding out threats of counter-attack if this arbitrary line of actual control is not accepted by the Government of India. This is clearly inconsistent with the Chinese Government's professions of their desire for disengagement of the forces of the two sides based on line of actual control prior to the invasion and the clashes with a view to reverting to the processes of peaceful talks and discussions to resolve the differences between the two Governments on the question of the India-China boundary.

**Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the
Embassy of India in China, 27 December 1962**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and, with reference to the note of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Indian Government, dated May 31, 1962, has the honour to state as follows: -

In a number of its previous notes the Chinese Government has repeatedly and patiently made it clear to the Indian Government that, in view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has not yet been formally delimited, no specific provisions have been made in the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty regarding the tri-junction of China, Burma and India.

However, the Indian Government has all along persisted in its subjective and one-sided assertion that this tri-junction has already been defined in the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. Furthermore, it wants to impose such a distorted interpretation on the signatories. The Chinese Government cannot but express once again its deep regret at the Indian Government's repeated and unreasonable haggling over the matter.

It is not difficult to see from the five Indian notes, and particularly from its note of May 31, that the Indian Government has been so endlessly harping on the subject simply because the conclusion of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty has provided a powerful circumstantial evidence which once again refutes the Indian contention that the Sino-Indian boundary has long been delimited, thus leaving the Indian side with no tenable ground in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. But that the Sino-India boundary has never been formally delimited is a fact which can by no means be altered. The Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will face up to this objective fact and not keep haggling over the question of the tri-junction of China, Burma and India. To continue the present Indian practice will be of no avail and deserve no further reply from the Chinese Government.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

**Memorandum given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to
the Embassy of India in China, 29 December, 1962**

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has received the memorandum of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs dated December 19, 1962. This memorandum once again shows that the Indian Government is deliberately creating side issues, reversing right and wrong, insisting on a reversion to the state of the boundary of September 8, 1962 and seeking pretexts for refusing to respond positively to China's proposed measures of cease-fire, withdrawal and holding of officials' meeting. This unreasonable position of the Indian Government runs completely counter to the five principles for a peaceful settlement of the differences between China and India as summed up in Prime Minister Nehru's letter to Premier Chou En-lai dated December, 1, 1962.

1. Concerning the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.

The whole vast area on the Chinese side of the traditional customary line in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border is part of Chinese territory; it has always been under China's effective jurisdiction and has never been administered by India. This is an immovable fact which the Indian Government can by no means overthrow by sheer fabrications. The Indian Government cannot deny that up till 1958 it had never disputed the fact of the Chinese Government's exercise of effective jurisdiction over this area. But later it fished out some spurious historical evidence and tried in a farfetched way to describe this area as belonging to India. During the meeting of the officials of both countries in 1960, the Indian side argued in the following way. First, it groundlessly claimed that the area of 27,000 square kilometres including Aksai Chin and Linghithang was administered by a small village called Tanktse. Then it produced some evidence to show that Tanktse was under India's jurisdiction.

Accordingly, it concluded that Aksai Chin and Lingshihang belonged to India. Such an absurd and ridiculous way of argument certainly cannot be regarded as serious. In contrast, the evidence cited by the Chinese side proved indisputably that the Chinese Government exercised effective jurisdiction over the whole area in the western sector, including the maintenance of administrative organs, patrolling, control of the passes, check on travellers, collection of taxes, extensive exploration and surveys, and the building of public works. The 1927 document referred to in the Indian memorandum is one of the many convincing documents cited by the Chinese side. This document proves clearly and unmistakably that the Aksai Chin and Lingshihang area was under the jurisdiction of Hotien of Sinkiang. China had exercised effective jurisdiction over this area for hundreds of years. The Government of the People's Republic of China took over this area from the Government of old China in 1950 and has continued to exercise effective jurisdiction there. The Indian side, on the other hand, had had no knowledge of the actual state of affairs in this area up till 1958. No wonder by September 10, 1959 Prime Minister Nehru still stated in the Indian Rajya Sabha that the said area in the western sector "has not been under any kind of administration." That was of course true so far as the Indian Government was concerned. That statement of Prime Minister Nehru completely overthrows all the so-called evidence the Indian side has produced to prove past Indian administration in this area.

The Indian Government cannot deny the fact that Indian military personnel were detained or repulsed by the Chinese side on all the three occasions when they illegally intruded into this area in the western sector in September 1958, July 1959 and October 1959. Nevertheless, it tried to prove that Indian personnel had entered the area before 1961 on more occasions than those three. It pretentiously asserted that even after 1950, in 1951, 1952, 1954, 1956 and 1957 Indian survey teams and patrol parties constantly reached this area. This assertion was entirely

groundless. During the meeting of the officials of both countries, the Chinese side asked the Indian officials to their faces whether they could provide evidence to bear out their assertion, but the Indian side could not produce even a single evidence. Furthermore anyone with common sense will ask: If indeed the Indian side had constantly patrolled this area before 1958, why should it have failed to discover that Chinese frontier guards frequented this area and that a highway involving gigantic engineering work was surveyed and built there?

The Indian memorandum has cited the Indian Government's notes dated July 2, 1958, November 8, 1958, July 30, 1959 and November 4, 1959 respectively in an attempt to prove that the Chinese side did not stop its patrols in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. This is ludicrous to the extreme. The Chinese side had never said that it would stop its border patrols before the Kongka Pass incident took place on October 20-21, 1959. The citing of these notes in the Indian memorandum not only is pointless, but exactly proves that Chinese border patrols reached the traditional customary line. It was only after the Kongka Pass incident that the Chinese Government ordered the Chinese frontier guards to stop patrolling along the entire Sino-Indian boundary. When the Chinese Government's proposal of November 7, 1959 for the armed forces of each side to withdraw and stop patrolling was rejected, the Chinese frontier guards further stopped patrolling within twenty kilometres on China's side of the line of actual control. In his letter to Prime Minister Nehru dated December 17, 1959, Premier Chou En-lai notified the Indian Government of the decision of the Chinese Government. During a period of more than two years, the Chinese frontier guards strictly carried out this order. The allegation that China continued its patrols, which was made in the Indian note dated October 31, 1962 referred to in the Indian memorandum, was a total fabrication which was already thoroughly refuted by the Chinese Government in its previous notes. As a matter of fact, it was not until May 1962 that the Chinese

frontier guards were ordered to resume patrolling in the western sector in order to resist the increasing intrusions and provocations of Indian troops. This decision was also notified to the Indian Government by the Chinese Government in its note of April 30, 1962. Chinese actions, whether stopping or resuming border patrols, have always been open and above-board, and no fault can be found with them by the Indian Government.

2. Concerning the Che Dong area.

Ever since the Indian side pushed up to the entire illegal McMahon Line both sides have been clearly aware of the location of the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 in the eastern sector of the Sino- Indian border. The dispute over the Che Dong area was caused by the Indian side which, taking advantage of China's cessation of patrols, crossed the illegal McMahon Line in June 1962, and in September launched armed provocations. The Indian side alleged that the Che Dong area is south of the illegal McMahon Line. But the only so-called basis which India can rely upon is the original map of the Illegal McMahon Line in the possession of both China and India. According to the original map, the Che Dong area is clearly situated to the north of the illegal McMahon Line. And the Indian military sketch map captured by China in the recent border conflict also clearly shows the Che Dong area as north of the illegal McMahon Line. No matter how it haggles, the Indian Government cannot deny that its deliberate crossing of the illegal McMahon Line and occupation of the Che Dong area north of the Line were an undisguised act of aggression and provocation.

The question of the Che Dong area is a very simple one, and the merits of the case are quite clear. But now the Indian Government is creating side issues by entangling the specific dispute over the Che Dong area with the question of the delimitation of the entire boundary in the eastern sector. The Indian memorandum referred to the comments under

"eastern sector" in the memorandum attached to the Indian Prime Minister's letter of November 14 to Premier Chou En-lai, and asked China to state whether it accepts the watershed principle or the coordinates principle. In its December 8 memorandum to the Indian Government and the text of the remarks made on the same day by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was handed over to the Indian Embassy in China on December 9, the Chinese Government has thoroughly refuted these comments and fully expounded its own viewpoint. The eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary has not yet been defined through negotiations, and so the question as to what principle China should accept in delimiting the boundary does not arise. The only line that exists in the eastern sector is the line of actual control marking each side's extent of administration. Both the Migyitun and Tulung Pass areas are on the Chinese side of the line, and no objections had ever been raised by the Indian Government. The Indian side now tries to create a fresh dispute over the Migyitun and Tulung Pass areas to cover up its aggression in the Che Dong area; this is completely futile.

The Indian memorandum referred to a so-called document of 1953. This document, far from substantiating India's case, is a protest to India's attempt to expand its aggression after occupying Tawang of Tibet in February 1951. It can be seen from the document that, although the Indian side tried to occupy the pasture of the inhabitants of the Le village and exacted grazing fees (i.e., taxes, as described in the Indian memorandum) from them, they still maintained that the pasture belonged to them. India's aggressive ambition did not succeed. In fact, the Che Dong area had been under China's effective jurisdiction through the whole period from 1951 to the recent Indian intrusion.

3. Concerning Longju.

In its memorandum, the Indian Government quoted a passage from Premier Chou En-lai's letter of December 17, 1959 as proof that both

sides had agreed to refrain from occupying Longju. Premier Chou En-lai's proposal, however, was very clear, namely, both sides should refrain from stationing armed personnel in other disputed places on the border as well as in Longju. And those places were specifically mentioned in Premier Chou En-lai's letter, i.e., Khinzemane, Parigas, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal. That proposal was an integral whole and must not be taken apart. It was not accepted by the Indian Government. How then can it be held that both sides had agreed to refrain from stationing armed personnel in Longju? The Indian Government is indeed arbitrary to the extreme in so unscrupulously and wilfully distorting Premier Chou En-lai's letter in order to justify its own unreasonable stand.

4. Concerning Wuje.

A similar trick was played by the Indian Government in connection with the Wuje question. The Indian Government is well aware that China has always maintained that Wuje is Chinese territory. How could the Chinese Government, which rejected as unacceptable the Indian Government's proposals for both sides to refrain from sending civil personnel to Wuje, agree to the even more unreasonable demand for the Indian side alone to control the area by sending its civil personnel there? It is inconceivable that the Chinese Government would accept such an unreasonable demand. As a matter of fact, either before or after 1959, there has not been a single case where the Chinese Government failed to lodge a protest with India when it sent its so-called civil personnel to enter the Wuje area illegally.

5. Concerning the question of cease-fire.

The Chinese Government has taken note of the indication that "nothing has been done by the Indian side to impede the implementation of the cease-fire declaration." It must be pointed out, however, that non-

impediment in China's unilateral cease-fire is not the same as India's formal agreement to a cease-fire. That is why the present state of cease-fire is still unstable. Since China unilaterally effected a cease-fire, Indian troops have, in the western sector, repeatedly intruded into the Spanggur Lake area; in the eastern sector, they frequently followed on the heels of and provoked the withdrawing Chinese troops. Indian aircraft also have repeatedly violated China's air space. The previous border clashes instigated by India were all the result of gradual development of such provocative activities. The fact that the Indian side now returns to its old ways while the Chinese frontier guards are withdrawing on China's own initiative cannot but arouse the serious attention of China and those Asian and African countries that take interest in a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

The first of the five principles for a peaceful settlement of the differences between China and India as enumerated by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of December 1 to Premier Chou En-lai is: "We should create a proper atmosphere for peaceful settlement of our differences." There is no doubt that the measures of cease-fire, withdrawal and the repatriation of sick and wounded Indian military personnel taken by China on its own initiative conform to this principle. However, the Indian side has not only continued provocations along the border and stepped up its arms expansion and war preparations, but adopted a series of measures deliberately aimed at poisoning the relations between the two countries. In unilateral violation of agreement, the Indian Government has closed down its consulates-general in China and has compelled China to do likewise. The Indian authorities have subjected Chinese nationals in India to ruthless persecution and threw more than 2,000 of them into concentration camps. The Indian Government has even decided to censor mail and telegrams between China and India. These acts taken by the Indian Government are in complete contravention of the above-mentioned principle.

6. Concerning the question of disengagement.

The Chinese Government has noted that the Indian Government is in favour of the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides on the basis of a commonly agreed arrangement. The Indian Government, however, holds that "such an arrangement can only be on the basis of undoing the further aggression committed by the Government of China on Indian territory on the 8th September, 1962." The Chinese Government has repeatedly and exhaustively proved that the so-called state of the border of September 8 was the position in which India had further occupied large tracts of Chinese territory by armed force since November 7, 1959, and from which Indian troops launched massive armed attacks against the Chinese frontier guards. To restore that position would be against the principle that the boundary question should only be settled through negotiations and that it is impermissible to create a *fait accompli* by the use of force. Therefore, it is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government. The Indian memorandum describes the state of the border prior to September 8, 1962 as a line. This is wholly untenable. The state of the border prior to September 8 was one in which the positions of the two sides were interlocked in a jigsaw puzzle fashion and which could by no means form a common base line for separating the armed forces of the two sides.

The Indian memorandum charges that the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 put forward by China is inconsistent with the fact. The sole ground for this charge advanced by the Indian Government is the allegation made in the memorandum attached to Prime Minister Nehru's letter to Premier Chou En-lai dated November 14, 1962 to the effect that the position of the line of actual control should be the locations of the Chinese frontier posts. This allegation has been thoroughly refuted in the remarks of the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 8, 1962 and in the memorandum of the Chinese Government to the Indian Government of the same date. It was pointed out that the extent of administration should not be confused with the location of

frontier posts and that, so far as the frontier posts are concerned, long before November 7, 1959 China had set up a series of posts on the Chinese side close to the line of actual control in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. The Indian Government cannot deny these facts, no matter how it may prevaricate. It is true that there is a difference between the positions held by Indian troops prior to September 8, 1962 and the line of actual control of November 7, 1959. The difference was estimated in the Indian memorandum is about 2,500 square miles. However, this difference was precisely created by India through perfidious armed encroachments on Chinese territory in the past three years by taking advantage of the Chinese frontier guards' cessation of patrols. This difference created by India through armed aggression can neither negate nor change the line of actual control of November 7, 1959. On the contrary, it precisely proves that it is most fair and reasonable to take this 1959 line as the base line for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides.

The third of the five principles raised by Prime Minister Nehru is purportedly quoted from Premier Chou En-lai's letter of November 4 to Prime Minister Nehru. The following are the original words of Premier Chou En-lai: "The fact that the Chinese Government's proposal has taken as its basis the 1959 line of actual control and not the present line of actual contact between the armed forces of the two sides is full proof that the Chinese side has not tried to force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on account of the advances gained in the recent counter-attack in self-defence." The principle contained in this sentence is perfectly clear, and that is, both sides should respect the 1959 line of actual control and neither side should alter this line by armed force and impose a *fait accompli* on the other side. It is precisely on this principle that the Chinese side proposed to take the 1959 line of actual control as the base line for separating the armed forces of the two sides and is withdrawing on its own initiative from the close to 20,000 square kilometres of territory south of this line in the eastern sector of the Sino-

Indian border. In insisting on a reversion to the state of the border prior to September 8, 1962, the Indian side has precisely gone against this principle by demanding that China should accept India's encroachment on large tracts of Chinese territory through violating this line of actual control by armed force since 1959.

The fourth of the five principles raised by Prime Minister Nehru requires that the measures taken by both sides "should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides." According to the Chinese Government's proposal for the armed forces of each side to withdraw 20 kilometres from the November 7, 1959 line of actual control the Chinese frontier guards would have to withdraw not only from vast tracts of territory south of the 1959 line of actual control in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, but another 20 kilometres from the 1959 line of actual control along the entire border. Thus they will in fact withdraw to positions far behind those they held on September 8, 1962. This represents China's greatest regard for the decency, dignity and self-respect of India. India, however, insists on its unreasonable demand to restore the state of the border prior to September 8, 1962, which is by no means consistent with China's decency, dignity and self-respect.

The last of the five principles raised by Prime Minister Nehru specifies that measures proposed by both sides "will not in any way prejudice either side's position in regard to the correct boundary alignment." This has been the consistent stand of the Chinese Government. But India has insisted on a reversion to the state of the border prior to September 8, 1962 as a precondition for holding negotiations. That is to say, India wants China to satisfy the greater part of India's territorial claims on China even before the negotiations start. It is impossible to hold that agreement to such an unreasonable demand would not prejudice China's position in regard to the boundary.

7. Concerning the question of the meeting of officials of the two sides.

The Chinese Government has noted that the Indian Government is not opposed to the holding of meetings of officials of the two sides, but maintains that there must first be a cease-fire and withdrawal arrangement commonly agreed by the two sides. If such an arrangement has been agreed upon by the two sides, the tasks of the officials of both sides would, of course, be much simpler. It is a pity, however, that such an agreement does not yet exist. It seems to the Chinese Government that this is no reason for putting off a meeting of officials of the two sides, but exactly points to the urgent need for holding such a meeting. Differences can only be solved through meetings and discussions; they would never be reduced, let alone removed, if no meeting is held. The second of the five principles raised by Prime Minister Nehru states: "We should settle our differences in a friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions." It was on this principle that the Chinese Government has repeatedly proposed negotiations between the two sides. The Chinese Government is awaiting actual deeds of the Indian Government to demonstrate that it is really willing to observe this principle.

**Letter from Premier Chou En-lai to the Prime Minister of India, 30
December 1962**

Respected Mr. Prime Minister,

I thank you for your letter dated December, 1, 1962. To the questions of substance raised in your letter the Chinese Government has given detailed answer in the remarks of the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the text of which was handed over to the Indian Embassy in China on December 9, and in the memoranda to the Indian Government dated December 8 and December 29, with which Your Excellency must have been acquainted.

In your letter you have summed up, from our correspondence, five principles for a peaceful settlement of the differences between our two sides. I very much appreciate your spirit of seeking common ground. These principles are indeed what the Chinese Government has consistently advocated, and for their realization it has made unremitting efforts. However, I must point out that these principles must be equally observed by both sides, and that our differences cannot possibly be resolved if one side attempts to bind the other side with these principles while itself refuses to abide by them. Up to now it is India, and not China, that has persisted in a position which is inconsistent with these principles.

It is hoped that from now on both sides will act in accordance with these principles in seeking a reasonable settlement of the Sino-India boundary question.

The Chinese Government has taken note of the fact that the Indian Government has stated that it will not impede the implementation of the cease-fire by China, that it is in favour of the principles of disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides and that it is not opposed to the holding of meetings of the officials of both sides. However, as is well known, the state of cease-fire is not yet stable. In order to consolidate the cease-fire, the armed forces of the two sides must disengage; otherwise there is no assurance that clashes will not recur. The Chinese Government still holds that its three proposals of October 24 constitute the most effective way to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question, and that the core of these proposals, namely, that the armed forces of each side should withdraw 20 kilometres with the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 as the base line, is all the more a most fair and reasonable arrangement. It is regrettable that the Indian Government even now insists on a reversion to the state of the boundary prior to September 8, 1962. I would not like to repeat here our old arguments. What everybody anxiously hopes is that the unstable state of cease-fire will not again develop into a border conflict on account of the fact that our two sides continue to be at loggerheads with each other.

In order to stabilize the cease-fire and seek a rapprochement of the views of the two sides, the Chinese Government proposes that, in the course of the withdrawal of the Chinese frontier guards on China's own initiative according to set plans, the Indian troops should stay in their present positions along the entire Sino-Indian border, and that in the meantime officials of the two sides should meet immediately to discuss such matters as withdrawal arrangements for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides establishment of checkposts and return of captured personnel. The rank of the officials of both sides and the time and place of their meeting can be discussed and fixed through diplomatic channels. The Chinese Government tentatively considers that it may be

appropriate for officials of the two sides to meet in January 1963 either in Peking, or in Delhi, or in the capital of a friendly Asian or African country.

I am awaiting your reply.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sd.) CHOU EN-LAI
Premier of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China.

**Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the
Embassy of China in India, 31 December 1962**

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the communique issued by the Chinese and Pakistan Governments on 26th December on their agreement in principle on the alignment of the border between China (Sinkiang) and the territory of Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan.

2. In their note of 30th June 1962, the Government of India had drawn attention to the attempts of the Chinese Government to exploit, for its own ends, the differences on Kashmir between the Indian and Pakistan Governments. Despite the assertion by the Chinese Government that it does not wish to get involved in the dispute, the calculated release of this communique at a time when delegations from India and Pakistan were attempting to resolve their differences on Kashmir and related matters is clear evidence of China's desire to exploit Indo-Pakistan differences for its own selfish and expansionist designs.

3. The joint communique is a brazen attempt at legitimisation of the gains of aggression in the hope that the Chinese Government will thereby secure Pakistan support to Chinese aggression on India and the gains of this aggression.

4. The Government of India protest strongly against this aggressive and expansionist move by the Government of China. They repudiate firmly the validity of any agreement involving Indian territory between parties who have no legal or constitutional locus standi whatever in respect of this territory.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

**Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of
China, 1 January 1963**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message of 30th December, 1962 which was delivered to our Foreign Office by your Charge d'Affaires in Delhi at 2015 hours on 30th December, along with a copy of the memorandum of your Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 29th December.

