

THE CHINESE THREAT

PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

PREFACE

First things must come first, and nothing is more important or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace. Everything else, however vital to us— and other things are vital to us— has a secondary place.

FROM PRIME MINISTER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECH AT THE
CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS AT BELGRADE, SEPTEMBER 2,
1961

The most important question facing humanity today is the choice between exploitation of the vast scientific and technological advances, particularly in the nuclear and thermo-nuclear field, for the promotion of the economic and social wellbeing of the people of the world in peace, freedom and independence and the misapplication of these advances for purposes of war and for the domination of one group of people over another by force. With the phenomenal advances in science and technology and the vast array of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, the latter choice can only lead to the destruction of the bulk of humanity and all that human civilisation stands for.

The Cuban crisis last October demonstrated how near the world had come to a nuclear holocaust involving large-scale destruction of humanity and human civilization. The wisdom, sagacity and tolerance of the big powers involved in this crisis, aided by the tactful handling of the crisis by the U.N. Secretary-General, averted the precipitation of a nuclear conflict in which the world might have been involved and strengthened the forces of tolerance, understanding and peace amongst the big powers.

Just about the time of this Cuban crisis the People's Republic of China, which had all along paid lip sympathy to the principles of peace and peaceful co-existence, mutual respect for the territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their internal affairs, chose to exploit its differences over the border question with India to mount a massive attack all along the India-China border and, in violation of all international standards of behaviour between neighbouring countries, to force its own dictates

regarding the alignment of the India-China boundary. This premeditated, massive attack was carefully planned and concerted and led to initial successes for China. The conscience of the world, however, began to assert itself against this wanton aggression on a peace-loving neighbour and China resorted to unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal to confuse world opinion and, at the same time, to compel India to accept interim arrangements dictated by China which would secure for China the advantages of a boundary alignment that it has been seeking by force.

India had all along befriended the People's Republic of China and argued its case in the councils of the world. India stood for peace and peaceful co-existence and undertook responsibilities in various parts of the world to maintain peace and promote a peaceful settlement of differences. India's championship of the policy of non-alignment had made a substantial contribution towards easing international tensions and facilitated the progress and advancement of developing countries in freedom and independence. Consistent with its dedication to peace, India had all along sought the settlement of the India-China differences regarding the boundary by peaceful talks and discussions. This, in spite of the surreptitious, forcible aggression by China into Indian territories in Ladakh since 1957 which led to China forcibly occupying over 12,000 square miles of Indian territory. And yet, China chose to commit further aggression on another sector of the India-China frontier on 8th September, 1962, and, after a few probing attacks, mounted a massive invasion all along the India-China border on 20th October, 1962.

The differences regarding the boundary do not require recourse to war for settlement. These could be settled by peaceful talks and discussions and, if these failed, by recourse to other peaceful methods accepted by international practice. The boundary differences were, however, used as an excuse by China to strike a blow against everything that India stands for, viz. peace, non-alignment and peaceful co-existence between nations with different social and political systems. The China-India clashes do not merely involve differences over boundary alignments in mountainous regions on

the border, but are a challenge to peace and peaceful methods, and to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence between countries with different social and political systems. The Chinese threat is thus directed equally against countries in Asia and Africa developing in independence and freedom according to their own genius. The Chinese invasion of India also constitutes an attempt to reverse the general trend in the world in the post-Cuban crisis period towards mutual tolerance, understanding and peaceful settlement of differences. Chinese insistence on "waging victorious revolutionary struggles" constitutes a serious threat not only to the development of Asian-African countries in freedom and independence, but to world peace.

The Chinese Government have directed their organs of propaganda to show that their differences with India are legalistic and based on small territorial misunderstandings. The evidence produced by the Chinese Government to support even such a limited case is meagre and unconvincing. This brochure is designed to correct the inaccuracies of Chinese propaganda and also to indicate to readers the dimensions of the Chinese threat.

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THE CHINESE THREAT

Ever since India attained independence she has been promoting the principles of Panch Sheel and following a policy of non-alignment. The Hon'ble Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, stated in her opening address at the Conference of the six non-aligned countries recently held in Colombo:

"We have all been accustomed to regard India as the foremost champion of non-alignment. None of us can deny the great contributions which India, led by her distinguished leader Prime Minister Nehru, has made in this respect. The concept of non-alignment and its moral force today is due after all, in large measure, to the powerful advocacy of India and the personal example set by the Indian Prime Minister in his tireless efforts to promote the idea of non-alignment throughout the world. We should, therefore, make it our joint responsibility and a moral obligation which we owe to the cause of non-alignment to see that non-alignment is preserved."

China Violates Panch Sheel

The Government of China, while proclaiming their adherence to the principles of Panch Sheel and laying the blame for the boundary dispute on the aggressive actions of imperialists and colonialists, have indulged in actions which even the imperialists and colonialists of the nineteenth century never adopted. When their aggression was sought to be contained, the Chinese commenced a massive invasion of India on 20th October, 1962. From the size of the Chinese forces deployed, the range of the attacks mounted in the Eastern and Western Sectors of the long boundary of over 2,500 miles and the vast logistic arrangements which supported this massive invasion, it was clear that it was a pre-planned and fully concerted aggression. Even while the Chinese call this "counter-attack in self-defence", their official spokesmen could not explain how this "self-defence" took them in the Eastern Sector alone into a further 20,000 square kilometres of Indian territory.

Same Natural Frontiers Accepted in case of Nepal and Burma

The fact that boundary disputes can be settled peacefully, provided certain basic geographic principles were accepted, has been indicated by the Chinese themselves in their boundary agreements with Nepal and Burma. In these cases, they not only accepted the principle that the main watershed ridge dividing a region should constitute the frontier but also explicitly endorsed it in their agreements. This willingness is, however, strangely wanting in their approach towards the India-China boundary question. While Premier Chou En-lai, in his letter of 15th November, 1962, addressed to Afro-Asian Heads of Government, refers to "the determination of the boundary between the two countries on certain geographical principles such as watersheds, river valleys, mountain passes, etc.....", the Chinese Government in their Memorandum of 8th December, 1962, published barely three weeks later, completely reversed this stand and in no uncertain fashion repudiated the very principle of a natural boundary between the two countries, by stating:

"If India takes exception to this fact, the only thing it can go by is the original 1914 map, and not by any so-called geographical principle laid down by India unilaterally."

And even then, the Chinese follow the 1914 map where it suits them and refuse to follow the 1914 map all along the boundary in the Eastern Sector (Map 5).

Premier Chou En-lai States China will Recognise the McMahon Line

The boundary dispute with India has been created by China very recently. The question of Chinese maps showing an inaccurate boundary alignment between India and China had been raised originally in October 1954 by Prime Minister Nehru with Premier Chou En-lai. The Government of India was then given to understand that the Chinese maps referred to were merely reproductions of old Kuomintang maps and that the present Government had not had the time to revise them. In fact, in November 1956, during his visit to India, Premier Chou En-lai specifically informed the Indian

Prime Minister that the Government of China had accepted the formalisation of the McMahon Line boundary in the case of Burma and that they proposed to recognise it in the case of India also. The Chinese Premier stated that he would be consulting the Tibetan authorities in this regard.

Chinese Armed Intrusions Begin

Surreptitious intrusions into Indian territory in the Western Sector (Ladakh) first started in 1957. The clearing of the Aksai Chin road was the initial step (Map 2). An Indian patrol party on its normal rounds within Indian territory was detained by Chinese forces near Haji Langar in September 1958. The Government of India protested against this detention and also against the clearing of the road by China across Indian territory. But these surreptitious intrusions were soon after followed by incidents between intruding Chinese troops and Indian patrols. The Government of India, still in the belief that these were instances of irresponsible behaviour by Chinese local commanders, lodged protests against these intrusions and incidents.

Boundary Questioned for the First Time in January 1959

It was only in his letter dated 23rd January, 1959, that Premier Chou En-lai, for the first time, questioned the established boundary alignment between India and China. Even then no specific claims on Indian territory were made. And it was not until 8th September, 1959-full eight months later- that Premier Chou En-lai spelt out the Chinese claims to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory (Map 1).

Even though the suddenness with which these claims had been put forward by China came as a great shock to the Government of India, they did not give up their efforts to reach a friendly settlement through patient explanation of the facts about the India-China border. These facts were set out in detail in the Indian Prime Minister's letter dated 26th September, 1959, as well as in an official Note of 4th November, 1959. (Appendices I & II)

The Incident at Kongka Pass

Meanwhile, in October 1959, Chinese armed forces which had advanced 40 miles inside Indian territory in the Chang Chenmo Valley in southern Ladakh, opened fire on an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass, killing 9 Indians. Ten other members of the Indian party were taken into custody and subjected to harsh and inhuman treatment.

The Prime Ministers Meet

In view of this rapid deterioration in the relations between the two countries the Indian Prime Minister wrote on 5th February, 1960, to Premier Chou En-lai suggesting that they might meet and discuss the problems at an early date. The meeting between the two Prime Ministers took place in Delhi in April 1960 and only confirmed that there were serious differences in regard to the understanding of the basic facts about the border. It was accordingly announced at the conclusion of the meeting of the Prime Ministers that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine all relevant documents in support of the stands taken by their respective Governments and report, and that in the meantime every effort should be made to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas. (Appendix III)

The Officials' Report

The Report of the officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the boundary question is a unique document. It has brought together much of the material on which the two sides base their respective stands. The positive Indian evidence as well as the analysis of the Chinese evidence contained in the Report establishes indisputably that the true traditional boundary between India and China is the one that India has shown all along in her official maps. In fact, the Indian officials were surprised at the map brought forward by the Chinese side showing a new frontier alignment in the Western Sector different from the alignment in the Chinese map of 1956 about which Premier Chou En-lai had stated in his letter dated 17th December, 1959, that it "correctly shows the traditional

boundary between the two countries in this sector". It is strange but true that the Chinese consider their frontier to be mobile depending upon the advance of their "frontier guards" (Map 1).

China's Mobile Frontier

It is pertinent to mention that according to the Chinese Notes it was the Chinese "frontier guards" who detained the Indian patrol party in September 1958 at the north-western end of the Sinkiang- Tibet road. Chinese Notes received during the few months before the massive Chinese attacks of 20th October, 1962, referred to Chinese "frontier guards" who were now stated to be manning a series of Chinese posts nearly a hundred miles south-west of where they were in September 1958. Surely, the India-China frontier cannot be mobile and vary from year to year in accordance with the progress of Chinese forcible intrusions.

It is, therefore, not entirely without significance that while the Indian Government published this Report as early as February 1961, the Government of China for long did not even acknowledge its existence and finally published it only in April 1962.

China Intensifies Tension on the Border

Early in 1962 Chinese troops stepped up their aggressive forward patrolling in the Western Sector of the India-China boundary. On 30th April, 1962, the Government of China repeated the threat that they would order the extension of patrolling along the entire boundary.

India Again Proposes Talks

To eliminate the possibility of military clashes, the Government of India, on 14th May, 1962, renewed the suggestion originally made by the Prime Minister of India in November 1959 that, as an interim measure, in the Ladakh region the Indian forces should withdraw west of the Chinese claim line as shown on Chinese maps and the Chinese forces should withdraw to the east of the traditional international boundary. India was further willing

to permit the use of the Aksai Chin road by Chinese civilian traffic. This was a token of India's earnest desire to settle the boundary question by peaceful negotiations.

China-Pakistan Agreement on Kashmir

However, in their reply dated 2nd June, 1962, the Chinese Government rejected this reasonable offer. In fact, in May 1962, China had provocatively entered into an agreement with Pakistan to "locate and align" that part of the boundary in Kashmir which is at present under the unlawful occupation of Pakistan. The Government of India lodged protests with both the Chinese and Pakistan Governments and made it clear that Kashmir is legally a part of India and that they would not recognise any agreement between Pakistan and China in the matter.

Lapse of the 1954 Trade Agreement

In addition to the military incursions deep into Indian territory, the Chinese Government constantly hampered the development of commercial relations between the two countries. These relations had been regulated by the 1954 Agreement on trade and intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China. It was in fact in the preamble to this Agreement that the principles of Panch Sheel had been formally enunciated. It was in this spirit also that the Government of India voluntarily renounced their rights and privileges in Tibet.

However, it had been evident, very soon after the signing of this Agreement, that China had no intention of conforming to its provisions. The Government of India had always provided the Trade Agencies of China in India with the requisite facilities for carrying out their functions. On the other hand, the Government of China, determined to eliminate all contact between India and the Tibet region of China, had continued to deny even normal facilities to the Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet. By their actions the Chinese Government had shown their complete disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Agreement as well as of the Five Principles of Peaceful

Co-existence. The Government of India considered it meaningless, against this background, to renew the Agreement, which, lapsed on the 2nd June, 1962.

The Border Situation Deteriorates

In July 1962, Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley. There were also clashes in the Pangong Lake area. In a Note dated 26th July, 1962, the Government of India referred to the tense situation prevailing in Ladakh and indicated their willingness, as soon as the current tensions had eased and the appropriate climate had been created, to enter into discussions on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the Report of the officials of the two Governments. While Notes on the holding of preliminary discussions to relax tensions and create the appropriate climate were still being exchanged, Chinese troops suddenly marched on 8th September, 1962, across the well-established, and till then peaceful, international boundary in the Eastern Sector. Even then the Government of India continued to maintain a moderate attitude and requested the Government of China, in their Note dated 6th October, 1962, to correct the serious situation created by their wilful and deliberate alteration of the status quo caused by the presence of Chinese troops south of the McMahon Line. (Appendix IV).

China Invades India

Instead of withdrawing her forces, China launched a massive attack in both the Eastern and Western Sectors of the India-China border on 20th October, 1962 (Map 3). This eliminated reasonable possibilities of settling the differences between the two countries in accordance with normally accepted international principles.

China's Three-Point Proposals

After the Chinese forces had advanced well into Indian territory in the Eastern Sector and overrun the limited Indian defence positions in the

Western Sector, Premier Chou En-lai, on 24th October, 1962, put forward a three-point proposal for a cease-fire and disengagement of forces from what he considered the "line of actual control" of the two sides. When this vague concept of the "line of actual control" was ultimately clarified, it turned out to be virtually the line that the Chinese claimed to be their boundary in the Western Sector in 1960. The Chinese also suggested that subsequent to their proposed disengagement, talks should be held between the two countries for the settlement of the boundary question.

In other words, a massive aggression and acquisition of further areas of Indian territory having been completed, China offered in a grand gesture to negotiate on what was left while retaining the gains not only of the earlier but also of her latest aggression.

