historical / November 28, 2016

Some documents on the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict

Several rare historical documents on the Sino-Indian tragic conflict of 1962 which traumatized India

  • The Chinese Threat
    Published by the Publication Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting  in 1963
  • A Soldier’s Voyage of Self-discovery
    The military and spiritual journey of Major General K.K. Tewari (Retd.) PVSM, AVSM
    Many friends and relatives have urged me to write about my life’s experiences with particular reference to three topics—namely, experiences as a prisoner of war with the Chinese; experiences in different wars starting with World War II in Burma and Malaya; and the Bangladesh War of 1971 which made me turn to Sri Aurobindo and the Mother and later decide to leave all my moorings in the North and after retirement from the Army settle down in Auroville in South India.
  • The Henderson-Brooks Bhagat Report
    Parts of the Henderson-Brooks/Bhagat Report about the 1962 Sino-Indian War have been posted by Neville Maxwell, the author of India’s China War on his website.
    Some sections on the battle of Walong as well as annexures and maps are still missing-in-action.
  • President Rajendra Prasad’s address to Parliament – 8 February 1960
    The incursions into parts of the territory of the Union of India, across our traditional and well understood borders, by elements of Chinese forces have, …deeply distressed our people and evoked legitimate and widespread resentment. They impose a great strain on our resources and our nationbuilding endeavours. We regret and deplore these developments on our border. They’ have resulted from the disregard by China of the application of the principles, which it had been mutually agreed to between us, should govern our relations. My Government have taken prompt and calculated measures, both defensive and diplomatic, to meet the threat to our sovereignty.
  • People’s Daily editorial on Khrushchev’s visit to India – 6 March 1960
    The foreign policy of peace of the socialist countries finds particularly clear expression in their economic and cultural relations with those countries which have won national independence. Comrade Khrushchev’s visit to the four nations provides an example of true international co. operation. The economic and cultural agreements signed by the Soviet Union with India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan make it clear that the economic and cultural co-operation of the socialist countries with these nations is entirely
    motivated by the desire to help them develop their national economies and raise their people’s living standards. This contrasts sharply with the “aid” from imperialism which is used as a smokescreen for aggression.
  • Foreword by GB Pant to India-China Border Problem – March 1960
    Foreword by Indian Minister G.B. Pant to Congress Party publication entitled India-China Border Problem, 4 March 1960 (Extract)
    The boundary between India and China along its entire length has been well known for centuries and is defined by treaty or international agreements or recognised by custom and tradition. It follows unchanging natural features and is in the main marked out by the Himalayas which are inseparably bound up with our frontiers as, since the dawn of our history, they are interwoven with the fabric of Indian civilisation. The historic northern frontiers of India are so well established that there could be no doubt, except to a mind pre-possessed otherwise, as to where the customary boundary lay. No Chinese Government called it in question in the past.
  • Zhou Enlai’s speech at the NPC- April 10, 1960
    Premier Chou En-lai’s speech at the second session of the Second National People’s Congress, 10 April 1960 (Extract)
    We likewise place ardent hopes in friendly relations between China and India. We are happy to see that the Indian Government has agreed to the Chinese Government’s proposal for a meeting between the Premiers of China
    and India.
  • Morarji Desai’s discussions with Chou En-lai – April 1960
    Finance Minister Morarji Desai’s discussions with Chou En-lai, April 1960 (Extract)
    When nobody supported China, India took your side and put up your case in the United Nations and forged friendship with you. You accepted the principles of Panchasheela. India accepted your sovereignty over Tibet, but you had accepted the condition that Tibet’s autonomy would be respected and that you would not interfere with it.
  • Nehru’s statement in Lok Sabha – 26 April, 1960
    Our whole argument was based on the Chinese forces having come into our territory. Their [Chinese] argument was that they had always been there not those particular forces, but the Chinese authorities either of Sinkiang in the north or of Tibet had been in constructive or actual possession of these areas for two hundred years. That was such a variance in the factual state that there was no meeting ground. We repeat, again after all these talks that their forces came into this area within quite recent times, in the course of the last year and a half or so. That is our case, to which we hold… In the prolonged talks that took place, this basic disagreement about historical and actual facts came up again and again.
  • People’s Daily editorial on Chou En-lai’s six points – April 27, 1960
    Of the six points, the first and the second are objective facts which nobody can deny. If the two sides recognize these facts and reach identical views, a favourable prerequisite will be provided for a reasonable solution of the boundary question. Points three and four are principles for the handling of the boundary question. Obviously they are completely reasonable and some of the geographical principles contained in them have also been repeatedly