2. The main theme of the memorandum of your Foreign Office, dated 29th December which also runs through your message of 30th December, is that it is India and not China which is "reversing right and wrong" and persisting in a position inconsistent with the peaceful settlement of the India-China differences over the border question. This is a distorted version of the factual history of the last few years recorded in the exchange of notes between India and China on the boundary question. It is hardly necessary for me to go into the detailed background of this factual history as it must be well known to you both from our personal correspondence and from our talks and discussions right up to 1960, as well as from the official notes exchanged between India and China.

3. In the course of the past 7 or 8 years, I have personally visited various parts of Ladakh on several occasions. During my earlier visits, there was no sign of Chinese forces there, nor was there any report about their coming into Ladakh. On later occasions, there were reports of their having entered Ladakh in various places. Still later, they had advanced still further. I can speak of this from my personal knowledge. You will not expect me to accept vague allegations of Chinese occupation of a greater part of eastern Ladakh when this goes against the evidence of my own eyes.

4. Apart from the factual history of the developments since 1957, it is absolutely clear that so far as the Eastern sector of the border is concerned, this had been a peaceful border with no tension or clashes whatever except as regards Longju where an incident was created by your forces in 1959. That this sector should, beginning with 8th September 1962, and more particularly since 20th October, 1962, have been the scene of violent armed clashes between Chinese and Indian forces, is a development for which the Government of China are entirely responsible. There are frequent references in recent Chinese notes and memoranda to the Chinese armed forces having advanced more than 20,000 square kilometres in what is called "counter-attack in self-defence". It would be obvious to any one who looks at the position objectively that this scale of military clashes and such large scale advance into Indian territory could not have occurred unless there was a pre-planned and carefully concerted aggressive move by the Chinese forces. Under the Chinese declaration of unilateral cease-fire and withdrawals, the Chinese forces propose to withdraw from the bulk of this area, but they stipulate a specific condition that the limited defensive measures against Chinese aggression taken by India both in the Eastern and Western sectors should not be restored. All sorts of fallacious arguments regarding the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959, the need for disengagement of forces etc. are advanced to enable the Chinese side to retain its gains of the latest aggression since 8th September 1962, in the Western sector and to retain a position of advantage for another armed aggression in the Eastern sector. No amount of wordy argument can hide this position of advantage that the Chinese Government seek to retain as the spoils of their latest aggression.

5. I requested you in my letter of 1st December 1962, for positive clarifications on what you call "the line of actual control as of 7th November 1959". The only clarification given is that this line is the

one unilaterally determined by China regardless of the factual history of the past few years. The only now suggestion in your present letter is that "the Indian troops should stay in their present positions along the entire Sino-Indian border and that in the meantime officials of the two sides should meet immediately to discuss such matters as withdrawal arrangements for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, establishment of checkposts and return of captured personnel." This new proposal is worse than your three-point proposal in as much as it seeks to exclude the Indian armed forces from the entire area of Indian territory subjected to this latest aggression since 8th September, 1962, that is, from Indian territory of over 20, 000 square kilometres in the Eastern sector and over 6,000 square kilometres in the western sector. Surely the officials of the two sides can hardly discuss and reach agreements on such matters as withdrawal arrangements for the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides if they have no clear direction from their Governments regarding the line with reference to which the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides is to be arranged.

6. Many countries are devoted to peace. But I imagine that no country is more passionately devoted to peace and peaceful methods than India. To us war is hateful. That we should have to come into military conflict with our neighbour China, with whom we have sought to develop friendly relations, has caused us great pain. We would certainly like to find peaceful solutions of any differences that we might have about our frontiers or about anything else. When the British Government relinquished their rule in India in 1947, the frontiers of our country which then existed naturally became the frontiers of free and independent India. If there was any argument about any part of these frontiers, we were perfectly willing to discuss this matter peacefully and decide it by peaceful methods. But we were not prepared, and are not prepared to have any decisions thrust upon us by aggression and military means.

7. Because of our desire that any point in dispute between our two countries be decided peacefully, we repeatedly, for the last many years, drew your attention to the wrong maps issued on behalf of China and gave you our own maps where our frontiers are clearly marked. You said that your maps were old ones that you had inherited from the previous regime and you had had no time to revise them. You were thus clearly aware of our precise frontier. Yet, at no time during these years before September 1959, did you inform us of what in your opinion was your frontier, even though your forces had started committing aggression in various places in Ladakh. Surely, that was a curious method of approaching, and enforcing your claim on a friendly country.

8. In regard to the Eastern sector, we had fairly lengthy talks, and you gave me clearly to understand that while you did not accept the McMahon Line, yet, because of our friendly relations, you were perfectly prepared to accept the watershed as our frontier, as you had done in the case of Burma. At no time before the 8th September 1962 ever since India became independent, did the Chinese cross the border of the Eastern sector except at Longju. Before our independence, the Chinese People's Republic had not been established, and there could have been no question of, therefore, of the Chinese coming there. Nor did the Tibetans enter our territory as there was no doubt that they certainly acknowledged the McMahon Line Agreement. Because of all this, it is a matter of amazement to me that, in spite of this past history and background, you should claim large areas of a Province of ours. It was a matter for still greater surprise that after the assurances given by you to us, you should carry out a massive attack on our country. I would beg you to consider not only the facts, but also whether this was in your opinion a proper way to treat a country which had repeatedly shown its friendship to you.

9. We firmly believe in peaceful methods and we shall always try to seek every avenue of peace to settle any problem or dispute. We want to do this despite the serious armed clashes that have occurred between India and China. But before a suitable atmosphere for any worthwhile talks between us is created, I think that at least the further aggression committed by the Chinese forces since the 8th of September 1962 should be removed and the positions as it existed then should be restored. After that, I shall gladly discuss the merits of these questions with you. I have even suggested to our Parliament that, if necessary, we would be prepared to refer these questions for decision on the merits to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which is an impartial world tribunal.

10. I agree that there is no point in repeating our old arguments and that though our differences continue, we should, despite these differences, explore what other possibilities are available to avoid development of further conflict. I would, in this connection refer to the proposals made by the six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries who met at Colombo earlier last month. These have been conveyed to me and also to you and the Ceylon Prime Minister is now on a visit to Peking to explain these proposals and will be coming to Delhi about the 10th of January 1963. We are examining these proposals and will be discussing them with the Ceylon Prime Minister and her colleagues when she comes to Delhi.

11. Our Foreign Office is examining in detail the memorandum of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 29th December and will be sending a full reply to that memorandum separately.

12. Please accept Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

**Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the
Embassy of China in India, 8 January 1963**

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's note dated 27th December 1962, has the honour to state as follow:

The Government of India have clearly stated their stand in their earlier notes on the subject and there is no need for reiterating the same.

It is, however, necessary to repudiate the suggestion contained in the present Chinese note that the conclusion of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty "refutes the Indian contention that the Sino-Indian boundary has long been delimited". There had at no time been any doubt that the traditional and customary India-China boundary alignment lies along the highest watershed ridges of the Himalayas. It is significant that the Boundary Treaty concluded by China with Burma has formally confirmed the Burmese frontier along the highest Himalayan watershed in this area. It is the western continuation of the same frontier, the McMahon line, which the Chinese Government perversely refuse to accept in the case of India.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurance of its highest consideration.

**Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
to the Embassy of China in India, 9 January 1963**

There is no response in the memorandum of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 29th December, 1962, to the peaceful sentiments expressed by the Indian Prime Minister in his letter of the 1st December, 1962, to the Prime Minister of China; nor does the memorandum indicate a helpful attitude towards the Indian Government's endeavour to achieve a peaceful solution of the Sino-Indian border problem, after the conditions prevailing before the massive invasion by Chinese forces on India are restored. The memorandum merely repeats false and mischievous allegations that have been refuted several times by the Government of India and is deliberately slanderous in tone because there is no logic or reason in support of its contentions.

Western Sector:

2. The Chinese Government have been constantly repeating that "the whole vast area on the Chinese side of the traditional customary line in the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian border is part of Chinese territory". Such repetition by itself cannot establish the validity of this claim. This has been a shifting claim which has kept pace with the forward movement of Chinese troops. In 1958, it covered the Aksai Chin road and was stated to be the same as shown in Chinese maps of 1956. In 1960, this was stretched still further west. And today, subsequent to the massive invasion by China, one does not know what the latest version of the claim is.

3. The Indian side had, in the discussions between the two Governments, given conclusive evidence that the Aksai Chin and the Chang Chengmo Valley were part of the ilaqa of Tanktse, and

administrative sub-divisional headquarters in the Ladakh Tehsil. The Indian side had produced published revenue records that made it clear beyond any doubt that the areas of Aksai Chin, Lingzi Tang and Chang Chengmo were part of the Tanktse ilaqa. Indian officials also clarified that the extent of territory for which the revenue headquarters of a district would normally be responsible is directly dependent upon the extent of population and assessable revenue. The Chinese memorandum called all this spurious evidence simply because they themselves have not been able to produce any evidence whatever of revenue assessment over areas they claim to have been in possession for thousands of years.

4. The Chinese claim to have produced evidence of their jurisdiction in these areas is entirely baseless. They have, in their present memorandum, repeated the reference to the 1927 petition from the Governor of Sinkiang, because that is the only plausible thing they could trot out. This was also mentioned in the meeting of officials in 1960. The document itself refers to an area north of the Kuen Lun ranges and mentions the intention of establishing an administrative organisation at Shahidulla (in Sinkiang) covering an area which has, as its southern limits, the Karakoram Pass. Obviously, this has no relevance to Aksai Chin or any other area of Ladakh. No other document of any kind from either the archives of the Sinkiang administration or from contemporary records has been produced to establish that Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang were ever part of Sinkiang.

5. On the other hand, the Indian side had furnished evidence of administration of this area prior to 1950 and details of patrols which were sent even subsequent to 1950 and right upto 1958 and even in 1959, which demonstrated that India had continued to exercise rightful sovereignty and was fully discharging the responsibility of local administration that vested in India consistently with the requirements of the terrain. Indeed, it was only in 1959 that the Aksai Chin area was fully

occupied by Chinese forces, disrupting thereby the Government of India's continued exercise of sovereignty. The fact that India, because, it put faith in Chinese professions of friendship and did not alter the traditional pattern of administration in the area by establishing a network of fixed administrative and defence posts all along the international border, can in no way prejudice its title or sovereignty over this Indian territory.

6. An instance of the type of baseless statement that the Chinese Government does not hesitate to make is the assertion that "the Government of the People's Republic of China took over this area (Ladakh) from the Government of old China in 1950". Such assertions as these are only indicative of the prevarications that are evident throughout the Chinese memorandum. It will be recalled that the former Government of China did not exercise any control at all in Tibet, much less in the Aksai Chin area during the years of the second World War and thereafter. In fact, in 1943, the British Government had to approach the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for permission for the transportation of armament through Tibet to assist the former Chinese Government.

Equally baseless is the Chinese Government's statement that Indian officials were unable to produce any evidence of patrolling in that area. The facts are exactly the other way round. It was the Indian officials who pointed out to the Chinese side that not only did Indian officials survey parties and patrols constantly visit these areas during the years 1911-1949, but Indian reconnaissance parties also visited this area in the years after 1950, when the Chinese Government falsely claim they were in the Aksai Chin area. In 1951, an expedition went to Leh, Lingzi Tang and Aksai Chin. In 1952, a party went to Lanak La via Tanktse, Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs and Kongka Pass. In August 1954 and August 1956, patrol parties went to Lanak La. The Indian flag planted at Lanak La in 1954 was still found there in 1956. In September 1957 an Indian reconnaissance party went upto Qara Tagh via Tanktse, Tsogatsalu, Hot

Springs, Shammalungpa and Shing Lung. In the summer of 1958 an Indian patrol party went via Phobrang, Shammalungpa and Nischu to the Sarigh Jilganang and the Amtogor Lake regions. The party planted the Indian flag at a point 80° 12' M East 35° 03' M North. Another Indian reconnaissance party went at the same time via Phobrang, Shammalungpa and Shing Lung to Qizil Zilga. Other places near the Pangong lake and in the Chang Chengmo valley were also under constant patrol by Indian officials. These facts were clearly put before the Chinese side at the talks of the officials but the Chinese Government, apparently, seem to think that all this evidence will disappear simply because they desire to ignore it.

7. The Chinese Government seek to disprove the fact of constant Indian patrolling in this area by stating that gigantic engineering work in the construction of the Aksai Chin road was not detected. This "gigantic engineering work" consisted of speedily and surreptitiously clearing a road over the comparatively smooth surface of a rocky plateau. Apart from the fact that the road follows an ancient caravan route, much of the area over which the road has been made merely required to be marked out and little actual road construction as such was necessary. It is because of this natural advantage that the Chinese had been able to lay out the road within a short time and to avoid detection in the process. In any event, the Chinese Government's contention that an illegal construction of a road through an other's territory, even if described as a big engineering project, confers title to territory is just too absurd and fantastic to require detailed refutation.

Eastern Sector

8. In spite of the fact that the memorandum of the Government of India of December 19, 1962 had very clearly indicated that the Thagla ridge area lies south of the main Himalayan watershed and that administrative control over this area had long been exercised by India,

the Chinese Government continue to assert that this region lies to the north of the McMahon Line. It is, however, significant that even the Chinese Government, in its memorandum, accept the fact that grazing fees have been as they choose to call "exacted" by India from inhabitants of Le village, which lies to the north of the McMahon Line, who came to graze their cattle in this region.

9. The Chinese memorandum claims to have captured an Indian military sketch map showing the Dhola area as north of the McMahon Line. There is no doubt that sketch maps were available with our forces to indicate the rendering of the McMahon Line, based on coordinates of the Simla map, just as they have maps indicating the highest watershed ridge which, in fact, is the correct alignment of the McMahon Line on the ground. In spite of all its protestations against the Indian presence south of the Thagla ridge, the Chinese Government has had, at no time, asserted that the Thagla ridge does not form the highest watershed ridge in that area. This is a matter of easy verification and would clearly determine that the areas to the south of the Thagla ridge were part of India.

10. The Chinese Government, beyond giving the coordinates of what they consider the eastern end of the McMahon Line, have never yet indicated their concept of the correct alignment. In addition to leaving this extremely vague, they have not indicated their acceptance of either the principle of the highest watershed dividing the territories between the two countries or of an alignment on the ground following a strict interpretation of the co-ordinates of the McMahon Line as appear in the Simla Treaty map. Whether in the Western sector in regard to their so called traditional and customary boundary or in the Eastern sector in regard to the McMahon Line, the Chinese Government are determined to keep their alignment vague and imprecise in spite of India's constant requests to the Chinese to state their position clearly.

11. The Government of India have already refuted the Chinese Government claims to the Tawang region. Tawang has always been within Indian jurisdiction and ample factual evidence has been presented by the Government of India to prove India's sovereignty over that area. The Chinese Government base their claims on certain taxes that were once paid by the inhabitants of Tawang to the ecclesiastical authorities at Lhasa. It has been pointed out that these tributes were ecclesiastical tributes to the Dalai Lama and not a "tax" in the political sense of the term.

12. All administrative dues from the Tawang area were paid to the Government of India over the years. It has been incontrovertibly established that the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction over the entire boundary in this region upto the international boundary. If the Government of India had any aggressive intentions, they would not have voluntarily acknowledged China's jurisdiction over the Migyitun area and Tamadem on the basis of the highest watershed boundary. This acknowledgement of the correct position of Migyitun and Tamadem as north of the frontier is sufficient proof of the just and correct position adopted by the Government of India on the basis of the highest watershed ridge principle of the 1914 Agreement as translated on the ground. Facts prove without doubt that it is the Government of China who have, despite their assurances about the McMahon Line frontier which they also accepted in their boundary settlement with Burma, launched an unprovoked attack after the 8th September 1962 in this area in the pursuit of China's aggressive and expansionist ambitions in this region.

Longju

13. There is another instance of Chinese prevarication. Prime Minister Chou En-lai, in his letter of 17th December 1959 to the Indian Prime Minister, stated:

"Pending the above-mentioned agreement, the Chinese Government, in a conciliatory spirit and out of the desire to move towards the withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border, is prepared to agree first to reach a partial solution by applying the proposal you have made in your letter for the non-stationing of the armed forces of both sides at Longju to the other disputed places on the border as well".

The arrangement on Longju had been observed by both Governments since 1959. The Chinese Government have now amplified this understanding to be contingent upon the same arrangements being accepted in such areas as Khimzeman, Parigas, Shipki Pass, etc. Surely this was not so during the past three years and the suggestion that this arrangement should apply in all areas is a new demand that India cannot countenance.

Bara Hoti.

14. On Bara Hoti as well, the Government of India had very clearly, in their Note of 13th September, 1959, stated:

"If the Government of China are not agreeable to this suggestion, the Government of India will continue as in previous years to send their civil personnel to exercise jurisdiction over an area which the Government of India have always considered as part of Indian territory. Such personnel, however, will not carry any arms."

The fact remains that the Chinese Government did not object then to this arrangement which had been continuing for several years.

15. The Government of India had categorically stated that no action would be taken to impede the implementation of China's unilateral declaration to cease-fire. The allegations that India had violated Chinese air-space during this period are completely unfounded. In fact, the Chinese forces have themselves been guilty of breach of the cease-fire as several instances have occurred of Chinese troops firing upon the Indian patrols since November 21, 1962. If an element of instability is being introduced in the cease-fire, it is the result of the actions of the Chinese Government, and not of the Government of India in spite of the unilateral decision by China to cease-fire, the objections raised in the Chinese memorandum to the legitimate steps being taken by India to ensure the security of the country is a cause of concern to this country. The treacherous massive attacks on India commencing on 20th October 1962 and the further military push forward on November 15 had also been preceded by a campaign of wild allegations of military measures being taken by India as well as by protestations of Chinese peaceful intentions. The efforts being made by India to strengthen itself and the removal of Chinese nationals from sensitive border areas of the country are all steps taken in the interests of the security of the country and have had to be undertaken because of the massive invasion mounted by Chinese forces.

Disengagement

16. The Government of India have, all along, maintained that a cardinal principle to be implemented, if India and China are to seek a peaceful settlement of their differences, is the restoration of at least the status quo that existed before the further Chinese aggression on September 8, 1962. The Government of India had already declared their agreement to a disengagement between the armed forces of the two countries on the basis of a commonly agreed arrangement as soon as the status quo before 8th September 1962 is restored.

17. The Government of India are, however, unwilling to accept a line which the Chinese Government have chosen to call the "November 7, 1959, line of actual control" and the alignment of which has been unilaterally decided upon by the Chinese Government in accordance with the advance of their forces following their latest massive aggression on India. It may be reiterated that the Chinese were nowhere in 1959 along the line at present referred to by them as "the 7th November 1959 line of actual control". In fact, in a desperate attempt to prove this, the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement on December 8, 1962 gave four locations where Chinese forces were alleged to have been on November 7, 1959. The first post, Shenhsienwan, is north of the Karakoram Pass in Sinkiang, and not in an area which is traditionally and customarily Indian. Two other locations, Hot Springs and Nyagzu, lie precisely in the vicinity of the line that Prime Minister Nehru referred to in his letter of 14th November 1962, as the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959. The fourth is an additional location in the Chip Chap River valley which the Government of India know did not exist till 1961. This would conclusively prove that the Chinese were, in 1959, nowhere west of the 1959 line of actual control as defined by India.

18. Apart from the fact that Chinese forces were never anywhere near their so called line of actual control of 7th November, 1959, the Chinese memorandum itself admits that there is a difference between the position held by the Indian troops prior to September 8, 1962 and the so called line of actual control of 7th November, 1959 as claimed by the Chinese. The fact is that the Indian Government took limited defensive measures in their own territory to prevent the continuing aggressive of Chinese troops.

It is indeed, perverse thinking on the part of China to suggest that when a country puts up border defence posts within its own territory, it is guilty of aggression because it interferes with the aggressive designs of an expansionist power. To take the so called 1959 line as the base line for disengagement is, to quote the Chinese memorandum, not only not "fair

and reasonable", but is a definite attempt to retain the wrongful gains of its latest massive aggression.

19. The Chinese memorandum, in insisting upon India accepting the Chinese version of the 7th November 1959 line of actual control, is imposing a pre-condition which gives China the territorial gains of its latest aggression. India, on the other hand, is not placing any pre-conditions at all and is yet prepared to consider steps for further talks and discussions for a peaceful settlement of the differences. All that India ask for is that the aggression must be undone before reverting to peaceful talks and discussions for resolving the differences. This is on the basis of a principle that has been accepted internationally and is in consonance with the precepts of Panch Sheel.