The Vacation of Aggression

The attitude of the Government of India to these suggestions has been simple and straightforward. While Chinese aggressive activity since 1957, culminating in the latest massive invasion, was cause enough to disbelieve any Chinese professions of peaceful intent, the Government of India were nevertheless prepared to discuss the question with China if only the latest aggression was undone. National dignity and self-respect demanded that there could be no talks with the Chinese unless the positions of the two sides before 8th September had been restored. If China is really sincere about the solution of this question the least she could do is to agree to the restoration of the status quo prior to her latest aggression (Map 4).

China's Unilateral Cease-fire

The attitude of the Chinese Government has never been straightforward or clear but always fraught with endless equivocation. On 21st November, 1962, when the Chinese Government declared their intention to cease fire and withdraw unilaterally from the midnight of the 21st/22nd and issued a statement to this effect, it was, as most other Chinese statements, both vague and ambiguous. Although clarifications were sought, the Chinese

Government declined to define with any degree of precision the base line which they referred to as the "line of actual control" as on 7th November, 1959, from which they proposed to carry out withdrawals in both the Western and the Eastern Sectors. Indications, however, were that in the Western Sector this was to be the line up to which Chinese forces had reached as a result of their recent massive aggression mounted after 20th October, 1962. (Map 4). In the Eastern Sector, the "line of actual control" was to be their version of the McMahon Line, which deviated to their advantage from the principle of the highest watershed ridge which is the natural and traditional boundary alignment (Map 5).

The Colombo Conference

There was general concern, especially amongst the non-aligned countries, at this rapidly developing threat to world peace. To deal with this serious situation created by the Chinese invasion of India, the Prime Minister of Ceylon convened a conference of six non-aligned countries-Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Ghana and the U.A.R.-at Colombo from 10th to 12th December, 1962, to discuss ways and means to assist in arriving at a peaceful settlement. The Conference announced that "its purpose was not to consider the merits and demerits of the dispute but to provide for an exchange of views in order to assist the two countries to resume direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a peaceful settlement". The Conference has made certain proposals which the Hon'ble Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike has been requested to discuss personally with the two Governments.

Chinese Deception

The Chinese claim that "the fact that the Indian Government refuses to restore the state of boundary of November 7, 1959, but wants to restore the state of the boundary on September 8, 1962, proves that since 1959 the Indian Government has seized by force large tracts of Chinese territory" . The truth is that as on 7th November, 1959, the Chinese had by no means

attained a consolidated line in Ladakh but had established only a few scattered posts on Indian territory. These posts at Haji Langar, Kongka Pass, Khurnak and Spanggur had been progressively established by intruding Chinese troops since 1957 by forcible and unilateral alteration of the status quo of the boundary even while assuring that China had no territorial claims against her. Chinese forces had by November, 1959, only reached the posts referred to above and were nowhere west of this line. By a process of gradual intrusion they occupied, by September 1962, more than 6,000 sq. miles of additional territory and, as a result of their massive aggression since, a further 2,500 sq. miles, till they finally reached the line which they now claim was their "line of actual control" as early as November 1959 (Map 3).

India holds firmly to the view that before negotiations are held, minimum corrective action should be taken to restore the position on the ground of the forces of both sides as they had been before the commencement of the latest Chinese aggression. Indian posts as on September 8, 1962, were all on Indian territory and in the nature of limited defensive measures that had been taken by the Government of India to prevent further Chinese aggression into Indian territory. These were the posts that were overrun when Chinese forces mounted a massive attack after October 20, 1962, resulting in further occupation of large areas of Indian territory.

THE WESTERN SECTOR

No Basis for China's Claims

The evidence relating to the Western Sector, i.e, the area where the Jammu and Kashmir State of India meets the Sinkiang province of China in the north and north-east, and Tibet in the north-east and east, produced by the Indian side at the talks of the officials in 1960, shows indisputably how, for many centuries, important points along the Indian alignment were recognised as the traditional limits of Ladakh on the one hand and Sinkiang and Tibet on the other.

All Documentary Evidence Supports India

The well-known Chronicle of the Kings of Ladakh, La Dvags Rgyal Rabs, written in the 10th century, recorded that the Ladakh boundary was traditional and well-known. Evidence has been furnished regarding other major points on this boundary by travellers of different centuries, who visited these areas. These travellers included Desideri (1715), Baillie Fraser (1820), Cunningham (1854), Nain Singh (1873), Carey (1885-87), Bower (1891), Wellby (1898) and Deasy (1900).

Similarly, the Indian side demonstrated with the support of a large variety of documents and maps originating in different countries, including China, that at least from the 6th century onwards, the southern limits of Sinkiang never extended south of the Kuen Lun ranges, and only reached up to them towards the end of the 19th century. This makes it clear that the Aksai Chin plateau and the Lingzi Tang plains were never a part of China. Among the authoritative items of evidence furnished were extracts and maps from well-known Chinese works, such as the Nei fu yu tu (1760), Hsi yu tu chih. (1762)—Map 6, Ta Ching hui tien (1818), Hsin Chiang chieh Lueh (1821) —Map 7, Hsi yu shui tao chi (1824) and Hsin Chiang tu chih (1911). Such maps were not only proof of cartographic accuracy based on first-hand knowledge; they were also authoritative as, in accordance with Chinese legislation (the latest being the Revised Ordinance Governing the

Examination of Maps and Charts of 8th September 1936), no maps and charts showing the boundaries of China could be published in that country without the express sanction of the Central Government. There were also maps such as the one given by Hung Tachen, a Chinese official, to the British Consul at Kashgar, in 1893 (Map 8) and others published by the Chinese Government themselves such as the Postal Atlases of 1917 (Map 13), 1919 (Map 9) and 1933 which showed the whole of Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang as parts of India.

Aksai Chin: An Integral Part of India

China falsely alleges that she has always exercised jurisdiction in the Aksai Chin area. At the talks of the officials, documentary evidence was furnished by the Indian side establishing that the people of Ladakh had used the Aksai Chin and other areas, now claimed by China, as of right for trading, hunting, grazing and salt collecting. Further, even though most of these areas were largely uninhabited, official documents establishing the continuous and comprehensive exercise of Indian administration over these areas for over a hundred years were brought forward. It was shown that police checkposts had been maintained by the Kashmir Government in the northern Aksai Chin area as far back as 1865. There were a series of revenue and assessment reports covering the whole area now claimed by China. Aksai Chin and the whole of the Chang Chenmo Valley were part of the Ilqa of Tanktse and Ladakh Tehsil; and the revenue map of this Tehsil of 1908-9 (Map 10) was supplied to the Chinese side and they were unable to refute it. Representative documents out of the continuous record showing the control exercised over the various frontier areas and the revenue collected from the frontier villages were also provided.

Demchok

As regards the regularly inhabited areas further south, such as Demchok, nineteen significant documents of regular administration, pertaining to revenue settlements and census operations, were brought forward by the

Indian side in an unbroken series for the years from 1865 to the present time.

Other evidence provided by the Indian side established that at least from the 19th century onwards trade routes running through this area were maintained by the Kashmir Government (Map 2). In 1870 the British Indian Government signed an agreement with the Government of Kashmir securing permission to survey the trade routes in this area "including the route via the Chang Chenmo Valley". There were also legislative enactments of the Government of Kashmir regulating hunting expeditions in the Demchok and Khurnak areas and the whole Chang Chenmo Valley. Officials had been touring these areas regularly right down to the present time, and Indian officials, survey parties and patrols constantly visited these areas up to the traditional alignment.

The Sanction of Treaties

Further, the Indian side showed that the traditional boundary received the sanction of treaties concluded in 1684 between Ladakh and Tibet and in 1842 between Ladakh on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other and that it found further confirmation in subsequent diplomatic correspondence between the British Indian Government and the Chinese Central Government and in a local agreement reached by the border authorities of the two States in 1852.

China's Shifting Claims

The Chinese side, however, was unable to bring forward any evidence which could substantiate its claims. Yet it produced a map which advanced its claims to take in another 2,000-2,500 square miles of Indian territory as against the Chinese map of 1956.

The so-called "line of actual control" in the Western Sector now claimed by the Chinese as having existed on 7th November 1959 varies again from the 1960 Chinese claim line, in some places cutting even further into Indian territory! (Map 4).

THE MIDDLE SECTOR

No Basis for China's Claims

Apart from the natural and geographical basis of the high Himalayan watershed which supports the Indian alignment in the Middle Sector, the Indian side at the talks of the officials showed that literary and religious tradition as well as ancient chronicles corroborated the Indian boundary alignment in a surprisingly precise manner. The area now claimed by China (Map 11) -Kaurik and Gyu in the Spiti area, Shipki Pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area and Bara Hoti, Sangcha-malla and Laphthal-were from the beginning of history parts of Indian kingdoms. The boundaries of the early Indian border states of Bashahr and Garhwal lay along the watershed, and numerous early inscriptions as also historians like Ferishta have borne testimony to this. The famous Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsang had visited the region in the 7th century and confirmed that it lay in India. After the 8th century the areas were ruled successively by the Katyuri, Chand, Pala, Malla and other Garhwali dynasties right up to the latter half of the 18th century. Later, some of these areas were conquered by Nepal but recovered by the then Indian Government in 1815. The Indian side produced innumerable contemporary records and accounts of explorers and travellers of the last 150 years who had testified that the boundary lay along the Himalayan water-parting. Moreover, the alignment was confirmed not only by unofficial British maps, but by maps prepared in Germany, Russia, France and, above all—and most significantly—by Chinese maps (Maps 12 and 13). Evidence was quoted for every one of the areas in dispute to establish that the Indian authorities had always exercised effective administrative and civil jurisdiction over these areas. For every area, numerous details of revenue settlements, tax collection records, official village maps, accounts of tours of officials and of road construction, and reports of topographical and geological surveys were furnished as manifest proofs of Indian official authority. The revenue records cited for Nilang-Jadhang, for example, were

of a very detailed character, covering the years 1868-1951 and giving information on the exact limits of every village and hamlet, the type of land, the extent of forests and the most detailed figures of revenue. (Map 14). The Indian side took pains to present such a selection of records as would make clear that they were not just of an occasional nature but mirrored an unbroken and continuous exercise of normal governmental authority down till today. All these documents were shown to the Chinese during the discussions of the officials.

The 1954 Agreement Confirmed the Border as Shown in Indian Maps

The Chinese Government also can have no doubt about where the frontier lies in this region, since the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 on trade and intercourse specifies six border passes in the Middle Sector thereby confirming the traditional alignment of the Indian frontier (Map 11). If there had been any doubt as to the border, the appropriate occasion when the Government of China could have taken it up was at the time of signing of the Agreement. If the border were not known to both sides, how could a Treaty embodying the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, one of which was mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity, have been signed in the first place? It certainly could not have been entered into if there had been the least doubt regarding the border.

THE EASTERN SECTOR

An Ethnic Argument

The Chinese assert that "the inhabitants who have long lived in this area are either Tibetans or peoples closely akin to them". The Chinese Government have often maintained that certain areas are part of Tibet by virtue of the fact that the inhabitants are ethnically Tibetans. However, one has only to consult Premier Chou En-lai's own statement at the Fourth Session of the National People's Congress at Peking of July 9, 1957, in order to establish how unreal such a claim is. The Chinese Premier had stated then as follows:

"The boundary question has a direct bearing on the interests of the nationalities living in compact communities on the Sino-Burmese borders. Therefore, in tackling this question we must specially take into account the interests of these nationalities. We know that the boundary line between two countries is often found dividing into two parts a nationality living in compact communities on the border. This is the result of historical development. On the various sections of the defined boundary between China and Burma and on the border between China and other countries we find people of the same nationality living on both sides of the boundary line. So, when we solve the question of the undefined boundary line between China and Burma, we must realise beforehand that it will be hard to avoid separating the nationalities concerned by the boundary line."

India shares these views, based on historical facts, which Premier Chou En-lai proclaimed in 1957; but they are in direct contradiction to what the Chinese now project to Afro-Asian countries as the substance of their claims on India in the Eastern Sector. India is a country in which people of different races and creeds enjoy common citizenship and there are thousands of Indian citizens of Tibetan origin. Needless to say these Indians of Tibetan origin have always been devoted and patriotic citizens of India.

India's Sovereignty over NEFA Never in Dispute

During the officials' talks held in 1960, the Indian side showed how the submontane region, i.e. the stretch of territory between the foothills and the main Himalayan range had always been a part of India. The British Indian Government which succeeded the Ahom rulers exercised administrative control over the tribals living in the area in the same manner as over other Indian tribes such as those in the North West Frontier areas of undivided India, as well as over those in the tribal areas in the heart of India.

No Basis for China's Claims

There is positive evidence to show that Indian sovereignty had always been exercised in this area. A special form of administration was necessary for this area as the distinctive features of tribal life had to be preserved. Thus, entry was restricted into these areas and a distinction was made between lines of administration. For instance, on British maps an "Inner Line" marked the extent of regular administration as it normally prevailed over the rest of the country. This "Inner Line" showed only the limits of regular administration as distinct from the international frontier which runs along the highest watershed ridges of the Great Himalayan Range. The Annual Reports of Political Officers from the middle of the 19th century provide a clear picture of the detailed and continuous administration exercised in these areas by the British Indian authorities even though this administration was necessarily of a special nature. That these areas have always belonged to India is clear from the various Indian legislative enactments, administrative regulations and statutes of 1873, 1880, 1884, 1914, 1919, 1928, and 1929 the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Constitution of 1950.

The Weakness of the Chinese Evidence

In sharp contrast, there is no evidence of even a single Chinese law or administrative enactment to show that China has ever exercised control

over the areas claimed by them south of the highest watershed ridge in this region. The only documents which they could adduce in their favour indicated ecclesiastical connections which cannot be confused with exercise of sovereignty.

The 1914 Agreement

This natural, traditional and customary boundary was formalised by the McMahon Line Agreement of 1914 signed by the Indian and Tibetan Governments with the knowledge of the Chinese Government (Map 15).

The Chinese Government, who are now refusing to recognise the McMahon Line, claim that the Agreement was arrived at outside the Simla Conference attended by the representatives of the three countries, and allege that the British Representative concluded the Agreement through a secret exchange of letters with the Representative of Tibet. In fact, the Chinese Government had conferred full powers on their Representative and, what was even more significant, accepted without any reservations the credentials of the Tibetan Representative who had been vested with full powers in the name of the Dalai Lama and authorised to function as an equal plenipotentiary with those of China and India to settle all matters pertaining to Tibet. Thus, the Chinese Government accepted a procedure which, under diplomatic usage, is normally adopted at international conferences of representatives of sovereign States.

