

Foreign Relations of the United States

Kennedy Administration

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wanted to avoid taking any major step along this road this year. He also was determined that the United States was not to be defeated on this issue in the United Nations. Based on discussions with Chen Cheng this past week, the President fears that Chiang Kai-shek may be in what Mr. Schlesinger called a "gotterdammerung" mood, ready to pull the house down on himself--and on us in the process. Nevertheless, we had to keep on trying to persuade him that in the interest of protecting his UN seat (a national interest of the U.S. as well as of the GRC) some tactical adjustments would be required as we went along.

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At the time of the U-2 attempt in the summer of 1960 President

source text not declassified] that my objections were known and had been rejected.⁶

This was presumed to take care of the promised consultation. I

DEAR GEORGE: Your memorandum of November 3 to Chester Bowles¹³

SUBJECT

Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting, January 2, 1962: Discussion of the Sino-Soviet Conflict and U.S. Policy²⁰

In your meeting with Mr. Bowles earlier this week you requested that I pass on my recollections of the discussion that took place at the Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting on January 2. The paper under discussion was "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and U.S. Policy."²¹ Here are

22nd Party Congress whose major aim would be to examine, under this cover, the Sino-Soviet split; (b) that the Department establish a study group within NATO on the sa

8. Mr. Bohlen said the essence of the quarrel is that the Russians have become the Mensheviks, while the Chinese are Bolsheviks. Mr. Bohlen added that the serious implications

14. Mr. Tubby suggested that, in view of the break, we place more emphasis on our struggle against Chinese nationalism and Russian nationalism rather than our struggle against communism.

19. Mr. Hilsman added that INR is preparing on Chinese Communist leadership, and one of capability.

23. Mr. Rice responded that the Mandate of Heaven will be lost when the party,²⁴ army, and security forces are no longer responsive to

the joint condemnation of the brutality and oppression which the Chinese Communists impose on the Tibetan people, and in the conviction that the principle of self-determination should apply to the people of Tibet.

The Chinese Government has denounced the General Assembly's adoption of the resolution concerning Tibet. They have taken the position that "no foreign countries or international organizations, the United Nations in any aspect of the situation in Tibet. Their belligerence even toward countries which have previously evident in recent months. In these circumstances it will clearly not be

easy to find effective means of halting the Chinese actions against the Tibetan people.

We are nevertheless determined to continue our efforts to solve this problem. We are also hopeful that provisions may be expanded and improved for

those Tibetans

Your counsel, a welcome in the

Respectfully yo

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²⁸ printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, pp. 1641-1642

Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)³⁰

revolution. It is obviously on its own, with the Soviets using a slow-down if not cessation of economic and military aid as a means to bring Mao back into line. Food shortage continues into third year, and we recently had good indications [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that even the army's capabilities have been affected.³² Moreover, the GRC is probably a wasting asset--so we too must consider whether or not to use it before it declines past the point of no return.

Ed Rice's excellent study on "return to the mainland"³³

without some tremendous provocation by the ChiComs, such as their overt intervention in SEA.

In any case, if we made a major attempt to retake South China, the Chinese would almost certainly, such as their

US support. So our very success would lead to a situation in which Peiping, humbling itself, would have to turn to the Soviets for aid. Then we'd have a major US/USSR war in China which, even if it did not spread, we'd be unlikely to win. Also, what if the GRC failed, even after an initial success? Assuming that the failure were visible enough, it might mean the end of the GRC's pretensions as "the only legitimate government" of China. In fact, the backlash of an unsuccessful attempt would only undermine further the GRC's international position and make it even more difficult for us to preserve it as an independent government on Taiwan. Chiang might be willing to take this gamble, but should we?

There is, of course, a third possible outcome between failure and complete success. In effect the GRC could stir up enough unrest in South China to deplete further ChiCom resources and energies and to make even more difficult Peiping's economic recovery. However, even this could lead the ChiComs to make their peace with Moscow (at least temporarily--most of us feel that, whatever happens, Sino-Soviet tie will never be the same again).

Note that my argument against unleashing Chiang is not based on any value judgment as to whether the ChiComs are now weak enough to

to grow and to buy time to strengthen such peripheral areas as SEA, Korea, etc.

The above becomes doubly relevant when we might go in the opposite direction and sell food to the ChiComs. Harriman is looking into bona fides of Seattle firm's claim ChiComs want to buy 400,000 tons of grain on normal commercial basis.³⁴ His inclination is to go ahead, largely because ChiCom dollars spent for food leave that much less for industrial buildup. But let's think thrice before we start down this road:
(a) ChiCom needs are so much grea

million tons of American wheat annua

desire for consultations at high level and his hopes for US assent to

In light of foregoing discussion it was agreed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] continue discussions with Chiang and his

Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State⁴²

Warsaw, March 1, 1962, 7 p.m.