    stressed by the Indian side on certain occasions. Therefore, there should not be difficulties, too, in reaching identical views on these principles. Points five and six relate to the necessary measures to be taken by the two sides pending a settlement of the boundary question. They are both reasonable and justifiable. In the past, the Indian side .also maintained that individual adjustments may be made on the boundary and that patrolling along the eastern sector should be discontinued.
  • Nehru’s statement in Rajya Sabha – 29 April, 1960
    So far as the original Akasai Chin road was concerned, it was an old caravan route, hundreds and hundreds of years old. This has always been used as a caravan route by people going from Sinkiang to Tibet. This and the near-by route were used by the Chinese forces, probably in 1951 or may be 1952, that is to say, soon after the Chinese Government came to Tibet.
  • Ministry of External Affairs – White Paper 6
    Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
    November 1961 – July 1962, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  • White Paper on China Volume 8
    Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
    WHITE PAPER VIII (extracts)
    October 1962 – January 1963
  • Conversation between Zhou Enlai and J. Zedebal – December 26, 1962
    On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic, Comrade J. Zedenbal. During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a conversation took place between the two, which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.
  • Benediktov in conversation with J.N. Nehru – December 12, 1962
    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General-Secretary of India, R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan – November 4, 1962
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Benediktov in conversation with R.K. Nehru – November 2, 1962
    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General-Secretary of India, R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Benediktov in conversation with E.M. Nambudiripad – October 26, 1962
    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPS – October 20, 1962
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Benediktov in conversation with the Chinese charge d’affairs in India – October 10, 1962
    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with the charge d’affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, Comrage E Cheng-Cheng regarding Sino-indian border disputes.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Benediktov in conversation with Bhupesh Gupta – January 27, 1962
    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Benediktov in conversation with Bhupesh Gupta – January 17, 1962
    Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta.
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • Nehru’s SOS to Kennedy – Two Articles by Inder Malhotra
    Forty-eight years have elapsed since the Black November of 1962, when took place the brief but brutal border war with China in the high Himalayas.
    As is clear, in retrospect, it was a relatively limited clash of arms — that unfortunately turned into a traumatic military debacle and political disaster for us. So, why recall those days and scratch the wounds that have nearly healed?
  • Zhang Wenji-Parthasarathy talks – 1961
    Three conversations between Zhang Wenji, director of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department Number One, and Indian ambassador Parthasarathy. Addressed are the future of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Indian border issues, and India’s focus on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan.
  • Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, South Asia
    The volume focuses upon the Kennedy administration’s efforts to reorient U.S. policy with respect to South Asia by improving relations with India while maintaining the established alliance relationship with Pakistan. It includes documentation on the impact of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the Indian invasion of Portuguese Goa, and the impact of the Pushtunistan dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It documents U.S. efforts to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan and India, as well as the attempt to take advantage of the border war between India and China that developed in 1962 in order to forge a closer relationship between the United States and India.
  • The Cuban Crisis – Some Documents
    Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
  • The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis – by M.Y. Prozumenschikov
    The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership’s deviation “from the generally fraternal countries and parties” and described Beijing’s authorities as seeking “to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice.”
  • Memorandum of Conversation of Khrushchev with Mao Zedong – 2 October 1959
    We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. We consider this issue as follows: five kilometers more land we have or five kilometers less—this is not important. I take Lenin’s example, and he gave to Turkey Kars, Ardahan and Ararat. And until today area a part of the population in the Caucasus are displeased by these measures by Lenin. But I believe that his actions were correct. I am telling about all this to show you that for us this territorial issue was not insurmountable. You have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position.




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