That China did not later ratify the Tripartite Agreement does not in any way invalidate the agreement reached by exchange of letters on 24th and 25th March, 1914, between the British and Tibetan Representatives in respect of the boundary alignment between Tibet and India. In fact, all Chinese reservations had been merely regarding the boundaries of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. (Appendix V). The Simla Convention was published in Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, and can by no means be said to have been secret. There was never any objection or indeed comment of any kind by the Chinese Government of the time regarding the boundary shown on the Simla Convention Map (Map 15) and formalised in the earlier

exchange of letters on 24th and 25th March, 1914, between the Indian and Tibetan Representatives.

Moreover, such Chinese evidence as was produced at the talks of the officials relating to other sectors of the boundary is of Tibetan origin and is based on the assumption of a Tibetan Government which functioned all along her frontiers without Chinese presence or support. By quoting such Tibetan evidence with approval, the Chinese Government have themselves confirmed Tibet's authority to negotiate and conclude treaties with her neighbours regarding her boundary. How then can the Chinese who, on the one hand, quote Tibetan agreements with India when they appear to corroborate their stand in the Middle and Western Sectors, disown a similar Tibetan agreement with India when it does not serve their purpose in the Eastern Sector?

In November 1947, the Government of China, after the transfer of power to the Government of India, enquired whether India had assumed the Treaty rights and obligations till then prevailing between India and Tibet, as distinct from those between India and China. This is the strongest possible proof both of the validity of the McMahon Line Agreement and its recognition by the Chinese Government. (Appendix VI).

The Status of Tibet

The present status and powers of Tibet cannot in any way be projected backwards to influence one's understanding of the nature of the relations subsisting between China and Tibet in 1914. During the 300 years prior to 1950, Tibet, whatever the status it enjoyed, had the right to sign treaties and have direct dealings with her neighbours on boundary matters. The treaties signed by Tibet with Ladakh in 1684 and 1842, and the treaty signed by Tibet with Nepal in 1856, confirm the fact that Tibet was in a position to conduct relations on her own with foreign powers. The Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856 was in operation for a full century until explicitly abrogated by the Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1956. In 1890, the Tibetan Government protested against the conclusion of a treaty between Britain

and China in regard to Tibet and successfully defied its implementation. It, therefore, became necessary for Britain to sign a separate agreement with Tibet in 1904. Far from objecting to all these direct negotiations by Tibet, the Chinese Amban had assisted in the proceedings. It is also well-known that in 1911 Tibet had issued a Declaration of Independence. All this goes to show that, whatever the theoretical concept of China's relations with Tibet, there were recurring periods when Tibet enjoyed full powers to deal with other States.

Sino-Burmese Boundary Agreement Based on McMahon Line

Indeed the Indian position regarding the McMahon Line as coinciding with the traditional boundary has found support, where the Sino-Burmese sector of the McMahon Line boundary is concerned, in the Sino-Burmese Agreement of 1960. In other words, Chinese arguments against the McMahon Line Agreement are proof of the fact that, with regard to the position of Tibet before 1950, they accept what suits them and reject what is not in consonance with present Chinese claims.

Philology in Support of Territorial Claims

"Most of the geographical names" that are in Ladakh and NEFA, Chinese commentators say, "are in the Tibetan language" and they are consequently parts of Tibet.

This is a wholly untenable argument to support a territorial claim. No country has made territorial claims on philological bases. Because certain places like Se La or Dirang Dzong have Tibetan names, they do not automatically become part of Tibet since, by the same logic, most of Tibet and a considerable part of Sinkiang having place names like Khotan, Kailash, Manasarowar, Rakastal etc. of Sanskrit or Prakrit origin, could well be claimed as parts of India.

The Tibetan Revolt

In an attempt to vilify the Government of India, the Government of China

have often alleged that "the Indian Government not only aided and abetted the rebellion in Tibet, but gave asylum to the Tibetan refugees and connived at the anti-Chinese political activities in India."

The Government of India emphatically repudiate any connection with the Tibetan revolt. The Dalai Lama as well as the Tibetan refugees who came to India after the revolt in Tibet in 1959 were given political asylum on the clear understanding that they should not indulge in any political activity. (Statement of the Prime Minister of India in Appendix VII). The Chinese argument, that by giving asylum, on humanitarian grounds, to Tibetans who had to leave their native land in 1959, the Government of India had interfered in the internal affairs of China is manifestly untrue. Tibetan refugees were given asylum in India in accordance with international law and practice in this matter. These refugees have received no encouragement from the Government of India to indulge in political activities.

The further charge that it was only after the rebellion in Tibet that the Indian Government formally laid claims to large tracts of "Chinese territory" is not only false but palpably absurd. Indian maps over at least the last one hundred years have been showing the traditional Indian alignment. It is strange that the Government of China should deliberately display ignorance of a large number of editions of official maps by the Survey of India on different scales and in general circulation for so many years. Indeed, some of these maps had been officially handed over to the authorities in Tibet at various times. On the other hand, it was only when the Chinese had decided to put down local autonomy in Tibet ruthlessly that Premier Chou En-lai, for the first time, stated in January 1959 that the Sino-Indian frontier was not delimited and later, after March 1959 when the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees were given political asylum in India, he put in a specific Chinese claim to over 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.

Chinese Interpretation of the McMahon Line

Chinese propaganda also claims that Indian armed forces crossed the

"illegal McMahon Line" and occupied Longju and the Thagla ridge area.

The Chinese claim that these two places lie to the north of the McMahon Line. But, as has been pointed out, the traditional boundary in the Eastern Sector lies along the highest watershed ridge and the area south of it is traditionally a part of India and administered by Indian authorities. Indeed the official communications of 1953 and 1955 from local Chinese officers, the Tsona Dzongpons, show that even the People's Government in China, for many years after they had established their authority in Tibet, had in this sector accepted the international alignment as shown on Indian maps. In an attempt to justify their recent illegal intrusion into the Thagla ridge area the Government of China have cited the co-ordinates of the western terminal point of the McMahon Line on the Treaty Map (Map 5).

The McMahon Line Map was mainly illustrative in nature and indicative of the basic fact that the boundary lies along the highest watershed ridge. In an explanatory Memorandum McMahon himself has recorded:

"...It will be seen that the boundary line on the west follows the crest of the mountain range which runs from peak 21431 through Tu Lung La and Menlakathong La to the Bhutan border. This is the highest mountain range in this tract of the country. To the north of it are people of Tibetan descent; to the south the inhabitants are of Bhutanese and Aka extraction."

That the map is on too small a scale to show the boundary in detail and that it does not give precise geographic locations is recognised even by the Chinese in the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty where they admit that there could be variations between the co-ordinates as read on such a map and the results obtained from actual survey on the ground. In fact, on a strict interpretation of the boundary according to the co-ordinates of the 1914 Treaty Map, India could claim more territory to the north of the line shown by her as the international boundary in the Eastern Sector.

China's Threat to the World

The situation created by the Chinese aggression across India's borders

has jeopardised not only non-alignment but Afro-Asian solidarity. India has never claimed an inch of territory belonging to another country. The people and the Government of India are traditionally dedicated to the ways of peace. However, there is no alternative for India but to resist when blatant aggression in violation of all internationally accepted norms of behaviour is committed by an expansionist and aggressive neighbour whose political philosophy is based on the principle that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

The aggression by China is a challenge to the very principle of peaceful co-existence and is a matter that affects not only India's security but that of the peoples of the world. As the Prime Minister of India has stated in his message of October 26/27, 1962, addressed to Heads of Government: "This is not a mere boundary dispute or a question of small territorial frontier adjustments. Apart from the vast and fantastic claims that China has made, China had already occupied 12,000 square miles of Indian territory during the last five years. While Notes were being exchanged for arranging talks and discussions to ease tensions and even dates and places were being suggested, further aggression by China started on 8th September and further areas of Indian territory were occupied in a new sector. The issue involved is not one of small territorial gains, one way or the other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries and whether the world will allow the principle of 'Might is Right' to prevail in international relations. Bearing this in mind, India will continue to resist aggression, both to preserve her honour and integrity and to prevent international standards from deteriorating into the jungle law of 'Might is Right'. When aggression is continuously taking place and vast Chinese armies are moving further into our territory, how can we discuss or talk about a peaceful settlement? The first essential is that the Chinese forces along the India-China border should go back at least to where they were prior to the 8th September, 1962.

"I have ventured to give you this short account of the crisis that has arisen on the Indian frontier with China. The story of this aggression is a long one

going back several years. The most recent aggression in our Eastern Sector which began on September 8th and has, since the Chinese massive attack along the entire India-China frontier which started on 20th October, resulted in serious conflicts, has brought matters to a crisis. This crisis is not only of India but of the world and will have far-reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the peace of the world. We cannot submit to this law of the jungle which affects our integrity and the honour of our motherland.

"In this hour of crisis, when we are engaged in resisting this aggression, we are confident that we shall have your sympathy and support as well as the sympathy and support of all countries, not only because of their friendly relations with us, but also because our struggle is in the interests of world peace and is directed to the elimination of deceit, dissimulation and force in international relations."

**Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of
China, 26 September 1959**

New Delhi; the 26th September, 1959.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of September 8, 1959. I must say that I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India. As you know; the boundary in the eastern sector is loosely referred to as the McMahon Line. I do not like this description, but for convenience I propose to refer to it as such. When I discussed this with you, I thought that we were confronted with the problem of reaching an agreement on where exactly the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the boundary lay. Even when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century. In your latest letter you have sought to make out a claim to large tracts of Indian territory and have even suggested that the independent Government of India are seeking to reap a benefit from the British aggression against China. Our Parliament and our people deeply resent this allegation. The struggle of the Indian people against any form of imperialism both at home and abroad is known and recognised all over the world and we had thought that China also appreciated and recognised our struggle. It is true that the British occupied and ruled the Indian sub-continent against the wishes of the Indian people. The boundaries of India were, however, settled for centuries by history, geography, custom and tradition. Nowhere indeed has India's dislike of imperialist policies been more clearly shown than in her attitude towards Tibet. The Government of India voluntarily renounced all the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by Britain in Tibet before 1947 and recognised by Treaty that Tibet is a region of China. In the course of the

long talks that we had during your last visit to India, you had told me that Tibet had been and was a part of China but that it was an autonomous region.

2. You have suggested in your letter that the Government of India have applied all sorts of pressure on the Chinese Government, including the use of force, to make the Chinese Government accept the Indian demand: This is the reverse of what the Government of India did. We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides. In fact our failure to do so has now resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the Government both in Parliament and in the press in our country. Far from using force, we sought the peaceful settlement of the disputes. You must be aware of the prolonged negotiations between the Indian and Chinese representatives over Bara Hoti in 1958 and of the notes exchanged between our two Governments on the other disputes. I need hardly tell you ' that there is great resentment in India at the action of your troops in overpowering our outpost in Longju on our side of the McMahon Line, and although you have up till now not withdrawn your troops have not sought to reoccupy the post.

3. You have referred to the maintenance of the long existing status quo on the border. The Government of India have always been in favour of it. It is the Chinese Government who have violated it repeatedly in recent years. I can refer, for example, to the construction of a 100-mile road across what has traditionally been Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area, the entry of Chinese survey parties in the Lohit Frontier Division in 1957, the establishment of a camp at Spanggur in 1959; the despatch of armed

personnel to Bara Hoti in 1958 and stationing them there in winter against customary practice and last, but not least, the use of force Longju.

4. It is true that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited along its entire length. Indeed the terrain of the Sino- Indian border in many places makes such physical demarcation on the ground impossible. But the entire length of the border has been either defined by treaty or recognised by custom or by both and until now the Chinese Government have not protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of India upto the customary border. You have yourself acknowledged the fact that no armed clash ever occurred along our border until the beginning of this year. All Chinese Governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that previous Chinese Governments were weak is no answer. Not even a protest was registered in accordance with established state practice in this regard, as was done in the case of Burma between 1906 and 1937.

5. Concerning the boundary between Tibet and Ladakh, it is incorrect to say that the then Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of the treaty between Tibet and Kashmir in 1842. The treaty was signed by the representatives of both the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China. Kalon Sokon, one of the signatories, though by birth a Tibetan, had Chinese rank. Even the Tibetan version of the treaty makes it clear -that China was a party to it. Thus, it asserts that "there will never be on any account in future till the world lasts, any deviation even by the hair's breadth and any breach in the alliance, friendship and unity between the King of the world Siri Khalsaji Sahib and Siri Maharaj Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur, and the Khagan of China and the Lama Guru Sahib of Lhasa."

6. It is true that the 1842 treaty referred merely to the "old established frontiers". This was because these frontiers were well-known and did not require any formal delimitation. Even the treaty of 1884 between Ladakh

and Tibet stated that "the boundaries fixed in the beginning, when Skyid-Ida-ngeema-gon gave a kingdom to each of his three sons, shall still be maintained." References in the Ladakhi chronicles of the 17th century indicate that the boundary was well-established. Cunningham, whom Your Excellency has referred to with approval, toured the area in 1846. He stated in 1854 that the eastern boundary of Ladakh "is well-defined by piles of stones, which were set up after the last expulsion of the Sokpo or Mongol hordes in A.D. 1687 when the Ladakhis received considerable assistance from Kashmir." (Ladakh, 1854, page 261). Thus it is clear that for nearly two centuries the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognized by both sides. There was a constant flow of trade between Ladakh and Tibet during these centuries as provided for by these treaties, and no boundary conflicts ever arose.

7. It has been stated in your letter that China never ratified the 1842 treaty. That China recognised the treaty is clear from the fact that the Chinese official in 1847 informed the British Government: "Respecting the frontiers I beg to remark that the borders of those territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed, so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them." There was no suggestion that the Chinese Government regarded the treaty as invalid. It is also clear from the statement quoted that not merely was the boundary known, but the boundary was distinctly and sufficiently fixed and there was no divergence of opinion as to where it lay.

8. Further evidence of Chinese acceptance of the 1842 treaty is provided by the fact that the other provisions of the treaty regarding exchange of goods and presents were in operation right up to 1946 without any hindrance from the Chinese Government.

9. It is incorrect to say that down to 1899 the British Government proposed

formally to delimit this section of the boundary but that the Chinese Government did not agree. No proposals were made between 1847 and 1899 for any such formal delimitation. The proposal made in 1899 by the British Government referred not to the eastern frontier of Ladakh with Tibet but to the northern frontier of Ladakh and Kashmir with Sinkiang. It was stated in that context that the northern boundary ran along the Kuen Lun range to a point east of 80° east longitude, where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This signified beyond doubt that the whole of Aksai Chin area lay in Indian territory. The Government of China did not object to this proposal.