20. The Government of India agree that differences can be solved through meetings and discussions, but these have to be on a just and equitable basis. No talks and discussions are possible in circumstances where India is compelled to accept an arbitrary line which the Chinese call "the November 7, 1959 line of actual control" which has no legal, traditional or customary basis whatever and which is purely based on the latest Chinese military aggression on India. The crisis of confidence referred to in the Indian Prime Minister's letter of November 14 can only be resolved when the Chinese Government give, by their performance, adequate proof of their professions to observe the normal standards of international behaviour between peaceful neighbours.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 8 September 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and, with reference to the Indian Government's note of June 6, 1962, has the honour to state as follows:

The Chinese Government clearly pointed out in its note of April 27, 1962, that as the point 35° 01' N, 78° 34' E (six miles west of Sumdo) on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border is as deep as over thirty kilometres inside Chinese territory, whether the Chinese Government sets up a post or adopts any other measure there is China's internal affair in which the Indian Government has no right to meddle. Besides, the allegation that China has established a new post there is not true at all.

The Chinese Government categorically rejects the unwarranted charge repeated by the Indian Government in its note under reference.

At the meetings between Chinese and Indian officials, the Chinese side already made a detailed description of the correct alignment of the traditional and customary Sino-Indian boundary in the western sector and conclusively established with a large amount of authoritative evidence that the entire border area east and north of this line was always under the jurisdiction and control of the Chinese side. As for the alignment described at great length by the Indian Government in its note, the Chinese side has long demonstrated that it is but an actually non-existent line drawn up underhandedly by British imperialism during the course of its aggression against China's Sinkiang, and the nature of this line

will not be changed no matter how many times the Indian side may repeat its description of it. The Indian side has never exercised jurisdiction over the large area between this line and the traditional customary line. This was admitted by Prime Minister Nehru in the Rajya Sabha as early as September 10, 1959. He then clearly stated that this area "has not been under any kind of administration".

Chinese border defence forces have never over-stepped their own boundary, nor has the Chinese side ever had any post in Indian Territory. Indian troops, on the contrary, have incessantly intruded into Chinese territory, occupied large tracts of Chinese territory, set up many aggressive strongpoints, and even not scrupled to start armed clashes. Therefore, in order to ease the tension along the border, the Indian side must withdraw all its illegal strongpoints and intruding personnel from Chinese territory.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 1 November 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's note dated 8th September, 1962.

The Government of India had in their notes of 15th April and 6th June, 1962 indicated that a new Chinese military post had been established deep inside Indian territory at a point $78^{\circ} 34'E$ $35^{\circ} 01'N$ six miles west of Sumdo. These facts had been carefully verified and there can be no doubt about the existence of a Chinese post at the above location. It is unfortunate that the Chinese note under reference should not only deny the existence of the illegal Chinese post but also presume to question the traditional alignment of the Sino-Indian boundary in this area.

At the meeting of the Officials of the two Governments in 1960, the Indian side had produced a wealth of consistent and conclusive evidence to substantiate the alignment of the traditional boundary. The positive Indian evidence in contrast to the sketchy material produced by the Chinese side establishes beyond doubt that the traditional boundary between India and China is that defined in the description provided by the Indian side at the talks. It is therefore futile for the Chinese note to refer to the detailed alignment in the Western sector of the border given in the Indian note dated 6th June 1962 as a "non-existent line". This stand of the Chinese Government only indicates that they have not seriously considered the Report of the Officials and are merely reiterating without any evidence that the Indian territory in Ladakh, which is now under their forcible occupation, has been "always under the jurisdiction and control of the Chinese side".

The Chinese note has made the claim that the "Indian side has never exercised jurisdiction" in this area and quotes in this regard the statement of the Indian Prime Minister in the Rajya Sabha to the effect that this area "has not been under any kind of administration". The Indian Prime Minister's statement quoted in the Chinese note in no way contradicts the Indian Government's position that India had always exercised sovereignty over this area upto the time of the Chinese illegal occupation. All that the Indian Prime Minister meant to say in the statement quoted in the Chinese note was that this area being practically uninhabited and at a height of about 17000 feet, there was no 'administration' there similar to the administration in other inhabited territories. The Chinese Government's efforts to establish that India had not therefore exercised 'sovereign jurisdiction' over this area are not likely to delude anybody. In international law it is a well-established principle that the exercise of Sovereign jurisdiction by a state over any territory is to be judged firstly by its intention or will to act as Sovereign, and secondly, by some actual display of state authority over that territory appropriate to the nature of the territory and the conditions prevailing there. The exercise of state authority over an uninhabited region in proof of its Sovereignty cannot and need not be the same as over an inhabited region. Sovereign jurisdiction over this area appropriate to the nature of the terrain, the difficult climatic conditions prevailing there and its practically uninhabited character had always been exercised by the Indian Government upto the time of its Chinese illegal occupation. Regular patrols were sent to the limits of the Indian border. Two of these patrols at Haji Langar and Kongka La were involved in incidents with the Chinese troops. There is further evidence of continuous exercise of state authority over all this area in the form of detailed survey undertaken, the use of the area for trading, grazing and salt collecting, maintenance of police checkposts by the Kashmir Government at appropriate places and a number of revenue and assessment reports.

In the light of the above facts, the Government of India categorically reject the contentions made in the Chinese note under reference and demand the immediate withdrawal of the illegal Chinese post at 18° 34' E 35° 01' N.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 6 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and has the honour to state the following:

According to reports from the Chinese frontier guards, Indian troops stationed in the area of Chushul and Tinruzhe in India in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border have since October 29, 1962 repeatedly shelled the Chinese frontier guards in China's Tibet with howitzers and heavy mortars. Up to November 3 they have altogether fired more than 170 shells. The specific cases were as follows:

(1) From 18:25 to 19:30 hours on October 29, the Indian troops stationed at Chushul fired more than 20 shells at the Chinese frontier post situated to the northwest of the Spanggur Lake in Tibet, China;

(2) From 18:00 to about 19:00 hours on October 30, the Indian troops stationed at Tinruzhe fired about 50 shells at the Chinese frontier posts situated to the west and southwest of the Spanggur Lake in Tibet, China;

(3) At 19:30 hours on October 31, the Indian troops stationed near Chushul fired about 30 shells at the Chinese frontier post situated near Digra in Tibet, China;

(4) At about 19:00 hours on November 2, the Indian troops stationed to the southeast of Tinruzhe fired nearly 20 shells at the Chinese frontier post situated near Jechiung in Tibet, China;

(5) At about 18:00 hours on November 3, the Indian troops stationed at the above-mentioned area fired more than 50 shells at the Chinese frontier post situated near Digra in Tibet, China.

The Chinese Government hereby lodges the strongest protest with the Indian Government against the above-mentioned serious cases of shelling of Chinese frontier guards by Indian troops. It must be pointed out that at present the Indian side is amassing a large number of troops in the Chushul area in preparation for a new attack on Chinese territory. The bombardment of Chinese frontier guards with heavy artillery by Indian troops in the past consecutive days in a prelude to such an attack. Should the Indian side continue to play with fire and insist on expanding the conflict, the Chinese side, pressed beyond the limits of forbearance, will be compelled to strike back in self-defence. The Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 6 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to Indian Embassy in China and, with reference to the note of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Indian Government, dated October 26, 1962, has the honour to state the following:

The Indian Government's note under reference is in reply to the Chinese Government's note of October 20, 1962 which lodged the most urgent, the most serious and the strangest protest against the massive general attacks launched by the Indian forces of aggression against the Chinese frontier guards in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. The Indian Government in its reply note vainly attempted to absolve itself of the guilt of refusing peaceful negotiations and launching armed attacks by employing its usual practice of calling black white. But the facts are all there and cannot be denied.

Firstly, it is India which refuses to negotiate. Without going back too far, in the period from July 26 to October 6, 1962 alone seven notes were exchanged between China and India on the question of holding negotiations. The Chinese Government thrice put forward the proposal for holding discussions speedily and unconditionally on the boundary question between the two sides on the basis of the report of the meetings of the officials of the two countries. But the proposal was thrice turned down by the Indian Government. The Indian side even opposed the Chinese Government's proposition that during the discussions neither side should refuse to discuss any question concerning the boundary that may be raised by the other side. The Indian Government first advanced the pre-condition that China should withdraw from large tracts of China's own territory in the western sector then it advanced another pre-condition, that China should withdraw from another tract of China's own

territory in the eastern sector, and it has all along obstinately stated that no discussions can be held unless the Chinese side accepts its pre-conditions. In this way, the Indian Government, in its note of October 6, finally categorically shut the door to negotiations.

Secondly, it is also India which first attacked. As is well known, from the midnight of September 20, 1962, continuous armed attacks were launched against the Chinese frontier guards by the Indian forces of aggression entrenched in China's Che Dong area north of the illegal McMahon Line. As of October 10, the Indian side had in its many attacks killed and wounded a total of 47 Chinese frontier guards. On this account the Chinese Government lodged seven times in succession the most serious protest with the Indian Government and demanded that the Indian side immediately stop attacking. Regrettably, the Indian side has always regarded China's self-restraint and forbearance as a sign that China is weak and can be bullied and, in disregard of China's repeated protests and warnings, willfully expanded its scope of aggression and stepped up its attacks. Indian Prime Minister Nehru declared on October 12 that he had ordered to "free" Chinese territory of Chinese troops. On October 17 the Indian troops started vehement shelling of the Chinese frontier guards in both the eastern and western sectors simultaneously. On October 18 an official of the Indian Ministry of Defence declared smugly that the Chinese forces had been "driven back two miles." Finally, in the small hours of October 20 the Indian troops, in pursuance of Prime Minister Nehru's order, launched a massive general attack. Only when the Chinese frontier guards were repeatedly subjected to frenzied Indian attacks and suffered heavy casualties was the Chinese side compelled to act in resolute self-defence. How can it be said that the Chinese frontier guards' counter-attack in self-defence was kindling the flames of war? Can it be that only India is entitled to launch attacks while China has no right to defend itself?

Thirdly, while still refusing to stop the clashes and reopen negotiations on a fair and reasonable basis, the Indian Government is even now actively preparing for attacks on a larger scale. It is unfortunate that serious border clashes have occurred between China and India. On October 24, that is, four days after the clashes began, the Chinese Government issued a statement, putting forward three peaceable proposals. Anyone can see that these proposals, fair and reasonable as they are, constitute the only way to salvage the current dangerous situation. The Indian Government, however, stated in its note under reference that "before any talks can be considered there must be a restoration of the position that existed in early September 1962." That is to say, the Indian side still wants to stage a comeback in order to "hold what they have taken by force over a period of years" and revert to the posture prior to October 20 in which it launched massive attacks on the Chinese side. This is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese side.

At the same time, the Indian side is stepping up nation-wide anti-China mobilization. The Indian President proclaimed on October 26 a "state of emergency" throughout the country. The Indian Prime Minister declared that the fight with the Chinese will go on for a long time to come. The Indian Ministers of Defence and Home Affairs personally flew to the frontiers to make inspections and dispositions. The Indian side is organizing new army units and moving large numbers of troops and transporting huge quantities of arms and ammunition to the eastern and western sectors of the border. What is especially serious, the Indian side is relying on the United States for the supply of large quantities of arms. Indian troops have never ceased bombarding and attacking Chinese frontier guards. Indian airplanes are still continually intruding into China's air space for the purposes of reconnaissance and harassment. Indian troops, declared a spokesman of the Indian Defence Ministry, have already made a Series of "probing attacks." In a word, the Indian side is using every means to create a war atmosphere, stir up anti-China waves,

persecute Chinese nationals in India, preposterously close down the branches of the Bank of China in Calcutta and Bombay and step up military dispositions in preparation for fresh attacks on China on an even larger scale.

The above-mentioned facts prove that the allegations made in the Indian note of October 26 are all falsehood and prevarications. What is imperative is to put an immediate end to the military clashes now going on and seek a peaceful settlement of the boundary question, not to engage in endless debate. The Chinese Government once again asks the Indian Government to give serious consideration to the three proposals put forward in the Chinese Government's statement of October 24 and make a positive response. Should the Indian side obstinately resort to force and continue to expand the clashes, the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the consequences.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 7 November 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in New Delhi and has the honour to refer to the note dated 6th November, 1962 handed over to the Indian Charge d' Affaires at Peking at 16:30 hours by Vice Director Chang

Tung on 6th November, 1962, and to state that the allegations made in the note are completely false.

It is the Chinese forces who have systematically attacked the various Indian defence border posts in the Ladakh region and eliminated these posts completely by massive concentrated ruthless attacks without any provocation whatsoever. The note of 6th November handed over by the Vice Director Chang Tung coupled with the earlier attacks mounted against Indian forces in Damchok and the surrounding region and the massive concentration of Chinese forces in the vicinity of Chushul area appear to be a preparation for further aggression on Indian territory. It is the Chinese authorities who started a new aggression on 8th September in the North-Western corner of the North East Frontier Agency of India and who, after probing attacks on limited Indian defensive posts in the region, commenced a massive offensive against the Indian defence forces all along the entire frontier region between India and China. It is the Chinese Government who now seem to be extending the aggression still further into Indian territory. The Chinese Government must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from their further aggression on Indian territory since 8th September and the preparations for still further aggression on Indian territory being made in the vicinity of Chushul.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 16 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and has the honour to state the following:

According to reports from Chinese frontier guards, large numbers of Indian troops are being amassed in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border; they have set up another strongpoint on Chinese territory and continuously opened heavy artillery fire at Chinese frontier guards, in preparation for new attacks. The Chinese Government once again lodges the strongest protest with the Indian Government against this.

In the western sector, Indian troops recently again set up in Tibet, China a new strongpoint for aggression located at approximately 32° 57' N, 79° 16' E in the Demchok area.

Meanwhile, the Indian side, in defiance of the protest lodged by the Chinese Government on November 6, 1962, has continued to amass large numbers of troops in the Chushul area in India west of the Spanggur Lake and shelled the Chinese frontier guards in the Spanggur Lake area in China.

In the eastern sector, ever since October 25, the Indian troops entrenched south of the Tawang River and in the Walong area have repeatedly shelled with heavy artillery the positions of Chinese frontier guards. In the Tawang River area, Indian troops shelled more than 600 rounds in the week from October 30 to November 5 alone. In the Walong area they shelled about 400 rounds in the four days from November 2 to 5 alone, and more than 200 rounds on the single day of November 12.

Moreover, on November 6 and 12, the Indian troops entrenched in the Walong area, under the cover of violent artillery fire, twice attacked the Chinese frontier guards. The Chinese frontier guards suffered heavy casualties under the repeated bombardments by Indian troops.

At the same time, the Indian side is rushing large reinforcements to the above-said two areas. Indian aircraft have incessantly intruded into the air space over the Chinese frontier guards' positions north of the Tawang River and over Sama, Tsayul, Chuwaken and other places, which are deep within Chinese territory circling for reconnaissance purposes and making provocative harassment. There were 12 sorties of these air intrusions in the four days from November 8 to 11 alone. At about 20:00 hours on November 5, an Indian aircraft flew deep into the air space over the Chamdo and Chiangta area in Tibet, China, for reconnaissance and provocation. Indian aircraft also stepped up air-drops and transport of large quantities of war material to the Walong area, with as many as 389 packs airdropped on November 10 alone.

The Chinese Government in its note of November 6, 1962, already enumerated the conclusive facts that Indian troops in the Chushul area were repeatedly shelling the Chinese frontier guards and preparing for launching attacks. The Indian Government hastily denied these facts in its reply note of November 7 and made groundless counter-charges against the Chinese side. But the above-stated series of new aggressive activities on the part of India have thoroughly exploded the lies of the Indian Government. Facts prove that the Indian side is making active preparations for new attacks in the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border. While keeping a close watch on the movement of the Indian troops, the Chinese Government once again advises the Indian side not to reject the good-will and appeal of the Chinese side for a peaceful settlement and for avoiding the expansion of the conflict, and also not to take China's forbearance and self-restraint as a sign that China

is weak and can be bullied. Should the Indian side still insist on expanding the border conflict, it must bear full responsibility for the consequences arising therefrom.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 5 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's note, dated 16th November 1962.

The factual details of the developments that occurred all along the China-India border since the 20th October 1962 when Chinese forces had simultaneously launched attacks on the Western and Eastern sectors of the Indian border are given below: -

Western Sector

(i) Commencing from 05:00 hours on 20th October 1962 all 13 forward Indian defence posts from the Galwan Valley upto north of Daulat Beg Oldi were attacked by Chinese forces in overwhelming numbers and were overrun.

(ii) On 21st October 1962 two more Indian defence posts in the Sirijap area were similarly attacked and captured by Chinese troops.

(iii) From 22nd to 24th October 1962, 3 Indian defence posts, one in Kongma and two in the Hot Springs area, were also attacked and taken.

(iv) On 29th October 1962 Chinese forces launched further attacks on Indian defence posts at Changla, Jarala and Demchok and occupied fresh Indian territory upto Dumchole, east of Fukche.

(v) From 6th November 1962 Chinese forces started to build up in the Spanggur area, opposite Chushul. On the same day Chinese troops were

observed digging in and bringing up additional gun reinforcements, 2 miles east north-east of Spanggur.

(vi) Commencing from the morning of 18th November 1962 Chinese forces shelled the following further areas: -

- (a) Rezangla.
- (b) Position 6 miles east of Chushul.
- (c) Position 6 miles south-east of Chushul.
- (d) Position 10 miles south-east of Chushul.
- (e) The Chushul airfield area.

(vii) At 07:50 hours on 18th November 1962 the Indian defence post at Rezangla was taken, after repeated heavy attacks by Chinese troops numbering over a thousand, Chinese tanks were also observed coming up from the Spanggur gap to assist in the attack which was preceded by heavy bombardment.

(viii) On 18th November 1962 at 16:30 hours, Chushul airfield was shelled again and the Indian defence post 6 miles east of Chushul attacked repeatedly by 400 to 500 Chinese troops from higher ground.

Surely, the above mentioned activities of Chinese troops against Indian defence posts in the Western sector can by no means be denied or concealed. The fact that Chinese forces did not scruple to bombard Chushul airfield which is inside Indian territory and more than 16 miles due west of the international frontier and 8 to 10 miles west even of the Chinese claim line of 1960 is clear evidence of the Chinese Government's unbridled aggressive activities.

The Government of India have, in their earlier notes, pointed out repeatedly how Chinese troops, since 1957, systematically intruded into

Indian territory, constructed new military bases, extended the military posts already set up and linked these by roads with bases at the rear. The extensive network of roads constructed by Chinese troops deep inside Indian territory in itself demonstrates the premeditated aggressive plans of the Chinese Government. It was by using these roads that the Chinese Government had been able to achieve in this area their formidable build-up of troops and artillery including armour with which they started their massive attacks on 20th October, 1962.

Eastern Sector

As already pointed out in the Indian Government's note of 26th October, 1962, Chinese forces, having build up since 8th September, mounted a fierce offensive with machine gun and heavy mortar fire against Indian defence posts along the Namkha Chu and at Khinzemane. Subsequently, Chinese forces continued their aggressive attacks and extended them over a wider area to include 4 out of the 5 Frontier Divisions of the North Eastern Frontier Agency of India, namely, the Kameng, Subansiri, Siang and Lohit Divisions.

(1) Kameng Frontier Division.

(i) On 20th October 1962 the Indian defence posts at Dhola and Tsengdhar were overrun by Chinese troops in major battle offensives. The same day the Indian defence post at Khinzemane was surrounded and overrun.

(ii) On 23rd October 1962 the Indian defence post at Bumla was attacked and overrun.

(iii) The town of Tawang had to be vacated around 23rd October 1962 due to heavy Chinese pressure.

(iv) On 17th and 18th November 1962 the Indian defensive position at Sela was attacked by Chinese troops of more than a Division strength.

(v) On the evening of 17th November 1962 Chinese forces cut off the line of communication 7 miles north of Bomdila.

(vi) On 18th November 1962 the Indian town of Bomdila which is over 40 miles south of the international border was attacked and fell to Chinese forces.

(vii) On 21st November 1962 Chakoo was also taken by Chinese forces.

(2) Subansiri Frontier Division.

Over the period 20th October to 21st November 1962 the towns of Asafila, Taksing and Limeking in the Subansiri Division were overrun by Chinese forces.

(3) Siang Frontier Division.

Over the period 20th October to 21st November 1962 in the Siang Division the Indian defence posts at Lamang, Henkor, Tadadege, Manigong, Mechuka and Tuting had to be withdrawn in the face of massive Chinese attacks.

(4) Lohit Frontier Division.

(i) In the Lohit Division, the town of Kibitoo was shelled and overrun on 22nd October 1962.

(ii) The town of Walong was then subjected to constant heavy attacks from 26th/27th October by Chinese forces of over 2 Brigades strength, and eventually taken by them on 16th November 1962.