1336. Cabot-Wang talks. 108 meeting two hours 15 minutes.⁴³ Re Deptel 1114.⁴⁴

(1) After initial civilities and handing Wang letter (reference telegram Tfeitiph 1),⁴⁵ I opened with substance Tfeitiph two reference telegram.⁴⁶ Long silence followed during which Wang nervously shuffled papers, which I interpret as bearing out prediction Tfeitiph three reference telegram.⁴⁷

(2) After welcoming me, Wang observed serious disputes exist between our two countries affecting not only our relations but

⁴² Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-162. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei, Hong Kong, Geneva, Stockholm, and Moscow.

⁴³ Cabot commented and sent recommendations for the next meeting in telegram

(5) I said majority governments of world did not agree Chinese Communist regime was legal government of China. My impression was it came to power by force and maintained self by force. Rebutted charges against US policy SEA along lines Deptel 786.⁵⁰

(6) In saying Chinese people rejected Chiang, Wang referred my personal observations of Chinese welcome to Communist forces in

occupation. I said this objective was a stated policy of the United States adopted about 1958 and supported by CIA. I had gathered from discussions at the Special Group some doubt as to whether this policy remained valid--some doubt as to whether the United States really

need, have more influence in handling agricultural problems. Overall planning for area is still function of

and that unless US agreed to reciprocity on all questions he was not prepared to budge. In this connection MacDonald has impression ChiComs do not rule out completely

2. The fundamental questions confronting the United States Government are:

a. Whether the retention of the island of Taiwan in friendly hands is vital to the interests of the United States in the Western Pacific and

b. How and when are we going to make it clear to President Chiang that a feeble attempt to assault the Mainland, with the intention of involving the United States Government in a first-class war with the ChiComs, cannot and will not be tolerated.

3. a. It would appear that the decision as to whether or not Taiwan is "vital" to our interests needs to be reviewed. This would require re-examination and a decision taken at the highest level.

b. The United States is committed, of course, to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 together with its accompanying Exchange of Notes. The GRC in turn is committed thereby not to use force against the Mainland without our "agreement." Th

character of the ChiCom Party has defected. Similarly no highly placed officer in the ChiCom armed forces has defected. Consequently claims made by the Generalissimo and others of his Government that widespread discontent does exist must be look(m)at askance.

5. On the other hand, there is a theory expressed from time to time by the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Yu Ta-wei, as well as General Chiang Ching-kuo, to the effect that any landing anywhere would produce a "detonation" resulting in widespread acclaim and adhesion to the forces of Nationalist China which would result in overthrow of the government of Peking. With this point of view it is hard to agree. The masses of the people in China are lacking in food, clothing, weapons, cohesion and leaders. Invading forces would muobliged to come equipped to supply these missing resources on a vast scale in order for their presence to generate widespread uprising of the people,

6. In the military dispatch made by "Blue Lion"

papers submitted by Embassy Taipei that the Chinese

time is so deficient in the elements necessary for a

organized and instructed, played a most important part (blowing bridges, railroad tracks, etc.).

7. The United States assistance

these staging areas or air fields whose precise locations are undoubtedly known to the Peking military authorities.

15. Here the question arises of what the United States Government would feel called upon to do. It might be the Government of Peking would disclaim any intent to invade the island of Taiwan, but bombing of such character would undoubtedly result in considerable damage to installations on the island of Taiwan plus the people living there.

~~America personnel. Casualties~~

to our own people would be expected to produce a sharp reaction in the United States--not only on the part of the Government but of the people and of the Congress. Retaliation on our part by our armed forces could scarcely avoid intrusions over the Mainland territory of Communist China. Such hostile action by United States forces would undoubtedly produce a reaction on the part of the Government of Peking. Thus, open warfare between the United States Government and the Government of Peking would eventuate. Consequently there arises the very delicate question as to whether such would not be the opening phase of World War III

military forces to intervene once invasion had been started by the

Gimo.

I consider it most inadvisable

private way of conveying to

reason with General Chiang Kai-sh

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said Mr. Hilsman was prepared to speak to the minority views of the State Department Intelligence officers. Mr. Hilsman responded that he was prepared to speak to the policy implications of the SNIE.⁶³ [

5 paragraphs (27 lines of source text) not declassified
Secretary Rusk asked whether we have any hard evid

The President called attention to a press story in the Philadelphia Inquirer which appeared to have been based on a statement made by a State Department spokesman to the effect that we were anticipating

weeks. He pointed out that the Chinese Communists could cause grave trouble from a standing start; i.e. without reinforcements, on several

on the split coming out of both Peking and Moscow, but it does not attempt to exploit the difference. The President agreed that this was the proper way to handle the current situation.