10. So Ladakh, Tibet and China had all accepted that the frontier between Ladakh and Tibet was the customary boundary. You have stated that the boundary as shown in the Chinese maps follows more or less, that shown in the map of "Punjab, Western Himalaya and adjoining parts of Tibet" compiled by Walker and attached to Cunningham's book published in 1854. Walker's Map states in the Compilation Index that the document used for this sector is the "Map of Ladakh and Nari Khorsum by Capt. H. Strachey". Now Strachey toured only a part of Ladakh in 1847-48. He knew little nothing about Aksai Chin, having never visited the area, and drew the boundary where he thought the main water-parting; which was the natural and old established frontier in this area, lay. Thereafter a number of exploration and survey parties were sent by the Government of India to this region. These parties ascertained the customary frontier on the basis of natural features and such local evidence as was available. Johnson visited the area in 1865 and Frederick Drew, an Englishman in the employ of the Maharaja of Kashmir as Governor of Ladakh, in 1869. Other survey parties in the nineteenth century were those of Hayward, Shaw and Cayley in 1868, Carey in 1885-87, Hamilton Bower in 1891, Littledale in 1895, Welby and Malcolm in 1896, Deasy and Pike in 1896, and Aurel Stein in 1900. Accurate maps of the whole Ladakh area thus became possible only from 1865, after the afore-mentioned surveys had ascertained the exact lie of the

watershed; and it is significant that most of the maps since that date show the customary boundary in accordance with the line shown by us in our map rather than that claimed by China. The later Map of Turkestan of Walker himself published in 1867-68, Drew's map attached to this book *Jammoo & Kashmir Territories* (1875), Johnston's Atlas (1882), and maps attached to the *Gazetteers of Kashmir* published from 1890 onwards all showed boundary lines more or less similar to our present frontier. Even official Chinese maps of the late nineteenth century showed a boundary approximating to our line. It is only in official Chinese maps of the twentieth century that the Chinese Government included large parts of our territory. On the other hand, *The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China*, published in Shanghai sometime after 1917 by the *North China Daily News* and *Herald* on the basis of authoritative surveys, shows a boundary in the north-west similar to our alignment and a boundary in the north-east which approximates to what later became known as the McMahon Line. I may add that the Chinese maps do not follow even Walker's Map of 1854 where it does not support the assertion made on behalf of China. Thus Walker shows the areas north of Demchok and north of Pangong in India but recent Chinese maps have not followed Walker's map in regard to these areas.

11. You have referred to the sector of the boundary between what is known as the Ari area of Tibet and India. We are told that Ari, which is an abbreviated form of Ngari Khorsum, is south-western Tibet. This is the sector of the boundary between the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in India and the Tibet region. You have stated that the boundary in this sector has never been formally delimited. In fact, there should be little doubt about the boundary in this sector. Article IV of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement specifies six passes in this area. There was discussion of these passes between the Chinese and Indian representatives before the Agreement was concluded. Your original draft contained the following: "The Chinese Government agrees to open the following passes." On behalf of India, Mr. Kaul then said that these were Indian passes. After some

discussion both sides agreed on the following text: Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes. Your Vice-Foreign Minister remarked in that context. "This was the fifth concession on our part". This was recognition of the passes as border passes. In fact the Government of India have always been in control of the Indian ends of the passes.

12. I am particularly surprised by your statement that "the so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China". You further state that the agreement in regard to the frontier between India and Tibet was concluded between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities and that it has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government. From this you draw the conclusion that the agreement is illegal. The facts, however; are otherwise. The arrangements for the Simla Conference were made with the full knowledge and consent of the Government of China. The Foreign Minister of China wrote to the British representative on the 7th August 1913 that the Chinese plenipotentiary would proceed to India "to open negotiations for a treaty jointly" with the Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries. It is clear from the proceedings of the conference that not only did the Chinese representative fully participate in the conference but that the Tibetan-representative took part in the discussions on an equal footing with the Chinese and the then British Indian representatives. Not only were the frontiers of India with Tibet discussed at the conference, but also the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China, and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. At no stage, either then or subsequently, did the Chinese Government object to the discussions on the boundary between India and Tibet at the conference. In the circumstances the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary a between India and Tibet must, in accordance with accepted international practice, be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet. In fact this was not the first occasion when Tibet concluded an agreement with other countries. In 1856

Tibet concluded an agreement on its own with Nepal. The Convention signed by Britain and Tibet in 1904 was negotiated by the British and Tibetan representatives with the assistance of the Chinese Amban in Tibet.

13. You have stated that for a long time after the exchange of so-called secret notes between Britain and Tibet Britain did not dare to make public the related documents. You have also contended that the McMahon Line "was later marked on the map attached to the 'Simla Treaty'". I am afraid I cannot agree either with your facts or your conclusion. The Chinese representative at the Simla Conference was fully aware of the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet. This particular line was discussed between the Tibetan and British Indian representatives, but when the draft convention emerging from the conference was presented on the 22nd April 1914 for signature by the British Indian, Tibetan and Chinese representatives it had attached to it a map showing the McMahon Line boundary as well as the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China, and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Later, the Chinese Foreign Office in a memorandum, dated the 25th April 1914 listed a number of objections to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and China. It did not raise any objection to the boundary between Tibet and India as shown in the map attached to the tripartite Simla Convention. Thereafter, on the 27th April, the Chinese representative initialed both the convention and the map without any objection. Subsequently, in their memorandum, dated the 13th June 1914, the Chinese made fresh proposals regarding the boundaries of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. It is significant that no mention was at all made in this memorandum of the boundary between Tibet and India. Almost five years later, on the 30th May 1919, the Government of China again suggested some modifications of the Simla Convention with a view to reaching a final settlement. These modifications related only to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. No reference at all was made to the boundary between Tibet and India (McMahon Line). Looking into the old

papers, we find that the British Government withheld the publication of the Simla Convention for several years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. The Simla Convention was published in the 1929 edition of Aitchison's Treaties and the McMahon Line was shown in the official maps from 1937 onwards. These maps were circulated widely but neither then nor subsequently was any objection raised by the Chinese authorities.

14. I entirely disagree with the inference drawn by you from the exchange of two communications between the Tibetan Bureau in Lhasa and the new Government of India in 1947. The facts are that our Mission in Lhasa forwarded to us a telegram, dated the 16th October 1947 from the Tibetan Bureau. The telegram asked for the return of alleged Tibetan territories on boundaries of India and Tibet "such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan; Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of river Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh etc. up to boundary of Yarkhim." It will be seen that the areas claimed by Tibet had not been defined. If they were to be taken literally, the Tibetan boundary would come down to the line of the river Ganges. The Government of India could not possibly have entertained such a fantastic claim. If they had the faintest idea that this telegram would be made the basis of a subsequent claim to large areas of Indian territory, they would of course have immediately and unequivocally rejected the claim. Not having had such an impression, they sent a reply to the following effect: "The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations on the existing basis until new agreements are reached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's Government". It would be unfair to deduce from this reply that India undertook to negotiate fresh agreements with Tibet on the frontier question. When the British relinquished power and India attained freedom on the 15th August 1947, the new Government of India inherited the Treaty obligations of undivided India. They wished to assure all countries with

which the British Government of undivided India had treaties and agreements that the new Government to India would abide by the obligations arising from them. All that the Government of India intended to do in the telegram mentioned in Your Excellency's letter was to convey an assurance to that effect to the Tibetan authorities. There could be no question, so far as India was concerned, of reopening old treaties with Tibet with a view to entertaining, even for purposes of discussion, claims to large areas of Indian territory.

15. It is wrong to say that the frontier east of Bhutan as shown on Chinese maps is the traditional frontier. On the contrary, it is the McMahon Line which correctly represents the customary boundary in this area. The water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples on both sides. The tribes inhabiting the area south of the McMahon Line—the Monbas, Akas, Dafias, Miris, Abors, and Mfshmis are of the same ethnic stock as the other hill tribes of Assam and have no kinship with the Tibetans. The Tibetans themselves regard these tribes with contempt and group them all together as "Lopas". It is true that the boundary of two adjacent countries is not determined by the ethnic affiliations of the people living in these countries. Some sort of cultural intercourse between the peoples living on both sides of the frontier is also not uncommon. All the same it is significant that the tribes mentioned above have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other, and this can only be due to the fact that the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area. On the other hand, Indian administration gradually moved up to these areas. Agreements were signed with the Akas in 1844 and 1888, the Abors in 1862-63 and 1866 and with the Monbas in 1844 and 1853, extending the authority of the Government of India over them. It was the British Government's policy generally to leave the tribes more or less to look after themselves and not seek to establish any detailed administration of these areas such as was to be found in the

rest of British Indian territory. All the same British Political Officers visited these areas for settling disputes and such like purposes. Finally, the Sadiya Frontier Tract, approximately 10,000 square miles in area, was formed in 1912, and the Balipara Frontier Tract also comprising about 10,000 square miles, was formed in 1913, i.e., before the Simla Conference met. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire, published in London by the Chinese Inland Mission in 1906, shows as the frontier in this area an alignment which is almost identical with what was settled at Simla in 1914. The area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibhang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13 and the Abor area in 1913. Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913-14. It was on the basis of all the detailed information that the boundary was settled between India and Tibet in 1914. It is clear, therefore, that the McMahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on a weak Tibet by the Government of India. It formalized the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area.

16. Your Excellency has referred to a map published by the Survey of India in 1917 and a map in the 1929 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. The Survey of India map shows the line claimed by China but on the same sheet, in the index map, the McMahon Line is also shown. The reason for this is that the British Indian Government were reluctant to issue new maps of India showing only the McMahon Line in the hope that China would accept the Simla Convention as a whole. As for the map in the 1929 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, it is true that in the eastern sector it shows roughly the line now claimed by China But the same map shows the whole of Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh. It would therefore be unfair to quote the authority of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in support of the Chinese claim in one sector of the boundary and to reject it in respect of the other. In fact, if maps published privately in other countries are to be cited as evidence, we can refer to a large number of such maps in our support. For example, the map

of *Asie Meridionale* published by Andriveau-Coujon in Paris in 1876 and the map of *Asie Orientale* published by the same firm in 1881 show the whole tribal area as outside Tibet. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire published by the China Inland Mission in 1906 shows a boundary which approximates to the McMahon Line. The British War Office Map of the Chinese Empire published in October 1907 shows almost the entire tribal territory 'in India. The map in Sir Francis Younghusband's volume *India and Tibet* published in London in 1910 shows the Tribal area in India; and so does the map in Sir Charles Bell's book *Tibet Past and Present* (Oxford 1924).

17. It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under treaty relationships with Bhutan the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations, and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government. The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector. As regards Sikkim, the Chinese Government recognised as far back as 1890 that the Government of India "has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State". This Convention of 1890 also defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet; and the boundary was later, in 1895, demarcated. There is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region.

18. You have stated that the Sino-Indian boundary is about 2,000 kilometres in length, is wholly undelimited, and that it is not Chinese maps but British and Indian maps that have been unilaterally altering the Sino-Indian boundary. In fact the Sino-Indian boundary (apart from the boundary of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet) extends over 3,520 kilometres.

It is wrong to say that this long boundary is wholly undelimited. The frontier east of Bhutan has been explicitly delineated on the 1914 treaty map. The frontier of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh has been clarified by implication by the mention of six passes in the 1954 Agreement. As for the charge that British and Indian maps have been unilaterally altering the boundary, the fact is that early British maps showed the boundary roughly where the British thought the water-parting was at the time. Later, as more topographical as well as local information about the water-parting was obtained, the boundary was shown with greater precision on the subsequent maps. The discrepancies between the earlier and later maps are also explained in part by the fact that British cartographers as a rule showed in their maps the administrative boundaries irrespective of the actual alignment of the frontier. Therefore, as administration was gradually extended in the frontier areas, corresponding changes were made in the boundaries on the later maps. Thus the map of India published by the Survey of India in 1895 (1"-128 miles) showed the un-administered areas of northern Burma and north-eastern India upto what subsequently came to be known as the McMahon Line by a light orange colour wash as distinct from the deeper colours used for the rest of the Indian territory. The Memorandum on Native States in India published by the Government of India in 1909 has a map in Volume II showing this whole tribal area as part of India. The fact is that the present frontiers of India have always been the historic frontiers but administration in the British period was only gradually extended up to these frontiers. Shortly after India attained independence' in 1947 the Government of India decided, as a matter of policy, to bring these frontier areas under more direct administrative control to enable them to share in the benefits of a welfare state subject to the protection of their distinct social and cultural patterns. It is not true to say that it was only after the recent Tibetan crisis and the entry into India of a large number of Tibetans that Indian troops started advancing steadily in the North-East Frontier Agency. In fact administrative personnel, civil and police had been functioning in these areas right up to the McMahon frontier for several years

before the recent disturbances broke out in Tibet. However, we did not have any military force anywhere in the border areas. There was only an armed constabulary in support of the civil personnel and even the frontier posts were manned by this constabulary. It was only when our outpost at Longju was overpowered by : superior Chinese military force and our personnel elsewhere along the frontier were being intimidated by Chinese .forces that we decided to place the responsibility for the protection of the frontier on our army.

19. It should be clear from what has been stated in previous paragraphs that it is the Chinese maps that have altered the boundary alignments through the years to include large areas of Indian territory in China. It should also be stated that Chinese maps published even after 1949 have not adhered to any definite frontier: Different maps show different alignments in the same sector.

20. I am sorry to have to say that it is the Chinese Government who have been trying unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border. There is no other explanation for the presence of Chinese personnel in Bara Hoti and of Chinese troops in the Aksai Chin area, Khurnak Fort, Mandal, Spanggur, Khinzemane and Longju, and for Chinese intrusions in the Spiti area, Shipki pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area, Sangcha, Laphthal, and the Dichu Valley. Nor is it correct to say that Chinese troops have never crossed the McMahon Line. Both Khinzemane and Longju are south of this line.

21. The Government of India emphatically repudiate the allegation that in recent times they have "invaded and occupied" a number of places in the middle sector of the boundary. In fact it is the Chinese forces which have made persistent efforts in recent times to come into and occupy indisputably Indian territory. Details of intrusions and attempted intrusions by Chinese forces have been given in the attached note. These intrusions have been particularly marked in the Spanggur area, where Chinese forces

have been pushing forward in an aggressive manner during the last year two in disregard of the traditional frontier. The Chinese have only recently established a new camp near the western extremity of the Spanggur lake at a point which even according to some official Chinese maps is in Indian territory. It is not for us to comment on the reports of large-scale movements of Chinese forces in the Tibetan frontier areas. We hope that these moves do not signify a new policy of actively probing into Indian territory along the whole length of the Sino-Indian frontier.

22. Reports have reached us that some Chinese officers in Tibet have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim Bhutan, Ladakh and our North-East Frontier Agency. I do not know what authority they had to make these remarks but I would like to draw Your Excellency's attention to them as these remarks have naturally added to the tension on the frontier.