It will be obvious from this chronological sequence of events that Chinese forces, after consolidating the gains of their aggression in all

sectors and regrouping, had continued with further aggressive attacks on Indian defence posts which had to fall back in the face of these premeditated and fully prepared massive Chinese thrusts. It is obvious that the Chinese note of 16th November 1962 which was received by the Indian Charge d'Affaires in Peking on the 17th November 1962 is not only factually inaccurate but also deliberately mischievous and designed to give a false impression to the people of China and the world outside regarding the deliberate and pre-planned Chinese aggression on India. The Chinese note of 6th November 1962 was intended to provide an apologia for the massive aggression by China against India from 20th October onwards. This further Chinese note of 16th November 1962 has the same objective of misleading and confusing public opinion at home and abroad.

To talk about Chinese goodwill and the appeal of the Chinese Government for a peaceful settlement in the face of Chinese aggressive actions and massive attacks is absurd and only serves to expose the Chinese Government's deception and duplicity.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 5 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to Chinese Government Note, dated 6th November, 1962, has the honour to state as follows: -

In their Note of 26th October, 1962, the Indian Government had shown in considerable detail the insincerity with which the Chinese Government advanced proposals for entering into talks and discussions with the Government of India on the border question. The record of China's negative response to the initiative taken by India over the past three months provides complete evidence of Chinese reluctance to embark upon peaceful talks and discussions. The massive invasion of India mounted since 8th September 1962 is clear confirmation of the fact that China had no intentions to find a peaceful solution, but was bent on enforcing its untenable claims on Indian territory by military force. The factual sequence of events re-capitulated in the following paragraphs establishing this conclusively.

The Chinese reply of 4th August, 1962, to the Indian Government's offer that the two countries should enter into further discussions on the India-China boundary was sent one day after the Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi stated that "no force in the world could oblige Chinese troops to withdraw from their own territory either in the past or in the future", thus unequivocally elaborating a firm Government policy in regard to all territories militarily occupied by Chinese forces and laying down a precondition that made a mockery of any discussions on the border question.

The next communication received by the Government of India was on September 13, 1962, five days after Chinese forces intruded into a hitherto peaceful section of the India-China border in the NEFA area. After having committed this aggression it is impossible to believe that Chinese professions for peace and peaceful discussions between the two Governments expressed in their letter of 13th September could have been anything more than hypocritical.

In spite of the extremely serious character of China's fresh invasion into Indian territory, the Government of India yet again expressed their willingness to enter into discussion provided the Latest aggression of the Chinese Government was vacated.

The Chinese Government's cynical response to this suggestion was a massive attack all along the Indian border. The Chinese note of 6th November, 1962 tries to establish that their offensive of 20th October 1962 took place only in the Eastern sector of the India-China boundary. The fact is that, after earlier probing attacks, Chinese troops, on 20th October, began hostilities along the entire border. False reports of Indian attacks in the Eastern sector were broadcast by the Peking Radio to provide an excuse for Chinese massive attacks which commenced at 5:00 A.M. Indian Standard Time on 20th October 1962. In the Western sector on Ladakh, attacks on Indian posts commenced from the very early hours of the morning of 20th October 1962 though the Peking Radio forgot to trump up any similar excuse for the massive Chinese attacks on Indian posts in the Western sector in Ladakh.

The hollowness of the Chinese claim that their troops were acting in self-defence is clear from the fact that within four days, Chinese forces, with the initial advantage of well planned and co-ordinated preparations available to an aggressor, were able to press forward deep into Indian territory.

China's massive invasion has destroyed completely any faith that may have earlier been placed in so called peaceful settlement proposals that the Chinese Government may put forward. It is perfectly clear that China's so called peaceful settlement proposals are only proposals for settlement on its own terms. If they are not accepted, China would again use military pressure to enforce these terms. While India will never agree to military dictation, it has been and is willing to enter into talks and discussions with the Chinese Government for resolving the differences peacefully, provided the status quo prior to 8th September 1962, when the further Chinese aggression commenced, is restored along the entire India-China border.

The Chinese note has referred to the declaration of a state of emergency throughout this country and the visit of the Indian Ministers of Defence and Home Affairs to forward areas in NEFA as a scheme of nation-wide mobilization against China. Action on the part of the Government to meet the emergency created by the Chinese Government has, indeed, been taken with the full co-operation of the people of India. Surely the Government of China do not expect the Government and people of India to facilitate Chinese aggression.

The Government of India are prepared to seek a peaceful settlement of the boundary question, but only in a manner consistent with decency and dignity. If the Government of China genuinely desires a peaceful settlement of the differences, they should agree to the restoration of at least the status quo that existed prior to 8th September 1962. Only thereafter can the representatives of the two countries meet to discuss and resolve the differences in one stage or in several stages as may be required.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 31 December 1962

"1. In its Note the Indian Government reiterated its hackneyed words which had long been refuted, and wantonly cast calumny and aspersion on China. But no matter how the Indian side may prevaricate, it cannot shirk its criminal responsibilities for refusing to hold peaceful negotiations and for launching armed attacks.

2. In the Notes the Indian Government slanderously charges China with making "negative response" to the "initiative taken" by India on the question of negotiations over the past three month . This is a complete reversal of black and white. As is well known, although the Indian Government had continuously despatched troops to set up many strong points of aggression on Chinese territory in the Western sector of the Sino-Indian border, the Chinese Government nevertheless proposed on 4th August 1962 that the two sides should quickly hold discussions on the boundary question on the basis of the officials' Report without any pre-conditions. In circumstances in which Indian troops had invaded and occupied China's Che Dong area North of the illegal McMahon Line, the Chinese Government reiterated its above mentioned proposal on 13th September. Even after Indian troops made repeated armed provocations against the Chinese side, killing and wounding many Chinese officers and men, the Chinese Government for the third time put forward on 3rd October the proposal for peaceful negotiations. In order to seek a rapprochement between the two sides the Chinese Government further suggested that neither side should refuse to discuss any proposition in regard to the boundary that may be raised by the other side during the discussions. Even such a suggestion was completely ignored by India. One may ask, when has the Indian Government demonstrated the least sincerity for negotiation in the face of so many important efforts made by the Chinese Government on its own initiative? Besides refusing to hold negotiations and insisting on China's acceptance of the pre-conditions of

unilateral withdrawing from large tracts of its own territory, where is the "initiative" taken by the Indian Government?

3. In its Note the Indian Government tried hard to describe China as the culprit who provoked massive armed conflict and decked itself as an innocent victim. But the Chinese Government has given a detailed account of the course of the Indian attacks in its Notes of 20th October, 6th November and 16th November 1962. No matter at how great a length the Indian Government might wilfully distort the facts or even unscrupulously fabricate such lies as that China allegedly despatched tanks and bombarded Chushul, it would be of no avail. One would ask, why did the Indian Notes maintain complete silence about Prime Minister Nehru's 12th October order "Free" China's territory of Chinese troops? Why did they not mention a single word about the 18th October remarks of the Indian Ministry of Defence official to the effect that Chinese forces had been "driven back two miles"? The Indian Government had probably forgotten too that on 15th November a spokesman of the Indian Ministry of Defence had publicly declared that India had launched another massive attack against the Chinese frontier guards. All these words are still ringing in our ears, how can they be denied? The Indian Government energetically played up China's establishment of defence posts and construction of roads on China's own territory, attempting thereby to prove a so called "pre-planned Chinese aggression". But Prime Minister Nehru himself said on 20th June 1962: "India had opened some new patrol posts endangering the Chinese posts, and it was largely due to movements on our side that the Chinese had also to make movements. It is well known in knowledgable circle in the world that the position in this area had been changing to our advantage and the Chinese are concerned about it". All the facts prove exactly that the recent massive armed conflict was pre-planned by the Indian Government for a long time. The Fiasco of the Indian plan for aggression was due to its misappraisal of China's repeated

forbearance and accommodation as a sign that China was weak and could be bullied. However it can by no means turn India from the aggressor into the victim.

Both in the past and in the present the Chinese Government unswervingly stands for peaceful settling the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations. In order to reverse the trend and promote peaceful negotiations China has effected a ceasefire and withdrawn its troops on its own initiative, and released large number of Indian personnel. In order to terminate the ceasefire and seek a rapprochement of the view of the two sides, Premier Chou En-lai further made a new positive proposal in this letter to Prime Minister Nehru, dated 30th December 1962. All these facts have fully demonstrated China's sincerity for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Indian side, however, has up to now remained pat in its attitude of persisting in its unreasonable demand for a so-called restoration of the "status quo that existed prior to 8th September." Prime Minister Nehru and other leaders of the Indian Government are still talking about long-term fighting with China. Indian troops and aircraft are still making continuous harassment and provocations against the Chinese side. These words and deeds run diametrically counter to the avowal of the Indian Government in its Note that it is prepared to seek a peaceful settlement of the boundary question. The Chinese Government once again urges the Indian Government to show sincerity for peaceful negotiations and respond positively to China's important measures and reasonable proposals."

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 2 January 1963

In its Note the Indian Government tried hard to deny the fact that the Indian side, in violation of the agreement between China and India, again sent troops into the Wuje area and stationed them there last summer. Also it tried, in disregard of the fact, to diminish at will the extent of the Wuje area in order to show that Indian troops were stationed not in that area, but "some distance away". But it is not difficult to explode the falsehood of this position. Back in 1958, at the talks held in Delhi by the Chinese and Indian sides, the same trick was played by the Indian side. At that time the Indian side first asserted that the extent of the Wuje area, which covers nearly 150 sq. km., was only 6 sq. miles; and later it even claimed that the area covered only 1.5 sq. miles. Then in its Note of 27th August, 1962, the Indian side persisted in the assertion that the area covered 1.5 sq. miles but on the very next day, that is 28th August, Prime Minister NEHRU stated at the Rajya Sabha that it covered 6 sq. miles. He stated: "6 sq. miles in the Bara Hoti plateau (i.e. the Wuje area) had been demilitarised by mutual agreement". This inconsistency only serves to show that, in attempting to change the size of Wuje, the Indian side has landed itself in utter confusion. The Indian Note, turning things up-side down, alleged that China had said the Wuje area was 300 square miles in size, charging China with inconsistency in describing the size and location of this area. Such an allegation is most absurd and has long been sternly repudiated by China. Facts are not to be altered. The Indian side absolutely cannot turn its unreasonable position into a reasonable one by using the tactics of making a false counter charge against China.

Further-more the Indian Government in its Note openly claimed that it was "legitimate" for it "to establish check posts (in) and despatch civil personnel" into China's Wuje area, which should not be regarded as intrusion. For this purpose it tried hard to describe the Wuje area as being Indian territory. But during the meetings of the officials of the two countries in 1960, the Chinese side already cited conclusive evidence

showing that the Wuje area was always part of China under the jurisdiction of Daba Dzong of Tibet. This was clearly recorded in the land-conferring document issued by P'OLHA in 1729 and the one sanctioned by the 7th Dalai Lama in 1737. The local authorities in Tibet have all along exercised effective jurisdiction over this area, stationing guards there, checking traders and travellers, maintaining security and order, collecting taxes and setting up markets.

As pointed out in the Chinese Government's statement of 21st November 1962, the Wuje area is on the Chinese side of the line of actual control between the two sides as of 7th November 1959. It is completely unlawful for the Indian side to despatch personnel, military or civil, to this area. The Chinese Government once again sternly asks the Indian side to stop all intrusions into China's territory of the Wuje area.

(Text by telegram)

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 4 January 1963

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the note, dated 31st December delivered by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Indian Charge d'Affaires in Peking on 1st January, 1963.

2. Apart from the complete distortion of the factual history of the developments on the India-China border in the last three months, which is the principal feature of the Chinese note, its intemperate and blatantly aggressive tone by itself indicates the complete hollowness of the Chinese professions regarding a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations.

3. The Chinese note is based on the fallacious assumption that a country taking limited defensive action on its own territory to check the continuing aggression of an expansionist neighbour who, in violation of all accepted norms of international behaviour between friendly neighbouring countries, continues, while talking of peace and friendship, to occupy by force the territory of its neighbour, is establishing strong points of aggression. The Chinese note also proceeds on the perverse hypothesis that a country putting up a border defence post within its own territory, to guard against the aggressive intentions of an expansionist neighbour, commits an invasion, simply because this interferes with the designs that the expansionist neighbour has towards occupying this territory.

4. The further Chinese aggression since 8th September 1962 and the massive Chinese invasion following later have fully confirmed Indian fears of the possibility of aggression by its expansionist neighbour. Such limited action as India took before and was compelled to take later to resist the latest Chinese aggression, which commenced on 8th September

1962, requires no apology or explanation. It is absurd to distort this as "armed provocations against the Chinese side". Surely, an aggressor committing violation of a friendly neighbouring country's territory does not expect to be welcomed by the victim of his aggression.

There is a reference in the Chinese note to the proposal of the Chinese Government for talks and discussions on India-China differences. The insincerity with which these proposals were advanced has already been reiterated by the Government of India. It was the Government of India that took the initiative on 26th July 1962 for talks and discussions in order to reduce the tensions then existing between the two countries. The Chinese reply of 4th August 1962 to this offer was sent one day after the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, stated that "no force in the world could oblige Chinese troops to withdraw from their own territory either in the past or in the future", thus unilaterally laying down the basis on which the Chinese Government wished to deal with all territories militarily occupied by their forces. This made a mockery of the proposal for talks and discussions on the border question.

6. The next communication received by the Government of India was on September 13, 1962, five days after Chinese forces intruded into a hitherto peaceful section of the India-China border in the NEFA area. All that India asked even then was that the invading Chinese troops should withdraw to their side of the frontier before talks and discussions could be undertaken. This is categorised as a pre-condition sought by India. Evidently the Chinese believe in the principle of taking what they can by force and asking for negotiations for the rest, and resent non-acceptance of this imperialist demand which is reminiscent of the old days of gun-boat diplomacy.

7. The following sequence of events since the beginning of September 1962, which has been detailed in previous notes of the

Government of India, would make clear who is the aggressor and who is the victim:

Western Sector

(i) Commencing from 0500 hours on 20th October 1962 all 13 forward Indian defence posts from the Galwan Valley upto north of Daulat Beg Oldi were attacked by Chinese forces in overwhelming numbers and were overrun.

ii) On 21st October 1962 two more Indian defence posts in the Sirijap area were similarly attacked and captured by Chinese troops.

(iii) From 22nd to 24th October 1962, 3 Indian defence posts, one in Kongma and two in the Hot Springs area, were also attacked and taken.

(iv) On 27th October 1962, Chinese forces launched further attacks on Indian defence posts at Changla, Jerala and Demchok and occupied fresh Indian territory upto Dumchele, east of Fukche.

(v) From 6th November 1962 Chinese forces started to build up in the Spanggur area, opposite Chushul. On the same day Chinese troops were observed digging in and bringing up additional gun reinforcements, 2 miles east north-east of Spanggur.

(vi) Commencing from the morning of 18th November 1962 Chinese forces shelled the following further areas: -

(a) Rezangla.

(b) Position 6 miles east of Chushul.

(c) Position 6 miles south-east of Chushul.

(d) Position 10 miles south-east of Chushul.

(e) The Chushul airfield area.

(vii) At 0750 hours on 18th November 1962, the Indian defence post at Rezangla was taken, after repeated heavy attacks, by Chinese troops numbering over a thousand. Chinese tanks were also observed coming up from the Spanggur gap to assist in the attack which was preceded by heavy bombardment.

(viii) On 18th November 1962 and 1630 hours, Chushul airfield was shelled again and the Indian defence post 6 miles east of Chushul attacked repeatedly by 400 to 500 Chinese troops from higher ground.

Eastern Sector

As already pointed out in the Indian Government's note of 26th October 1962, Chinese forces, having built up since 8th September, mounted a fierce offensive with machine gun and heavy mortar fire against Indian defence posts along the Namka Chu and at Khinzemane commencing from 20th October 1962. Subsequently, Chinese forces continued their aggressive attacks and extended them over a wider area to include 4 out of the 5 Frontier Divisions of the North Eastern Frontier Agency of India, namely, the Kameng, Subansiri, Siang and Lohit Divisions.

(1) Kameng Frontier Division

(i) On 8th September, Chinese forces crossed the Thagla Ridge and intruded into Indian territory.

(ii) On 20th September, at about 2130 hours, Chinese soldiers opened fire and again at 0330 hours on the 21st. This latter exchange of fire continued till 0530 hours the same day.

(iii) On 9th October at 2030 hours, Chinese intruding forces again opened fire and provoked another clash. Next morning this was followed up with an attack in which 2-inch mortar guns, automatic weapons and grenades were used. In the fighting that ensued Indian forces suffered 17 casualties.

(iv) On 20th October 1962, the Indian defence posts at Dhola and Tsangdhar were overrun by Chinese troops in major battle offensives. The same day the Indian defence post at Khinzemane was surrounded and overrun.

(v) On 23rd October 1962 the Indian defence post at Bumla was attacked and overrun.

(vi) The town of Tawang had to be vacated around 23rd October 1962 due to heavy Chinese pressure.

(vii) On 17 and 18th November 1962, the Indian defensive position at Sela was attacked by Chinese troops of more than a Division strength.

(viii) On the evening of 17th November 1962 Chinese forces cut off the line of communication 7 miles north of Bomdila.

(ix) On 18th November 1962 the Indian town of Bomdila which is over 40 miles south of the international border was attacked and fell to Chinese forces.

(x) On 21st November 1962, Chakoo was also taken by Chinese forces.

(2) Subsansiri Frontier Division

Over the period 20th October to 21st November 1962 the towns of Asafila, Taksing and Limeking in the Subansiri Division were overrun by Chinese forces.

(3) Siang Frontier Division

Over the period 20th October to 21st November, 1962, in the Siang Division the Indian defence posts at Lamang, Henkar, Tadadege Manigong, Mechuka and Tuting had to be withdrawn in the face of massive Chinese attacks.

(4) Lohit Frontier Division

(i) In the Lohit Division, the town of Kibitoo was shelled and overrun on 22nd October 1962.

(ii) The town of Walong was then subjected to constant heavy attacks from 26th/27th October by Chinese forces of over 2 Brigades strength, and eventually taken by them on 16th November 1962.

8. The Chinese note refers to certain statements made by Prime Minister Nehru and by officials of the Ministry of Defence in regard to the limited defensive action that the Government of India had to take after the Chinese had committed aggression on Indian territory commencing on the 8th September, 1962. These statements referred to the clear violation of the Indian frontier by Chinese troops and the limited measures taken to prevent continuing Chinese intrusion in this area. The fact that the Government of India still put faith in the possibility of persuading the Government of China, towards whom they had consistently shown friendship and understanding, to restrain their aggressive "border forces" and to withdraw them to their own territory,

and did not take more extensive defence measures, can hardly constitute a ground for a grievance by China.

9. It is China and not India that is making a wrong appraisal of the events of the last three months. The forbearance and tolerance shown by India were misconstrued as a sign of weakness and it is China that adopted bullying tactics by mounting massive attacks. When this plan of aggression began to be condemned by all peace loving countries of the world, the Chinese Government hurriedly adopted a plan of unilateral cease-fire and withdrawals in the hope that they would be able to confuse world opinion under the guise of peaceful intentions and, at the same time, succeed in compelling India to come to terms in accordance with the military dictates of China. If China is really sincere about settling the India-China border differences by talks, discussions and peaceful means, why does it regard the Indian proposal to restore the status quo that existed prior to the further Chinese invasion of India on 8th September 1962 as unreasonable? Chinese forces have been progressively intruding into India and occupying Indian territory since 1957. Since 8th September 1962, they have invaded India, mounted massive attacks and occupied over 26,000 square kilometres of Indian territory and are now pressing India to accept terms dictated by them in the guise of peace and peaceful settlement of differences. If India, which has experienced this massive invasion, is distrustful of Chinese intentions and makes preparations for defence against the continuing Chinese aggressive threat, why should this be a cause of concern to China unless it still harbours further aggressive intentions?

10. The Prime Minister of India has, in his letter of 1st January 1963, reiterated India's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question and has agreed to holding talks and discussion to this end when the latest Chinese aggression since 8th September 1962 is undone. The Prime Minister of India has also referred in his letter of 1st

January 1963 to the suggestion he made in the Indian Parliament regarding reference of the differences between India and China for decision to the International Court of The Hague, Which is an impartial body. It is hoped that the Government of China will respond positively to the proposals made by the Prime Minister of India and indicate that they are sincere in their professions for a peaceful solution of the differences between the two countries.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 10 January 1963

In disregard of the Chinese Government's protest the Indian Government has continued to make use of the territory of Sikkim for its aggressive activities against China. It has been satisfied through repeated investigations that Indian troops crossed the Natu La on the China-Sikkim border on 28th September 1962 and penetrated about 300 metres into Chinese territory where they started building fortified structures. In the past few months, the Indian troops have built a total of 39 pill boxes in Chinese territory, of which 11 are big and 28 small. The Indian troops have also set up barbed wire, dug communication trenches at the Natu La and blocked the pass to himself the normal movement of border inhabitants. Furthermore the Indian troops, who have been reinforced again and again, have repeatedly intruded into Chinese territory for reconnaissance and provocation. Meanwhile Indian aircraft have been sent out on many occasions to intrude, via Jelep La, the Natu La, the Thanka La, the Tagi La and the Kailu pass into China's air space over the Khamba Dzong, Yatung, Phari and other areas in Tibet, China, for reconnoitring and

harassing purposes. As many as 12 verified cases of such intrusions took place from 19th October to 11th December 1962 above.

