

793B.00/1-1050: Telegram

request and while his reply was not catego

infringes on Tibetan autonomy. Menon emphasized any military ventures in Tibet were ruled out⁴. Sent Department 44, pouched Karachi. Department pass London.

Henderson

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793B.02/1-1250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to

aid not specified, Dept considers it unlikely US wld be prepared this time extend
aid Tibet, particularly in view attitude

depressing effect. He agreed it would be preferable for Tibetans not to be completely discouraged in their efforts to fortify their position against possible Chinese Communist invasion but said he could make no helpful suggestions as to

6. In circumstances we suggest Department authorize us call in immediately informal representative in Delhi of Tibetan Government and asked him inform Tibetan Government US not at present in position lend effective aid to Tibet that in opinion US Government arrival in US just now of Tibetan mission might be

89. Reference Deptel 25, January 11.⁸ During my discussion with Foreign Secretary Menon January 14 re Tibetan proposal send mission US (Embtel 88, January 20), I told him we had under consideration for some months advisability sending party to Lhasa and asked for GOI views. I said

3. British have no definite information as

Sent Departmental 301, Department Pass London

possibility of further such allegations which proposed visit (?) would inevitably cause. Tibetan Government therefore ask that proposal to send US officials to Tibet may please be dropped."

2. Menon stated that Richardson, Indi

5. I plan requesting Ministry External Affairs in its discretion ask Richardson get in immediate touch with survivors, render them all possible assistance and report to

3. After usual exchange of greetings and small talk we asked re their plans. They said they wished go Hong Kong to discuss future relationship Tibet with representatives Peiping Government who were to meet them there. Unfortunately although their travel documents were in order they were not permitted to leave because according to UK High Commissioner, UK could not afford recognize Tibetan passport. (Comment: Apparently GOI prevented departure at UK request). They had talked with UK High Commissioner June 7 and had asked him if UK High Commissioner denied that such was significance of

negotiations failed they expected invasion and without foreign help saw little

12. At conclusion conversation they said they were particularly concerned at delay of negotiations because of telegram received from Lhasa to effect that Chinese Communists have made incursions Tibet's eastern borders and captured several villages in one of which was mobile radio unit (Embtel 808, June 5).

HENDERSON

was using Korea merely as pretext to strengthen armed forces in Far East which would eventually be used to assist Nationalist China against Communists.

c. In Pannikar's opinion GOI should redouble efforts get Communist China into SC so that Russia also could return. Unless SC could begin functioning with Russia and Communist China participating, world might well be drifting to third great war. One hopeful aspect that Peiping showed tendency differentiate between

could no longer be said SC had degenerated into organization composed of group of nations revolving around US and other western powers.

5. Matter of providing radio transmitter, et cetera as well as other points in Department's telegram will be discussed with Tibetans if Department approves Embassy's above suggestions and instructs us accordingly.

6. Shakapba mission understood be Calcutta; we are endeavoring ascertain definite whereabouts and travel plans.

Henderson

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793B.00/7-2250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1950-12 Noon

104. Deptel 48 July 11 and urtel 96 July 15

1. Our response PriMin's appeal re Commie China²⁴ probably additional reason position give assurances Tibetans re US aid. Details will be forwarded separate msg. View current state US- Indian relations, Dept believes action designed

opening with request for more Indian

to Shakabpa. Tibetan representative morning August 4 Calcutta with Consul

that it would be difficult for GOI to refuse Tibet authorities both additional aid and cooperation in securing foreign aid in event GOI could not spare material.

5. Steere then outlined procedure laid down by Department, stressing and repeating to assure no misunderstanding, namely, that Tibet should first ask GOI for additional aid and if refused then ask GOI friendly cooperation by permitting passage of aid it wanted to secure ab

9. Re Communist China: Shakabpa said Tibet National Assembly had decided Tibet in no circumstances would agree Chinese suzerainty-Said Tibet tactics all along had been to play for time. That was why they had wanted to go Hong Kong. He intimated they had rather welcomed British refusal visas. They were now awaiting for Chinese Communist Ambassado

306. Acting United Kingdom High Commissi

examination of all of Panikkar's report

told Bajpai that I thought it would be well for GOI to have this information for

2- Bajpai said he was grateful that I had given him this information; that he felt it might be preferable for GOI take no action until, or unless, it was approached by GOI [*Tibetan Government?*]

Department pass London; sent Departme

609. 1. Shakabpa, Tsechag Khenehung, and J. Taringqop Niloqti developments re military aid and their negotiations with Chinese Communists.