23. Your Excellency has spoken of Indian parties having trespassed into Chinese territory. Nowhere have our personnel done so. Even if they had done so through an error of judgment at any point in the barren wastes of some far-flung frontier region, we would have expected that a friendly Government would promptly bring it to our notice for remedial action. Instead, last year when an Indian party was engaged on routine administrative patrol near Haji Langar in Ladakh, your forces arrested them and did not inform us a of the arrest until we had enquired of you almost five weeks later. In the meantime our personnel were subjected to threats, harsh treatment and severe interrogation. Surely this is not the manner in which the personnel of a friendly Government should have been treated.

24. The charge that India has been shielding ·armed Tibetan rebels in the frontier areas in the north-east is wholly unfounded and we firmly reject it. On the contrary, our personnel disarmed the Tibetan rebels as soon as they crossed the frontier into Indian territory and insisted on their moving well

away from the frontier areas. The few who showed disinclination to do so were told that they would not get asylum in India and made to leave our territory finally.

25. There is no truth in the allegation that Indian aircraft have repeatedly violated Chinese territorial air in this area. We have issued definite instruction to all our aircraft to avoid trespass into Chinese air space and we are assured that this instruction has been carefully observed. You will appreciate, however, that aircraft engaged in supply dropping missions to a frontier outpost may accidentally cross the international frontier or appear to do so even though it has not actually crossed the frontier. Our anxiety to respect the Chinese territorial air space would be clear from the fact that when in July last the officer in charge of our outpost at Longju fell seriously ill we informed your Government that we would be para-dropping a doctor. The object of our giving the information to your Government was to ensure that you would not misunderstand it if by error of judgment our aircraft should cross into Chinese territory in flying over a frontier outpost. For the same reason we also gave you information in advance that survey operations would be carried out from the air on our side of the border during the months from November 1959 to February 1960. Incidentally, the information that we gave you about Longju would disprove any suggestion that we had surreptitiously started an outpost on Chinese territory. Had we done so, we would not have given its location your Government.

26. I have looked into the allegation that the boundary drawn on Indian maps includes in many places even more territory than the McMahon Line, but have been unable to discover any basis for it: If you have in mind the Sino-Indian frontier shown in the Indian maps in the Migyitun area which differs slightly from the boundary shown in the Treaty map, the position can be easily explained. As settled between the British and the Chinese representatives at the time of the Simla Conference, the boundary was to follow the natural features, but a reservation was made that Migyitun (and

a few other places) would be within Tibetan territory. This was done in order to leave within Tibet the two sacred lakes of Tsari Sarpa and Tso Karpo which were places of pilgrimage for Tibetans and the village of Migyitun from which the pilgrimage started. At the time of the Simla Convention, the exact topographical features in this area were not known. Later after the topography of the area had been definitely ascertained, the actual boundary followed the geographical features except where a departure was necessary to leave Migyitun within Tibetan territory. The actual boundary as shown in the Indian maps, therefore, merely gave effect to the treaty map in the area based on definite topography. This was in accordance with established international practice.

27. I entirely disagree with your view that the tense situation that has arisen on the border has been caused by Indian trespassing and provocation. In fact, as the attached note will show, it is the Chinese who have trespassed into Indian territory across the traditional border at a number of places in recent years. You have mentioned that we in India have staged a second so-called anti-Chinese campaign. This, if I may say so, is the reverse of the actual position. Despite the regrettable happenings on the frontier of our two countries, we in India have conducted ourselves with great restraint and moderation. At a number of places your forces assumed a threatening attitude; at others they actually came into our territory. Such incidents concerning as they did the integrity of India were very serious, but in our anxiety not to create feelings against your Government we deliberately avoided giving publicity to them. Questions in Parliament had, however, to be answered and the facts could not be withheld. When the facts thus became known, the reaction both in Parliament and among the public was one of dismay and great resentment. There was criticism of our Government both in Parliament and the press for our failure to give publicity to these developments at an earlier stage. Under the Indian Constitution Parliament is supreme. India has also a free press and the Government could not restrain public criticism. In the circumstances, to allege that the

Government of India built up pressure on China in any manner is a complete misreading of the facts of the situation. It is also based on complete misunderstanding of the constitutional procedures under which the Government, Parliament and the press function in India. Needless to say, such an allegation is entirely baseless.

28. I have stated before and wish to affirm once again that the Government of India attach great importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with China. They have hitherto sought to conduct their relations with China, as with other countries, in the spirit of Panch Sheel. This indeed had always been India's policy even before the five principles were enunciated. It is therefore all the more a matter of regret and surprise to us that China should now have put forth claims to large areas of Indian territory inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Indian nationals, which have been under the administrative jurisdiction of India for many years. No Government could possibly discuss the future of such large areas which are an integral part of their territory. We however recognise that the India-China frontier which extends over more than 3,500 kilometres has not been demarcated on the ground and disputes may therefore arise at some places along the traditional frontier as to whether these places lie on the Indian or the Tibetan side of this traditional frontier. We agree therefore that the border disputes which have already arisen should be amicably and peacefully settled. We also agree that until a settlement has been reached the status quo should be maintained. In the meantime both sides should respect the traditional frontier and neither party should seek to alter the status quo in any manner. Further, if any party has trespassed into the other's territory across the traditional frontier, it should immediately withdraw to its side of the frontier. So far as the Government of India are concerned, at no places at present have they any personnel, civil, police or military, on the Tibetan side of the traditional frontier. There was only one outpost, that at Tamaden established some months ago, which, subsequent enquiries showed, was somewhat north of the McMahon Line. In keeping with our earlier promise

we have already withdrawn it to a point south of the Line. There can therefore be no question of withdrawing any Indian personnel at any other place. We would now request that in the same spirit your Government should withdraw their personnel from a number of posts which you have opened in recent months at Spanggur, Mandal and one or two other places in eastern Ladakh. Similarly, your forces should also withdraw from Longju which they forcibly occupied on the 26th August and which they still continue to occupy. No discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations immediately cease.

29. Mr. Prime Minister, I regret that I have had to write to you, length and in such detail. But I must frankly say that your of the 8th September has come as a great shock to us. India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years and, I thought settled. I appreciate your statement that China looks upon her south-western border as a border of peace and friendship. This hope is promise could be fulfilled only if China would not bring within the scope of what should essentially be a border dispute, claims to thousands of square miles of territory which have been end are integral part of the territory of India.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

A NOTE ON THE BORDER DISPUTES

Annexure to the letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 26 September 1959

A. Aksai Chin,

As shown in the text of the letter, Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Haji Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized. When the Government of India protested at the serious and continuous occupation of our territory which road-building implied, and enquired whether the Chinese authorities had any knowledge of the Indian patrol, they admitted that they had detained the Indian party. Later the party was released at the Karakoram pass.

B. The Pangong area

The customary boundary between Ladakh and Tibet in this region lies from Lanak La (34° 24' North and 79° 34' East) along the eastern and southern watershed of the Chang Chenmo and the southern watershed of the Chumesang, and then along the southern bank of the Chumesang and the eastern bank of the Changlung Lungpa. Skirting the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong Tso, the boundary thereafter follows the Ang watershed and cutting across Spanggur Tso, follows the north-eastern and northern watershed of the Indus. In recent years Chinese armed personnel have crossed this border in several places; fanned out and occupied Indian territory illegally. In July 1958 the Government of India protested against the Chinese occupation of Khurnak Fort, about 1.5 miles within the Indian

frontier. This fort has from time immemorial been within Ladakh, and has never been the subject of dispute. Even at a conference on certain pasture grounds in this area, attended by the representatives of Tibet and Kashmir and a British Commissioner in 1924, the jurisdiction of India over this fort was not disputed. However, there has been no reply as yet to the note of the Government of India.

In July 1959 it was learnt that a Chinese armed detachment had entered Indian territory in the Spanggur area south of the Pangong Lake, and had established a camp at Spanggur. When an Indian police party on its way to Khurnak approached them, it was over-powered. The Government of India protested, but the Chinese Government in their reply asserted that this was Chinese territory. This statement is contradicted even by the boundary alignment in this sector shown on Chinese maps, for example, the Map of the Administrative Areas of the Chinese Republic (1948), in which the boundary cuts across the eastern extremity of the Spanggur Lake.

Spanggur stands on the western edge of the lake. Though the Government of India would have been justified in dislodging this Chinese camp, they have refrained from doing so in the hope that the Chinese would themselves withdraw.

C. Demchok

Demchok or Parigas, is another area which India is supposed to have "invaded and occupied". This is part of the Hanle region in south-eastern Ladakh. Ladakhi chronicles of the 17th century and accounts of travellers of the 18th and 19th centuries all state that Demchok was a part of Ladakh. The Kailash range, which is the eastern watershed of the Indus, lies east of Demchok. Strachey, who visited this area in 1847, confirmed this position, and Walker on the authority of Strachey, showed the boundary in this region as running east of Demchok village. The pasture grounds between Demchok and the Kailash range have been used by Indian villagers for a long time past. All revenue records of this century prove that taxes were collected in this area by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, and a

check-post has been maintained in this area for several decades.

D. The Spiti area

Premier Chou-En-lai's letter alleges Indian "invasion" of Chauva and Chu-je, i.e. the Spiti area in the Punjab State. The Spiti valley is, however, traditional Indian territory. The frontier in this area is the major watershed between the Pare Chu and the Spiti systems. As far back as 1879 the "Map of Hundes or Ngari Khorsum and Monyol" issued by the Trigonometrical Survey of India showed the boundary along this watershed. In 1956 a Chinese survey party visited this area and sought to place boundary stones on Indian territory and in 1957 a Chinese patrol party was noticed there. The Government of India drew the attention of the Chinese Government to these violations of Indian territory. The Chinese authorities neither denied the charge nor claimed this territory to be a part of, 'Tibet. They did not appear even to have an exact knowledge of this terrain, for they asked India for details of latitude and longitude. A wall map of the People's Republic of China published in November 1953 (Ya Kuang Publishing Society) shows this area within India. To speak of Indian aggression in this area is, therefore, to say the least, astonishing.

E. Shipki pass

Shipki pass is the first of the six border passes mentioned in the 1954 agreement. This has always been the limit of Indian territory. All old maps indicated this as the border pass. The Government of India have constructed a road up to this point and have been maintaining it for many years; and in 1954 the words "Hindustan-Tibet" were engraved on a rock flanking the pass on the left. The summer of 1956 a Chinese patrol was found on the Indian side of the pass and well within Indian territory. On being asked to withdraw the Chinese personnel threw stones and threatened to use hand grenades. The commander of the Chinese patrol contended that he had received instructions to patrol the area up to Hupsang Khud and if the Indian party went beyond Hupsang Khud he "would oppose it with arms".

Hupsang Khud is four miles from Shipki pass on the Indian side. Indian protests to the Government of China against this incursion remain unanswered.

F. The Nilang-Jadhang area

Premier Chou En-lai states that there have been historical disputes regarding many places in the sector of the boundary between Ladakh and Nepal, and gives as an example the area of Sang and Tsungsha, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet. In fact this is the only area in regard to which the Chinese authorities have raised a dispute. Sang is Jadhang village, Tsungsha is Nilang village and Tsaparang Dzong is the district headquarters in this part of Tibet. The Chinese Premier accuses India of having invaded and occupied Puling-Sumdo, that is Pulam Sumda, a village in the Nilang-Jadhang area.

It is not true that this area had always belonged to China and that the British occupied it only thirty to forty years ago. By the middle of the seventeenth century Nilang formed part of Bushahr state (now in Himachal Pradesh of India). A copper-plate inscription of 1667 A.D. records a treaty of mutual defence between Bushahr and Tehri and the cession to Tehri of Nilang. So clearly Nilang was then in India. Documents of the 18th century show that Tehri was administering the area. The inhabitants of this area are Garhwali by stock and not Tibetan.

In 1804 Nepalese troops are said to have destroyed Nilang village but in 1850 the Tehri Durbar re-established the village of Nilang and a hamlet named Jadhang, further north. In 1914 the Tibetans tried to set up a boundary pillar at Gum Gum Nala south of Nilang, and four years later the Tehri Durbar in its turn erected three boundary pillars at the border pass of Tsangchok La.

In 1926 a boundary commission consisting of Tibetan, Tehri and British representatives met at Nilang. Considerable evidence was produced by the Tehri Government in their own favour. It included ownership rights in land, proof of construction of roads and buildings and collection of land revenues

for centuries. The only evidence the Tibetans could produce was that their agents had occasionally collected a tax levied on trade with Tibet. The territory continued under the administration of the Tehri Durbar and, after the merger of Tehri State in Uttar Pradesh (India) in 1948, under the administration of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Since 1951 no taxes at all have been paid by these villagers to Tibetans, as they have discontinued the practice of visiting Tibet for trade.

The area of Nilang-Jadhang is situated south of the main watershed in this region, along which the six border passes mentioned in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement are situated. In April 1956 it was found that some armed Chinese personnel had intruded into this area without securing the permission of the Indian authorities. A protest was lodged by the Government of India on 2nd May 1956, but till now there has been no reply to this protest from the Chinese Government.

G. Bara Hoti

Bara Hoti, which the Chinese call Wu-je and accuse the Government of India of having occupied, is a small area (about 1 ½ square miles) in the State of Uttar Pradesh (India). The area lies between the main watershed of the Sutlej and the Alakhnanda, which is the boundary in this sector, and the highest range of the Himalayas further south. Revenue records and other official documents of the 19th century establish that the watershed is the traditional frontier between India and Tibet in this region. It has been shown in Indian maps since 1850, when maps of this region based on surveys were first drawn. Even Chinese maps up to 1958 show the watershed as the frontier. Bara Hoti which is south of the watershed must, therefore, be regarded as within India. Till 1954 neither the Tibetans nor the Chinese seriously challenged this position, but since then Chinese personnel have persistently visited this area. There was a conference in Delhi to consider this question in April-May 1958. The Indian representatives proposed that pending a settlement of the dispute no armed personnel should be sent to the area. The Chinese Government agreed to this, but rejected the further

proposal that neither side should send civilian personnel to the area. The Government of India, therefore, have continued to send civilian personnel to the area to exercise their long-established civil jurisdiction in this area. Bara Hoti has for centuries been under a patwari, and officials of Garhwal district have been touring it regularly. To describe the continuation of this administration as "aggression" is therefore, a distortion of facts. The accusation is more applicable to the Chinese Government, who sent not merely civilian officials but an armed party to the area in 1958 in contravention of the agreement at the Delhi conference. The Government of India have scrupulously adhered to the interim agreement not to send armed personnel and have not allowed even the revenue officials to carry arms for self-protection. Furthermore, the Chinese personnel stayed at Bara Hoti in 1958 for part of the winter also, contrary to normal practice.