The above mentioned intrusions by Indian forces constituted serious violations of China's territory and air space, against which the Chinese Government hereby lodges a serious protest with the Indian Government. It must be pointed out that the China-Sikkim boundary, which was formally delimited long ago, has always been tranquil, and that the Natu La is a pass through which Chinese and Sikkimese border inhabitants customarily moved to and fro. The utilisation of the territory of Sikkim by Indian troops for intrusions into China and for blocking the normal customary movement of border inhabitants can only be regarded as a deliberate act to upset the tranquility along China-Sikkim border.

The above mentioned intrusions by Indian troops once again powerfully corroborates the well-established fact that armed Indian personnel intruded into Chinese territory across China-Sikkim boundary, against which the Chinese Government has protested in its Note of 24th August 1962. It is complete futility for the Indian Government to deny flatly this fact in its reply Note of 10th September 1962. The Chinese Government once again urge that the Indian side immediately cease its various activities of intrusion into Chinese territory and air space across the China-Sikkim boundary. Moreover the Chinese Government declares solemnly that China has consistently respected the China-Sikkim boundary, which has long been delimited, and that the Indian scheme to create tension along the China-Sikkim border so as to impair the good-neighbourly relations between China and Sikkim will definitely fail.

(text by telegram)

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 16 January 1963

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the Chinese Government's note dated 10th January 1963, has the honour to state as follows: -

The Chinese note itself admits that "The China-Sikkim boundary, which was formally delimited long ago, has always been tranquil...." However, the same note makes various baseless charges against the Indian Government and has referred to "aggressive activities against China" which are of a completely imaginary nature.

The Government of India have in their note of the 10th September 1962, clearly pointed out that Indian defence personnel, unlike the Chinese forces on the border, are well aware of the limits of the international boundary. They are under strict instructions not to cross this boundary and have again been asked to adhere strictly to these instructions.

The Chinese allegations that "Indian troops crossed the Nathula on the China-Sikkim border on the 28th September 1962 and penetrated about 300 meters into Chinese territory " are completely groundless. Nor is there any basis for the other allegations regarding construction of "pill boxes" in Chinese territory and of air violations. There have, on the other hand, been a number of confirmed reports that Chinese forces have been steadily concentrating on the border of Sikkim over the past few months. These reports are causing concern to the residents of the border areas.

The Government of India are constrained to observe that the baseless charges contained in the Chinese note are reminiscent of similar

groundless allegations made by the Chinese Government just before their massive attacks on the Indian border which commenced on 20th October 1962. The Government of India hope that these unfounded charges concerning the border of China and Sikkim are not a prelude to a new aggression.

The Government of India believe there is no need to remind the Chinese Government about the special treaty relationship between India and Sikkim as the Chinese Government are fully aware of these arrangements and of the fact that the defence of Sikkim is the responsibility of the Government of India.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 17 January 1963

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and with reference to the note handed over to the Indian Embassy in Peking on the 2nd January, 1963, by the Chinese Government, has the honour to state the following:

2. It has been clearly stated in the Indian Government's note dated the 27th August, 1962, that the Government of India have continually refrained from sending any armed personnel into the Bara Hoti area. The Government of India do not maintain any armed posts in Bara Hoti which the Chinese call Wuje. There are, however, some Indian posts well to the rear which would not fall within the purview of the agreement on the demilitarisation of Bara Hoti. The Government of India repudiate the right of the Chinese Government to question the propriety of these limited defensive measures taken by the Indian Government. It would appear that in a vain attempt to show that India has violated the agreement with regard to not sending armed parties into the Bara Hoti area, the Chinese Government have arbitrarily enlarged the area of Bara Hoti to suit themselves.

3. The Government of India have, on various occasions, given the precise location of Bara Hoti and have indicated that it lies indisputably within Indian territory. For the benefit of the Chinese Government, the Indian Government would once again like to identify the location of Bara Hoti. Bara Hoti is a small pasture ground, covering two miles in length and three-quarter mile in breadth, south of Tunjun La. It lies in the Pargana of Malla Painkhanda in the district of Garhwal in Uttar Pradesh State. The India-China boundary in this sector runs along the water parting from Tunjun La, Shalshal Pass, Marhe La to Balchadura Pass. Bara

Hoti, being south of Tunjun La, is entirely within Indian territory. This is further established by the fact that Bara Hoti is also south of the Niti Pass which is one of the six border passes mentioned in the Agreement of Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China which was concluded in 1954.

4. The Chinese Government, in their note, allege that the Indian Government do not know the extent of the area of Bara Hoti. A reference to the Annexure to the letter dated 26th September 1959 from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China and to other notes of the Indian Government on the subject will show that it is not the Indian Government that is unaware of the extent of the area of Bara Hoti which is within Indian territory. On the other hand, it is the Chinese Government which has repeatedly shown its lack of precise knowledge in regard to Bara Hoti and other areas falsely claimed by them.

Originally, in 1955, the then Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in India had indicated that the location of Bara Hoti was 12 kilometres north of Tunjun La. Changing this position later in April-May 1958 at the Conference on Bara Hoti held at Delhi between Indian and Chinese officials, the Chinese side said that Bara Hoti is south of Tunjun La and that it covered an area of 15 kilometres north to south and 10 kilometres east to west. But no co-ordinate had been made available with reference to this area. At the officials' talks in 1960, China's claims had expanded, basically what is a small area of 1 ½ square miles, into the sizeable figure of 300 square miles.

5. The Chinese Government, in their note of 2nd January, 1963, have once again wilfully distorted the facts regarding the civil patrolling of Bara Hoti. In their note of 27th August 1962, the Government of India had clearly pointed out the fact that, at the Delhi conference of 1958, it was the Chinese Government who had, while agreeing that both sides should refrain from sending armed patrols into Bara Hoti, refused to agree

to the further proposal that civil patrols also should not go into the area. As such the Government of India were constrained as before to send their civil administrative personnel to the territory and the Chinese Government had been informed of this.

6. During the talks of the officials in 1960, it was established by the Indian side that the so called "land-conferring document" mentioned in the Chinese note, which was issued by the Seventh Dalai Lama referred to the areas merely as "an Estate for raising funds for religious expenses" for the Tashigong monastery. It was a clear case of a religious endowment and cannot constitute any proof of political authority.

7. Nothing in the documents produced by the Chinese side showed that Bara Hoti ever belonged to Daba Dzong. As for the Tibetan sarjis "stationing guards" or "checking travellers" near Bara Hoti, it has been pointed out by the Indian officials at the time of the talks in 1960 that these Tibetan officials came down to Indian villages by convention to announce the opening of the trade season in Tibet and to assure themselves that pack animals used by the traders were free from disease. They also contacted Indian traders and executed agreements with them that they would abide by customary practices in their trade with Tibet.

8. It is clear that the Bara Hoti area has been continuously under Indian administration. During the officials' talks in 1960 also, it was pointed out how Bara Hoti has always been traditionally under Indian administrative jurisdiction. In fact, even Chinese maps upto 1958 have shown Bara Hoti as part of India.

9. It is evident from the Chinese note that the Chinese Government are not interested in going into the merits of the issue, but are only anxious to revive an issue in an area which has remained undisturbed so far. Such a provocative attitude at a time when friendly Afro- Asian

countries are doing their best to find a solution to the grave situation created by the Chinese aggression cannot but attract serious attention.

10. The Chinese note refers to Bara Hoti (Wuje) having been shown on the Chinese side of the line of actual control of 7th November, 1959, as defined by China, according to the Chinese Government's statement of 21st November, 1962. This does not in any way constitute a proof that Bara Hoti is located in Tibet. It is a unilateral decision by the Government of China to which India is certainly not a party. The Indian Government have clearly shown the fictitious nature of this "line of actual control" which has no basis in fact. That the Chinese Government should keep raising this question only confirms the view that China may endeavour to alter the status quo unilaterally in this sector also as she has done in the other sectors of the India-China boundary.

11. In the light of the above, the Government of India categorically reject the note dated the 2nd January 1963 from the Chinese Foreign Office.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 15 November 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to state as follows:

On the 27th October 1962 about 1020 hours, a Chinese jet aircraft circled over KUTHI (30° 19' N, 80° 46' E) for full eight minutes before it flew away in a north-easterly direction re-entering Tibet. The aircraft had been earlier seen approaching from the Tibetan side of the international boundary. The Government of India lodge a strong protest against this latest violation of Indian airspace by Chinese aircraft and demand that the Chinese Government put a stop forthwith to such provocative flights.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 29 November 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to this Ministry's note dated 15th November, 1962 regarding the violation of Indian air space over Kuthi.

On 11th November 1962 at about 1900 hours a Chinese aircraft was seen approaching Milam ($30^{\circ} 26' N 80^{\circ} 09' E$) from a northerly direction. The aircraft after circling over Milam flew back again in a northerly direction entering Tibet. It is regretted that so shortly after the air violation mentioned above another instance of violation of Indian air space by Chinese aircraft should have taken place.

The Government of India lodge a strong protest against the continued violation of Indian air space by Chinese aircraft and demand that these provocations are stopped forthwith.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 3 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour, on behalf of the Government of Bhutan, to draw the Embassy's attention to the following violation of Bhutanese air space by Chinese aircraft:

1. On 30th October 1962 Chinese helicopters flew over Wagya La into Bhutanese territory. They were thereafter sighted flying through Gasa Dzong, more than 16 miles south of the international border, and thereafter over Lingshi Dzong and back into Tibet through Pyimi La.

2. On 20th November 1962 at 1130 hours Chinese Jet planes flew over Wangdi Phodrang nearly 60 miles south of the international border. The jet planes were seen approaching from the Luna area and disappeared in a southerly direction.

3. On 21st November 1962 Chinese helicopters crossed the Tibet-Bhutan boundary and came upto Kuna after which they went back into Tibet.

4. On 22nd November 1962 Chinese jet planes were once again seen, this time over Lingshi. The planes flew away in the direction of Paro.

The Government of India hereby lodge, on behalf of the Government of Bhutan, a most emphatic protest with the Government of the People's Republic of China against these repeated violations of the air space of Bhutan by Chinese aircraft. This is being continued in spite of the Chinese Government's protestation in their note of 14th October 1962 that the question of any violation or threat against the territory and air

space of Sikkim and Bhutan is non-existent. The Chinese Government should take the necessary steps immediately to prevent the recurrence of such air violations in the future.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 11 December 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and has the honour to state the following:

During the one day of December 10, 1962 there occurred nine Indian air intrusions deep into China:

At 07.32 hours an Indian aircraft intruded into the air space over the Walong area, repeatedly circling over the positions of the Chinese frontier forces there and making harassment and provocation;

At 12.05 hours another Indian aircraft intruded into the air space over the suburb of Lhasa, capital of Tibet, and then flew eastward along the Szechuan-Tibet road for extensive reconnaissance.

At 14.20 hours another Indian aircraft intruded into the air space over Towa Dzong, Gyantse and Shigatse in Tibet, and engaged in reconnaissance and harassment;

Furthermore, at 11.55 hours 13.00 hours, 13.25 hours, 13:30 hours, 14.37 hours and 14.38 hours, Indian aircraft made six intrusions into the air space over Nalung (near Gyantse), Miku (near Tsayul), Ketang (near Meto), Tamaden, Chumitan, Changlun (near Khamba Dzong) and other places in Tibet of China.

The above-mentioned intrusions into China's territorial air by Indian aircraft are direct provocations against the Chinese frontier forces who have ceased fire and are withdrawing on China's own initiative; what is

more, these aircraft penetrated deep into the air space over main cities of the Tibet region of China. These incidents are therefore extremely grave. The Chinese Government hereby lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government against these air intrusions.

Since the Chinese frontier forces ceased fire and began withdrawing on China's own initiative along the entire Sino-Indian border, violations of China's territorial air by Indian aircraft, pressing forward on the Chinese frontier forces' cease-fire line and crossing of the 1959 line of actual control by Indian troops have happened repeatedly. The Chinese Government cannot but take a serious view of this. Does it mean that the Indian side deliberately intends to disrupt the cease-fire and withdrawal by the Chinese side? The Chinese Government has clearly pointed in its statement of November 21, 1962 in what eventualities China reserves the right to strike back in self- defence. The Chinese Government urges the Indian side to stop all provocations immediately. Should the Indian side turn a deaf ear to the warning and request of the Chinese Government, responsibility for all the consequences that may arise therefrom must lie with the Indian Government.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 13 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs present its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to

the Chinese Government's note dated the 11th December 1962, handed over to the Indian Charge d'Affaires in Peking.

There is a reference in the note of the 11th December to a so called intrusion by Indian aircraft over the Walong area. The Government of India would like to affirm in unmistakable terms its rights to fly over any air space within the sovereign jurisdiction of India, of which Walong is an integral part.

The Government of India instituted a detailed investigation into the other allegations regarding violation of Chinese air space by Indian aircraft cited in the above-mentioned note. The investigation held has confirmed beyond any doubt that no Indian aircraft ever crossed into the areas in the Tibet region of China referred to in the Chinese Government's note.

While the allegations made in the Chinese note have been found to be groundless, the Government of India would like to bring to the attention of the Chinese Government that on the 10th December, at 17.30 hours, a twin-engined Chinese jet aircraft was noticed flying over Chabua in Indian territory. The aircraft was flying away from Chabua in a north-easterly direction (045°) towards Rima.

The Government of India strongly protest against this violation of India's air space by Chinese aircraft in contravention of normal international practice. It is, indeed, surprising that while it is a Chinese aircraft which crossed over the recognised international boundary between India and China and violated Indian air space, the Chinese Government chooses to make baseless allegations about Indian aircraft violating Chinese territory.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 24 December 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and, with reference to the note of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Indian Government dated December 3, 1962, has the honour to state the following:

The Indian Government's allegation made in its note that Chinese aircraft had violated the air space of Bhutan on four occasions is entirely fabricated. As the Indian Government clearly knows, the Chinese Government has repeatedly declared that China has never permitted its aircraft to violate or intrude into the territorial air of any foreign country. In fact, no Chinese aircraft has ever violated or intruded into the territorial air of any foreign country. The fact that the Indian Government has once again groundlessly invented the lie about so-called violations of the air space of Bhutan by Chinese aircraft can only be regarded as an attempt of the Indian side to cover up its own incessant violations of Chinese territorial air (vide Chinese Government's note of December 11, 1962) and to sow discord in the friendly relations between China and Bhutan. The Chinese Government hereby categorically rejects the protest lodged by the Indian Government.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 5 January 1983

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's note dated the 24th December, 1962.

The instances of air violations by Chinese aircraft over Bhutanese territory had been carefully verified before being communicated to the Chinese Government. There is not the least doubt that these violations had taken place. Neither vehement denials nor false allegations can wipe away these facts. It is, however, the hope of the Government of India that cases of such violation of Bhutan territory by Chinese aircraft will not recur in future.

The Government of India categorically repudiate the suggestion in the Chinese note under reference that the charges of Chinese air violations over Bhutan have been made to counter similar Chinese allegations against India in respect of Tibetan air space, contained in the Chinese Government's note of 11th December 1962. The Indian Government's note dated the 13th December 1962 has fully exposed the baseless nature of the allegations contained in the last mentioned note.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 10 October 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and, with regard to the serious incident in which the Indian Government connived at a bunch of ruffians in disrupting a National Day Reception given by the Chinese Embassy in India, lodges a protest as follows:

1. On October 1, 1962, the day on which the Charge d' Affaires a.i of the Chinese Embassy was going to hold the reception to celebrate the 13th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, there appeared in the main streets leading to the Embassy a lot of big-lettered placards in English and in Hindi aimed at coercing Indians into boycotting the Chinese Embassy's reception. About six o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, that is, about one hour before the Embassy's reception started, a group of about forty to fifty Indian ruffians shouted anti-Chinese slogans and distributed leaflets in the three streets leading to the Embassy. They obstructed the passage of pedestrians and vehicles and hindered the guests coming to the reception from entering the Embassy. Some of the ruffians took photos of the Indians attending the reception. Other ruffians threw leaflets into the courtyard of the Embassy. During the reception, the ruffians' disruptive activities still continued unbridled, and even developed to the grave extent of damaging an automobile of a diplomatic envoy attending the reception.

2. The Indian Government took an attitude of deliberate connivance at and shielding of the disruptive activities of those ruffians. Even several days before the Chinese National Day, Indian bourgeois newspapers already carried agitating reports on and clamours for these disruptive activities by the ruffians. On the morning of September 30, an official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs took this matter up with Mr.

Banerjee, Charge d' Affaires a.i. of the Indian Embassy in China, and asked the latter to draw in time the Indian Government's attention to this matter. Again, in the morning of the day of the incident, the Chinese Embassy sent an official to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs urging the Indian Government to pay heed to this matter. But the Indian authorities did not take the necessary measures, and the Indian policemen on the spot simply stood idly by and looked on with indifference at the disruptive activities of the ruffians. When Mr. Yeh Cheng-chang, Charge d' Affaires a.i. of the Embassy, was compelled by the gravity of the situation to make representations concerning this matter on the spot to Mr. R. K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, who attended the reception, the latter went so far as flagrantly to defend the ruffians, uttering the nonsense that these acts of the ruffians reflected the sentiments of the Indians, that these acts were permitted by India's system and law, and so on and so forth.

3. It is well known that the Indian Government has been in the recent years making use of the Sino-Indian boundary question, which is created single-handedly by itself, to stir up anti-Chinese waves in India. It was against this background that certain Indian reactionaries made disturbances time and again in front of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General in India; and now they have even gone so far as to disrupt the solemn National Day celebrations of the Chinese people. The Chinese Government and people are fully aware that the great Indian people cherish very friendly and respectful feelings for the great National Day of the Chinese people. The despicable acts of a handful of ruffians not only have aroused the indignation of the Chinese people, but are sure to be denounced by the Indian People.

4. The Chinese Government hereby lodges a stern protest against the Indian Government's attitude of conniving at and shielding the ruffians in the above mentioned incident. It must be pointed out in

particular that the defence made by R. K. Nehru, a high ranking official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, for the ruffians lays bare the fact that this disruption was a premediated, planned and organized action connived at and sheltered by the Indian Government. Of course, the Indian Government can, as before make prevarications and denials in regard to the anti-Chinese activities by the Indian reactionaries in one way or the other. But the facts are all there, and no matter how the Indian Government may prevaricate, it cannot shirk its responsibility, moral and political, for this serious provocation and cannot escape the just condemnation which is its due.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy in China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Embassy of China in India, to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 3 November 1962

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India presents its compliments to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India and has the honour to state as follows:

1. On the evening of November 1, 1962 three batches of Indian ruffians came to the gate of the Chinese Embassy at about 6·10, 7·10 and 7·45 respectively, making disturbances and shouting slogans like "Chinese dogs go back", "Death to Chou En-lai", etc. insulting the Chinese people and Chinese leader. Some of them burnt an effigy of Premier Chou En-lai. On the morning of November 2 several batches of ruffians came successively to the gate of the Embassy from 10·15 P.M. On October 24, more than 40 ruffians shouted similar insulting slogans and burnt portraits of Chairman Mao Tze-tung at the gate of the Embassy. They even hurled stones into the premises of the Embassy and threw some burning articles into the roof of the porter's lodge in an attempt to set fire. At about 12·35 and 2·45 P.M. on October 25 and about 12·35 P.M. on October 26, three batches of school-boys came respectively and clamoured in front of the Embassy. At about 3·30 P.M. on October 30, ruffians also came to the gate of the Embassy, made disturbances and burnt effigies.

On October 27, 30 and 31 Indian ruffians proceeded to the Chinese Consulate-General in Calcutta, shouting slogans insulting China and even hung an anti-Chinese poster on the gate of the Consulate-General.

In Bombay, there also occurred that ruffians came to the Chinese Consulate-General and made noises and disturbances on October 22 and on the evening of October 24.