2. Shakabpa stated that Tibetan Government has taken firm decision to meet any communist Chinese incursion with force. He said that his government wished him to express its deep appreciation of US offer of military assistance. As had been suggested, the Tibetan Government would approach the GOI to solicit its cooperation. A separate mission comprising Surkhang Depon and Khemchung Lobsang Tsewang had been dispatched from Lhasa and would arrive in New Delhi in a few days. To allay suspicion this mission had been designated as trade mission but its real purpose was to bring

4-Shakabpa confirmed that Tibetan Government had received information

7- In response to our questions concer

semi-governmental organizations. Such a survey should reflect the view of the respective United States Service Attaches in Taipei.

5. All shipments under the \$125 million grant were consigned to Taiwan after December 1949, at the request of the Chinese Government. Prior to that time

Ammunition, Cal. 45	9,000,000 rounds
Small Arms Ammunition (from Spain)	1,000 tons
Rockets, RE, 2.36	70,000 rounds
Shells, 37 mm.	70,000 rounds
Shells, Mortar	75,000 rounds
Bombs, various categories	17,600 each
Shells, 20 mm. and 40 mm.	44,000 rounds
AT—6 Aircraft	20 each

Indications are that little of this material was reshipped from the Island. The Chinese Government also acquired considerable stocks of arms from the Japanese

396. Totib. Reurtel 525 Sept 1³². Tibetans have already been informed our willingness assist procurement and financing milit materiel. Dept still considers steps indicated Deptel 104 July 22 consti

4. Without direct Soviet participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forces, the Chinese Nation

were arriving Delhi that afternoon and desired advice from Embassy re military aid to Tibet. Consulate advised them

Fate of Tibet is of more direct interest to India than any other country. Moreover, asons people Tibet look India for help and support in maintaining traditional autonomy. Such help can, of course, only be

endeavoring use Peiping offensive in Tibet in order create rift between Communist China and India. If rift should come, he pointed out, it should clearly come through force of events and not with help of outside powers.

(a). We were not suggesting any course of

would turn friendly disarming face on India. Express its regret at being compelled take action disagreeable to India; reiter

1072. 1. During my talk with Nehru on evening November 2 (Embtel

regard would be suspect. Furthermore among charges made by Peking was that Chinese Nationalists had been active in Tibet. Presentation of matter by Formosa would give , 67n ammunition to Peking.

4- I obtained impression that although Nehru was not planning to launch crusade

1. You should support El Salvadoran request as item of important and urgent character under Rule 15. We have always taken the position that when a complaint of aggression is made to the

USSR undoubtedly wld be in opposition. A widening breach in India –Commie China and India-USSR relations, probably resulting from active Indian opposition to Chi actions in this case, might induce India to be less neutral and more realistic about Communism in general. Hence India might be more willing to support US on Major issues against USSR and its satellites.

(C) FYI US support of Indian lead wld aid in developing better US-India relations.

5. A position paper will be prepared and forwarded shortly⁴⁵.

HENDERSON

SECRET

New Delhi, November 30, 1950-3.p.m

1350. Occasion taken to show Bajpai

2. Bajpai replied no communication similar character received by GOI from Tibet although there had been informal conversations between GOI officials Kalimpong and Tibet. GOI attitude reference Tibetan case unchanged. If GOI should press Tibetan case just now in UN Communist China would be alienated to such extent problems. Therefore Tibetan case would remain GOI concerned.

3. Bajpai stated great confidence Dalai Lama left Lhasa for India overland about nine days ago and should arrive Gyantse in few days. GOI endeavoring enshroud departure great secrecy lest he be st

SECRET PROIRITY

New Delhi, December 30, 1950-noon

The attention of the British Embassy is in

not at the time desire to formulate a definitive legal position to be taken by the United States Government relative to Tibet. It would appear adequate for present purpose to state that the United States Government recognizes the de facto autonomy that Tibet has exercised since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, and particularly since the Simla Conference. It is believed that, should the Tibetan case be introduced into the United Nations, there would be an ample basis for international concern regarding Chinese Communist intentions toward Tibet, to