India's proposal at the conference that even civilian personnel should not be sent to the area shows the extent to which she was willing to go in the interest of a peaceful settlement. The only major argument that the Chinese side brought forward was that certain Tibetan agents called Sarjis came occasionally to this area to collect imposts. These men, however, were not regular officials of the Chinese Government but merely promoters of trade who came to declare Indo-Tibetan trade open and to inspect the cattle which was coming from or going to Tibet to see if it was diseased. They collected taxes only from Tibetans who had come down to trade and not from local villagers. And even against these visits of the Tibetan Sarjis, the Government of India had always been making repeated protests.

Indeed, it was revealed at the Conference at Delhi in 1958 that the Chinese did not even know what area they meant by Wu-je. They therefore, pressed for a local enquiry as that would enable them to know what area they were claiming.

Two other places south-east of Bara Hoti also mentioned in Premier Chou En-lai's letter as "invaded and occupied" by India are Sangcha or Sangcha Malla, and Lapthal. They are situated in Almora District in Uttar Pradesh, on the Indian side of the Balcha Dhura pass. This pass is located on the

water-parting which is the traditional boundary in this area between India and Tibet. This is confirmed by Edwin Atkinson in his volume *The Himalayan Districts of North-Western Provinces of India* (1886). Sangcha Malla is two miles south of the border and Lapthal six miles south. No Chinese map has ever shown these places within Tibet, and they have never before been claimed by either Tibet or China. It was only in October 1958, when the Indian check-posts retired as usual because of the onset of winter, that Chinese personnel entered Indian territory and established outposts at these two places. A protest of the Government of India on 10th December 1958 has elicited no reply.

H- Yasher, Khinzemane and Shatze

"Premier Chou En-lai alleges that Indian troops intruded into Yasher and are still in occupation of Shatze and Khinzemane. The Government of India are aware of no such place or area as Yasher. Judging from its location on the small-scale maps recently published in Chinese newspapers, it is presumably a small area north-east of Height 15721 in the Simla Convention Map. Here the boundary runs due north and the territory that is marked as Yasher is inside India. Indian personnel, in this area have been given strict orders not to cross the boundary and they have scrupulously observed these orders. If the village Lung is being referred to as Yasher, then it can be categorically stated that Indian troops have never occupied it. Khinzemane is south of the Thangla range which forms the international boundary in this area. In fact Chinese troops intruded into Khinzemane and tried to overawe Indian personnel there. Khinzemane and the Droksar pastures near it in the North East frontier Agency of India have for years belonged to the Indian village of Lumpo. The villages of Le and Timang in Tibet have been allowed to use these pastures on payment for pasture rights to the Indian village of Lumpo. There is no record of the Tibetan authorities ever having exercised jurisdiction in the region south of the Thangla range. As for Shatze, it is south of Khinzemane and within Indian territory.

I- Longju and Migyitun

Premier Chou En-lai says that Indian troops have not only over-stepped' the McMahon Line as indicated in the map attached to the notes exchanged between Britain and Tibet, but have also advanced across the boundary drawn on current Indian maps, and these maps are alleged in many places to cut even deeper into Chinese territory than the McMahon Line. It is alleged that Indian troops "invaded and occupied Longju and launched armed attacks on Chinese frontier guards stationed at Migyitun, leaving no option to the Chinese frontier guards but to fire back in self-defence. It has been stated in the text of the letter that the representation of the McMahon Line on Indian maps strictly conforms to the line shown in the Simla Convention Map. Indian troops have not crossed the boundary as drawn on current Indian maps. The Indo-Tibetan boundary drawn at the Simla Conference departed from the watershed in the Subansiri area in order to leave in Tibet the sacred lakes of Tso Karpo and Tsari Tsarpa, the village of Migyitun to which Tibetans attach importance as the starting point of the twelve-year pilgrimage, the route from Migyitun to the lakes, and another shorter pilgrimage route known as Tsari Nyingpa. The alignment on current Indian maps carefully leaves these territories in Tibet. The international boundary here runs just south of the village of Migyitun. Longju which is entirely distinct from Migyitun lies 1.5 miles further south of the border. It cannot be part of Migyitun, which was a decaying village of twelve huts in 1913 and had further deteriorated to six huts and a monastic in 1935. The lands attached to Migyitun village were few extended to a very short distance from the village.

Until Chinese troops recently trespassed into Longju no administrative control was ever exercised over this village by the Tibetan authorities. The detachment of Indian armed constabulary was instructed only to resist trespassers and to use force only in self-defence. It was the Chinese who first fired at the Indian forward picket and later overwhelmed by force the Indian outpost at Longju. This deliberate attack in superior numbers on an Indian outpost could have no justification at all. However, even though

Longju is undoubtedly Indian territory, the Government of India are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Government the exact alignment of the McMahon Line in the Longju area. The Government of India have also offered not to send their personnel back to Longju provided that the Chinese Government also would withdraw their forces. The Chinese Government have not so far replied to this offer.

APPENDIX II

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi to the Embassy of China in India, 4 November 1959

The Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India present their compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and have the honour to refer to the note which the Chinese Vice-Minister handed to the Indian Ambassador in Peking on October 25. The Government of India have also seen the statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at Peking on October 26. They have to state with regret that the account of the incidents given in the Chinese Government's note to the Indian Ambassador, and repeated in greater detail in the statement published by the Chinese Foreign Office, is completely at variance with facts and is a travesty of truth. The Government of India have enquired into this matter fully and have received a detailed account of the events of October 20 and 21 from the officer who was second-in-command of the Indian police party when it was attacked by Chinese forces and who later returned to the nearest Indian outpost. The account of the officer is appended to this note. The gallant officer who was in command of the party lost his life during the clash.

2. The Government of India not only reject the, factual account given by the Chinese Government of this incident, but also repudiate certain assumptions underlying it. The suggestion made that the Indian police party armed with rifles only and in a disadvantageous position would attack a heavily armed Chinese force strongly entrenched on a hill top above them and equipped with mortars and hand-grenades, cannot be accepted by any reasonable person. All the circumstances concerning this incident as well as the detailed information that we possess contradict the version which has been supplied by the Chinese Government.

3. The attached note about the tragic incident in the Chang Chenmo Valley

which gives a first-hand account by a responsible officer, clearly that at no time on the 20th or 21st October did the Indian personnel take any aggressive attitude. While they were engaged on patrol duty, they were suddenly subjected to ruthless attack by Chinese forces with rifles, mortar and hand-grenades. One contingent of the attacking force was apparently entrenched on a hill top and the other was across the Chang Chemmo river on the right. Although the Indian party fired in self-defence, they had no chance against the superior strength of the Chinese force which was aided by its strategic situation and the superior arms that it possessed. The Chinese Government have not stated the exact casualties suffered by the attacking Chinese force, but have indicated that their casualties were much less than those of the Indian party. The Government of India entirely disagree with the extraordinary conclusion drawn by the Chinese Government from the heavy casualties suffered by the Indian personnel that the Indian party had taken the offensive. The obvious conclusion would be the opposite of this and would indicate that the Chinese forces were the attacking party as they were entrenched on hill top and used mortars and hand-grenades.

4. This incident has to be viewed also in the context of other events preceding it as well as of the correspondence that has taken place between the Government of India and the Chinese Government. The Indian frontier, throughout its long extent, has been well known is a traditional frontier and has been shown with precision in official maps published by the Survey of India. There has been no doubt about this frontier. Repeatedly during the past few years, the Prime Minister of India has declared firmly and clearly what this frontier is. The Government of the People's Republic of China said nothing about this frontier for a number of years. When their attention was drawn to some vague Chinese maps appearing in magazines and showing large areas, without any Precision, as part of the Chinese State, objection was taken to these by the Government of India. The answer given was that these maps were old maps produced by the previous regime in China and

the present Government of China had been too busy with other activities to consider a revision of these maps. That answer itself indicated that the Chinese Government had no serious doubt about the correctness of the Indian maps, except perhaps for some minor disputes. As has been previously brought to the notice of the Chinese Government, the Premier of the People's Republic of China himself stated to the Prime Minister of India that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept the north eastern frontier of India which has been referred to as the McMahon Line. No question of the frontier of the Tibet region with Ladakh was ever raised during all these years, although the Chinese Government must have known very well, both from Indian maps and statements made on behalf of India as well as from the facts of the situation, where this frontier is. The Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 purported to deal with all outstanding issues between India and the Tibet region of China inherited from the British days. But neither during the long and detailed discussions preceding the Agreement nor in the Agreement itself was any mention made by the Chinese Government of their claim to such large areas of Indian territory. It was only in the letter addressed by Premier Chou En-lai to the Prime Minister of India dated 8th September 1959 that for the first time the Chinese Government laid claim to the territories vaguely included in their maps. This statement was at variance with the previous statements on the subject of the Chinese maps. It is to be observed that at no time up till now has any precise statement been made by the Chinese Government as to where according to them, their frontier is. Even their own maps give completely different and varying frontiers.

5. So far as the Government of India are concerned, their position has been clear and precise from the beginning and indeed for a long period of years and there has been no doubt about it. That position was described in detail in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Indian Prime Minister's letter of September 26 to Premier Chou En-lai. In this letter, the Prime Minister of India has given the historical background of the traditional Sino-Indian

boundary and the basis of its delineation in different sectors in official Indian maps. Indeed any person with a knowledge of history not only of recent events, but of the past hundreds of years and more, would appreciate that this traditional and historical frontier of India has been associated with Indian culture and tradition for the last two thousand years or so, and has been an intimate part of India's life and thought.

6. The Government of India, therefore reject and repudiate the assumptions underlying the note of the Chinese Government in regard to this long frontier. They reiterate that the area where the clash: took place is not only a part of Indian territory but is well within it that the entire area, Kongka pass "has always been Chinese territory and under respective jurisdiction of the local authorities of Sinkiang and Tibet region". This statement is contrary to history and facts. The maps published by the Survey of India since 1867-68 have been showing the boundary between Ladakh on the one hand, and Sinkiang and the Tibet region on the other, as in the present-day official maps published by the Survey of India. From the Karakoram Pass this boundary proceeds north-east via the Qara Tagh Pass and the follows the Kuen Lin range from a point 15 miles north the Haji Langar to peak 21250 (Survey of India map) which lies east of Longitude 80 east. This line constitutes the watershed between the Indus system in India and the Khotan system in China. From point 21250 the boundary runs south down to Lanak La along the Western watershed of streams flowing into lakes in the Chinese territory. The boundary further south from Lanak La to Chang La has been described in the note presented by the Indian Embassy in Peking to the Chinese Foreign Office on the 13th August 1959. As stated in that note, the international boundary follows the eastern and southern watershed of Chang Chenmo and the southern watershed of Chumesang and thence the southern bank of Chumesang and the eastern bank of Changlung Lungpa. Skirting the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong Tso (which is called Yaerhmu in Chinese maps), the boundary then follows the Ang watershed and cutting across Spanggur Tso, follows the

north-eastern and northern watershed of the Indus.

7. It will thus be seen that the international boundary has been shown for nearly a century in official Indian maps as it is today. In fact, detailed surveys of the area were undertaken from 1867-68, and the boundary as shown in our maps is not only in accordance with tradition and custom but is also based on the results of these surveys, The area on the Indian side of this boundary was surveyed by Hayward, Shaw and Cayley in 1868, Bower in 1891 and Aurel Stein in 1900. Drew who was Governor of Ladakh under the Maharaja of Kashmir, officially inspected the area up to its northern border in 1871 and the maps appended to his book on Jammu and Kashmir Territories 1875 as also the maps attached to the Gazetteers of Jammu and Kashmir published from 1890 onwards and the Imperial Gazetteer of India of 1908 show the boundary more or less similar to the frontier shown in official Indian maps today. It is the Chinese maps of the area which have shown different lines at different times. An official Chinese map of 1893 shows the Aksai Chin area as in India. The New Atlas of China published by Shun pao, 1935, shows a great part of the Chang Chenmo region in India. In fact the place where the recent clash took place is in Indian territory according to this map This map and the subsequent Chinese maps until 1951 showed the international boundary as running 30 to 60 miles east of and parallel to Shyok river It is only in 1951 that a few Chinese maps took the boundary within 10 to 30 miles east of and parallel to the Shyok river. Most of the Chinese maps as late as 1954, and one as late as 1956 depict the boundary in the Pangong lake as cutting the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong Tso called Yaerhmu in Chinese maps. The few Chinese maps of 1951 referred to above show the line as cutting the western half of Pangong lake area in Tibet.

8 It is true that the Government of India did not open any border outposts right along the traditional frontier. This was because the area was inhabited very sparsely if at all and they had no reason to anticipate any aggressive

intention on the part of the Chinese Government. They were therefore content with sending regular police patrol parties to these areas in previous years. The Government of India cannot accept the statement in the press note issued by the Chinese Government on the 26th October that the frontier guards of the Chinese People's Liberation Army have all along been stationed and patrolled this entire area." Indian survey and reconnaissance parties, which went from Leh to Lanak La in 1954 and 1956, did not come across any evidence of Chinese occupation. For the first time in 1957 signs of intrusion by outsiders were noticed at Shinglung and some places further north. Obviously such intrusion must have occurred in these places for the first time in 1957. Other Indian reconnaissance parties went as far as Karakoram Pass without coming across any Chinese personnel. No Indian reconnaissance party was sent to the area in Aksai Chin where the Chinese authorities had built a new road. No adverse conclusion can however be drawn from the mere fact that the Chinese had constructed this road. This was done without the knowledge of the Government of India. As early as 1949, the then Government of India communicated to the authorities in Peking the international boundary in this area, which then was more or less as it is today. And as stated above, official Indian maps have shown the Aksai Chin area as part of India for nearly a century. This area is extremely difficult of access from inhabited areas in western and southern Ladakh, and the Government of India had no reason to suspect that the Government of China, with whom they had friendly relations, would trespass into the area and construct a road.

9. No answer has been received yet by the Government of India to the long and detailed letter of the Prime Minister of India to Premier Chou En-lai of September 26, 1959. Regardless of the facts stated in this letter, the forces of the Chinese Government have not only committed further aggression but have attacked an Indian police party engaged in its normal patrol duty. This was the second armed attack on an Indian party the previous one taking place at Longju where Chinese forces crossed the Indian frontier forcibly.