It must be pointed out that at a time when Indian troops are launching massive attacks on the Chinese frontier guards, a small number of ruffians should have been permitted for the past consecutive days to demonstrate, make disturbances, insult Chinese leaders and even burn portraits of Chairman Mao Tze-tung, the respected and beloved leader of the Chinese people, in front of the gates of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General; they have also induced school-boys to shout slogans insulting China at the gate of the Embassy. All these are attempted to fan up anti-Chinese sentiments among the Indian people. Some ruffians even threw stones into the premises of the Embassy and tried to set fire to the porter's lodge. These provocations and disturbances have not only obstructed the normal functioning, but also threatened the security of the Embassy. The Indian authorities, however, shut their eyes to all such acts mentioned above without preventing them. Facts have shown that the Indian authorities are giving a free hand to the ruffians to indulge in outrages. For all this, the Indian Government cannot shirk its responsibility. The Chinese Government expresses its indignation at this. The Chinese Embassy hereby lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government and demands the Indian Government immediately take effective measures to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China takes this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 5 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and has the honour to state the following:

The Chinese Government received urgent reports to the effect that the Calcutta Branch and the Bombay Agency of the Bank of China are under grave and preposterous persecution by the Indian authorities. Following up their cancellation of the two establishments' foreign exchange licenses on December 27, 1961, the Indian authorities took sudden action on November 2 and 3 of this year to unwarrantedly shut down and forcibly take over these bank establishments in Calcutta and Bombay. In the meantime, the Indian authorities placed restrictions on the freedom of movement of the personnel of the Bank. The Indian Reserve Bank has even notified all the banks in Calcutta not to allow the Bank of China to draw its deposits. The Chinese Government hereby expresses its resolute objection to, and lodges a strong protest against, this rude persecution by the Indian authorities in unwarrantedly closing down and forcibly taking over these branches of the Bank of China. It demands that the Indian Government take immediate steps to cancel the orders for the closing down and taking over of these bank establishments, stop infringement on the personal freedom of the bank personnel and truly ensure the safety of the personnel and property of the above-mentioned bank establishments.

As a result of the Indian authorities' unwarranted measures of closing down and taking over, the Calcutta Branch and the Bombay Agency of the Bank of China have become totally unable to function, and the Indian authorities must bear full responsibility for all the legal and other consequences. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that the Indian Government must be held responsible for all the losses suffered by China as a result of the Indian authorities' orders to stop the business of and forcibly take over these branches of the Bank of China, and the Chinese Government reserves the right to ask for compensation for these losses.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 7 November 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's Note dated the 10th October, 1962.

The Government of India had indications that certain organisations were planning a demonstration to dissuade Indian invitees from attending the National Day Celebrations held by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China. Adequate police arrangements were made well in advance to ensure that if demonstrations were staged they would be conducted strictly in a peaceful manner and without any interference with the reception. Demonstrators should not be permitted to approach any closer than 100 yards from the entrance to the Chinese Embassy.

These arrangements were finally implemented by the police.

To state that these demonstrators hindered guests and vehicles from coming to the Reception is completely without foundation. The allegation that an automobile of a diplomatic envoy had been damaged is equally unwarranted as no such complaint had been lodged either with the Ministry of External Affairs or with the local police.

The precautions taken by the Government of India to see that the celebrations of the National day of the Chinese People's Republic were not interfered with by demonstrators were most elaborate as the Embassy itself would be able to testify. In fact, the function was attended by several officials of the Government of India including the Secretary-General, Foreign Secretary and other officials of the Ministry of External Affairs.

On a representation at the reception from the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, the Secretary-General stated that it was a matter of regret that such a demonstration took place at all and told the Chinese Charge d'Affaires that while local laws would not permit the stopping of such demonstrations all efforts have been made to see that they were peacefully conducted and no one was physically interfered with. For the Chinese Government to characterise these sentiments as nonsense is as unwarranted as the Chinese Government's baseless allegation that this demonstration was a premeditated plan in which the Indian Government had participated. While rejecting the Chinese Government protest as completely without any foundation the Government of India regret that the Chinese Government should unscrupulously attempt to twist the facts for its own propagandist ends.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 8 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and, with regard to the recent intensified persecution of Chinese nationals by the Indian Government throughout India, has the honour to state the following:

Since October 20, 1962, when massive armed attacks were launched by Indian troops along the Sino-Indian border, the Indian Government has frantically persecuted Chinese nationals throughout India in a planned way. On October 31 the President of India promulgated the Foreigners' Law (Application and Amendment) Ordinance, 1962, a law directed against Chinese nationals. As a matter of fact long before the promulgation of this Ordinance the Indian authorities had already taken a series of measures openly discriminating against and rudely persecuting Chinese nationals throughout the country. Chinese nationals were put under unwarranted control and deprived of the freedom of normal activities. Moreover, the Indian authorities have unjustifiably arrested Chinese nationals in various places, continued to compel Chinese nationals to leave India and even unscrupulously coerced them into opposing their motherland.

While the Indian Government is openly discriminating against and rudely persecuting Chinese nationals, Indian ruffians are wantonly bullying them. Chinese stores have been smashed and sacked, and Chinese nationals have been beaten and insulted. Instances of flagrant outrage by ruffians endangering the lives and property of Chinese nationals have occurred even in New Delhi, the capital of India. The fact that the Indian authorities have allowed these ruffians to run riot without stopping them proves that the Indian authorities have obviously connived

with and supported them. The Indian Government cannot shirk its responsibility for these outrages.

The Chinese people have always been friendly to the Indian people and the Chinese Government has always protected law-abiding Indian nationals in China. Despite the fact that the Indian Government has in recent years persisted in a policy of persecuting Chinese nationals, the Chinese Government has continued to allow Indian nationals to lead a peaceful life in China as ever. Even when Indian troops have launched massive attacks against China, Indian nationals still enjoy all the rights which foreign nationals enjoy in China. Now the Indian Government has so rudely persecuted the Chinese nationals, connived at damage and assault on them by ruffians and violated openly the acknowledged principles of international law and practice. This policy of hostility to friendship between the peoples of China and India is obviously in contravention of the will of the Indian people. The Chinese Government firmly condemns and emphatically protests against such unlawful activities of the Indian Government of open discrimination against and rude persecution of Chinese nationals. The Chinese Government reserves the right to ask for compensation for all the losses incurred by the Chinese nationals.

At present the atrocious persecution of Chinese nationals in India is still going on. The proper rights and interests of the Chinese nationals are seriously encroached upon and the safety of their lives and property is not at all ensured. Moreover, the situation is growing daily more serious. The Chinese Government expresses its very deep concern about this state of affairs. In view of this, the Chinese Government solemnly urges the Indian Government to do the following:

(1) Immediately stop all discrimination against and persecution of Chinese nationals, and release all the Chinese nationals who have been unjustifiably arrested.

(2) Punish the ruffians who have committed outrages against Chinese nationals, truly ensure the safety of the lives and property of Chinese nationals, and protect their proper rights and interests.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 13 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and has the honour to state the following:

The Ministry of External Affairs of India delivered successively on November 7 and 8 two notes to the Chinese Embassy in India. The note of November 7 stated that starting from the day of notification no staff member (whether diplomatic or non-diplomatic) of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates or his wife or child shall leave India without obtaining beforehand a permit issued by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. It added that no Chinese national shall leave India except from the four ports specified by the Indian Government. The note of November 8 stated that the Indian Government had promulgated orders to the effect that no Chinese national shall leave his place of residence or absent himself from his residence for a period exceeding twenty-four hours without obtaining the prior permission in writing of the so-called registration officer concerned. On November 8 staff members of the Chinese Consulate-General in Calcutta were stopped by an Indian police officer when going out by car. The police officer tried forcibly to ride in the car of the Chinese Consulate-General who were going out, stating that he was instructed to do so by Government orders. The Chinese Government considers that the two above-mentioned regulations and the intended forcible ride of the Indian police officer in the car of the Chinese Consulate-General are extremely unreasonable. It is well-known that the Chinese Government has always given treatment to all the Indian official missions to China which is completely equal to that given to the official missions of other countries in China, and no exclusive regulations or discriminative measures have ever been adopted. The Indian Government, particularly the Indian Embassy in China, should be fully aware of this. But the above-

mentioned unreasonable regulations of the Indian Government are directed exclusively against the personnel of the Chinese missions and Chinese national in India. They are not only discriminative and special restrictions imposed on Chinese nationals, but violations of acknowledged international practice. The outrageous measure taken by the Indian police authorities not only obstructs the normal functioning of the Chinese Consulates-General, but directly infringes upon the personal freedom of the staff of the Chinese Consulate-General. The Chinese Government lodges a serious protest with the Indian Government against the above mentioned discriminative regulations and outrageous measure, and urges that the Indian Government immediately cancel the above two unreasonable regulations and prevent such rude action by Indian police officers.

Since the Indian Government launched massive military attacks in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border, the Indian authorities have stepped up their anti-Chinese measures and vigorously created among the Indian people an atmosphere of hostility to China. Following on the closing down and taking over of the two branch establishments of the Bank of China in India and more frantic persecution of Chinese nationals, the Indian Government promulgated those orders designed exclusively for restricting and discriminating against Chinese nationals, including Chinese diplomatic officials, and even created the above-mentioned rude incident in which the Indian police officer forcible wanted to ride in the car of the Chinese Consulate-General. The Anti-Chinese activities of the Indian Government have developed to an astonishingly unscrupulous degree. The Chinese Government would like to advise the Indian Government : even though the Indian Government completely disregards the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples, it should respect the minimum code of international practice and diplomatic relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

Note given by the Embassy of China in India, to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 13 November 1962

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India presents its compliments to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India and has the honour to state as follows:

On the afternoon of November 3, 1962 a few hundred Indian ruffians carrying with them loud-speakers arrived successively at the gate of the Embassy from 4.50. They shouted slogan insulting Chairman Mao Tse-tung and kept on clamouring as long as one and a half hours. At about 11.45 A.M. on November 7 and 3.15 P.M. on November 10 respectively more than one hundred people shouted in front of the Embassy slogans insulting the Chinese people and their leaders and burnt an effigy of Premier Chou En-lai. At about 7.15 P.M. on November 9, about 150 people carrying torches and Congress flags shouted and made disturbances before the Embassy's gate. Again, on November 11, about 200 ruffians carrying Congress flags came to the Embassy at about 11.50 A.M. burnt an effigy of Premier Chou En-lai and shouted insulting slogans like "Death to Mao and Chou".

In Calcutta about 200 ruffians made clamours before the Chinese Consulate-General at 5.50 p.m. on November 3 and slandered the Chinese people as "bandits". On the afternoon of November 4, two batches of ruffians made troubles and burnt portraits of Chinese leaders before the Consulate-General. On the afternoon of November 6, about 300 and on the afternoon of November 9 about 80 ruffians were clamouring before the Consulate-General. Before the Chinese Consulate-General in Bombay similar incident occurred on the afternoon of November 2.

It must be pointed out that after the Chinese Embassy lodged a protest with the Indian Government on November 3, 1962 against incidents of Indian ruffians making clamours and disturbances in front of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General, those ruffians should have still been allowed to continue to make trouble and provocations, and insult the Chinese people and their leaders. That the Indian authorities do not stop the outrages by the ruffians shows that the Indian Government is conniving at them to fan up anti-Chinese sentiments. For this the Indian Government can in no way evade its due responsibility. The Chinese Embassy hereby lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government and demands that the Indian Government immediately take effective measures to prevent recurrence of the above-said acts of slandering the People's Republic of China and her leaders, obstructing the normal functioning and threatening the security of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China takes this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of its highest consideration.

Memorandum given by the Embassy of China in India, to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 20 November 1962

According to reports from the Chinese Consulates-General at Calcutta and Bombay, in recent period Indian police and some unidentified men openly questioned visitors at the gates of the two Consulates, registered their names, and even tried to prevent them from entering the Consulates. These policemen and unidentified men followed the Consulates cars and subjected their personnel to various ways of surveillance. Even the driver of the Consulate-General at Bombay was closely watched when he was stepping downstairs and cleaning his car. Apart from these, the Chinese Embassy has recently been similarly subjected to restrictions and surveillance by the Indian police and unidentified men. They even threatened and searched visitors besides questioning them. Cars of the Embassy are also followed, including those of the Chinese Charge d'Affaires and Military Attache.

It must be pointed out that Indian policemen and the unidentified men have all along been putting the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General under unwarranted restrictions and surveillance. Now, when the Indian troops are launching massive attacks on the Chinese Frontier Guards, these restrictions, obstruction and surveillance directed against the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General by the Indian authorities have been stepped up to an unscrupulous and discourteous degree. As a result of the above-mentioned questioning of and threatening to visitors, and restrictions, obstruction and surveillance against the Embassy and the Consulates-General by the Indian police and the unidentified men, people have been unable to come to the Embassy and Consulates out of fear. It is obvious that the Indian authorities, in effect, want to completely isolate the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General. All this not only seriously obstructs the normal functioning of the Embassy and Consulates General, but also gravely violates the acknowledged international

practice. The Chinese Embassy lodges a protest with the Indian Government against this, and demands the Indian Government immediately take measures to stop the above-mentioned rude and discourteous action and ensure against recurrence of similar incidents.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 21 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and has the honour to state the following:

On November 5, 1962, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a protest with the Embassy of India in China against the unwarranted closing down and forcible taking over of the Calcutta Branch and the Bombay Agency of the Bank of China by the Indian authorities and demanded that the Indian Government take immediate steps to cancel the orders for the closing down and taking over of these bank establishments. The Indian Government, however, while refusing to respond to this proper and reasonable demand of the Chinese Government, has stepped up its taking over, forcibly seized all the assets and property of the said bank establishments, brought all their business under its control and dismissed their employees. The Chinese Government expresses its utmost indignation at the arbitrary and unreasonable attitude of the Indian Government.

The Ministry has been informed that the officials in charge of the Calcutta and Bombay branch establishments of the Bank of China have been denied all possibilities of carrying on their functions. Mr. Cheng Chien-feng, Manager of the Bombay Agency, has been called "former" manager by the Indian authorities. The Calcutta Branch has even been prevented from making an announcement of its closing down in Indian newspapers. Since the dismissal of the employees of the branch establishments of the Bank of China was announced the Indian authorities have so far failed to give them severance pay, stripping them of their means of living.

Obviously, following their forcible taking over of the Bank property, the Indian authorities are creating various difficulties for the Bank personnel in an attempt to make it impossible for them to live on in the localities. At present, all functions of these bank establishments have come to a standstill.

In view of the above, the Chinese authorities concerned have decided to withdraw the responsible officials of the Calcutta and Bombay branch establishments of the Bank of China. As for the other persons working in the establishments, the Indian authorities concerned should give them proper severance pay and give those of Chinese nationality and their families who desire to return to China the facilities to do so. In this connection, the Chinese Government urges the Indian Government to render the aforesaid responsible officials and other Chinese nationals working in these bank establishments and their families the necessary facilities for their departure. The Chinese Government reiterates that the Indian Government must be held fully responsible for all the losses suffered by China as a result of the Indian Government's orders to stop the business of and forcibly take over the branch establishments of the Bank of China. The Chinese Government reserves the right to ask for compensation for these losses.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Memorandum given by the Embassy of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 23 November 1962

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs' Memorandum, dated September 28, 1962 in reply to the Embassy's Memorandum, dated August 16, 1962, in regard to the unwarranted examination and delay of mails addressed to the Chinese Embassy, is entirely unsatisfactory. Facts are there that the Indian Customs House has examined Embassy's mails and this can in no way be denied. The question of exemption of duties for newspapers and magazines sent to the Embassy from China does not arise at all, and it has never arisen for the past ten years or more. Obviously, in doing so, the Indian authorities concerned are making something out of nothing, deliberately making harassment and finding an excuse for the unwarranted examination and delaying of the Embassy's mails. The Embassy demands that the Indian Government ensure against recurrence of similar incident in the future.

It must also be pointed out that in recent months the newspapers and magazines mailed to the Chinese Consulate-General at Bombay have all along been held up or delayed by the Bombay Customs House. The Consulate has several times made inquiries at the Foreign Post and taken up the matter with the Bombay Customs House, but they are of no avail. To date, newspapers and magazines mailed to the Chinese Consulate at Bombay not only continue to be examined, but are generally delayed for as long as one or two months. All this is completely unjustified and has seriously obstructed the functioning of the Consulate. The Chinese Embassy demands that the Indian Government immediately take measures to ask the Bombay Customs House to release all the mails being held up, and ensure against recurrence of similar incident in the future.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 24 November 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and has the honour to state the following: -

The Ministry has been informed that the Indian Government issued on November 20 an order to arrest and intern all the Chinese nationals and those of Chinese descent in Assam State and five districts of West Bengal. This unprecedentedly cruel persecution constitutes a serious violation of international law and the standard of international relations. Against this, the Chinese Government lodges the strongest protest with the Indian Government.

In its note of November 8, 1962, the Chinese Government already lodged a serious protest with the Indian Government against the intensified persecution of Chinese nationals throughout India and demanded that the Indian Government put an immediate end to all discrimination against and persecution of Chinese nationals. At the same time, the Chinese Government declared that it would continue to protect law-abiding Indian nationals in China. However, while refusing to respond to China's reasonable demands, the Indian Government resorted to persecution of Chinese nationals on a larger scale and in a cruder manner. On the heels of the Indian Government's restrictions on the departure of Chinese from India and its decision to put Chinese in India under unwarranted discriminatory control, the Indian Parliament has adopted a bill which purports to put foreigners under stricter surveillance but is actually directed against Chinese nationals. There had been reports even earlier that the Indian Government was prepared to arrest Chinese nationals on mass and that concentration camps had been set up for them. Now the Indian Government does come out with its mass arrest of Chinese nationals. Under all these terrors and persecution of the Chinese nationals in India have not only suffered serious encroachment on their personal liberty but have been deprived of the minimum right to a normal

living. Such arbitrary and unwarranted arrests and internment of large numbers of innocent foreigners by the Indian Government constitute outrages rarely seen in international relations.

At a time when the Chinese Government is repeatedly making great efforts to reverse the trend in the grave situation of the Sino- Indian border conflict, the Indian Government has arrested Chinese nationals en masse and further aggravated the tense anti-Chinese atmosphere. This makes it crystal clear to the people of the world who is trying its best to relax tension and who is deliberately creating tension, who is actively upholding the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and who is doing its utmost to undermine it.

The Chinese Government resolutely demands that the Indian Government immediately release all the interned Chinese nationals stop all its persecution of Chinese nationals and truly protect the life of Chinese nationals and the safety of their property. The Chinese Government reserve the right to claim compensation from the Indian Government for the losses suffered by the persecuted Chinese nationals.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Embassy of China in India, to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 26 November 1962

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India presents its compliments to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India and has the honour to state as follows: -

At 3-30 P.M., November 23, 1962 about two hundred Indian ruffians came to the gate of the Chinese Embassy and shouted slogans slandering the Chinese people and their leaders. Later on some of them pasted some slanderous propaganda materials on the Embassy's gate. The Indian policemen who were then on the spot did not try to stop them from doing all the above. Prior to this, on November 12 and 18, three incidents of the same nature, in which ruffians made provocations and disturbances, occurred in front of the Chinese Consulate- General at Calcutta.

The continued occurrence of these incidents shows that the Indian Government, in disregard of the protests lodged by the Chinese Embassy on November 3 and 13, continued to connive at these anti-Chinese activities by the ruffians. The Indian Government cannot in any way evade its due responsibility for the above-mentioned incidents. The Chinese Embassy lodges once again a strong protest with the Indian Government to take immediate steps to prevent such acts of slandering the Chinese people and their leaders, obstructing the normal functioning and threatening the security of the Chinese Embassy and the Consulate-General.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China takes this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 3 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Embassy's note, dated 13th November 1962.

On an earlier verbal representation by the Embassy, it had been made clear that certain regulations had been instituted in respect of Chinese nationals in India on a basis of strict reciprocity. As the Embassy is aware, Indian nationals residing in China, including Diplomatic and Consular Officers of Indian Missions, are required to obtain exit visas from the Chinese Government. Similar regulations are applied to Chinese nationals residing in India. The Government of India categorically reject the Chinese charge that the regulations so enforced are "discriminative" or in any way a "violation of acknowledged international practice".

The note has referred to the stopping of the car of the Chinese Consulate General in Calcutta on November 8, 1962. Due to the tense atmosphere that had been created following the latest Chinese aggression, the local authorities concerned had been given instructions to afford protection to members of staff of all Chinese Missions in India. In this particular case an Indian police official had only politely offered to accompany the officials of the Chinese Consulate- General so as to afford them the necessary protection. This offer had obviously been misunderstood by the officials of the Consulate- General.

The Indian Government regret in this connection that, in the concluding paragraph of the Chinese note, an attempt should have been made to reverse the actual facts relating to the honour conflict and to suggest that it is the Indian Government and not the Chinese Government that had launched massive military attacks in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. Such aggression can deceive nobody. The unwarranted Chinese aggression on India constitute clear evidence that it is the Chinese Government that has continued to disregard the "friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples".

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the Embassy of China in India, 4 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Embassy's notes, dated November 3rd, 13th and 26th, 1962.

The accounts given, in the Chinese notes under reference, of the demonstrations are not consistent with facts. The Government of India, fully mindful of their obligations in regard to the protection of foreign Missions in India, have taken and are taking all necessary precautions to safeguard the security of the personnel and property of the Embassy.

However, it may be reiterated for the information of the Embassy that so long as such demonstrations are peaceful and are in the lawful exercise of the fundamental rights as guaranteed in the Indian Constitution, no action can be taken to interfere with them. The demonstrations mentioned in the notes quoted above were a spontaneous expression of the emotions that had been generated in the minds of the Indian people as a result of the massive attacks launched by China on Indian territory since the 20th October, 1962.

The Government of India have ensured that the Embassy has not, in any way, been prevented from carrying out its normal functions because of these demonstrations.