These facts taken together with a continuance of aggressive attitudes in various parts of the frontier and the type of propaganda that is being conducted on behalf of the Chinese Government are reminiscent of the activities of the old imperialist powers against whom both India and China struggled in the past. It is a matter of deep regret that the Chinese Government, which has so often condemned imperialism, should act in a manner which is so contrary to their own assertions. It is a matter of even greater regret that the Five Principles as well as the Declaration of the Bandung Conference should thus be flouted by the Chinese Government.

10. The Government of India are surprised at the complaint in the Chinese Government's note about the publication of an official Indian communiqué on this incident. The Government of India would not have been justified in keeping the Indian people in the be aware not only of the strong feelings on India on the question of Indian frontiers, but also and more especially, about this incident. As a matter of fact the Government of India published their communiqué only after they found from the Chinese Government's note handed to the Indian Ambassador on October 25 that the account given in that note was at complete variance with the facts.

11. The Government of India do not propose to discuss in detail other matters referred to in the statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office on the 26th October. They repudiate emphatically the allegation that the Indian forces have violated the status quo in several places on the Sino-Indian frontier or that they have occupied any place inside Chinese territory. The facts about the frontier have been given in detail in the Indian Prime Minister's letter of September 26. Paragraphs 12 to 16 of that letter deal with the traditional frontier in the north-east, which is sometimes referred to as the McMahon Line. It will be seen from these paragraphs that the Chinese claim to any territory south of this line is entirely baseless. Any trespass into this area by Chinese personnel would amount to deliberate violation of the territory of India.

12. The Government of India have always been willing to respect the traditional frontier between India and China and have indeed done so. They cannot however recognise any boundary, in the Ladakh region or elsewhere, which includes in China areas on the Indian side of the traditional frontier For a long period of years this frontier has been peaceful. Trouble and conflict have arisen there recently because the Chinese forces, having advanced up to the frontier in many places, committed aggression by crossing it at some places.

13. The Chinese Government have rightly stressed the importance of maintaining the status quo. An essential prerequisite to the maintenance of the status quo is that neither side should seek to extend its occupation in assertion of a supposed right in disregard of the traditional frontier, and that in any event, there should be no resort to force except as a last resort in self-defence. The deplorable incident, which has resulted in such heavy casualties to the Indian personnel, would have been avoided if the Chinese force had paid regard to this basic fact.

14. It is recognized the world over that India stands for peace and is entirely opposed to the use of warlike methods for the settlement of international disputes. Even in their struggle for independence, the Indian people adhered to peaceful methods. In regard to the Government of China, India's attitude has always been friendly in consonance with India's well known policy, but was due to the desire of the people and the Government of India that it was essential in the interests of India and China as well as of peace in Asia and the world, that these two great countries of Asia should have friendly relations, even though they might differ in their internal structure of Government. To that end, the Government of India have laboured through these years. It is a matter, therefore, of great sorrow to them that their hopes have been belied and a situation created which endangers the peaceful and friendly relations which have existed and which, they hoped, would continue to exist, between these two great countries.

15. It is a matter of special regret to the Government of India that at a time when the world appears at last to be moving towards a peaceful settlement of the grave problems which have afflicted it during the last twelve years and when the two great nations the Soviet Union and the United States of America are striving to their utmost ability to put an end to the cold war there should be this relapse into violence and aggression on the frontiers of India. The countries of Asia have ardently advocated peace and have played not an insignificant part in the work for peace. At this critical moment in the history of the world, it would have been fitting for all the nations of Asia not only to stand for peace, but to further it by their own attitudes and activities.

16. In accordance with her firm policy, India will continue to endeavour to resolve all disputes by peaceful methods. But where aggression takes place the people of India inevitably have to resist by all means available to them. The independence and integrity of India are what the Indian people laboured for during their long struggle for freedom and they cannot permit any injury to or infringement of them. The Government of India therefore, trust that the Chinese Government will remove their forces from Indian territory and seek to resolve minor frontier disputes by peaceful methods.

17. The Ministry of External Affairs take this opportunity of renewing to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of their highest consideration.

Annexure to the Note of the Indian Government (Chang Chenmo Valley), 4 November 1959

ACCOUNT RECEIVED FROM THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND OF THE INDIAN
POLICE PATROL PARTY

On the 19th October, the party reached Hot Springs and established a temporary camp there. Before proceeding further north the next morning (20th) the officer in charge, Karam Singh, sent two police constables and a porter on reconnaissance towards the east. Neither the constables nor the porter returned to the camp at the appointed time. A small patrol party was therefore sent out in the evening in search of the missing persons but it returned at 11 o'clock at night without being able to find any of the missing personnel.

On the 21st morning, the officer in charge decided to go out himself in search of the missing persons as it was possible that they had lost their way to these trackless hills. Accompanied by Tyagi, who was his second in command, some members of his staff and some police constables making a total of about 20, the officer in charge left the camp at about 10 o'clock in the morning on ponies. He left instruction for the rest of the party to follow behind on foot.

At six miles east of Hot Springs, at a place overlooked by a hill to the left, Karam Singh noticed some hoof-prints. So he halted and waited for the main party to come up. When the main party arrived, he and Tyagi decided that the main party under Tyagi should halt at that place whilst Karam Singh with a small party would follow the tracks to find if there were any intruders in the vicinity.

Karam Singh passed by this hill feature to the left without noticing anything unusual and went out of sight of the main party. A little later, Tyagi went forward to see how far Karam Singh's party had gone but he could not find them apparently because Karam Singh's party had by then gone down the river bed. At this time, suddenly fire was opened on Tyagi's party by a

Chinese force which was entrenched on the hill feature Karam Singh's party was also simultaneously fired upon by another Chinese party entrenched on the other side of the river as well as by the party on the hill-top. The attackers fired with mortars and automatic weapons.

Subjected to this attack members of both Karam Singh's party and Tyagi's party tried to take cover and fire back, but they were in a very disadvantageous position having no proper cover and, therefore their firing was not effective. The Chinese on the hill-top effectively stopped Tyagi's party from going to the aid of Karam Singh's party which was being attacked from both sides.

After some time the Chinese who were apparently in some strength on the other side of the Chang Chenmo river and some of whom were mounted on horses, advanced forward and overwhelmed Karam Singh's party with automatic fire and mortar. They moved further forward to attack Tyagi's party, which then had no other alternative but to retreat. Karam Singh's party was therefore decimated either by killing or by capture except for a few survivors who escaped along the river bed and over the high hills in the dark.

At night, Tyagi's party attempted to go forward to ... the dead and the injured, but the Chinese were still in position on the hill feature and maintained that position even on 22nd. Tyagi then withdrew his entire force to Tsogstalu.

17 persons including Karam Singh were missing after the clash. Out of these, five including the officer in charge and the Jamadar were seen by the survivors to have been killed by Chinese fire.

Appendix III

Joint Communiqué of the Prime Ministers of India and China, April 25, 1960

At the invitation of the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Delhi on the 19th April to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which have arisen between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of India. His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai was accompanied by His Excellency Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Foreign Minister of China, and other officials of the Chinese Government. His Excellency the Premier and his party concluded their visit to India on the morning of the 26th April.

The two Prime Ministers had several long, frank and friendly talks between themselves. Their Excellencies the Premier of the Chinese People's Republic and the Vice-Premier also had long talks with the President, the Vice-President and several senior ministers of the Government of India.

The two Prime Ministers explained fully their respective stands on the problems affecting the border areas. This led to a greater understanding of the views of the two Governments but the talks did not result in resolving the differences that had arisen. The two Prime Ministers were of the opinion that further examination should take place by officials of the two sides of the factual material in the possession of both the Governments.

The two Prime Ministers, therefore, agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question, on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments. This report would list the points on which there was agreement and the points on which there was disagreement or which should be examined more fully and clarified.

This report should prove helpful towards further consideration of these problems by the two Governments.

It was further agreed that the officials should meet from June to September, 1960, alternately in the capitals of the two countries. The first meeting should take place in Peking and the officials would report to the two Governments by the end of September, 1960. During the period of further examination of the factual material, every effort should be made by the parties to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas.

Advantage was taken of the meeting by the two Prime Ministers to discuss certain other important problems in world affairs. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the forthcoming conference in Paris of the heads of governments and expressed the hope that this conference would help in lessening international tensions, banning the production and use of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament.

**Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the
Embassy of China in India, 6 October 1962**

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and has the honour to refer to the note presented to the Charge d'Affaires of India at Peking on 3rd October, 1962.

The Government of India regret that the Chinese Government have not only turned down the proposal to hold further discussions regarding measures to remove the current tensions in the Western sector, the implementation of which is a necessary preliminary to the creation of a climate of confidence between the two Governments for constructive discussions to resolve the differences over the border question, but categorically have stated that any consideration of measures for restoration of the status quo of the boundary unilaterally altered by force is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government. How can any talks take place in the context of this pre-condition?

The Government of India have repeatedly stated their desire to enter into talks and discussions, first to devise measures to reduce tensions and to create a climate of confidence, and then to undertake purposeful and constructive discussions in the improved climate to resolve the differences between the two Governments over the border question. The Government of India's approach in this matter of talks and discussions has been clear and straightforward-preliminary talks to ease tensions and to create the appropriate climate of confidence to be followed by further purposeful talks, after implementation of measures to ease tensions and restore confidence have been taken, to resolve differences between the two Governments on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials. If there has been any double-dealing or hypocrisy, it is entirely on the Chinese side as can be seen in the succeeding four paragraphs below.

The Government of China have repeatedly stated in their communications sent to the Government of India that they have all along

refrained from disturbing the status quo of the eastern sector of the boundary along the McMahon line, though they did not recognise it, as they were respecting the actualities of the situation. This boundary, running along the highest Himalayan watershed ridges, has been the traditional and customary boundary between India and Tibet for centuries and Indian administration had been established right up to it. This was conclusively proved by the Indian officials at the talks of 1960. The Agreement of 1914-The McMahon Line Agreement-merely formalised the traditional boundary and gave it the added sanction of confirmation by treaty. The Government of China has recently accepted the eastern section of the McMahon line as the traditional watershed boundary between China and Burma. They have also in their recent publication, "Selected Documents on Sino-Indian Relations", issued in 1962, and attached a map showing the McMahon line as the alignment along "the Himalayan Mountains". This makes clear that even according to the Chinese, it was not just "a line which a Briton drew on a map at will without any basis" but the highest watershed ridge in this area.

Despite this clear knowledge of the boundary, the Chinese forces have, during the last month, while notes were being exchanged for holding talks and discussions, intruded into Indian territory in the eastern sector and have been attacking Indian forces since 20th September. The Government of India have in their notes of 17th, 21st, 25th and 28th September given full details of this unwarranted and deliberate Chinese violation of the status quo of the border. The Government of India in their note of 25th September requested the Government of China, in the light of the full details given by them regarding this latest intrusion of Chinese forces into Indian territory, to issue immediate instructions to their forces to cease their aggressive activities on Indian territory and to return to Chinese territory across the frontier to the north of the Thagla Ridge, i.e., to the region indicated by the co-ordinates given by the Chinese authorities themselves in their note of 16th September, viz., 27° 49' N and 91° 48' E. The Government of China have not only not taken any action in this regard,

continued their aggressive activities in Indian territory and created further tensions in the Eastern sector, which has so far been quiet and peaceful, but are now arguing, on the basis of tensions created by their deliberate aggression, that the eastern sector being the most pressing question at present, should also be discussed. The Government of India will not enter into any talks and discussions under duress or continuing threat of force. The latest Chinese intrusion must be terminated first.

The Government of India in their note of 19th September commented on the suggestion of the Chinese Government regarding withdrawal of forces on both sides by 20 kilometres that this suggestion "suffers from the serious defect that it leaves the aggressor who altered the status quo by unilateral action over the last few years, in possession of the fruits of his aggression". This comment of the Government of India is fully justified. While India has never altered the traditional status quo of the boundary, it is obviously the Chinese practice to alter the status quo unilaterally whenever they can. This has been further confirmed by the latest action of the Chinese forces during the last month in the eastern sector. Quite apart from the claims of either side, it is clearly established that Chinese forces have, during the last month, crossed the Thagla Ridge and entered into the area on the Indian side. This cannot be denied. And further, they are continually strengthening their position on the Indian side of the Ridge. The Chinese forces have thus advanced into and occupied Indian Territory. These facts are clear and no one can be deceived by suggestions for talks and discussions and professions of peaceful settlement when force is actually being employed to grab Indian Territory even while these notes for talks and discussions are being exchanged.

Nor can anyone be deceived by the false allegation that the Government of India have raised the question in such a way as to bog down the two sides in endless procedural debate and make it utterly impossible to start discussions on the boundary question. The position of the Government of India in this matter is clear as stated in the third paragraph above. It is the Government of China, on the other hand, that want to bog down the

talks in endless debates and wrangles by proposing that neither side should refuse to discuss any questions concerning the Sino-Indian boundary that may be raised by the other side. No useful talks and discussions can take place in the absence of a precise agenda and it appears that the Chinese are specifically aiming at creating confusion regarding the proposal for starting talks and discussions merely as a cover for their aggressive and expansionist activities along the India-China border.

The Government of India are prepared to make necessary arrangements for starting discussions in Peking or in Delhi from a mutually convenient date as soon as the latest intrusion by Chinese forces in Indian territory south of the McMahon line has been terminated as requested in Government of India's note of 25th September 1962, and the Chinese Government indicate their acceptance of the proposal made in that note, which is reproduced below for ready reference: -

"The Government of India are prepared to hold further discussions at the appropriate level to define measures to restore the status quo in the Western sector which has been altered by force in the last few years and to remove the current tensions in that area. The implementation of such measures will create a climate of confidence between the two Governments which alone can make possible constructive discussions to resolve the differences between the two Governments on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials."

The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

APPENDIX V

Memorandum given by the Chinese Foreign Minister to the British Minister in Peking, 30 May 1919, showing that the objections of the Chinese Government to the Simla Convention concerned only the boundaries of Inner and Outer Tibet.

For many different reasons the Tibetan question has been held up for some years, and it is much to be regretted that it has not been possible to effect a settlement long ago. Your Excellency has now repeatedly asked verbally for the opening of negotiations, and you have requested us to lay on the table a statement of the ultimate articles on which we would effect a settlement. The Chinese Government earnestly hope for a settlement of this matter and they are moved by the same feelings as your Excellency in this respect, but, in view of the popular feeling with regard to this question throughout the whole of China, it is necessary to approach it with due care and consideration.

In the past the Chinese Government have treated Mongolia and Thibet in the same manner. Outer Mongolia having already been permitted to enjoy autonomy, it follows that no opposition will be placed in the way of Thibetan autonomy.