The allegations in the Chinese note of 3rd November, 1962, that stones were thrown into the premises of the Embassy and an attempt made to set fire to the porter's lodge have been carefully investigated and are entirely baseless. The Government of India also categorically repudiate the mischievous suggestion made in the Chinese notes that they had connived at the holding of these demonstrations.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Memorandum of the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 4 December 1962

With reference to the Memorandum of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China dated November 23, 1962 the Ministry of External Affairs would draw the attention of the Embassy to the factual position already given in Government of India Memorandum dated 28th September 1962. The allegation of the Embassy that the mail packets addressed to the Embassy had been opened by the Indian customs is absolutely without any foundation.

As regards the newspapers mailed to the Chinese Consulate-General at Bombay, which have been seized, the Chinese Embassy is aware of the Ministry of Finance Notification dated 26th November 1959 which prohibits the entry into India of any book, periodical, pamphlet, leaflet or other document containing any words, signs or visible representation which directly or indirectly question the frontiers of India. A copy of this Notification was also handed over to the Embassy. The newspapers referred to in the Chinese Embassy's Memorandum had been held up on account of their violating the provisions of the above Notification of the Government of India. The Government of India find it difficult to accept the suggestion contained in the Memorandum that confiscation of these offending newspapers has in any way obstructed the functioning of the Consulate.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 4 December 1962

Reference the Chinese Embassy's Memorandum dated November 20, 1962.

In order to ensure the security of the premises and personnel of the Embassy and of the Consulates-General, due to the tense atmosphere created as a result of the latest Chinese aggression local authorities had been instructed to afford additional protection to the Embassy premises and the premises of the Consulate-General at Bombay and Calcutta.

The Chinese Embassy will appreciate that this is a necessary measure in order to prevent the possibility of any untoward incidents arising out of the spontaneous reaction of the Indian people to Chinese aggression on Indian soil. The Government of India find it difficult to accept the suggestion that these measures taken by the Government, which are in the interest of the Chinese Missions in India, in any way obstruct the normal functioning of the Embassy and the Consulates-General.

The Government of India also reject the suggestion in the Chinese Embassy's memorandum that the legitimate precautions taken by them in the interests of the Chinese Missions themselves are a violation of acknowledged international practice.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 8 December 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and has the honour to state the following:

On November 21, 1962 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed a note to the Indian Embassy in China regarding the unwarranted closing down and forcible taking over the Calcutta Branch and the Bombay Agency of the Bank of China by the Indian authorities, and asked the Indian Government to facilitate the departure of the responsible officials of the Calcutta Branch and the Bombay Agency of the Bank of China, who are now unable to carry on their functions, and the other Chinese employees and their families. The Indian Government has not yet given any reply so far.

It is reported that in applying to the local authorities concerned in India for leaving India, the personnel of the Calcutta and Bombay branch establishments of the Bank of China have encountered manmade difficulties and are thus hitherto unable to leave India. The Chinese Government cannot understand this attitude taken by the Indian authorities, and is very much concerned over the fact that those personnel are encountering difficulties. The Chinese Government once again requests the Indian Government to take immediate measures to give due facility to the departure of the responsible officials and other Chinese employees of the Calcutta and Bombay branch establishments of the Bank of China and their families.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.
Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 13 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's notes dated 8th November and 24th November, 1962.

The Chinese Government are aware that the established practices of international law require foreign nationals living in the territory of another State to respect the laws and regulations of that State. The maintenance of law and order and public security assumes greater significance when the country concerned has been subjected to external aggression. Several orders were promulgated by the Government of India under the Defence of India Regulations placing restrictions on Indian nationals in order to safeguard the security of the country endangered by massive Chinese invasion. The Foreigners Law (Application and Amendment) Ordinance, 1962, was also promulgated with the same end in view. The promulgation of this Ordinance is a matter solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Government of India.

The Chinese note of 24th November has referred to internment of Chinese nationals in Assam State and five districts of West Bengal. It became necessary for the Government of India to remove all Chinese nationals from that region along with others who were security risks when Chinese aggressors had been moving threateningly towards these areas. This was done in pursuance of the requirements of security and defence of the country against foreign aggression.

The Chinese note dated 8th November, 1962, has alleged that some Chinese stores had been damaged during recent demonstrations. It is a matter of regret to the Government of India that one or two incidents of this nature should have occurred. Such instances have, however, to be seen in the context of the intensity of public feeling against continuing Chinese aggression on Indian territory and the prompt action taken by the

Government of India to restrain these feelings and to enforce law and order. The Prime Minister of India, speaking in the Indian Parliament on 14th November, 1962, stated:

"We have nothing against the Chinese people. We regret many things that their Government has done. We think that their Government has acted infamously towards us. We regret many things that their Government has done in their country. We cannot help them. Anyhow, we must always distinguish between the people of any country much more so of a great country, great in size, great in history and its government and not transfer somehow our anger and bitterness at what has been done by the Government to the people..... "

"We should always distinguish between Governmental action and the people as a whole. Therefore, I have not liked some poor Chinese shopkeepers, some restaurant-keepers being attacked in Delhi or elsewhere as if they were the symbols of the attack on us. Perhaps some people thought so. But, it was wrong for them to think so."

This will indicate that, despite continuing Chinese aggression and the havoc being wrought on our defence personnel and civilians by Chinese aggressors, careful attention is being paid by the Government of India at the highest level to the interests of the Chinese community residing in India.

These are the facts. The Government of India, therefore, reject the propagandist and factually inaccurate Chinese Government's notes under reference.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 18 December 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China present.; its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and, with reference to the note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs dated December 13, 1962, has the honour to state the following:

The Chinese Government has twice sent notes to the Indian Government, on November 8 and 24, 1962, seriously protesting against the Indian authorities' wanton persecution of Chinese nationals. But in its note the Indian Government deliberately evaded matters of substance and made denials in hollow and vague terms in a futile attempt to absolve itself of the guilt of cruel persecution of Chinese nationals, and once again tried to turn black into white and cast groundless calumny on China. The Chinese Government hereby categorically refutes and rejects such denials and calumny contained in the Indian note.

The Indian Government was telling a big lie when it claimed in its note that "careful attention is being paid to the interests of the Chinese community residing in India". As a matter of fact, the Indian Government not only has disregarded the serious protests lodged by the Chinese Government and the repeated representations made by the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General, but has been stepping up its cruel persecution of Chinese nationals in the recent period. Since November 20 this year, the Indian Government has in sudden raids, made wholesale indiscriminate arrests of law-abiding peaceable Chinese nationals, both man and woman, old and young, in such states as Assam and West Bengal. According to the public announcement made by the Indian Minister of Home Affairs Shastri on December 3 alone, the number of arrested Chinese nationals has reached 1,736. The arrested Chinese nationals have been thrown into concentration camps, cut off from their

families and deprived of their personal liberty and property. They have been subjected to all kinds of inhuman treatment, with the result that many of them have fallen ill or even died. Those Chinese nationals who have not been arrested are also in a precarious position; many have lost their jobs, have been rendered unable to carry on business in their shops, or have had their property frozen.

Moreover, the Indian authorities have unjustifiably subpoenaed them and searched their houses at all times and connived at various kinds of atrocities committed by ruffians. Chinese nationals proceeding to the Chinese Consulates-General have been unwarrantedly harassed and even searched. Exercising the universally acknowledged right of protecting their own nationals, the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General repeatedly asked the Indian Government for permission to visit the arrested Chinese nationals and for relevant information about them. But these completely proper requests were all rejected. These actions of the Indian Government, trampling on the code of conduct in international relations, wantonly persecuting Chinese nationals and obstructing the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General from exercising their proper rights, have aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. The Chinese Government hereby again lodges the most serious protest with the Indian Government.

In its note, the Indian Government again slanderously charged China with so-called aggression against India and described its large-scale barbarous persecution of Chinese nationals as action to meet "the requirements of security and defence". There is no need to recapitulate here the facts known to the whole world about India's rejection of peaceful negotiations and its aggression. But the fact that India is linking its persecution of Chinese nationals with the armed conflict it provoked on the Sino-Indian border does further demonstrate that the Indian Government's large-scale persecution of Chinese nationals has been

carefully planned and is an integral part of its overall anti-Chinese conspiracy. As for the claim in the note to the effect that promulgation by India of the ordinance designed to discriminate against and persecute Chinese nationals is "a matter

..... Within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Government of India", it is completely untenable. The Indian Government should be aware that, according to international practice, the country of residence has the obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of foreign residents and to protect the safety of their person and property. No matter what pretexts it may employ, the Indian Government cannot justify its actions against the Chinese nationals which constitute a serious international delinquency.

What is more, in his conversation with the Chinese Charge d' Affaires a.i. on December 10, the Director of the China Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs raised the absurd proposition that the Indian Government was willing to exchange information concerning the internees only on a reciprocal basis and through the medium of the International Committee of the Red Cross. It must be pointed out that, while diplomatic relations are still maintained between China and India, it is the indisputable diplomatic privilege of the Chinese Embassy in protecting its nationals to request the Indian Government to provide information concerning the unwarrantedly arrested Chinese nationals and to arrange visits. By dragging in the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Indian Government is attempting to deprive the Chinese Embassy of its legitimate right and cover up India's crime of persecuting Chinese nationals. The Chinese Government absolutely will not agree to this. It should also be pointed out that, in contrast to the Indian Government's unbridled persecution of Chinese nationals, the Chinese Government has always provided protection for law-abiding Indian nationals in China so that they may live in peace and engage in their normal pursuits, and not a single Indian national has been interned on

account of the border conflict between the two countries. This fact can in no way be denied even by the Indian Government. Under these circumstances, the Indian Government's demand for so-called reciprocity obviously harbours ulterior motives. The Chinese Government would ask the Indian Government: Is India planning to blackmail the Chinese Government by holding large numbers of Chinese nationals as hostages?

At present, when the Chinese Government has on its own initiative adopted the measures of cease-fire and withdrawal and released successive batches of wounded and sick Indian troops captured in the border conflict and thus brought about some relaxation in the situation, the Indian Government, while failing so far to respond positively to the measures that China has taken on its own initiative, has gone to the length of unilaterally tearing up the agreement between the two countries on the mutual establishment of consulates-general and of stepping up its persecution of Chinese nationals. This can only demonstrate that the Indian Government is bent on obstructing a relaxation of the situation and further worsening the relations between the two countries. Furthermore, all signs suggest that the Indian Government, after compelling the termination of the Chinese Consulates-General, is preparing to arrest and persecute Chinese nationals on an even bigger scale and in an even more cruel way. All this cannot but attract the serious attention of the Chinese Government.

Owing to the stepped-up persecution by the Indian, Government, the Chinese nationals in India are now in the direst straits. In order to succour the victimized Chinese nationals and rescue them from their bitter plight, the Chinese Government after careful consideration has decided to send ships to India to bring back those Chinese nationals who are either interned or unable to continue to earn their living in India as a result of other forms of persecution and who wish to return to their motherland. The Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government

will take to heart the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and will not obstruct the return of these Chinese nationals to China or allow any forces inimical to the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples to sabotage the Chinese Government's work of bringing back its nationals.

In order to protect the proper rights and interests of the Chinese nationals and ensure the smooth performance of the work of bringing back the victimized Chinese nationals, the Chinese Government asks the Indian Government to do the following:

1. Immediately stop persecuting Chinese nationals release all the arrested and interned Chinese nationals, return to them their property and compensate for their losses, immediately supply the number, name list and places of detention of the arrested Chinese nationals and afford facilities for the realization of visits and other reasonable requests made by the Chinese Embassy,

2. Ensure the freedom of departure of Chinese nationals wishing to return to their motherland and allow them to bring with them their money and property, ensure the personal freedom of Chinese nationals wishing to stay on in India and the safety of their person and properly, without discriminating against them in any way.

3. Give due cooperation and the necessary facilities to the Chinese Government's measure of bringing back its victimized nationals.

The Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will give it a speedy and explicit reply.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking to the Embassy of India in China, 24 December 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of India in China and, with regard to the Indian authorities unreasonable obstruction of the departure of the responsible officials of the branch establishment of the Bank of China in India, has the honour to state the following:

Since 20th November 1962 the Chinese Government, the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Consulates General have made repeated representations with the Indian Government, asking the Indian authorities to render facilities to the departure from India of the responsible officials and other Chinese staff members of the branch establishments of the Bank of China in India and their families. However, the Indian local authorities said that this was a matter for the Central Government to decide, while the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in turn, referred it back to the local authorities. This is obviously a deliberate attempt on the part of India to obstruct the departure of the responsible officials of Bank of China from India. The Chinese Government expresses its utmost regret at the Indian side's unreasonable attitude. The Indian authorities unjustifiably declared on 10th December 1962 that officials had been formally appointed to take over all the property and assets and affairs of the branch establishments of the Bank of China in India. They have even compelled the men in charge of the Bank establishments to leave the living quarters of the Bank where they were residing. The Indian authorities have, on the one hand, seized all the property of the Bank establishments, taken over all their affairs, deprived the responsible Bank officials of their functions and threatened them to, remove from their living quarters; on the other hand, they have prevented the responsible Bank officials from leaving India. Furthermore the Indian authorities have recently unwarrantedly arrested Mr. HUANG CHIN-AN, a staff member of

the Bank of China, and his whole family, all these facts show that the Indian Government; not contented with unwarrantedly closing down and forcibly taking over the branch establishments of the Bank of China, wants to go further and persecute the personnel of the Bank. The Chinese Government urges the Indian Government to change this unreasonable attitude, take immediate measures to enable the smooth departure of the responsible officials and other Chinese staff members of the Bank and their families who desire to leave India, and stop its threats against and persecution of the personnel of the Bank of China who are still residing in India at present.

The Chinese Government awaits a reply from the Indian Government.

Memorandum given by the Embassy of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 25 December 1962

According to recent reports in some Indian newspapers, the Government of India has, through U.S. imperialism, had contacts with the Chiang Kai-shek gang in regard to the Chinese nationals residing in India and the over two thousand Chinese nationals unjustifiably arrested by the Indian Government; the Chiang Kaishek gang has even requested "repatriation" of these arrested Chinese nationals, and the Indian Government should have given so called "assurance" to the Chiang Kai-shek gang. These reports cannot but arouse the most serious attention of the Chinese Embassy. The Embassy, therefore, requests that the Indian Government immediately make clarifications regarding the above-mentioned reports.

Memorandum given by the Embassy of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 25 December 1962

With regard to the wanton persecution of Chinese nationals by the Indian Government, the Chinese Embassy and former Chinese Consulates-General at Calcutta and Bombay have time and again taken up the matter with the Indian Government and the Indian local authorities, and have repeatedly asked them to supply the information concerning the unjustifiably arrested and interned Chinese nationals and make arrangements for the officials of the Embassy and the Consulates to visit them. In its note dated December 18, 1962 sent to the Indian Embassy in China, protesting against the Indian Government's prosecution of the arrested Chinese nationals and comply with the request for visiting them and other reasonable requests put forward by the Chinese Embassy. The Indian Government, however while unable to deny the fact of its large scale arrest of Chinese nationals, still failed so far to provide the relevant information concerning the arrested and interned Chinese nationals nor has it made any arrangement for the realization of visits. It must be pointed out that to supply the above-mentioned information and make arrangement for the visits is a responsibility of the Indian Government, which it can never shirk under whatever pretext. The Embassy hereby once again demands that the Indian Government immediately supply the number, name list, cause of arrest and places of detention of all the arrested Chinese nationals and immediately make arrangement for officials of the Embassy to visit those already thrown into the concentration camp and others who have been arrested.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 28 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the Chinese Government's Notes dated 5th and 21st November and 8th and 24th December, 1962, has the honour to state as follows: -

Orders of liquidation had been served on the Bombay and Calcutta Branches of the Bank of China by the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta respectively on an application made by the Reserve Bank of India under the Statutory Banking Regulations obtaining in India. Whatever action has been taken is as a result of normal legal processes and there can be no complaint of "persecution" in this regard. It is accepted practice that when a bank is under liquidation, its assets are frozen and the account books of the bank are taken into the safe custody of the Official Liquidator appointed specifically for this purpose. It is also the normal practice that until the books of accounts are scrutinised and liquidation proceedings are completed, the Agents of the Branches of the bank should be available for consultation. These requirements are in conformity with Indian laws and are purely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Government of India.

As regards the Provident Fund and other Gratuities of the employees of the Bank the final settlement can only be made after the High Courts have passed their orders and given permission to the Official Liquidator to make the necessary payments. However, all the employees of the Bank have been paid up to 30th November, 1962, and will also be paid for the further period upto 10th December, 1962, which is the date from which they have been retrenched, as soon as the prescribed formalities are completed.

There is absolutely no basis for the allegation made by the Chinese Government that unnecessary restrictions are being placed on the personnel of the Bank. The Government of India reject the baseless and

mischievous propagandist charge contained in the Chinese Note of 21st November 1962, that difficulties have been created for the personnel of the Bank of China in an "attempt to make it impossible for them to live on in the localities".

The Chinese Note of 8th December, 1962, has sought facilities for the Officials of the Bank of China and their families to leave for China. Necessary facilities are being extended for them to leave the country.

In the light of the above facts, the Government of India categorically reject the baseless charges made by the Chinese Government in their Notes dated 5th and 21st November and 8th and 24th December, 1962.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 31 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the Chinese Government's note dated the 18th December, 1962.

2. The detailed factual background in regard to the detention of Chinese nationals has already been furnished in the Ministry's note dated the 13th December, 1962. It was the carefully planned invasion of India by China, which led to the necessity of interning Chinese residents in the border areas. This action had been reluctantly taken by the Indian Government, in the larger interests of national security, only following the massive Chinese attacks since 20th October 1962 in the Eastern and Western sectors of the Indian border. This factual sequence of events clearly establishes the absurdity of the Chinese suggestion that "a large scale persecution of Chinese nationals has been carefully planned by the Government of India." In fact, so far as cold calculated planning and deliberate aggressive action are concerned, that has been completely on the Chinese side.

3. The bulk of the Chinese, who have been lawfully interned as a result of the Emergency arising out of the massive Chinese attack against India launched on 20th October 1962, are from the sensitive border areas of India from where they have had to be removed in the interest of national security. This action taken by the Government of India is fully within their sovereign competence and there has been no violation of international law in this regard. The Chinese note states that "Chinese nationals who have not been arrested have lost their jobs, have been rendered unable to carry on business in their shops or have had their property frozen." This is gross exaggeration. But, in any case, any hardships that they may be suffering, are clearly caused by the wanton and aggressive activities of the Government of China.

4. India has no quarrel with the people of China and is opposed only to the aggressive and imperialist activities of the Chinese Government. As the Prime Minister of India recently stated:

"We have no bitter feelings against Chinese people as such. The Chinese Government have done certain evil things and attacked our country.... We must fight the aggressor but it would be wrong to go against certain basic principles. We are looking forward to a time when we shall again have friendly relations with the people of China."

It is in appreciation of this basic attitude of the Government and the people of India that the Overseas Chinese Association of India, representing the overseas Chinese community, the bulk of whom are in Calcutta, had spontaneously addressed the Prime Minister of India, shortly after the Chinese massive attack of 20th October 1962, declaring unequivocally their solidarity with the Indian people.

5. The Chinese nationals whom the Government of India have been compelled to intern for security reasons, are being properly looked after. The officially accredited representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in India has also visited the camp and was fully satisfied with the arrangements made. It may be stressed for the information of the Chinese Government that the facilities accorded to these internees are in full conformity with the scales prescribed under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which the Chinese Government are also a signatory.

6. The cases of these Chinese internees are being reviewed from time to time. Only those who constitute serious risk to national security will continue under detention. The Government of India are also prepared to give necessary facilities to Chinese nationals in India, who wish to return to China of their own free will. These facilities will, in the first instance, be limited to holders of passports issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China who have no criminal or civil complaints pending against them. These Chinese nationals returning to China will be allowed to take back the sale proceeds of any property that they may have in

accordance with the prevailing Indian regulations on the subject. The Government of India presume that similar facilities for repatriation etc. will be extended by the Chinese Government on a reciprocal basis to Indian nationals in China who wish to return to India.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 31 December 1962

In its notes dated 18th June and 18th August 1962 the Chinese Government has given detailed account of the fact that Indian troops who had crossed the illegal McMahon Line fired at the Roma family, inhabitants of the Lung village in Tibet, and killed Roma and kidnapped his sister-in-law Yekhu and others, and it has asked the Indian Government to make thorough investigation into the incident. Indian Government in its two notes of 30th June and 21st August did not deny the facts in question. The Indian side however described in its 21st August Note the outrage of shooting and killing Chinese border inhabitants committed by Indian troops as a "misfortune of the Roma family, which they alone had brought upon themselves". The Chinese Government is shocked and regrets at this bigoted unreasonable attitude taken by the Indian side. The Note further arbitrarily asserted that "the incident took place inside Indian territory". This baseless allegation has already been sternly repudiated by the Chinese Government in its 18th August Note. The fact is that Natiemula, where the incident took place, is located not only within Chinese territory, but definitely north of illegal McMahon Line.