Apart from the question of boundaries, Great Britain and China were in general agreement as to the remaining articles of the draft Simla Convention of 1914, as you were informed in a note from this Ministry dated the 1st May of that year. Subsequently, in June 1915, the present Chinese Minister to the United States, Mr. Wellington Ku, had an interview with your Excellency in his capacity as counsellor of this Ministry and laid before you a scheme for settlement in three articles. That scheme, apart from the boundary question which was also dealt with, both as regards the appointment of officials and as regards the inclusion in the actual convention of the questions of territory and of rights of suzerainty, was based on the method adopted for Outer Mongolia and in no way conflicts

with the general principle of China's recognition of the autonomy of Outer Thibet. In its desire to arrive speedily at a solution the Chinese Government is at the present time quite ready to leave these points until the time when the text of the convention is altered, when they will again be brought up for discussion. As regards the boundary, a brief outline of our proposal is as follows: -

1. The region of the native chiefs of Tachienlu, Litang, and Batang shall continue to be entirely under the administration of the Province of Szechuan.

2. The region under the hutukhtus of Chiamdo, Bashu, and Riwoche, together with that under the native chiefs of the thirty-nine tribes shall be assigned to Outer Thibet.

3. The Chinese Government, attaching weight to the proposal made by the British plenipotentiary at the time of the convention that the region to the north of the K'un-lun mountains belonging to Kokonor and Hsinchiang should be assigned fully and completely to Chinese rule, express their willingness to assign to Inner Thibet, Derge, Nyarong, and the southern portion of Kokonor, that last being the region south of the K'un-lun Mountains and north of the Tangla range, and of the native chieftainships of the thirty-nine tribes Chiamdo and Derge.

4. The boundaries of the provinces of Yunnan and Hsinchiang shall continue to be governed as before.

APPENDIX VI

Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of China, 5 November, 1947

No. 1517/47

Embassy of the Republic of China in India, New Delhi

November 5, 1947

The Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the Republic of China presents his compliments to the Hon'ble Minister of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations and has the honour to enquire whether after the transfer of power the Government of India have replaced the former Government of British India in assuming the treaty rights and obligations hitherto existing between British India and Tibet and whether the Government of Pakistan are also assuming part of such treaty rights and obligations. In the latter case, the Charge d'Affaires would very much appreciate it if he could be informed as to (1) what rights and obligations are now assumed by the Government of India, (2) what rights and obligations are now assumed by the Government of Pakistan and (3) how such rights and obligations are divided between and shared by the two Governments.

SEAL

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
NEW DELHI

The Hon'ble Minister of External Affairs & Commonwealth Relations,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

APPENDIX VII

Statement by the Prime Minister of India in the Lok Sabha on the Situation in Tibet, April 27, 1959

I have made several statements in the House in regard to the developments in Tibet. The last statement was made on April 3, in which I informed the House that the Dalai Lama had entered the territory of the Indian Union with a large entourage. I should like to bring this information up-to-date and to place such additional facts as we have before the House.

A few days ago, the Dalai Lama and his party reached Mussoorie, where Government had made arrangements for their stay. I have had occasion to visit Mussoorie since then and have had a long talk with the Dalai Lama.

In the course of the last few days, reports have reached us that considerable numbers of Tibetans, numbering some thousands, have recently crossed into the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency and some hundreds have also entered the territory of Bhutan. They sought asylum, and we have agreed to this. Such of them as carried arms were disarmed. We do not know the exact number yet. Temporary arrangements are being made in a Camp for their maintenance until they can be dispersed in accordance with their wishes and the necessities governing such cases. We could not leave these refugees to their own resources. Apart from the humanitarian considerations involved, there was also the law and order problem to be considered. We are grateful to the Government of Assam for their help and cooperation in this matter.

So far as the Dalai Lama and his party are concerned, we had to take adequate measures on grounds of security and also to protect them from large numbers of newspaper correspondents, both Indian and foreign, who, in their anxiety to obtain first-hand information in regard to a matter of world importance, were likely to harass and almost overwhelm the Dalai Lama and his party. While we were anxious to give protection to the Dalai Lama and his party, we were agreeable to giving these newspaper- men

suitable opportunities to see him. I had received an appeal from nearly 75 representatives of news agencies and newspapers from Tezpur requesting me to give them such opportunities. A senior officer of the External Affairs Ministry was, therefore, deputed to proceed to Tezpur in advance to deal with the press representatives and photographers who had assembled in that small town of Assam. This officer made the necessary administrative arrangements to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the newspapermen to see the Dalai Lama and to photograph him. Soon after entering India, the Dalai Lama indicated his wish to make a statement. We were later informed that this statement would be released at Tezpur. Our officer made arrangements for the distribution of a translation of the statement to the newspaper correspondents.

In view of certain irresponsible charges made, I should like to make it clear that the Dalai Lama was entirely responsible for this statement as well as a subsequent briefer statement that was made by him from Mussoorie. Our officers had nothing to do with the drafting or preparation of these statements.

I need not tell the House that the Dalai Lama entered India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we suggested that he should come to India. We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and when such a request came, we readily granted it. His entry with a large party in a remote corner of our country created special problems of transport, organization and security. We deputed an officer to meet the Dalai Lama and his party at Bomdila and to escort them to Mussoorie. The particular officer was selected because he had served as Consul-General in Lhasa and therefore was to some extent known to the Dalai Lama and his officials. The selection of Mussoorie for the Dalai Lama's stay was not finalised till his own wishes were ascertained in the matter and he agreed to it. There was no desire on our part to put any undue restrictions on him, but in the special circumstances, certain arrangements had necessarily to be made to prevent any mishap. It should be remembered that the various events in Tibet, culminating in the Dalai Lama's departure from Lhasa and

entry into India had created tremendous interest among the people of India and in the world press. After arrival in Mussoorie, steps were taken to prevent the Dalai Lama from being harassed by crowds of people trying to see him as well as by newspapermen. Apart from this, no restrictions about movement were placed on him. He has been told that he and his party can move about Mussoorie according to their wishes. It should be remembered that the Dalai Lama has recently not only had a long strenuous and dangerous journey, but has also had harrowing experiences which must affect the nerves of even a hardened person. He is only just 24 years of age.

These are some bare facts, but behind these facts lie serious developments which may have far-reaching consequences. Tragedy has been and is being enacted in Tibet, passions have been let loose, charges made and language used which cannot but worsen the situation and our relations with our northern neighbour. I am sure that the House will agree with me that in considering matters of such high import, we should exercise restraint and wisdom and use language which is moderate and precise. In these days of cold war, there has been a tendency to use unrestrained language and often to make wild charges without any justification. We have fortunately kept out of the cold war and I hope that on this, as on any other occasion, we shall not use the language of cold war. The matter is too serious to be dealt with in a trivial or excited way. I would, therefore, appeal to the press and the public to exercise restraint in language. I regret that occasionally there have been lapses from this on our side. In particular, I regret that grave discourtesy was shown some days ago to a picture of the head of the Chinese State, Chairman Mao Tse-tung. This was done by a small group of irresponsible people in Bombay. In the excitement of the moment, we cannot allow ourselves to be swept away into wrong courses.

It is not for me to make any similar appeal to the leaders, the press and the people of China. All I can say is that I have been greatly distressed at the tone of the comments and the charges made against India by responsible people in China. They have used the language of cold war regardless of truth and propriety. This is peculiarly distressing in a great

nation with, thousands of years of culture behind it, noted for its restrained and polite behaviour. The charges made against India are so fantastic that I find it difficult to deal with them. There is the charge of our keeping the Dalai Lama under duress. The Chinese authorities should surely know how we function in this country and what our laws and Constitution are. Even if we were so inclined, we could not keep the Dalai Lama under some kind of detention against his will, and there can be no question of our wishing to do so. We can gain nothing by it except the burden of difficult problems. In any event, this matter can be easily cleared. It is open to the Dalai Lama at any time to go back to Tibet or wherever he wants to. As the Panchen Lama has made himself responsible specially for some strange statements, I have stated that we would welcome him to come to India and meet the Dalai Lama himself. Should he choose to do so, every courtesy will be extended to him. I have further said that the Chinese Ambassador or any other emissary of the Chinese Government can come to India for this purpose and meet the Dalai Lama. There is no barrier for anyone to come peacefully to India, and whether we agree with him or not, we shall treat him with courtesy due to a guest.

Another and an even stranger allegation has been made about "Indian expansionists", who, it is alleged, are inheritors of the British tradition of imperialism and expansion. It is perfectly true that British policy was one of expansion into Tibet and that they carried this out by force of arms early in this century. That was, in our opinion, an unjustified and cruel adventure which brought much harm to the Tibetans. As a result of that, the then British Government in India established certain extra territorial rights in Tibet. When India became independent, we inherited some of these rights. Being entirely opposed to any such extra territorial rights in another country, we did not wish to retain them. But in the early days after Independence and partition, our hands were full, as this House well knows, and we had to face very difficult situations in our own country. We ignored, if I may say so, Tibet. Not being able to find a suitable person to act as our representative at Lhasa, we allowed for some time the existing British

representative to continue at Lhasa. Later an Indian took his place. Soon after the Chinese armies entered Tibet, the question of these extra territorial rights was raised and we readily agreed to give them up. We would have given them up anyhow, whatever developments might have taken place in Tibet. We withdrew our army detachments from some places in Tibet and handed over Indian postal and telegraph installations and rest houses. We laid down the Five Principles of the Panchsheel and placed our relationship with the Tibet region on a new footing. What we were anxious about was to preserve the traditional connections between India and Tibet in regard to pilgrim traffic and trade. Our action in this matter and whatever we have done subsequently in regard to Tibet is proof enough of our policy and that India had no political or ulterior ambitions in Tibet. Indeed, even from the narrowest practical point of view, any other policy would have been wrong and futile. Ever since then we have endeavoured not only to act up to the agreement we made, but to cultivate the friendship of the Chinese State and people.

It is therefore a matter of the deepest regret and surprise to us that charges should be made which are both unbecoming and entirely void of substance. We have conveyed this deep feeling of regret to the Chinese Government, more especially at the speeches delivered recently in the current session of the National People's Congress in Peking.

I stated some time ago that our broad policy was governed by three factors; (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. That policy we shall continue to follow, because we think that a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future. It would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia, India and China, which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past, should develop feelings of hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy, but we hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the wider point of view of the peace of Asia and the world.

The Five Principles have laid down, inter alia, mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of cold war used.

I have already made it clear previously that the charge that Kalimpong was a centre of the Tibetan rebellion, is wholly unjustified. We have a large number of people of Tibetan stock living in India as Indian nationals. We have also some Tibetan emigres in India. All of these deeply respect the Dalai Lama. Some of these have been exceedingly unhappy at developments in Tibet; some no doubt have anti-Chinese sentiments. We have made it clear to them that they will not be permitted to carry on any subversive activities from India and I should like to say that by and large they have acted in accordance with the directions of the Government of India. I cannot obviously say that someone has not done something secretly, but to imagine or say that a small group of persons sitting in Kalimpong organised a major upheaval in Tibet seems to me to make a large draft on imagination and to slur over obvious facts.

The Khampa revolt started in an area of China proper adjoining Tibet, more than three years ago. Is Kalimpong supposed to be responsible for that? This revolt gradually spread and no doubt created a powerful impression on the minds of large numbers of Tibetans, who had kept away from the revolt. Fears and apprehensions about their future gripped their minds and the nationalist upsurge swayed their feelings. Their fears may have been unjustified, but surely they cannot be denied. Such feelings can only be dealt with adequately by gentler methods than warfare.

When Premier Chou En-lai came here two or three years ago, he was good enough to discuss Tibet with me at considerable length. We had a frank and full talk. He told me that while Tibet had long been a part of the Chinese State, they did not consider Tibet as a province of China. The people were different from the people of China proper, just as in other autonomous regions of Chinese State the people were different, even though they formed part of that State. Therefore, they considered Tibet an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy. He told me further that it

was absurd for anyone to imagine that China was going to force Communism on Tibet. Communism could not be enforced in this way on a very backward country and they had no wish to do so even though they would like reforms to come in progressively. Even these reforms they proposed to postpone for a considerable time.

About that time, the Dalai Lama was also here and I had long talks with him then. I told him of Premier Chou En-lai's friendly approach and of his assurance that he would respect the autonomy of Tibet. I suggested to him that he should accept these assurances in good faith and cooperate in maintaining that autonomy and bringing about certain reforms in Tibet. The Dalai Lama agreed that his country, though, according to him, advanced spiritually, was very backward socially and economically and reforms were needed.

It is not for us to say how far these friendly intentions and approaches materialized. The circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. On the one side there was a dynamic, rapidly moving society; on the other, a static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reforms. The distance between the two was great and there appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile changes in some forms inevitably came to Tibet. Communications developed rapidly and the long isolation of Tibet was partly broken through. Though physical barriers were progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased. Apparently, the attempt to cross these mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed.

To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation: Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only upper class people but others also. No doubt, vested interests joined it and sought to profit by it. The attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans, is seldom helpful.

When the news of these unhappy developments came to India, there was immediately a strong and widespread reaction. The Government did not bring about this reaction. Nor was this reaction essentially political. It was largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons. Also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people derived from long- established religious and cultural contacts. It was an instinctive reaction. It is true that some people in India sought to profit by it by turning it in an undesirable direction. But the fact of that reaction of the Indian people was there. If that was the reaction here, one may well imagine the reaction among the Tibetans themselves. Probably this reaction is shared in the other Buddhist countries of Asia. When there are such strong feelings, which are essentially not political, they cannot be dealt with by political methods alone, much less by military methods. We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their helpless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all, we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease.

As I have said above, I had a long talk with the Dalai Lama three days ago at Mussoorie. He told me of the difficulties he had to face, of the growing resentment of his people at the conditions existing there and how he sought to restrain them, of his feelings that the religion of the Buddha, which was more to him than life itself, was being endangered. He said that up to the last moment he did not wish to leave Lhasa. It was only on the afternoon of the 17th March when, according to him, some shells were fired at his palace and fell in a pond nearby, that the sudden decision was taken to leave Lhasa. Within a few hours the same day he and his party left Lhasa and took the perilous journey to the Indian frontier. The departure was so hurried that even an adequate supply of clothes etc. could not be brought.

When I met the Dalai Lama, no member of his entourage was present. Even the interpreter was our own. The Dalai Lama told me that the two statements which had been issued were entirely his own and there was no question of anybody coercing him to make them. Even though he is young, I could not easily imagine that he could be coerced into doing something he did not wish. All my sympathy goes out to this young man who at an early age has had to shoulder heavy burdens and to face tremendous responsibilities. During the last few weeks he has suffered great physical and mental strain. I advised him to rest for a while and not to take any hurried decisions. He felt very unhappy at conditions in Tibet and was especially anxious that fighting should stop.