It must be pointed out that according to reports from the Chinese local authorities, the Indian troops have carried the kidnapped Yekhu to the south of and far away from the Lung village forcibly separating her from her family. No prevarication or denial can cover up the outrage committed by Indian troops in unwarrantedly obstructing peaceable Chinese inhabitants from returning to their native place; wantonly killing people and kidnapping women. The Indian Government can by no means evade its due responsibility.

(text by the telegram)

Memorandum given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking to Embassy of India in China, 2 January 1963

The Chinese Embassy in India handed to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on 25th December 1962 a Memorandum requesting clarifications from the Indian Government on the news reports that the CHIANG KAI SHEK clique had made representations with the Indian Government in respect of the arrest of Chinese nationals residing in India and that the Indian Government had given certain "assurances" to the CHIANG KAI SHEK clique through the United States Government. This request of the Chinese Embassy is entirely proper. It is surprising that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs should have, in contravention of universally acknowledged diplomatic practice, rejected the Memorandum of the Chinese Embassy and refused to make clarifications on the above mentioned news report. The Chinese Government deeply regrets this unreasonable act on the part of the Indian Government.

It was stated in the Note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to the Chinese Embassy in India dated 5th December 1959 that it will not permit any activities designed to promote the idea of "two Chinas". However the Indian Government has now refused to clarify whether it has had contacts with the CHIANG KAI SHEK clique on the persecution of Chinese nationals in India. This ambiguous position cannot but attract the serious attention of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government once again asks the Indian Government to make speedy and unequivocal clarification on the above mentioned news report.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 6 January 1963

Reference the Chinese Embassy Memorandum dated the 25th December, 1962.

The Embassy has on vague newspaper reports levelled wild and irresponsible charges. The Government of India reject the Embassy's allegation that "assurances" have been given to any party regarding Chinese nationals who have been interned under Indian laws.

The Government of India have already made it clear in their note of 31st December that it is for the overseas Chinese themselves to decide on their future plans and that the Indian Government would consider any legitimate requests made by them.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 8 January 1963

Reference the Chinese Embassy Memorandum, dated 25th December 1962.

The Government of India have already fully clarified the factual background regarding the detention of Chinese nationals in their notes, dated 13th and 31st December 1962. The action taken in respect of persons of Chinese origin is one that has been thrust on the Government of India on account of the unprovoked aggression launched by Chinese forces. The Prime Minister of India has stated several times in the past that India has no quarrel with the people of China, much less with people of Chinese origin resident in India. However, in the face of the massive Chinese invasion, the action taken by the Government of India is the minimum that any Government would take under similar circumstances.

It has already been pointed out to the Chinese Government that the Chinese nationals, whom the Government of India have been compelled to intern for reasons of security, are being well looked after. This fact has also found confirmation in the report of the officially accredited representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross in India. The facilities accorded to these internees are in full conformity with acknowledged international practice. All relevant information pertaining to the internment has been provided to the International Red Cross in keeping with the Geneva Convention of 1949 to which the Chinese Government are also a signatory. In the circumstances, there is no need to inform the Chinese Government specifically of actions which are within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Government of India.

Despite much of this information having been furnished even earlier to the Chinese Government, it is regretted that they should continue to persist in levelling wilful and unwarranted accusations against the Government of India.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 8 January 1963

Reference the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Memorandum, dated January 2, 1963, handed over to the Indian Embassy at Peking.

The Memorandum of 25th December 1962, handed over by the Chinese Embassy to the Ministry of External Affairs, has been clearly replied to in the Ministry's Memorandum, dated 6th January 1963 and hence no further clarification is necessary.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the Embassy of China in India, 11 January 1963

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the note, dated 31st December 1962 from the Chinese Foreign Ministry has the honour to state as follows:

A detailed factual account concerning the incident about the Loma family has already been furnished by the Government of India in their note, dated 30th June 1962. However, the Chinese Government who could not possibly have had any knowledge of what actually transpired inside Indian territory, have continued to make wild and irresponsible charges for their own propagandistic purposes.

Tibetan refugees in India have always been treated with the generosity and compassion that are due to a people who have been rendered homeless. As pointed out in the Indian Government's earlier note, the Government of India while helping to rehabilitate these Tibetan refugees to the best of their capacity have never stood in the way of any Tibetan refugee who wished to return to Tibet. In such a context, the allegation that a woman member of the tribal party, named Yaku, had been "kidnapped" and forcibly separated from her family is absurd in the extreme and is firmly repudiated.

In the light of the fact stated above the Government of India reject the Chinese note, dated 31st December 1962.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 4 November 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs had brought to the notice of the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi that in flagrant violation of all established international practices the Indian Consulate-General, Lhasa, had been denied facilities of telegraphic and courier communication with the Indian Government from 9th October 1962. It was only on 25th October that telegraphic contact was eventually re-opened. Even then the Indian Consulate's telegrams to Delhi are delayed by 3 to 4 days and it is doubtful whether any of the telegrams sent by the Government of India are delivered at all to our Consulate-General.

The Indian Consulate-General staff are being subjected to most wilful harassment by local Chinese authorities in Lhasa. There is total prohibition to anyone entering the premises of the Consulate-General. Essential articles of food are denied to them and under pressure from local authorities the entire local staff have refused to serve from November 1st, 1962. Despite this wilful withdrawal of their services, they are, under instigation of local authorities illegally demanding gratuity for past services and planning strikes and demonstrations.

The Government of India strongly protest against this completely unwarranted harassment of the Indian Consulate-General staff which is contrary to all tenets of international law and international behaviour. Such local staff as required by the Consul-General should be permitted to work at the Consulate-General, supplies of food locally obtained should be made easily available and all other restrictions should be removed forthwith.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking to the Embassy of India in China, 17 November 1962

The Content of the Memorandum of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs delivered to the Chinese Embassy in India on November 4, 1962 is completely inconsistent with the facts.

The local authorities in Tibet, China, have always done their best to render assistance to official Indian missions in the latter's normal functions. The allegation made in the memorandum that the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa had been denied facilities of telegraphic communication with the Indian Government is a sheer distortion of the facts. Assistance has been rendered to the greatest possible extent to the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa in its communications even under very difficult natural conditions in the locality. In the middle of last October, owing to telegraphic circuit troubles, the Lhasa Post and Telegraph Office had to suspend all its telegraphic contact inside and outside the country, and informed all its client of the same. Later, after great efforts were made by the Lhasa Post and Telegraph Office in repairing, telegraphic communication inside and outside the country was quickly restored. This is unimpeachable indeed. The Memorandum, in addition, alleged that the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa had been denied facilities of courier communication with the Indian Government. This is an unwarranted charge too. The Chinese side has always accorded Indian couriers all the privileges and facilities in strict accordance with international practice, providing them even with special cars. Under such natural and road conditions as in the Tibet region, mechanical troubles can hardly be avoided in car driving. However, the local authorities in Tibet, China, have done their best to help maintain normal runs of courier cars and tried their utmost to do the repair work promptly whenever an occasional mechanical trouble developed. In fact, courier cars are on normal runs. The Chinese Government does not understand how this can become a pretext for the Indian Government to slanderously charge China with "flagrant violation of all established international practices."

Since the armed attacks by Indian forces have aroused indignation and anger among the Chinese people, the local authorities in Tibet, China, taking into account the safety of the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa and out of the desire to give it protection, have adopted certain safeguards and security measures and informed it of the same. Food supplies needed by the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa have always been regularly provided. As for the allegation that employees of the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa have refused to serve under pressure from local authorities, it is all the more an out-and-out fabrication. The Indian Government must be fully aware that the employees of the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa were chosen and engaged by the Indian side itself. They have all served many years with Indian missions. Whether they would continue to serve with the Indian missions is solely their own business and can be decided by themselves of their free will. The Chinese Government wishes to point out here in passing that according to its principle of giving protection to the interests of the working people, any worker who wishes to resign is entitled to ask for severance pay from the establishment which he serves.

It can be seen from the above that the protest of the Indian Government is completely unwarranted and inconsistent with the facts. The Chinese Government firmly rejects this unwarranted protest. Evidently, these slanderous charges of the Indian Government are merely aimed at worsening Sino-Indian relations, aggravating tension and creating a pretext for the frenzied anti-China activities being carried on by India.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 12 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and with reference to

Note No.62, Pu Yi Ya Tzu No. 1002 dated 22nd September (In White Paper No. VII), 1962 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, has the honour to state that full facts regarding the harassment of the Indian Trade Agents at Yatung and Gyantse and the consequential delay in the winding up of the Indian Trade Agencies at Yatung and Gyantse had been given in this Ministry's previous notes. In order to create obstacles in the smooth withdrawal of our Trade Agencies in Yatung and Gyantse, the local authorities raised vexatious problems and insisted of their settlement on the eve of the departure of the Indian Trade Agents.

The issue of arrears of rent for the Indian Agency at Gyantse for which there had neither any documentary evidence nor any legal basis was raised arbitrarily without giving even sufficient details for the basis of the claims. The Indian Trade Agents was not in a position to settle those unjust claims on the spot and he was made to sign under duress a document to the effect that the over-due rents to the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in Tibet will be paid by the Indian Consulate-General at Lhasa. It may be mentioned that this unwarranted action taken by the local Chinese authorities was against all norms of International courtesy and practice.

Regarding the Indian property left over, the Indian Trade Agent was asked to transport them physically out of Gyantse knowing fully well that the material acquired by the Indian Trade Agency could not be utilised due to the unreasonable and transigent attitude of the local authorities to complete the partly built structures.

The local authorities also did not want the Tibetan wives of the Indian Employees to accompany their husbands and to this end they created endless difficulties in the issue of proper travel documents to them. Some of them were even arrested on some pretext or the other.

These actions not only created needless separation of families but also created a great sense of uneasiness and despondency among the employees of the Government of India.

At Yatung the activities of the Indian Trade Agent was restricted to such an extent that he was not able to know even the whereabouts of his own employees. Some of them had left Yatung for no reason other than sheer fear the local authorities had created in them.

The Chinese Note referred to the suicide of a Tibetan employee Mr. Mingmapingtso. On the 2nd of June, 1962, a Chinese Security Officer with 2 Secretaries of the Foreign Bureau and 2 interpreters were present within the compound walls of the Agency when the incident took place. No expired after a few hours and the local Foreign Bureau was immediately informed of the death. The Indian Agency Doctor gave all possible medical help to the patient and did his best to save his life. The representatives of the Foreign Bureau were present at the premises when Mr. Mingmapingtso committed suicide and contrary to the allegation made in the Chinese Note had an opportunity to talk to Mr. Mingmapingtso if they wished to. The local authorities were fully aware of all the above mentioned facts and, even in spite of it, they ordered the Indian Trade Agent to accept the responsibility for the suicide of Mr. Mingmapingtso just on the eve of his departure from Yatung. He was also asked to sign an arbitrary investigation report in the Chinese language.

It will, therefore, be seen from the foregoing that all the allegations made by the Chinese authorities in their above mentioned note are utterly baseless and are categorically rejected.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 28 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India, and, with reference to their Note dated 17th November, 1962, has the honour to state that full facts regarding the wilful harassment by local Chinese authorities of the Indian Consulate General staff at Lhasa have already been given in this Ministry's note, dated 4th November, 1962.

The local authorities had taken a number of steps in the part calculated to restrict the freedom of movement of the staff of the Indian Consulate in Tibet and to deny them free access even to their own nationals. These restrictions were gradually intensified and, during the last few months of their stay, members of the Consulate staff were virtually denied any contact outside their office premises and, for all practical purposes, were confined to their houses.

Telegraphic contact with Lhasa was completely cut off between 9th and 25th October, 1962. Even the telephone of the Consulate General was cut and outsiders were forbidden to enter the premises. Supplies of even such essential commodities such as milk, eggs, fire- wood, etc. were stopped.

Following upon the massive Chinese attack on India which commenced on 20th October, 1962, the attitude of the local Foreign Bureau was quite unco-operative and the local Tibetan staff were even pressed to leave the services of the Consulate General. They were, at the same time, instigated by the local authorities to resort to strikes and demonstrations to strengthen illegal demands of gratuity for the services they had rendered to the Indian Consulate General in the past, although they were leaving without giving the notice necessary in such cases. The

provisions of the jeep contract for carriage of diplomatic bags were contravened and jeeps for our diplomatic couriers were refused.

The explanation given by the Chinese authorities that the wireless telegraphic link between Darjeeling and Lhasa were cut off from the 9th to 25th of October, 1962, due to certain technical defects, is not satisfactory. The link was operated by wireless and although radio contact with Lhasa was established, they refused to accept any messages.

The Chinese Government's further contention that they have given adequate facilities to our officials for the performance of their normal functions is untenable. It is abundantly clear from the above that the local authorities have always been adopting restrictive measures and curbs to cause maximum harassment to Indian officials in their work against all accepted norms of international courtesy and practice.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 3 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to state that the Government of India have decided to discontinue the Indian Consulates General at Lhasa and Shanghai from December 15, 1962 and to withdraw their personnel manning these Consulates General. The Government of the People's Republic of China are requested to take reciprocal action on the same date in regard to their Consulates-General in Calcutta and Bombay.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Embassy of China in India, to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 7 December 1962

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India presents its compliments to the Ministry of External Affairs of India and, with reference to the conversation between Mr. Ma Mu-ming, First Secretary of the Embassy, and Mr. A. P. Venkateswaran, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry, on December 6, has the honour to state as follows: -

1. The personnel of the Chinese Consulate-General at Calcutta are scheduled to leave India for China in groups between 9th and 15th December, while those of the Chinese Consulate-General at Bombay are scheduled to leave India for China in groups between 13th and 15th December. The Embassy requests the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to render them all necessary facilities in order to ensure their departure on schedule.

2. The Chinese Consulates-General at Calcutta and Bombay are scheduled to begin shipping their cars, refrigerators, projectors, films, typewriters, furniture and other articles from December 10, 1962. The Embassy hopes that the Ministry will expeditiously inform the authorities concerned including the Reserve Bank of India, the Customs and Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports both at Calcutta and Bombay so as to enable the Consulates to fulfil all the necessary formalities before December 9 and ship all the articles on schedule.

3. The Chinese Consulate-General at Bombay has plans to dispose of some of its articles locally. Because of the unreasonable prevention of all visitors from entering the Consulate by the Indian police officers, the Consulate, however, has been unable to do so. In spite of the fact that the Embassy has time and again taken up the matter with the Ministry, it has continued to happen. The Embassy cannot but express its deep regret

at this. The Embassy hopes that the Indian Government will instruct the local authorities to put an immediate end to such unwarranted obstructions so as to enable the Consulate General to dispose of the articles.

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China to takes his opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 8 December 1962

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China acknowledges receipt of the note of December 3, 1962 handed over to the Chinese Embassy in India by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The note stated that the Indian Government has decided to terminate the Indian Consulates-General at Lhasa and Shanghai from December 15, 1962 and unreasonably requested China to terminate its Consulates-General at Calcutta and Bombay from the same date. The Indian Government is aware that the above-mentioned Consulates-General of the two countries were set up by agreement between the two governments. The action now taken by the Indian Government one-sidedly without prior consultation with the Chinese Government constitutes a unilateral tearing up of an agreement between the two governments. Such practice of the Indian Government can only be taken as a calculated move to worsen the relations between the two countries and impair the interests of the two peoples. For this the Chinese Government lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government.

In these past years, the Indian Government in line with its set anti-Chinese policy has subjected Chinese official organs and nationals in India to all sorts of restrictions and persecutions. Particularly since the Indian Government provoked a large-scale armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border, India's measures of opposition and discrimination against the Chinese have been redoubled. Thousands of Chinese nationals have been locked up in concentration camps; branch establishments of the Bank of China in India were unwarrantedly closed down and forcibly taken over; the Chinese Embassy and consulates have been subjected to restriction and discrimination in serious contravention of accepted international practice so that they have been unable to carry out their normal functions; and even the personal safety of the staff of the Chinese

Embassy and consulates has been threatened. Especially, the Chinese Consulates-General in Calcutta and Bombay have long been surrounded and placed under close surveillance day and night by Indian armed police and have in actuality been cut off from the outside world. Such abnormal treatment meted out to the Chinese in India, including the staff of the Embassy and consulates, is rarely seen even when a war has been formally declared between two countries. Leaders of the Indian Government have moreover voiced threat on many occasions that India would sever diplomatic relations with China and would declare war on China at the opportune time.

The measures recently taken by the Chinese Government on its own initiative have led to a halt in the border conflict between the two countries and some relaxation in the situation. But the Indian Government, far from making a positive response to the efforts made by China, has adopted this measure of terminating the Consulates-General, which further impairs the relations between the two countries. This fact fully demonstrates that the Indian Government does not in the least take to heart the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples but is trying hard to obstruct relaxation of the situation and improvement in the relations between the two countries.

The Chinese Government holds the view that this unilateral action by the Indian Government, just as all its past anti-Chinese measures, does not in the least reflect the will of the Indian people. The peoples of China and India are friendly to each other and their friendly relations will go on from generation. The withdrawal of the Consulates-General or any other action by the Indian Government cannot possibly shake the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples. The Chinese Government has consistently upheld Sino-Indian friendship and worked for the improvement of relations between the two countries. In line with this position, the Chinese Government has always accorded normal

treatment and due protection to the official organs of India and their staff as well as Indian nationals in China. The Chinese Government's position of upholding the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples will not change under whatever circumstances.

Since the Indian Government has unilaterally wrecked the agreement between the two countries on the establishment of consulates-general in each other's country and unscrupulously obstructed the normal functioning of the Chinese Consulates-General in Calcutta and Bombay, these two Chinese Consulates-General can no longer continue. The Chinese Government has therefore decided to terminate these two Consulates-General from December 15, 1962 and to withdraw their staff. But this decision does not in any way mean that the Chinese Government accepts the Indian Government's unreasonable demand or agrees to the Indian Government's unilateral action. The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the ill effects and consequences that this action on the part of the Indian Government may produce in the relations between the two countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of India the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the Embassy of China in India, 15 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and has the honour to their Note No. M/628/62, dated December 7, 1962.

The Ministry of External Affairs would like to point out that all the necessary facilities for the departure of the personnel of the two Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta have been fully accorded. The local authorities, mentioned in the Embassy's Note, have co-operated to the utmost extent possible in enabling the personnel of the two Consulates-General to depart according to schedule. In the circumstances, the Ministry of External Affairs do not accept the Embassy's charge that "unwarranted obstructions" have been placed on the Consulates-General.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 1 January 1963

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the note handed over to the Embassy of India in China on 8th December 1962, has the honour to state the following: -

The Indian Consulates General at Lhasa and Shanghai have been constantly subject to restrictions of various kinds which were intensified after Chinese forces launched massive attacks on Indian territory. A detailed account of the hardships of the Indian Consulate-General at Lhasa has been given in this Ministry's note, dated the 28th December, 1962 food was difficult to obtain, communications were cut off and the personnel were harassed.

In the circumstances it was felt that continuance of the two Consulates-General would not serve any useful purpose. The Chinese Government was accordingly informed of this position and requested to take similar action in respect of the Chinese Consulates-General at Bombay and Calcutta. The contention of the Chinese Government that the Indian Government has broken any agreement between the two Governments by this action is without any factual basis.

The Government of India cannot also accept the suggestion contained in the Chinese note that measures which they have taken in the interests of the personal safety of the staff of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General had, in any way, restricted the scope of their normal functioning. In view of the unprovoked aggression of the Chinese forces against India, strong emotions had been aroused amongst the people of India and in order to prevent any untoward incidents, the Government of India had taken adequate security measures. These measures cannot be

viewed as “abnormal” particularly at a time when vast Chinese armies were launching repeated attacks on Indian soil.

In the note of the Chinese Government the untenable charge is made that the “action by the Indian Government does not in the last reflect the will of the Indian people”. These Chinese Government have ignored the fact that their recent actions have deeply aroused the righteous indignation of the Indian people. It is the Chinese Government alone that has been responsible for damaging Sino-Indian friendship. Notwithstanding this, the Government of India have been and continue to be friendly to the Chinese people.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

Memorandum given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 2 November 1962

Reference Ministry of External Affairs Note, dated 9th May 1962 and subsequent Note, dated 27th June 1962, regarding the prescription, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961, of the issue No. 18, dated 5th May 1962 of "China Today". The Ministry of External Affairs regrets to note that this prescribed issue No. 18 of "China Today" was again sought to be circulated by the Embassy through postal channels on 27th October 1962. This action of the Chinese Embassy is in direct contravention of the law of the land and is a serious breach of diplomatic privilege. The Ministry of External Affairs would impress upon the Embassy the impropriety of their action and expresses the hope that similar lapses will not occur again in the future.

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 3 December 1962

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and has the honour to state that the allegations made in their Note No. (62) Pu Ling Erh Tzu No.B11/96, dated September 30, 1962, have been investigated and have been found to be baseless. The Protest note of the Chinese Government is, therefore, categorically rejected.

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.